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t h i s  B oo k  h a s  B e e n  long in coming—over fifteen years in the making. Although my passionate interest in Christine Brooke-Rose’s 
work never flagged over that time, the period coincided with my assum-
ing greater administrative responsibilities: chairing the English Depart-
ment at the University of Utah; serving as Dean of Humanities at the 
University of California, Irvine; and moving in 2007 to Sarah Lawrence 
College to become president of the College. My various computers 
charted my slow pace and the shrinking calendar for my own research: 
chapter 1 was dated August 1993, chapter 2, August 1994, chapter 3, 
August 1995 and so on, with some lean years when, although my read-
ing and study continued (I needed to keep up with Brooke-Rose’s own 
productivity), the writing lagged behind. Finally, upon assuming my 
exciting new duties at Sara Lawrence, I realized it was now or never.
 I first discovered Christine Brooke-Rose’s work when my colleague 
at the University of Utah, Robert Caserio, introduced me to the novel 
Between, as I was writing my book on women and travel, Penelope	Voy-
ages:	Women	and	Travel	in	the	British	Literary	Tradition. I fell in love with 
vii
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that work and decided that my final chapter would focus on Brooke-
Rose’s novel. Robert Caserio has continued to be an invaluable interloc-
utor for discussion of the significance of Brooke-Rose’s work. I have also 
greatly profited from conversations with Barry Weller, another former 
colleague at the University of Utah.
 It is appropriate that this book be published in the Theory and Inter-
pretation of Narrative Series at The Ohio State University Press, the 
home also of the International Society for the Study of Narrative, as 
I first met Brooke-Rose when she delivered a plenary address at the 
Society’s annual narrative conference, which was held in Park City, 
Utah in 1995. Thus began a friendship that included three trips to visit 
Christine in her home near Avignon, where, in the summer of 2004, we 
conducted the discussion recounted at the end of this book. My knowl-
edge of Christine Brooke-Rose deepened as well by virtue of trips to the 
Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas 
at Austin, home now to her papers. Tom Staley, friend, fellow Joycean, 
and director of the Ransom, first informed me of the library’s acquisi-
tion of her papers; the librarians at the Ransom expertly guided me to 
the papers and manuscripts I needed, even early on before some of the 
work had been fully catalogued.
 Both the University of Utah and the University of California, Irvine 
supported my research, for which I am extremely grateful. Doctoral stu-
dents at both universities eagerly responded to Brooke-Rose’s work in 
seminar, helping to mine the richness of her texts. Paul Lin, my research 
assistant at UCI, graciously put up with the fits and starts of my research 
schedule and continued to help me after I moved to New York, where 
I appreciated UCI’s continued support of the final stages of the project. 
I had the pleasure of guest teaching Out and Between	 to the wonder-
fully curious and creative undergraduates at Sarah Lawrence in Stefanie 
Sobelle’s course on postmodernism.
 My deepest gratitude goes to my husband, Peter. Despite his own 
incredibly busy and productive life as an academic vascular surgeon, he 
has taken pleasure in my career as an author. From the time Christine 
discussed the physiology of phantom limbs with him (many years after 
she wrote “The Foot”), to our last visit with her at her home, he never 
ceased to champion this project. Finally, my son, Jeff, a doctoral student 
in comparative literature, read and discussed parts of the manuscript 
with me. His astute comments give me confidence that generations of 
readers will continue to appreciate the techniques for living in the work 
of Christine Brooke-Rose.
 I gratefully acknowledge permission from the publishers to reprint, 
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in revised form, portions of the following previously published mate-
rial:
“Postmodern Vessels of Conception: Brooke-Rose and Brophy,” in Penel-
ope	Voyages:	Women	and	Travel	in	the	British	Literary	Tradition	(Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 207–36.
“Saving the Text: Cultural Crisis in Textermination and Materpiece	 The-
atre,”	Narrative	5 (January 1997): 108–16.
“‘Who Could Have Read the Signs?’” Politics and Prediction in Gertrude 
Stein’s Mrs.	Reynolds	and Christine Brooke-Rose’s Amalgamemnon,” 
Western	Humanities	Review	(Fall 1995): 18–38.
“Dialogizing Theory in Brooke-Rose’s Thru,” Western	Humanities	Review	
(Winter/Spring 1997): 352–58.
 This book is dedicated to Christine.

in  i n t e r v i eW s  a n d  e s s ay s  on her status as a writer, Christine Brooke-Rose describes herself as having “little or no existence.” In 
Stories,	 Theories	 and	 Things, where she considers her dual career as 
experimental writer and literary theorist, she says ruefully: “outside 
the canon no interpretation, rather as one (now abandoned) dogma had 
it: outside the Church no Salvation. Fish [Stanley] would add: therefore 
no existence” (Brooke-Rose, Stories,	 Theories	 and	 Things 4). She notes 
that although her work has been reviewed, she lacks existence at the 
“critical level”:
I am one of the many authors who have a brief existence at what Hirsch 
(1967), as opposed to Fish, calls the interpretation level (the ‘meaning’ 
or simple reading of the text as syntax, for instance by reviewers), but 
who have little or no existence at what Hirsch calls the critical level 
(the ‘significance’ or what others call interpretation, that links the text 
to other things/realms of thought: the world, that is, other stories, 
other texts). This can only begin to happen, for better or for worse, 
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when an author enters a canon, however shifting, and I have a knack 
of somehow escaping most would-be canonic networks and labels: I 
have been called ‘nouveau	roman	in English’ and nouveau	nouveau, I have 
been called Postmodern, I have been called Experimental, I have been 
included in the SF Encyclopaedia, I automatically come under Women 
Writers (British, Contemporary), I sometimes interest the Feminists, 
but I am fairly regularly omitted from the ‘canonic’ surveys (chapters, 
articles, books) that come under those or indeed other labels. On the 
whole I regard this as a good sign. (Brooke-Rose, Stories,	Theories	 and	
Things 4)
 “On the whole,” she considers this neglect “a good sign,” but there 
is the distinct note of complaint in this description. The predicament of 
the “I” here is worth noting, for this predicament of invisibility or omis-
sion is ubiquitous in both Brooke-Rose’s fictions and her critical writ-
ings. The author, Christine Brooke-Rose, is a specter, a being of “little 
existence.” Like the shades that inhabit the underworld in The	Odyssey, 
like the ghost of King Hamlet intoning “remember me,” the author’s 
existence depends upon the ear of the other. Only within the “Church” 
of the canon is a literary afterlife (Salvation) possible. Beyond the hint of 
petulance is a serious point about the ontology of authorship: the “I” of 
the author is simultaneously established in writing (on the page) and yet 
always aware of the persistent threat of its “textermination” at the hands 
(or deaf ears) of others. The proper name, “Christine Brooke-Rose,” is 
a signifier for the life of the author; the author’s existence is a function 
of intertextuality, which is another word for a living on by virtue of a 
haunting of other texts.
 Now past eighty and living a relatively reclusive life in the south of 
France after her retirement from her teaching post at the University of 
Paris, Vincennes, Brooke-Rose desires to haunt the theories and fictions 
of critics and novelists with an interest in narrative experiment. She 
desires to be read. Although she has courted difficulty, like the mod-
ernists before her, and refused to pander to more popular tastes, she is 
reaching the end of her life with the desire she fictionalized in her novel 
Textermination: a desire to be given existence through her words. Her 
most recent books are overtly valedictory, Invisible	Author:	 Last	 Essays 
(2002), a collection of essays in which she returns to the themes of Sto-
ries,	Theories	and	Things to further ponder the ontologies of authorship, 
and Life,	 End	 Of, a memoir (2006). Like Italo Suevo’s chapter in The	
Confessions	of	Zeno, “The Last Cigarette,” these “last essays” are both a 
rehearsal of and protest against the death of the author.
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 In Stories,	Theories	and Things (published in 1991) and Invisible	Author:	
Last	Essays, Brooke-Rose conducts a kind of self-interview in which she 
makes a claim on the ear of the other by offering notes on her “inten-
tions.” The word is, of course, anachronistic in a poststructuralist, post-
modernist context, the context in which we must discuss Brooke-Rose. 
Indeed, she has consistently derided the biographical approach to fic-
tion in which the life is meant to explain the work. Yet in the genre of 
self-examination in her essays, Brooke-Rose reconnects the umbilicus 
between the author’s being and her words, as if to add weight to her 
unbearable lightness. In commenting on her dual roles as critic and 
writer, she describes a “double paradox, that despite the long taboo on 
author intention . . . writers are constantly invited to talk about their 
work (first paradox), though the taboo survives in that they are not sup-
posed to write about it (second paradox)” (Brooke-Rose, Stories,	Theories	
and	Things 5). Ironically, the “taboo” that Brooke-Rose notes is a form 
of logocentrism, a privileging of the author’s speech in articulating her 
“intention.” Indeed, the fate of Brooke-Rose’s writings in being both 
ignored and misunderstood enacts an extreme case of the predicament 
of all texts, according to poststructuralist theory, a predicament that 
Derrida has explored, that is, as the fragility and tenacity of the connec-
tion between language and being (Cinders). This is a predicament that 
Brooke-Rose investigates in her fiction and criticism. She fictionalizes 
the orphaning of the text from the author, what Derrida describes in 
“Signature Event Context” and elsewhere as “writing . . . cut off from 
all absolute responsibility, from consciousness	 as the ultimate author-
ity, orphaned and separated at birth from the assistance of its father” 
(Derrida, “Signature Event Context” 181). With nuance and, sometimes, 
pathos, Brooke-Rose’s fiction theorizes this central poststructuralist per-
ception of the “death of the author” and the spectrality of all language 
cut off from its source in being.1
 Deconstructing the metaphysics of presence occurs on the level of 
character as well as author. The “unbearable lightness of being” afflicts 
the characters in Brooke-Rose’s fiction as it afflicts Brooke-Rose, the 
author. It is most clearly narrativized in her metanovel Textermination, in 
which literary characters assemble at a convention to hold a “Prayer for 
Being” to the Implied Reader, hoping, the narrator tells us, to “recover, 
after an unimaginable journey, to savour what remains of international 
ritual for the revival of the fittest” (Textermination 8). The characters 
are “ghosts” (Textermination 19), languishing from “lack of involved 
attention” (Textermination 2) in an age of popular culture. In this comic, 
apocalyptic novel, we are reminded of fiction’s link with death. Texter-
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mination brings literature to the brink of extinction, thematizing, and, 
ironically, bringing to life the various “deaths” that have become such 
critical commonplaces—of the author, of character, of the novel. And, 
although the postmodern condition has forced us to confront this situa-
tion, exacerbated as it is by the technological developments that produce 
competing claims on the attentions of would-be readers, Brooke-Rose’s 
novel makes us understand that all fiction in some sense theorizes its 
own potential demise. Not only postmodern fiction, but realist fiction as 
well constructs phantoms of the imagination who demand the reader’s 
faith. In a meeting between Milan Kundera’s Tomas and Austen’s Emma 
Woodhouse, Brooke-Rose even stages an acknowledgment that reality 
and unreality are wed in both	realism and antirealism, nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century fiction. Emma thinks: “Being seems to trouble him 
for some reason, and he calls it unbearably light. And to her astonish-
ment she finds herself agreeing. She has never thought of it in that way, 
and it somehow relieves her of the oppressive feeling she has had ever 
since she arrived, that her certitudes are uncertain, that she no longer 
quite exists in them, no longer quite coincides with herself” (Textermi-
nation 109). Specters and speculation go together in the textual world 
Brooke-Rose has created as she tests and tries out the endurances and 
vulnerabilities of fiction and its elements. In the thought experiments of 
Brooke-Rose’s fiction, criticism, character, and theory converge as points 
of speculation.2
 In Brooke-Rose’s oeuvre narrative and theory are chiasmic; she 
demonstrates how theories tell stories and stories tell theory. Theories 
themselves are metastories told about language and fiction in particular; 
conversely, fictions are theories that take narrative form; they embody 
abstractions as they create a fictional ‘world.’ In	 Stories,	 Theories	 and	
Things and Invisible	Author, Brooke-Rose attempts to add weight to the 
unbearable lightness of fiction’s being and to the kind of speculation we 
call narrative theory.
 This chiasmus of theory and fiction might seem to confine us within 
a closed circle of postmodern theory and practice that includes new 
techniques, but not the “techniques for living” promised in my title. For 
Brooke-Rose, however, new fictional techniques are needed to represent 
the cultural narratives of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, nar-
ratives that must capture heightened constraint and loss. In A	Rhetoric	
of	the	Unreal, she describes this cultural narrative:
Never before have the meaning-making means at our disposal (linguis-
tic, economic, political, scientific) appeared so inadequate, not only to 
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cope with the enormity of the problems we continue to create . . . but 
simply to explain the world. This seems to be the century which, despite 
or because of the pace of technological advance, has taken the longest, 
relative to that pace, to emerge from the mental habits of the previ-
ous century. We know that all the old secure values have gone, that 
a radical change is occurring which man must undergo or perish, yet 
we somehow go on as	if, ensconced still in relics of nineteenth-century 
ideologies, in a way which other times in parallel situations apparently 
did not. (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 6)
 Brooke-Rose associates the last fifty years with a painful loss of our 
ability to differentiate reality from what she calls “the unreal.” Her nov-
els mime the absence of certain reality, or of some crucial analog for what 
we used to take as indubitably real. Obsolescence and extinction—even 
the loss of the human archive—haunt her texts. As they rupture “the 
relics of nineteenth-century ideologies,” her fictional experiments are 
performed for the sake of finding new ways to theorize life and formu-
late conduct in a new world order. The revival meeting at the heart of 
Textermination, meant to staunch the extinction of its attendees, presages 
the grand narrative of evolution told in her last novel, Subscript, which 
begins 4500 million years ago with a chemical reaction and ends with 
humans on the earth about eleven thousand years ago. In Subscript, con-
straints on language, mirroring constraints on biological life, turn out to 
be glorious modes of engendering evolution and survival. Every one of 
Brooke-Rose’s fictions is a rehearsal for living under the constraints of 
a new world, one that is as much a matter of shrinking possibilities as 
it is of a renewed expansion. Yet, contrary to any melancholy implied 
by Brooke-Rose’s vision, her fiction draws creative vitality and moral 
inspiration out of the limitations it evokes.
 In this book I make three claims about Brooke-Rose’s fictions: (1) 
Despite their playful experiments with language, they are not insou-
ciant about the pain underlying the “corpus crysis” (Thru 736) and 
“direlogue[s]” (Amalgamemnon	 29) of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries; (2) They explore opportunities to convert pain, through dis-
cipline, into fictional power; and (3) They trust theory to emerge fic-
tionally. Her novels produce significant experiments in writing and 
theorizing the novel tradition that fictionally “diagnose” the unreality 
of twentieth-century life, the conditions that much contemporary theory 
seeks to analyze and demystify. Kenneth Burke said that literature pro-
vides “equipment for living.” Brooke-Rose’s texts and techniques offer 
us just such instruments.

t he  mo s t  F i t t i n g  P l a c e  to start an examination of “the unbear-able lightness” in Brooke-Rose’s writing is with her ghost stories. 
In Go	 When	 You	 See	 the	 Green	 Man	 Walking, a short story collection 
published in 1970, for example, narrative speculation begins with the 
specter. Many stories are told from the position of the already dead: a 
seraph who greets people at the “Point of No Return” (“George and the 
Seraph”) or a suicide who takes on bodily existence for one more time to 
demand that her unfaithful ex-lover give her away in marriage to death 
(“On Terms”). In the latter story, the “terms” of the title play off of the 
“on no terms” that mark the failed relationship between narrator and 
ex-lover. Jealousy feeds the narrator’s fantasy of assembling her bodily 
atoms one more time to require her ex-lover’s presence at her marriage 
to death (“But the being not on terms is the driving force which impels 
me to invent new terms, for of course we are on terms even if only those 
of agreeing to give me away” [“On Terms” 26]). Protesting her prema-
ture obsolescence in their relationship, she forces him to acknowledge 
his role in her suicide.
7
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 In these stories, the work of fantasy is equated with the physical 
energy needed to sustain an illusion, to prop up a ghost and make her 
function. The gothicism of these stories underlines the gothicism of all 
fiction. The ghosts perform the metacritical function of reminding us 
of fiction’s task of conjuring and the energy it takes—atom by atom—
to create the “semblance of a temporal body” (“On Terms” 18) out of 
words. The difficulty of sustaining this temporal body is emphasized 
in the truncated form of the short story itself. The fruitful play on the 
phrases “on terms,” “not on terms,” and “new terms” couples the terms 
of the love bond with the narrative bond between an “I” narrator and 
the reader. Out of the literally dead-ended relationship between lovers, 
the “new terms” of posthumous fiction combine the gothic with black 
comedy. The postmortem conducted thus leads to new techniques for 
fiction, with fantasy providing new inspiration, new life. It is no sur-
prise, then, that “On Terms” was first published in a collection called The	
Fourth	Ghost	Book. Go	When	You	See	the	Green	Man	Walking also included 
the republication of a rich and emblematic story called “The Foot,” that 
first appeared in The	Unlikely	Ghosts. In this story, the most fascinating 
in the collection, Brooke-Rose allegorizes the spectrality of narrative.
 As with “On Terms,” the brevity of the story encapsulates the pre-
cariousness of fiction’s conjuring act. Like the other ghost stories in the 
collection, this story is told from a posthumous position. Composed 
roughly at the same time as her novel Out	(1964) but published later, this 
important early story is narrated by a phantom limb. Specifically, the 
first-person narrator is the phantom limb of a beautiful woman whose 
leg has been amputated following an automobile accident. The narrative 
“I,” then, derives his existence from his ability to “haunt” his “victim” 
with sensations of pain from her already severed foot. The story begins: 
“The victim to be haunted is female. And beautiful. This makes a differ-
ence” (“The Foot” 43). The victim is also intelligent, which, according to 
the narrator, also makes a difference. The “highly intelligent undoubt-
edly suffer more than the plethoric unimaginative” (“The Foot” 46). In 
other words, their active imaginations goad them to feel the phantom 
pain through “imitation neurones” (“The Foot” 49), even though they 
realize that the limb is gone. Like Beckett characters or Scheherazade, 
narrators who must continue talking or risk extinction, this spectral 
voice speaks in order to affirm his ghostly existence and maintain his 
hold on the patient. The narrator is not the amputated limb but its 
image, a phantom subject to banishment if the patient, lying disconso-
late in a hospital bed, is “cured” by the suave doctor, Mr. Poole. Like the 
narrative “I” in the story “On Terms,” the jealous lover who is threat-
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ened with replacement in the beloved’s and the reader’s attention, the 
phantom limb guards its existence through narrative. He inflicts pain 
in order to reassert his connection to the place of the limb’s origin, the 
body of the female victim.1 Indeed, the patient’s pain consummates the 
phantom foot’s existence:
She cries much more than quietly now, she shouts, she sobs, she yells, 
she gasps. I find it very exciting. The imitation neurones I am composed 
of agitate their dendrites like mad ganglia that arborise the system as 
the cell bodies dance along the axis cylinder within the fibres of the 
foot that isn’t there, move backwards now, tugging away from the 
interlaced antennae as if trying to wrench themselves from some sub-
microscopic umbilical tie anchored into soft tissue, caught into bone, 
straining, straining to freedom birth and terror of time and space as 
the impulses race down the fibrils and create me, shape me and I ache 
strongly, I swell to huge existence that possesses her wholly and loves 
her loves her loves and hurts her unendurably until the cortical area 
can only respond by switching off the supply of blood along the nerves 
going out of the spinal cord so that she faints. (“The Foot” 49–50)
 The metaphors suggest that the narrator is both orphan, cut off from 
the body of the mother, and castrated phallus (“I do not mind how-
ever at present being thus wound round cut off castrated as a phan-
tom limb for I have temporarily spent my energy in possessing her so 
hugely hurtfully and I must rest recuperate my atoms . . . [“The Foot” 
51]). This phallic “I’ swells to its phantom existence in writing, yet he 
recognizes that his power is a sham, a magic puff subject to dissipation. 
We are made to see the enormous energy necessary to sustaining the 
narrative’s conjuring act (“the impulses race down the fibrils and create 
me, shape me), in this case identified as a phallic energy. Tumescence 
and detumescence are the underlying rhythms in the narrative—as the 
desire to be felt swells into existence and ebbs after satisfaction. This 
“lover’s discourse,” a heterosexual plot of longing and abjection, splits 
the subject, the “I” of narration, into self-confronting parts. The narra-
tor speaks from the point of view of the abjected part, severed from the 
bodily whole. One could say that his is a synecdochic desire, the desire 
of the part for the whole that animates the story itself.
 “The Foot” is doubly a narrative of abjection: a story of a phantom 
lover who longs to return to the body of the mother/lover and jealously 
guards his companionship through pain and a metacritical tale about 
writing cut off from presence. The story emblematizes the divorce of 
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narrative utterance from its “lived” context and writing from being. 
One thinks again of deconstruction’s seminal recognition that “writ-
ing [is] an iterative structure, cut off from all absolute responsibility, 
from consciousness	as the ultimate authority” (Derrida, “Signature Event 
Context” 181). In Brooke-Rose’s version of this “cut,” the prelapsarian 
body is a female body, its origin haunting a male narrator, as he, in turn, 
haunts it. The phantom limb, which derives its power by successfully 
mimicking a lost connection to the body, fears it will be exposed as a 
fraud. “The Foot” is a narrative of	 and	 as	 fetish, a substitute phallus 
whose potency is a sham. Like the Wizard of Oz, the narrative “I” fears 
discovery behind the magic curtain. The short story is a kind of foot 
fetish, enacting an erotics of longing and substitution.
 The potency of the narrator vies with the potency of science, repre-
sented by the English doctor healer, Mr. Poole. In the context of the plot, 
the jealousy of the speaker stems from his fear that his own mimetic 
powers will be no match for the potent treatment of the doctor. The doc-
tor is a disenchanter, the scientist who tries to convince the patient that 
her pain is only phantom. Yet this male rivalry between the narrator’s 
potency and the doctor’s scientific disenchantment is only a screen. For 
the narrator comes to acknowledge that the patient herself creates his 
existence. It is SHE who mourns the loss of her bodily image, in the 
process giving him his paradoxical phenomenality. “And now she thinks 
about me, giving me strength, existence, and creating my shape, her slim 
phantom foot, her unendurable phantom pain” (“The Foot” 47–48). He 
realizes that through her act of mourning, it is she who ontologizes his 
remains. Although the titles of the short story collections refer to ghosts, 
these posthumous hangers-on in Brooke-Rose’s fiction have a sensuous 
materiality to them, more specters than ghostly spirits. These specters 
figure memory as a palpable reminder and remainder of event and rela-
tionship.
 By the end of the story, it is the writing of the young woman that 
itself presents the greatest threat of extinction for the narrator, as the 
technology of writing becomes a prosthetic tool that will allow her to 
control her own pain. The story circles back on itself. When Mr. Poole 
asks his patient what she plans to do when she leaves the hospital, 
she replies that she has been thinking of writing. “Love stories?” (“The 
Foot” 59) he asks in his characteristically flirtatious and patronizing 
tone, and she says no. At this point the narrator, who has already told 
us that he is not “partial to words, they can be enemies too” (“The Foot” 
46), recognizes that the young woman wants to write about him so as 
to exorcise the phantom pain (“She is thinking of me to write about 
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in order to get me out of her system as they call it not sympathetic or 
parasympathetic autonomous but cerebrospinal out of her midbrain on 
to paper instead of aching there fifty-three and a half centimetres away 
from her stump” (“The Foot” 59). “I shall not let her get rid of me with 
words that recreate my shape my galvanising atoms of agony on mere 
paper to be read by careless unsuffering millions vicariously and thus 
dispersed” (“The Foot” 60). Her words “recreate” his shape, creating 
her own prosthesis in language. Disperse him is what she attempts to 
do, for as she writes, she encircles his narrative, the one that began “the 
victim to be haunted is female”: “and she opens meanwhile the small 
exercise book and in thin impersonal strokes she writes the words she 
hears like white sun swamping all other receptors in the brain so that 
the white page slowly engraves itself with the victim to be haunted is 
female. And beautiful. This makes a difference” (“The Foot” 61).
 The white page engraves itself with the beginning of the story, the 
“I” of the phantom foot now subsumed in the young woman’s act of 
authorship. The grammatical and narrative tables are turned: It is she 
who is the subject and he who is the object; his effect is already her cre-
ation, her cause. She objectifies her pain and mourns her narrative into 
existence: “à la recherche du pied perdu” (“The Foot” 61), the narrator 
jokes near the end of the story, but unlike Proust, Brooke-Rose restricts 
herself to the ephemeral present tense in representing the search of the 
lost object. Emily Dickinson wrote, “Power is only Pain—/Stranded, 
thro’ Discipline.”2 Through the discipline of her gothic writing, the 
young woman “strands” her pain and usurps the phantom authority 
of the phantom limb. Writing functions as her prosthesis, extending the 
life and limits of the body. Brooke-Rose generates narrative, rather than 
lyric, out of this self-stranding; the discipline of language counteracts 
loss.
 In her meditation on the nature of narrative and loss, On	Longing,	
Narratives	of	the	Miniature,	the	Gigantic,	the	Souvenir,	the	Collection, Susan 
Stewart helps to shed light on the erotics of narrative, its relation to the 
body and to fetish. Her description of narrative as a structure of desire 
is helpful in discussing Brooke-Rose’s fiction. In chapters on the souve-
nir and the collection, Stewart interprets the souvenir as “emblematic 
of the nostalgia that all narrative reveals—the longing for its place of 
origin” (Stewart xii). “It is this very desire of part for whole which both 
animates narrative and, in fact, creates the illusion of the real” (Stew-
art xii). But as Stewart makes clear, the longing for the whole body is 
marked by a play “between the present and an imagined, prelapsar-
ian experience” (139). In Brooke-Rose’s case, the beautiful women, the 
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“model,” functions as this platonic body image of wholeness. In “The 
Foot,” the narrative returns to this archetypal female image, the body 
of the mother/lover figured as source both of life and death, womb and 
tomb:
Eyes open can bring beauty alive with awareness of pain terror despair 
or anger, not to mention desire and liquid tenderness or even the allur-
ing invitation down the pathways to the womb the tomb the cavern the 
ebb and flow of time linked to the sun-devouring moon the monster 
chasm of death and timelessness that draws man like a magnet from 
the moment he is conscious of a fall a wrench of umbilical tissue rough 
manhandling tumbling lying in soft cloud sucking at heaven severed 
weight of body on stumbling legs and fall, fall through the days and 
minutes. Eyes open can bring archetypes alive . . . (“The Foot” 43–44)
 Stewart describes her title, “On Longing,” as itself “a kind of ache,” a 
perfect reference for capturing both the erotic longing and sense of loss 
that underwrite narrative. It aptly describes the combination of mourn-
ing and erotic desire that makes up the particular “lover’s discourse” of 
“The Foot.” As I will show, this metaleptic lover’s discourse is replayed 
in much of Brooke-Rose’s fiction, with its apotheosis in her most meta-
critical narrative, Thru: “‘You are the sentence I write I am the paragraph, 
generating each other cutting off each other’s word.’”3 Roland Barthes 
explored these erotics in terms of the relationship between writer and 
reader, the “I” and the “you” of the text, in A	Lover’s	Discourse and The	
Pleasure	of	the	Text.	Famously announcing the death of the author in The	
Pleasure	of	the	Text, Barthes acknowledges the ache that remains for the 
writer’s presence: “but in the text, in a certain way, I desire the author. I 
need his figure . . . as he needs mine” (Barthes 27). This codependency is 
staged in Brooke-Rose’s “posthumous” fiction. Walter Benjamin reminds 
us in “The Storyteller” that the form of the story, unlike the form of the 
novel, is historically associated with oral rather than written production. 
Thus, Brooke-Rose’s use of an “I” narrator who tells his story (an ele-
ment she will eschew in almost all of her novels), exposes the nostalgia 
behind the “longing” for origin in the body of the author. In exposing 
this process of estrangement, Brooke-Rose does not minimize the aspect 
of mourning.
 Like all of Brooke-Rose’s writings, this story of palpable absence 
dramatizes a cultural narrative, an elegy that is historical. By this I mean 
more than to acknowledge the fact that the fiction “theorizes” a post-
structuralist insight. For Brooke-Rose’s fiction is historical in the way it 
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records in “new terms” what she calls the “unreal” reality of the post-
traumatic second half of the twentieth century. In A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 
(1981), published approximately a decade after Go	When	You	See	the	Green	
Man	Walking, Brooke-Rose tries to account for the “return of the fantastic 
in all its forms” in twentieth-century literature, theory, and philosophy 
(Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal 7). She sees this important return as a symptom 
of a ‘reality crisis” in the twentieth century according to which there is 
a pervasive sense of unreality (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 3–4). In her novels, 
reality is already an effect, issuing from some unspecified cause of sepa-
ration, an abjection associated with the displacements of the twentieth 
century: e.g., World War II in Between, an unspecified, probably nuclear, 
apocalypse in Out, scientific “post-humanism” in Such;	technology that 
threatens to render humanism obsolete in	Amalgamemnon. In choosing 
the phantom limb as her narrator in “The Foot,” Brooke-Rose puns on 
the idea of extremity. The foot is the extremity that used to link the body 
with terra firma, the pedestrian, the “real.” Without this link to the earth, 
reality becomes unreal, fantasmatic. Yet the word “extremity” also con-
veys the sense that crisis is a part of our everyday lives:
And yet it is obvious that to be effective pain must attack the most active 
therefore vulnerable part of the central memory-image, the extremities 
once in touch with earth air fire and water, the soles that bear the whole 
weight of existence as man transmutes his structural archetypes from 
curled to lying to upright position and learns the shapes of time food 
light dark play by fingering breasts limbs balls cuddly animals. (“The 
Foot” 45)
Curiously, this passage from “The Foot” prefigures Brooke-Rose’s last 
novel, Subscript, in which she traces the increasing sophistication and 
sentience of man as he evolves from the prokaryote cell. Throughout her 
work, Brooke-Rose’s testifies to a “corpus crysis” (Thru, 736) in language 
and history. The crisis is revealed along the pulses of the body; it is a 
“corpus” crisis, beginning with the legs whose malfunction calls into 
question what man’s evolution has wrought. Man must adapt to his 
environment or face the possibility of his own extinction. In A	Rhetoric	
of	 the	 Unreal she speaks of “a radical change” occurring “which man 
must undergo or perish” (6). “Never before,” she says, “has man been 
so squarely faced with the possible annihilation of mankind and all 
his works, his planet and perhaps more. . . . These essential differences 
[between our century and others] . . . are deeply linked to the sense we 
have that the real has become unreal” (Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal 8). In her 
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powerful essay, “The Dissolution of Character in the Novel,” Brooke-
Rose discusses the prevailing sense of characters as verbal structures 
“more and more swollen with words, like stray phalluses, cut off from 
the real” (“The Dissolution of Character” 186). The narrative construc-
tion of a “foot fetish” in “The Foot” enacts this sense of loss and unre-
ality that marks the twentieth-century in particular. Specters populate 
Brook-Rose’s fiction, clinging to their power to haunt sensuously, pal-
pably. Painfully and in pain, they acknowledge their obsolescence and 
cling to their material existence in an attempt to be a body that mat-
ters. Brooke-Rose’s fictions “speculate” by materializing their theories 
of narrative in the equivocal figure of the specter. But the pain awaiting 
conversion, through discipline, into fictional power (to paraphrase Dick-
inson) is not purely personal. It is public and historic.
 Like the phantom limb of “The Foot,” the specter is a revenant, an 
unwelcome guest whose appearance cannot be controlled. In Specters	
of	Marx:	The	State	of	the	Debt,	the	Work	of	Mourning,	and	the	International, 
Derrida speaks of the figure of the specter in relation to the question 
of repetition. It is a figure of iterability that cannot be put in its place 
or time. He calls this haunting by specters “historical, to be sure, but 
it is not dated, it is never docily given a date in the chain of presents, 
day after day, according to the instituted order of a calendar” (4). In his 
own analysis of the rhetoric of the unreal that the twentieth century has 
inherited, Derrida invokes Shakespeare, specifically, the specter of King 
Hamlet at the beginning of Hamlet,	who begins the play with the injunc-
tion, “Remember me.” Derrida describes “this pre-originary and prop-
erly spectral anteriority of the crime—the crime of the other, a misdeed 
whose event and reality, whose truth can never present	 themselves in 
flesh and blood, but can only allow themselves to be presumed, recon-
structed, fantasized” (21; emphasis in original. Emphases in quoted 
material are original to the text unless otherwise noted.). But for Der-
rida, this spectrality is not confined to our sense of being haunted by the 
past. It refers to a haunting, a nonpresence, at work in the present and 
anticipating the future. He describes this nonpresence of the present 
as the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present” (Spec-
ters xix). According to Derrida, reality is shot through with its spectral 
twin. As in Brooke-Rose’s fiction, this “non-contemporaneity” is exacer-
bated by a number of features of contemporary life imported with the 
speed of the technological revolution. Describing the “spectral effects” 
at work in the twentieth century, he cites “the new speed of appari-
tion (we understand this word in its ghostly sense) of the simulacrum, 
the synthetic or prosthetic image, and the virtual event, cyberpace and 
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surveillance, the control, appropriations, and speculations that today 
deploy unheard-of powers” (Specters 54). It also derives from the sense 
of the already dead and the non-yet-living, the specters with whom we 
commune in the present. This spectral invasion is also a question of 
ethics, of attending to the invisible others who cannot claim attention 
for themselves.
 Brooke-Rose, too, is concerned with those “who are	not	there, of those 
who are no longer or who are not yet present	and	 living” (Specters xix). 
These are the specters haunting her texts spanning past and future: Sub-
script, THE story of survival and extinction; Amalgamemnon, a novel in 
future and conditional tenses which predicts the end of humanism and, 
in “unrealized tenses,” imagines the alternatives; Xorandor, a computer 
fiction in which she imagines us on the eve of the destruction of the 
human archive.
 I propose Brooke-Rose as a candidate for the new writer/scholar that 
Derrida conjures in Specters	 of	Marx: “There has never been a scholar 
who, as such, does not believe in the sharp distinction between the real 
and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, 
being and non-being (‘to be or not to be,’ in the conventional reading), in 
the opposition between what is present and what is not, for example in 
the form of objectivity. Beyond this opposition, there is, for the scholar, 
only the hypothesis of a school of thought, theatrical fiction, literature, 
and speculation” (Specters 11). Derrida posits the existence of another 
scholar, one who could think “the possibility of the specter, the specter 
as possibility. Better (or worse) he would know how to address himself 
to spirits. He would know that such an address is not only already 
possible, but that it will have at all times conditioned, as such, address 
in general” (Specters	12). Brooke-Rose’s fiction and theory take up the 
theoretical wager, this hypothesis, the specter as possibility. Her work 
explores the palpability of absence, the sensuous reminder, remainder, 
anticipation, of event.
 It should be clear from my description that Brooke-Rose’s form of 
postmodernism provides a vision of inevitable human constraint and 
loss. It does not conform to the kind of ludic postmodernism privileged 
by Linda Hutcheon in A	Poetics	of	Postmodernism:	History,	Theory,	Fiction 
(1988). Hutcheon sees in postmodern literature a break and liberation 
from modernist anxieties, an open-ended plurality that leaves behind 
the anxious formalisms of the modernists in favor of a more insou-
ciant attitude. She offers a rather glib inventory of what is jettisoned 
with postmodern experimentations, “such principles as value, order, 
meaning, control, and identity . . . that have been the basic premise of 
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bourgeois liberalism” (Hutcheon 13). Although “control” and “identity” 
are concepts that come in for some skewering in Brooke-Rose’s fiction, 
value, order, and meaning stubbornly reassert themselves in new forms 
that bind the fiction to the theory it materializes. Technique materializes 
theory through what Brooke-Rose calls “constraint” (I will return to this 
concept in a moment). Rigor, formulation, and form constrain Brooke-
Rose’s essays and fiction; they constrain as spurs to invention. They are 
not abandoned in jouissance.
 With the assistance of an unusual essay by Vivian Sobchack I can 
further distinguish Brooke-Rose’s work from Hutcheon’s version of 
postmodernism. In an essay entitled “Beating the Meat/Surviving the 
Text, or How to Get Out of this Century Alive,” Sobchack attacks Bau-
drillard’s interpretation of the cuts, slashes and amputations in J. G. 
Ballard’s Crash, an interpretation that celebrates the dematerialization 
of the text. Sobchack critiques the way that Baudrillard, in particular, 
and millennial discourses about cyberspace and technology, in general, 
“decontextualize our flesh into insensate sign or digitize it into cyber-
space where, as one devotee put it, ‘it’s like having had your everything 
amputated.’ In the (inter)face of the new technological revolution and its 
tranformation of every aspect of our culture (including our bodies), we 
have to recognize and make explicit the deep and dangerous ambiva-
lence that informs the reversible relations we, as lived-bodies, have with 
our tools and their function of allowing us to transcend the limitations 
of our bodies” (Sobchack 209).
 Now Sobchack, it should be noted, is writing from a particular and 
highly unusual position, a position she makes explicit to establish her 
authority: the position of an amputee who has lost her leg to cancer 
and who tries to come to grips with her prosthesis, her new “cyborg” 
existence. Her essay is a biting attack on the too confident transcen-
dentalism and happy metaphor hunting in which contemporary theory 
sometimes engages. Indeed her critique of the decontextualization of the 
body provides an important corrective not only to Linda Hutcheon and 
Baudrillard but also to discourses of the posthuman in cybernetics. In 
this, context, too, “The Foot” is an important text to consider. Although 
I have read “The Foot” in part as an allegory about narrative, it also 
clairvoyantly introduces the information age, the noncontemporaneity 
of the present for the “posthuman subject.” N. Katherine Hayles defines 
this subject as “an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, 
a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous 
construction and reconstruction” (Hayles 3). As Hayles puts it in her 
analysis, which also critiques the dematerialization that is the object of 
Sobchack’s criticism, “information loses its body” (Hayles xiii). “The 
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Foot” inaugurates the theme of information and its embodiments and 
disembodiments that will recur more explicitly in Brooke-Rose’s later 
novels. Both the false messages relayed by the phantom limb to the 
victim and the attention to the boundaries and limits of the body are 
themes that will recur.
 Considered in the light of information theory, the sensuous haunting 
by the phantom limb creates a reverberating loop between body and 
mind, a circuit of information. Brooke-Rose’s notes for the chapter reveal 
not only her determination for scientific accuracy but also her focus 
on how messages deceive the amputee into an illusory image of the 
body. The falsely “reverberating loop” is explained in Hayles’s history of 
cybernetics, which explicitly describes the phenomenon of the phantom 
limb in terms of signs and signals at work: “[McCulloch] proposed that 
neural nets can set up reverberating loops that, once started, continue 
firing even though no new signals are incoming. To distinguish between 
firings signifiying an external event and those caused by past history, 
he called the former ‘signals’ and the latter ‘signs.’ A signal ‘always 
implies its occasion,’ but a sign is an ‘enduring affair which has lost its 
essential temporal reference” (Hayles 59). In “The Foot,” Brooke-Rose’s 
drama of narrative as fetish, the sign is caught in reverberating loops 
of self-haunting. Brooke-Rose conveys both the pathos and the pain 
that Sobchack resolutely seeks to retain for postmodern discourse. Yet 
in the end, I would contend that despite its power, Sobchack’s essay 
loses some effectiveness in its unquestioning recourse to the authentic-
ity experienced by the lived body, that is, the author’s experience. It 
contrasts with the impossibility of retracing the link to the lived body in 
“The Foot” and Brooke-Rose’s emphasis on the phantom limb as sensate 
sign. In Brooke-Rose’s fiction, pain is “stranded” through the discipline 
of language. She refuses to essentialize the body’s experience.
the sign as sPecter: The Turn of The Screw
Brooke-Rose’s brilliant tripartite analysis of James’s The	Turn	of	the	Screw, 
republished in her book, A	Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal, reprises, in the form 
of literary criticism and theory, the theme of the spectral sign. In 101 
pages, it takes James’s tale as its model of the return of the fantastic in 
fiction. Indeed, following Todorov, Brooke-Rose considers James’s text 
as the example, par excellence, of the “pure fantastic” (128). According 
to Todorov, the pure fantastic is a category of reading in which two 
plots (fabulas), one supernatural and one natural, coexist perfectly such 
that the reader cannot resolve which one is to be preferred. Brooke-
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Rose is mindful, of course, that this seminal turn-of-the-century tale 
has inspired a history of readings which indeed choose between a ghost 
story (the supernatural) or a psychic tale of hallucination (the “natural”), 
but Brooke-Rose’s point, and Todorov’s, is that a scrupulous and “objec-
tive” reading of the text demonstrates that the clues support either read-
ing without tipping the balance toward one or the other (the unreal or 
the real). Her exhaustive essay reads The	Turn	of	the	Screw as “an endless 
spiral” (Rhetoric	of	 the	Unreal 173), in which either reading can be sup-
ported structurally by the series of contrasts and oppositions mirrored 
on multiple levels without recourse to a single originating event.
 Indeed, the absence of a single precipitating event for the trauma of 
the ghosts’ appearance (whether as emanations of evil or emanations of 
the governess’s psychic state) leads Brooke-Rose to dwell on the psycho-
analytic concept of trauma as a metonymic relation between two events 
that share certain features, “a displacement through which the elements 
shared by both cause the second to symbolize the first and reactivate 
it” (159). As opposed to a simplistic psychoanalysis of the governess (a 
project that Brooke-Rose abhors), her own analysis of the “natural” read-
ing (i.e., the nonsupernatural interpretation) posits that the text	 itself 
is symptomatic, i.e., a complex transmission of signs fundamentally 
dependent upon displacement and substitution. In a reading that com-
bines the tools of structuralist analysis, complete with tree diagrams and 
tables of repetitions and variations that occur in the text, with the meth-
ods of psychoanalysis that focus on what is not said or said obliquely 
(with discussion of Lacan, Freud and Breuer, and Shoshana Felman), 
Brooke-Rose considers the ghostly effects of letters in the text and the 
language of the text. Her original essay on James’s text, “The Squirm 
of the True II: The Long Glasses—a Structural Analysis,” revised and 
reprinted in A	Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal, anticipates by one year Shoshana 
Felman’s psychoanalytic essay, “Turning the Screw of Interpretation,” 
published in 1977.4 In her revised essay, which takes Felman’s work 
into account, Brooke-Rose focuses on the metonymic displacements and 
inversions that structure the text and prevent us from mastering its con-
tent (i.e., solving its puzzle). She paraphrases Felman’s reading of the 
“signifying chain of letters” in James’s text that functions as “a chain 
of ghosts, the erased letter being like the return of the dead, and both 
like the story of the unconscious, the return of the repressed through 
the insistence of the signifier” (Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal). In cataloguing 
the quadripartite structure of the text (based on a series of four-sided 
frames), Brooke-Rose notes that the four storytellers, Griffith, Douglas, 
the “I-narrator,” and the governess, all are transmitters of the tale for 
which we are given no “original.” She comments that this transmission 
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process “further emphasizes the loss of origin, the curiously Derridean 
trace of lost origin and the curiously Lacanian ‘rehandling of the signi-
fier’ in a complex chain of transmission, each transmittor or addressor 
having first been a receiver or addressee, a reader who turns narrator” 
(Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 173). In this frankly Derridean reading, the miss-
ing letters set off a complex transmission of information with neither 
identifiable source nor destination.
 But unlike Felman, Brooke-Rose seeks to anchor her discussion of the 
ghostly effects of James’s text narratologically, in the precise and careful 
structuring of its mirroring processes, including, but not limited to, the 
thematic of the letters and story telling in the text. A fulcrum between 
structuralism and poststructuralism, Brooke-Rose’s essay tries to show 
how a poststructuralist reading depends upon a precise formulation of 
the structures of a text, that “indeterminacy” and “ambiguity” are not 
antithetical to method and methodology.5 It also demonstrates that in 
the work of a “master” such as James, fiction, in its traumatic knowl-
edge, anticipates theory. Although Brooke-Rose mentions that according 
to previous critics, James could have been acquainted with Freud’s and 
Breuer’s 1895 Studies	 on	Hysteria (Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal 159), she main-
tains that a psychoanalytic reading of his text need not depend upon 
such influence. “James, however, must have been perfectly aware that 
mirrors and their adjuncts (windows, spectacles, telescopes, etc.) are a 
constant motif in the supernatural, notably in E.T.A. Hoffmann. Nor is it 
so by chance. In this text, this odd detail about the governess’s upbring-
ing, and the castration shock it ought in theory to provoke, is a fine 
example of the writer’s intuition having little need of specific reading 
in contemporary or (of course) later scientific discoveries” (Rhetoric	 of	
the	Unreal 398, fn 7). What fiction “knows” is an issue that Brooke-Rose 
engages in multiple forms and valences, as critic, theorist, and fiction 
writer. The pleasures, methods, freedoms, and constraints operate vari-
ously in texts in which she represents both the systems and intuitions of 
contemporary discourses. Throughout this oeuvre, however, we witness 
a fascination with the pressure of what’s missing and an exploration of 
the ties that bind precisely because they are already severed.
the Fascination oF What’s missing
For Brooke-Rose, the fascination of what’s missing is a fundamental 
matter of technique as well as philosophy and theme. The two are 
indissoluble. Invisibility, nonpresence, severed ties that bind through 
haunting—these themes, engaged in her fiction and criticism, correlate 
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with the most distinctive feature of her experimental writing: her use 
of lipograms. Lipograms are techniques of omission, self-imposed by 
the author, in which a grammatical or alphabetical feature is deliber-
ately left out. Strictly speaking, the word “lipogram” means “lacking a 
letter,” although I join Brooke-Rose in using the term more inclusively 
to refer to a number of technical “constraints.” Invisible	 Author:	 Last	
Essays is devoted to her explanation of her constraints as well as an 
attempt to tease out the link between these technical omissions and 
her own invisibility as a writer. Brooke-Rose’s constraints include: the 
omission of the verb “to be” in Between; “to have” in Next; personal 
pronouns and possessive adjectives in her autobiography Remake and in 
sections of Subscript (depending on the “consciousness” of the organism 
she is representing); and constative sentences in Amalgamemnon. The 
most significant and consistent lipogram Brooke-Rose invents in her 
fiction is a narratorless narrative that eschews the past tense and first-
person. With no retrospection (hence, no one vantage point for looking 
back) and no origin or voice speaking the text, she constantly raises the 
question “Who speaks?” In chapter 7 of Invisible	 Author, called “The 
Author is Dead: Long Live the Author,” and in a reprisal in Life,	 End	
Of, Brooke-Rose describes her technique, adapted for her own purposes 
from Robbe-Grillet’s nouveau roman, as a “speakerless present . . . [an] 
impersonal, speakerless (narratorless) narrative” (Brooke-Rose, Invisible	
Author 152).
 These “constraints” fund invention. They turn deprivation into 
power and jolt the novel into experimental form using limitation as a 
window to creative freedom.6 Brooke-Rose’s invention of a new, char-
acteristic style asserts a vital alternative. In her focus on lipograms and 
other constraints in her experimental novels, as well as her emphasis on 
writing as craft and practice, Brooke-Rose resembles the group of French 
writers known as Oulipo, a group of writers who founded an association 
in 1960 which began as a colloquium devoted to the work of Raymond 
Queneau. The name stands for Ouvroir	de	Littérature	Potentielle.	Queneau 
described the objective of Oulipo: “To propose new ‘structures’ to writ-
ers, mathematical in nature, or to invent new artificial or mechanical 
procedures that will contribute to literary activity: props for inspiration 
as it were, or rather, in a way, aids for creativity.”7 The idea of “the 
artisinal nature of literary work . . . central to Oulipian poetics” (Motte 
“Introduction” 10) characterizes Brooke-Rose’s treatment of technique 
as well. Writing with constraints emphasizes the discipline and craft 
of writing as well as its difficulty as labor. In his edited collection of 
some of Oulipo’s most important writings, Motte points out that “the 
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French word ouvroir has three principal meanings: it denotes the room 
in a convent where the nuns assemble to work, a charitable institution 
where indigent women engage in needlework, and a ‘sewing circle’ 
where well-to-do ladies make clothes for the poor and vestments for 
the Church” (Motte, “Introduction” 9). Motte does not emphasize the 
paradox that although all the forms of labor listed pertain to women’s 
work, most of the Oulipean writers were male.8
 Yet, unlike the Oulipeans who advertised their lipograms both 
within their fiction and in manifestos, Brooke-Rose challenged her read-
ers to discover them. Where the Oulipeans publicized the use of their 
constraints, sometimes affixing a “user’s manual,” Brooke-Rose tended 
to embed them. In doing so, she has run the risk that her technical 
“absences” would go undetected. In essays and interviews, Brooke-Rose 
sometimes laments the fact that her lipograms often went unnoticed by 
her readers. Invisible	Author attempts to redress the peculiar “overlook-
ing” of Brooke-Rose’s main grammatical lipogram: the refusal of the 
third-person, past tense narrative. The book begins with the question, 
“Have you ever tried to do something very difficult as well as you 
can, over a long period, and found that nobody notices? That’s what 
I’ve been doing for over thirty years (Brooke-Rose, Invisible	Author 1). 
In Invisible	Author she explores the “problem of ‘visibility/invisibility’ 
raised by the lipogram” (3). For, despite able criticism and positive 
reviews, critics and reviewers failed to comment sufficiently (in Brooke-
Rose’s eyes) on the importance of this absence. She contrasts the lack of 
attention paid to her use of the lipogram with the attention that Georges 
Perec attracted in writing La	Disparition (1969), in which he omitted the 
letter “e.” Brooke-Rose published Between	in 1968, a few months before 
La	Disparition (translated by Gilbert Adair as A	Void	in 1994). She clearly 
resents the fact that the critics were intrigued when Perec announced 
that he had used a lipogram in La	Disparition; yet when she revealed her 
own self-imposed omission to a friend and reviewer, Hélène Cixous, no 
one, including Cixous, seemed to care.
 As much as the joint interest in lipogram, the contrast between 
Brooke-Rose’s use of constraints and those of the Oulipeans is instruc-
tive. Never a joiner of groups, Brooke-Rose worked alone all her life, 
despite her friendship with other writers in England and France. Indeed, 
the only reference to Oulipo in her essays on her craft in Invisible	Author, 
comes in one footnote reference to Georges Perec: “Perec belonged to the 
club Oulipo (Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle), headed by Raymond 
Queneau at the time, whom I greatly admired, and which relished for-
mal tours de force of this kind. I was once invited (by a lesser member) 
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to join, which was a huge honor, but I refused, for fear, perhaps, of being 
drawn into such attractive games” (Invisible	Author 183, n.5).9
 Perec and his translator, for example, offered more markers of absence 
than Brooke-Rose in Between. In chapter one of A	 Void, the reader is 
introduced to the main character, Anton Vowl, whose surname itself 
marks the absence of the letter “e” in the word “vowel.” In addition, 
Anton, the character’s Christian name, is an anagram for “not an,” add-
ing to the clues of the absence of the letter “e.” Every time we see his 
name, then, we are reminded of the absence of the most common letter 
in the French language. Indeed, later on, the character himself disap-
pears. Although the English title, A	Void, names an absence, the French 
title La	 Disparition, meaning disappearance and passing, more keenly 
suggests an element of ghostly trace. It is worth noting that in 1972, 
Perec wrote Les	 revenentes, literally, “ghosts,” in which “e” is the only 
vowel employed. A headnote to A	Void, published in 1994, after Perec’s 
death, informs the reader: “After writing La	Disparition (A	Void), he took 
all his unused e’s and devoted them to a short text, Les	 revenentes, in 
which e is the only vowel employed.” (Perec np)10 Talk about a return 
of the repressed!
 How absence signifies, technically, ontologically, emotionally is a 
question Brooke-Rose will raise throughout her oeuvre in different 
genres and with different techniques of omission.11 Although there is 
often something elegiac in these hauntings, they are also intimations of 
obsolescence. Like the phantom limb, desperate to continue to signify 
in the young woman’s life, Brooke-Rose’s characters feel themselves 
becoming increasingly obsolete, losing their significance. Writing of 
what he calls “obsolete objects in the literary imagination,” Francesco 
Orlando sees in literature a range of affective reactions to the obsoles-
cence hastened by the speed, mechanicity, and remakes of modern life. 
His categorization of different types of images of “nonfunctional corpo-
rality,” might usefully help classify the “lightness of being” Brooke-Rose 
explores: (1) living human (2) nonliving human, (3) living nonhuman, 
and (4) nonliving nonhuman.12 Orlando is most interested in the fourth 
category, the “nonliving nonhuman” and least interested in the first cat-
egory, which includes what happens to the human body in its weakness, 
decrepitude, and infirmity. Brooke-Rose’s novels, however, take up the 
full range of this problematic.
 As the title suggests, Out, her first consciously experimental lipo-
gramatic novel, represents abjection, its central consciousness a sick, 
lethargic, and out of work humanist. Next	 (with its lipogram of “to 
have”) explicitly represents the abjected as a social class, the homeless. 
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In most of her novels, humanism is a dead letter, and with it those 
writers, characters, and professors whose expertise is no longer val-
ued, as with the multifaceted Cassandra-like consciousness of her novel 
Amalgamemnon, crafted in future or “unrealized” tenses only. But it is in 
Remake and, more painfully, in Life,	End	Of, that the central conscious-
ness finds itself in a Yeatsian predicament, fastened to a dying animal. 
It is here, in her memoir, that “nonfunctional corporeality” renders the 
writer’s cruelly ironic predicament most acutely. Losing the use of her 
legs and her eyesight, the worker in difficult prose is no longer able to 
climb the stairs to her library, to read, and, finally, to write, her pleasure 
in the artisinal nature of her work now denied.
 Brooke-Rose’s books catalogue as well the “nonliving human”—the 
specters that haunt the living like the phantom limb; the ghosts she 
analyzes in James’s The	 Turn	 of	 the	 Screw; Larry, the psychiatrist, who 
has returned from the dead and is the central consciousness of her novel 
Such; the literary characters who wander the pages of Textermination, 
nervously resisting their own extinction in the cultural memory; and, in 
the broadest archeological sweep, the extinct species of her Darwinian 
novel, Subscript. In Subscript, she also takes up the record of the “living 
nonhuman” (or prehuman), from the earliest cells to the invertebrates 
and vertebrates that comprise the species before the appearance of homo 
sapiens. And in Xorandor, she examines the “non living nonhuman”—
the computer, Xorandor, whose progeny do nothing less than threaten 
the human archive.13
 As Brooke-Rose destabilizes the ontological foundations of her 
“beings,” it is language that concerns her. She invents new terms for 
her literature of speculation. In novels and in essays, she creates “tech-
niques for living,” a phrase she uses in her novel Out. Again and again, 
language is the site of both the threatened textermination and of sur-
vival. Indeed, originally entitled “Textermination,” Brooke-Rose’s most 
metatextual novel Thru offers constant reminders of the way that “per-
sons” emerge grammatically and ontologically on the page (“out of the 
Zero where the author is situated, both excluded and included, the third 
person is generated, pure signifier of the subject’s experience” (Thru 
647). Thru traces the path of “the sign that watches, helpless and in great 
pain, the engendering of its own projected trajectory struggling along” 
(Brooke-Rose, Thru 737). In “splitting” herself as theorist and novelist 
in Thru and elsewhere, Brooke-Rose stages the drama of the sign watch-
ing the engendering of its own trajectory in the theater of theory. Here, 
and throughout her work, technique is inseparable from techniques for 
living.
ouT (1964 )
If Brooke-Rose’s short story “The Foot” presents an abjected narrative 
“I,” her novel Out, written almost simultaneously, represents an entire 
abjected society. The novel is a neocosm, in Cristopher Nash’s terms, 
an “alternative-worlds fiction” (Nash 60). Out	is a post-apocalyptic fan-
tasy in which the “color bar” is reversed after a cataclysmic event (pre-
sumably some kind of nuclear episode). Unlike the “Melanian” races, 
the “colourless” have been susceptible to radiation, producing major 
mutations in their bodies and psyches. Whites have become sickly and 
powerless and blacks are healthy and in control. Nation states have 
regrouped in major new political configurations (e.g., Afro-Eurasia, 
Sino-America) and geographic displacements and internments have 
occurred. The binary opposition of race still determines social hierarchy, 
now, however, with a revolutionary reversal.
 The narrative microscopically depicts the environs of a sick and 
unemployed white male who spends most of his time tended by his 
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wife in their small shack. This former humanist makes occasional forays 
to the “Labor Exchange” to look for work, but is basically relegated to 
picking up menial “odd jobs” around the estate of his wife’s employer, 
Mrs. Mgulu. The unnamed man is a perceiver and object of attention 
but not an I- narrator or lyric center: “A fly straddles another fly on the 
faded denim stretched over the knee. Sooner or later, the knee will have 
to make a move, but now it is immobilised by the two flies, the lower 
of which is so still that it seems dead.”1 Rather than actively perceiv-
ing his proximate surroundings, the man passively registers objects in 
the environment, objects including his own body. Out is the first novel 
in which Brooke-Rose forged what would become her signature con-
straint, the narratorless narrative sentence. Describing this technique 
in Invisible	Author, she says: “there is no seer, only the seen, no “énon-
ciation . . . only énoncé” (Invisible	 Author 138). Like Beckett’s “uncho-
sen beings” (Brooke-Rose’s phrase),2 the man exists OUTside the power 
structures of society, with neither the opportunity nor the will to be an 
agent in his own drama.
 The narration is awash in passivity—“sooner” and “later” merge in 
lethargy, symptomatic of the enervation experienced by society’s whites. 
The narration is strictly present tense; no authoritative act of narra-
tive retrospection is possible. The passive constructions in the narrative 
mimic a loss of both energy and action: “Sooner or later some inter-
ruption will be necessary, a bowl of gruel to be eaten, for instance, or a 
conversation to undergo. Sooner or later a bowl of gruel will be brought, 
unless perhaps it has already been brought, and the time has come to go 
and get rid of it” (Out 11–12). Protagonist, plot, exposition, event, and 
suspense—these elements of traditional narrative are largely absent. The 
novel begins with a man so abjected that he cedes his minimal desire to 
two copulating and near dead flies whose “drama” keeps him immobi-
lized. Rather than positing meaningful alternatives, the conjunction “or” 
in the phrase “sooner or later” signifies the man’s, and the narrative‘s 
indifference.3
 Something has happened, but when or how is never recounted. “Did 
you ever find your trauma?” (Out 120), the man asks Mrs. Ned, a white 
woman, but the origin of the present predicament is irretrievable. We 
learn that there has been a general “displacement from cause to effect” 
(Out 120). “Somewhere in the archives there will be evidence that this 
occurred, if it is kept, and for those who risk to look it up. Other epi-
sodes, however, cannot be proved in this way” (Out 79). The histori-
cal sense enabled in traditional past-tense narration is itself displaced 
onto some imagined, but uncertain, archive. Thus, narrative, along with 
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society, suffers symptoms of a disease. A doctor tells the man “diagnosis 
only prognosticates aetiology” (Out 140), meaning, we learn later, that 
“no ultimate cause or ultimate cure” is possible, only an accommoda-
tion to the present reality (Out 151). A rupture has occurred as a result 
of some prior injustice or circumstance, but despite the many attempts 
to determine “what did you do avant la guerre,” there are no causes—
only symptoms needing treatment. The lack of movement, the inertia, 
doubles the meaning of “patient,” as sick characters and ailing narrative 
wait for something to happen. Society, and, mimetically, the narrative, 
are riven with what would now be termed posttraumatic stress syn-
drome, a condition summed up in the line, “The weeds are scattered all 
over the scorched earth” (Out 197). The reader arrives somehow belat-
edly, unable to get her bearings.
 The present-tense narrative sentence Brooke-Rose developed in Out 
is, in her own view, her most significant technical innovation, one that 
permeates her fiction. Lipogrammatic, the narrative sentence refuses 
traditional past tense narration. In a chapter entitled “The Author is 
Dead: Long Live the Author” in Invisible	Author, she places her devel-
opment of this narrative sentence, beginning with its use in Out, in the 
context of the French “nouveau roman,” as initiated by Robbe-Grillet, 
most prominently, along with Nathalie Sarraute and other French exper-
imental writers. This technique deliberately eschews the third-person 
past tense narration of the traditional novel, that “reassuring guarantor 
of real events” (Invisible	Author 132) and relies, instead, on the present 
tense. Indeed, Brooke-Rose sees Robbe-Grillet’s eschewal of the past 
tense as the technique that inspired Barthes to declare the “death of the 
author.”
 Brooke-Rose read Robbe-Grillet’s In	the	Labyrinth when it was pub-
lished in French in 1959 and translated it in 1967, three years after Out 
was published. (Her translation won the 1969 Arts Council Translation 
Prize.) She regards In	 the	 Labyrinth as the purest example of Robbe-
Grillet’s narrative innovation, a “speakerless, narratorless narrative” 
(Invisible	Author 151). It is not the present tense, per se, that she finds so 
fruitful in Robbe-Grillet, but its paradoxical	uses. First, Robbe-Grillet used 
the present tense and its deictics, traditionally a speech form, in com-
bination with an impersonality associated with the past-tense narrative 
sentence of the traditional novel. This, she calls the “‘scientific’ present 
tense (as in a scientific law)” (Invisible	 Author 138). Second, Robbe-
Grillet’s creation of a “scientific” present was limited to a zone of con-
sciousness instead of the omniscient perspective of science. The third and 
probably most important paradox is that Robbe-Grillet “never evokes an 
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act of seeing or a consciousness, that is, there is no seer, only the seen” 
(Invisible	Author 138). These paradoxes add up to the distinctive narra-
tive sentence of the “speakerless, narratorless narrative” (Invisible	Author 
151) Brooke-Rose describes Robbe-Grillet’s “astonishing use of the NS 
[narrative sentence], in which ‘no one speaks’” (Invisible	 Author 139). 
Yet, the narrative sentence is “in the present tense, in which someone 
necessarily speaks, yet we don’t know who, since he never says ‘I,’ or 
anything about himself; he is the very ‘no one speaks’ of the NS” (Invis-
ible	Author 139). In characterizing Robbe-Grillet’s technical innovation, 
Brooke-Rose points to a zone of consciousness, rather than a perceiver 
or speaker. In her translation of In	the	Labyrinth, Brooke-Rose is careful 
to maintain these paradoxical features and the strange kind of myopic 
description that results: “Here the sun does not enter, nor does the wind, 
nor the rain, nor the dust. The fine dust that dulls the shine of the hori-
zontal planes, the varnished tabletop, the polished parquet, the marble 
of the mantelpiece and that of the chest of drawers, the cracked marble 
of the chest of drawers, the only dust here comes from the room itself: 
from the gaps in the parquet possibly, or from the bed, or the curtains, 
or the ashes in the fireplace” (Robbe-Grillet, In	the	Labyrinth 7–8).
 In his 1963 manifesto, Pour	 un	 Nouveau	 Roman,	 Robbe-Grillet 
describes his technique as counteracting the anthropomorphism of tra-
ditional humanism. He desires to be on record as launching a sweeping 
critique of the use of metaphor to connect man and nature: “To reject 
our so-called ‘nature’ and the vocabulary which perpetuates its myth, to 
propose objects as purely external and superficial, is not—as has been 
claimed—to deny man; but it is to reject the “pananthropic” notion con-
tained in traditional humanism, and probably in all humanism” (Towards	
a	New	Novel 57). Yet Robbe-Grillet’s emphasis on the scientific and anti-
humanistic implicitly contradicts his reliance on the psychologizing 
effect of avoidance and obsession in La	jalousie or the state of delirium 
in In	the	Labyrinth. Indeed, in analyzing Robbe-Grillet’s technique in In	
the	 Labyrinth, Brooke-Rose calls the sudden and confusing changes in 
perspective in the nouveau roman “baroque,” and attributes them to 
the delirious experience of the dying soldier, its protagonist. The novel, 
she says, is
presented instantaneously, yet out of time, experienced and re-experi-
enced through the dying soldier’s delirium, when all the data of the 
preceding days have acquired a dream-like intensity that nevertheless 
confuses time, accuracy and even subjective identity, so that the soldier 
could be seeing himself from outside himself as well as reliving inci-
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dents and collocations of data with omissions, shifts, or added detail, 
as if through the expanding and contracting lens of memory and imagi-
nation; but instantaneously, merging with direct experience.” (“The 
Baroque Imagination of Robbe-Grillet” 418)
Although the metaphor of the lens suggests the technological apparatus 
of science, it is linked inextricably here to the psychological state of the 
soldier.
 By her own admission, Brooke-Rose was “influenced” more by 
Robbe-Grillet than Nathalie Sarraute, another writer of the nouveau 
roman; yet it is Brooke-Rose’s description of Sarraute’s narrative “tro-
pism” that most aptly characterizes the quality of her own cold nar-
ration in Out. Sarraute’s novels, she says, explore “the imperceptible 
movements at the threshold of consciousness as if they were biological 
tropisms.” In this summary, she contrasts Sarraute with Robbe-Grillet, 
who “externalizes and objectifies” (Brooke-Rose, “Imitations Are Proof 
of New Writing’s Power” vii). Yet this description of biological tropisms 
captures the way Brooke-Rose treats the human beings in her fiction as 
equivalent to other sentient matter undergoing chemical and physical 
reactions, in a kind of reversal of the pathetic fallacy. Like plants with 
the basic responses of turning toward and away from the light, her 
sickly white man’s emotional spectrum has been reduced to the most 
basic reactions of approach and avoidance. The avoidance of risk is his 
most noticeable characteristic, his signature tactic for survival. Danger 
lurks everywhere amongst ordinary actions:
The feeling is one of heterotrophism. The left foot treads the length of a 
cemented line. Between the tiles, the right foot carefully selects another 
line of cement parallel with the edge of the path. The amount of free 
energy that becomes available for the performance of useful work does 
not correspond to the total heat change but is equivalent to about ten 
thousand calories per gram. molecule, the remaining two thousand 
being involved in the intra-molecular changes of the reaction. It is pos-
sible to walk on such parallel lines only, almost without touching the 
diagonals. (Out 39)4
 In Brooke-Rose’s version of the narrative sentence as “scientific law” 
a deep estrangement takes place in the writing, a wrenching of narra-
tive from the human perspective. This is a process of estrangement that 
transcends the more subjective rationale of alienation at work in Robbe-
Grillet’s fiction. In this greater narrative defamiliarization Brooke-Rose 
can be compared to the writer whom she considers the greatest of inno-
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vators: the author of what she calls the new “Anti-novel” novel. As 
early as the fifties, Brooke-Rose wrote essays on and reviews of Beckett 
for the English-reading public, such as her 1958 essay, “Samuel Beckett 
and the Anti-Novel,” published in John Lehmann’s The	 London	Maga-
zine. It is here that Brooke-Rose acknowledges Beckett’s role behind the 
development of the nouveau roman, specifically, his experiments with 
a narrative amnesia that had a profoundly defamiliarizing effect, trans-
forming both the characters and the novel into a species of mutants. In 
this essay, Brooke-Rose comments on the “out of time” quality of Beck-
ett’s narratives, which she describes as “out of focus and as if observed, 
not so much by a foreign visitor as by someone outside the human 
race, outside the world and outside time” (“Samuel Beckett and the 
Anti-Novel” 40). Beckett shifts the focus of the narrative lens, estrang-
ing man as the narrative almost graphs his position: “Hence the weird 
almost mathematical style in Watt, a style with a slight legal flavour, 
allowing for all contingencies, a style based on permutations of possi-
bilities. For not only does any one action have numerous explanations, 
but metaphysically speaking there are also numerous other possible 
actions which, though not actualized by us in any one instance, exist 
nevertheless in a timeless mind” (“Samuel Beckett and the Anti-Novel” 
41).
 It is in Out	 that Brooke-Rose	mixes Robbe-Grillet’s myopic, cold 
descriptive sentence with Beckett’s agnostic list of possibilities played 
out in the narrative. As in Beckett, but not Robbe-Grillet, mutation	and	
permutation	come	together.	Scientific and narrative experimentation merge 
visibly in the text. In Out, the obsessive play of variables, the almost 
compulsive enumeration of possibilities is not confined to the psyche 
of the central consciousness but becomes a property of narrative experi-
mentation, possibilities entertained and discarded:
Mr. Swaminathan’s eyes strike an atonal chord, confusing the neural 
cells which complain by discharging a high mad microvoltage. It is 
not, however, his eyes which do this but the memory of his eyes hav-
ing possibly done so, or the psychic presence, now hammered into by 
the high-pitched ring of metal hammer on metal chisel. A recording 
engineer might perhaps separate the components of the mixture. If the 
hammering were extracted, the lost sentences that came and went and 
returned in reconstructed form might be recovered and heard. (Out 
98–99)
 The “expanding and contracting lens of memory and imagination” 
that Brooke-Rose speaks about in Robbe-Grillet is literalized in a text 
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that proposes various instruments for recording experience. In an ironic 
twist on the French novel’s “scientific” present tense, scientific instru-
ments, “scopes” of all kinds, are advanced in the narrative as possible 
modern technologies for returning the narrative to old certainties. The 
narrative suggests that these instruments might be useful in charting 
physical, emotional, and narrative movements, but the narrative does 
not “commit” to using them:
A microscope might perhaps reveal animal ecstasy among the innumer-
able white globules in the circle of gruel, but only to the human mind 
behind the microscope. And besides, the fetching and the rigging up 
of a microscope, if one were available, would interrupt the globules. 
If, indeed, the gruel hadn’t been eaten by then, in which case a gastro-
scope would be more to the point. And a gastroscope at that juncture 
of the gruel’s journey would provoke nausea. (Out 15)
Here, the contents of bowels, stomachs, and minds receive equivalent 
treatment in the deadpan narrative. Although the “human mind” is 
granted as the only consciousness capable of projecting “ecstasy,” each 
potential act of measurement, whether by instrument (gastroscope) or 
human intervention, runs the risk of nullifying the activity itself. And, 
assuming the bowl of gruel/Petri dish contents had been consumed 
already, the instrument would provoke nausea and disgust rather than 
an imagined orgy of ecstatic globules.
 There is indeed something “baroque” about this style, which yokes 
together by violence disparate things, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson on the 
Metaphysical poets. This is a kind of “analogical thinking” that Brooke-
Rose recognizes in Robbe-Grillet, despite his overt claim to eschew all 
forms of metaphor. Indeed, Brooke-Rose protests that Robbe-Grillet 
means only certain kinds of metaphors associated with “humanizing” 
nature. She explicitly counters his sweeping refusal of metaphor by 
pointing to the “analogical thinking” present in the nouveau roman 
and points to the Baroque poets as precursors of the genre. In the “best 
baroque poetry,” she says, metaphor is
neither just decorative nor anthropomorphic but functional, one of the 
many means developed by those poets for the purpose of resolving 
the contradictory aspects of emotional experience in relation to the 
changing validities of time and the physical world. When Donne turns 
a flea into ‘our mariage  bed, and mariage temple” or says to the sun 
“This bed thy center is, these walls, thy spheare,” or of his lady-love 
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“She’ is all States, and all princes, I,” he is shifting the perspective quite 
as suddenly as Robbe-Grillet does with a swift verbal close-up or a 
camera swerve away from, say, the eyes of A, the ‘narrator’s’ wife in 
Jalousie, to the parapet of the terrace and then to the banana-segment 
in the distance. In Donne the shift is part of a complex argument, but 
the argument itself is a way out of an emotionally untenable position 
stated as an intellectual dilemma. Today, the process is necessarily much 
less overt, reflecting unconscious or semi-conscious fears, and Robbe- 
Grillet’s unpronouned [sic] narrator averts his eyes from a visual image 
because it may, and eventually does, lead to other visual images which 
are too painful.” (Brooke-Rose, “The Baroque Imagination” 408–9)
Brooke-Rose the critic and Brooke-Rose the experimental novelist merge 
in these perceptions, as she tries to capture the function of Robbe- 
Grillet’s deliberate juxtaposition, with its disjunctive formal and emo-
tional effects. In updating this “yoking” with Robbe-Grillet’s example, 
Brooke-Rose both localizes the sudden shifts of perspective in the pain 
and desire of the protagonist and acknowledges the avoidance as a nar-
rative property, a textual reaction to the altered properties of a radical 
new world order.5
 Even as she pays tribute to Robbe-Grillet’s influence, Brooke-Rose 
ups the ante of the narrative stakes. Her own “paradoxical” narrative 
sentence is more radically severed than Robbe-Grillet’s from the subjec-
tive, anthropomorphic rationale that he intends to leave behind. In Out, 
Brooke-Rose’s narrative technique is neither as phenomenologically 
based as Robbe-Grillet’s nor as existential as Beckett’s. In her version 
of the French new novel, Brooke-Rose makes the breakdown of narra-
tive symptomatic of a social breakdown. For Out is a dystopia, a type 
of science fiction in which we find “new configurations of inner and 
outer space.”6 Brooke-Rose imagines a scenario of revolutionary reversal 
which is like a photographic negative, with black and white power rela-
tions reversed, sometimes explicitly, in the technology of representation: 
“In the white wall the glossy black door opens suddenly. The woman 
stands framed by the whiteness, pert and petite and pretty in a white 
linen dress the neckline of which embraces the glowing basalt of her 
throat as a crescent moon the night sky. It is more difficult as a negative. 
The background is of pale flowers and cypress hedge receding. . . . The 
negative creates a silence” (Out 175–76).
 Language, geography, and physiology bear the effects of this radi-
cal reversal of black on white, “negative” on positive. Whites, formally 
the norm and therefore unmarked in language, are now described as 
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“colourless,” their lack of color marked linguistically (Out 146). Their 
“waxiness” (Out 175) is a symptom of deficiencies in liver and spleen. 
In Out, Brooke-Rose ironically rewrites “the white man’s burden” (Out 
140) in a fantasy of a new (and white) “invisible man.” What is unusual 
about Brooke-Rose’s dystopic fiction, however, is that it links social 
critique to narrative experiment. As opposed to much science fiction, 
which leaves a more or less “transparent” prose intact in order to cre-
ate a coherent “neocosm” or alternative world, in Brooke-Rose’s fiction, 
discourse becomes symptomatic.
 Here again, Brooke-Rose literary critic and Brooke-Rose experimen-
tal novelist intervene in literary history. Although a student of science 
fiction, Brooke-Rose herself finds it formally unadventurous: “One of 
the most striking features of much science fiction until fairly recently 
has been its lack of imagination with regard to narrative technique, as 
opposed to its imagination with regard to ideas. It took over wholesale 
the techniques of the realistic novel” (Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal 82). Work-
ing against this tradition, Brooke-Rose creates a mutant narrative about 
mutation. Her strict omission of past tense narration and its corollar-
ies—narrative memory, event, authority, and, even, desire—mimes the 
social deprivations of the colourless characters. The disappearance of 
retrospective past tense narration (the “guarantor” of the real), signals 
an ironic punishment for the former subjugators; it brings a loss of nar-
rative memory that severs them from their power to call the shots. The 
unrelenting narrative present in Out	 is a “sentence” meted out to the 
once powerful white society: “—It’s because of there being no past, and 
no future, ma’am, it’s so difficult, living in the present” (Out 124), the 
white man tells Mrs. Mgulu, his wife’s employer, who takes pity on 
him and gives him work. “—You fed on our past,” he tells her, “and 
drained us, now you deny the past but need to remind us, it’s an empty 
ritual for you, a weakness. But it hurts” (Out 124). Trapped in repetition, 
uncertain of the difference between projection and event, imagination 
and occurrence, the dying white man suffers.
 The sickly white imagination swells uncomfortably and uncontrol-
lably, a symptom without a demonstrable cause. History in Out is recov-
erable only as a series of possible textualizations of the past, “an absent 
cause”, as defined by Fredric Jameson in The	Political	Unconscious	 (35). 
Nonetheless, history leaves its indelible wound on the bodies of the 
characters and the body of the narrative. Brooke-Rose’s novel is post-
colonial as well as postapocalyptic: the empire strikes back against the 
vampiric colonizer, giving new meaning to the phrase “the white man’s 
burden.” If colonialism is the obvious satiric target (and the source of the 
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original “moral” imperative behind the phrase and its conception), any 
redress provided by liberalism, with its dream of equality is exposed as 
illusory. The “displacement from cause to effect” (Out 120) signals the 
lost cause of liberalism and the specious idealism of the liberal “inter-
est” in all races and peoples. A poster hanging above the entrance to 
the Labour Exchange proclaims, “We had a dream. It’s a disgrace” (Out 
82).
 Despite the ironic justice underlying the reversals of power, slo-
ganeering and subjugation continue in their new lodgings. Although 
the past is “denied” by the newly powerful, the empty mantra of the 
new bureaucrats actually commemorates the failed dream: “Exalting 
all colours to the detriment of none, don’t you know your slogans?” 
(Out 125) says Mrs. Mgulu to the man. The “revolution” produces no 
miracles, only more bureaucracy, more bourgeois policings of the norm, 
albeit with a different-looking norm produced. “—And if the past proves 
nothing why do they keep asking about my previous occupation?” the 
white man says to Mrs. Ned, and she replies: “—They’re bureaucrats. 
They’re behind the times” (Out 118).
 Thus novelistic “transgression” and societal subversion are linked 
mimetically in Brooke-Rose’s first use of her characteristic narratorless 
narrative. The categories of identity, history, and community have been 
radically altered in the postapocalyptic reordering of society; transgres-
sions of time, mode, and voice reveal a corresponding lack of faith in 
the categories of narrative. In an essay on similar “transgressions” in the 
nouveau roman, Brooke-Rose uses Genette’s structuralist system to ana-
lyze the creation of a disorienting, perpetual present. Robbe-Grillet and 
other French writers of the new novel, she says, exploit a fusion of time 
to create a “slow down” of narrative time. By using the present, what-
ever the order of events, Brooke-Rose says that these practitioners of the 
novel leave the reader disoriented: “we never quite know when (and 
whether) something is occurring, or re-occurring (or being recalled), 
the only time markers being contingent ones, such as slight differences 
in the retelling, in the position of objects, or in the climate” (Rhetoric	of	
the	Unreal 314). These fictions participate in a kind of narrative “slow-
down” which renders the element of “story” wholly problematic, as the 
categories of foreground and background become indissoluble. In these 
novels, Genette’s category of “order,” too “becomes irrelevant, since the 
very notion of ‘event’ is transgressed” (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 315).
 Thus, although Out retains the lineaments of a plot, as most ana-
lysts have observed, events are difficult to chart, both because (1) it is 
impossible to know whether a particular event is told many times but 
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happens once (repetitive telling) or told many times and happens many 
times (singulative telling) (“Transgressions,” Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 317), 
and (2) it is impossible to distinguish between scenes that are in the 
mind or in the world. This transgression is commented on continually 
and metanarratively in the text: “Unless perhaps a certain period has 
already elapsed since that episode, if indeed it occurred.” Not only are 
there new configurations of outer and inner space, but the demarcation 
between the two is deliberately obfuscated. In this forensic nightmare, 
we, and the man, are deprived of “proof” of existence and event (“It 
would help me so much, it would help to confirm my existence,” the 
man tells Mr. Swaminathan).
 These technical “transgressions” create a sense of narrative inertia, as 
the time of narration greatly exceeds the time of the story. This technical 
inertia is a “technique for living,” of sorts, for the phrase, “[e]verything 
that moves increases risk” (Out 57), echoes repeatedly in the text. It 
is a mantra that pertains to both the man and the narrative; the nar-
rative makes a tropic swerve from certain topics and a phobic refusal 
to commit to story: “Sometimes it is sufficient merely to imagine an 
episode for the episode to occur, though not necessarily in that precise 
form” (Out 68). In this desultory mix of supposition, conjecture, erasure, 
and iteration, narrative authority vanishes and narrative desire appears 
moribund.
 Postapocalyptic and postcolonial, Out also locates us in a “post-
psychoanalytic age” in which transference, the belief, established over 
time, in the authority of the doctor/analyst, is no longer possible.7 In 
the absence of traditional trusted “authorities,” licensed to report both 
psychological and epistemological realities, substitute techniques and 
specious authority figures proliferate. The “psychoscope” takes over the 
function of the trusted retrospective narrator; supposedly it “telescope[s] 
a whole life-time after all, and quite, quite objectively” (Out 150). The 
swami-like figure of Mr. Swaminathan, Mrs. Mgulu’s “managing agent,” 
presents himself, one of many bureaucrats and functionaries who intrude 
on the white man’s consciousness. Surveillance performed by the omni-
scient narrator is replaced by a series of stand-ins policing his thoughts. 
No one can set the story straight; no one can provide knowledgeable 
exposition. Mr. Swaminathan polices the white man’s desires and with-
holds his approval like a stern father. Yet, although these substitutes 
appear in the text as separate characters with speaking parts and agency, 
it is also suggested that they function as figments of the white man’s 
imagination, as introjected authorities:
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—Mr. Swaminathan, you said in the street that memory is a primitive 
weapon.
—My dear chap, memory is not a place but a racing function of neural 
cells giving off dismal rhythms at less than ten microvolts, which are 
driven into by the high-pitched ring of hammer on chisel into marble. 
What did you say your occupation was before the er—?
—I was a humanist.
—I didn’t mean your politics . . . You’re a square peg in a round hole 
aren’t you?
 The conversation cannot take the form of the hammering because 
during the hammering there is no conversation, and during the con-
versation, if it occurred, there was no hammering. Without a recording 
engineer no chemistry of identity can put those two elements together in 
time. . . .  Either the conversation has partially occurred, the beginning, 
for instance, the remainder being suppressed, selected, manipulated, 
transformed, schematised, because inunderstood. Or the conversation 
has wholly occurred, and been wholly manipulated, transformed, sche-
matised, because inunderstood . . .  A corollary is that the conversation 
has wholly occurred and that Mr. Swaminathan is mad. . . .  A second 
corollary is that the conversation has wholly occurred and is wholly 
sane but beyond the grasp of sick white reasoning.” (Out 108–9)
 In a scene in which the man receives “psychoscopy,” Mr. Swamina-
than merges with other authority figures, doctors, priests, fathers, and 
God. “Will you lay down the white man’s burden?” the doctor adds, 
and the next line of dialogue, presumably thought by the white man 
himself is “—He is dying. Absolve him . . .  That are heavy laden. Take 
it up, take it up for me . . .  Oh, father, doctor, touch me, cure me, oh Mr. 
Swaminathan, I love you” (Out 140). Yet the past cannot be absolved or 
forgiven, the guilt of the “white man’s burden” is not expunged. Some 
quick fixes are proposed, spurious “technique[s] for living” (Out 132), 
like the one Mrs. Mgulu proposes, can be provided by a Doctor Fu 
Teng. The new elite babble on about “rehabilitation” and reclamation 
(Out 146), but the effects of trauma persist. Despite Mrs. Joan Dkimba’s 
assertions that “it’s quite incredible but people do forget, oh yes, new 
generations, despite history and everything” (Out 150), and no matter 
how many instruments attempt to sanitize the past, a residue remains. 
Indeed, like the phantom limb in “The Foot,” absence physically	aches: 
“The absolute knowledge that Mrs. Mgulu writes no notes and walks 
along no highway and does not nod and aches there by her absence, the 
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absolute knowledge enters the body through the marrow bone, and up 
into the medullary centers, down the glosso-pharyngeal nerve no doubt 
or the pneumogastric, at any rate forward and down into the throat 
which tightens as the knowledge spreads into the chest and hurts” (Out 
163).
 The fixers, including a peremptory narrative voice that exhorts the 
man to “comment and percolate” suggest that ridding the mind of pain-
ful thoughts is like emptying the bladder: “We can make our errors in a 
thought and reject them in another thought, leaving no trace of error in 
us. Comment and percolate. Sooner or later the bladder must be emp-
tied, leaving no trace of urine in us. Explicate and connect. The grey base 
of the olive-tree darkens and steams a little” (Out 53).
 These easy prescriptions, these spurious “techniques,” cannot heal 
the trauma. Yet, amidst these false cures, hints of possible connections 
and possible meanings appear. The new instruments of narrative just 
might detect a meaningful moment before it is quickly erased: “A peri-
scope, held backwards, might perhaps reveal whether the turning away 
of the red network of veins and the moving off, beyond the red poin-
settias, of the broad-brimmed hat over the deeply lined red neck has 
been totally accomplished, or whether there has been another turn, and 
a pause, and a watching there still” (Out 39). A look, a phrase of dia-
logue—something possible but not verifiable “happens” in the novel, 
before suffering the typical fate of erasure. One is left with a fleeting 
sense of emotional connection, a pale shadow of what real human inter-
action might look like. Narrative conjectures, narrative investments in 
possibilities, however quickly “erased,” begin to take on a resonance.
 Thus, out of the strict lipogrammatic denials of the prose—a prose 
without history, author, narrator, or story—some emotional valence sur-
vives. Here, a comment Brooke-Rose makes about Robbe-Grillet’s exper-
imental program is helpful. In her review of Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy, 
Brooke-Rose praises his experimental technique but goes on to say: “To 
me, however, the most fascinating aspect of Robbe-Grillet is the extent 
to which his novels come off best where he fails these theories, investing 
objects, willy-nilly, with emotional and moral significance . . . ” (“Review 
of Jealousy” 74–76). Within the Petri dish, the human organism strangely 
adapts. Within the cold, withholding narrative Brooke-Rose deliberately 
constructs in her novel, objects and perceptions are invested with emo-
tional significance. Constraints produce adaptations. Even lost words 
can become valuable: “The dialogue runs smoothly along the kindness 
in the soft black eyes, orchestrated by a depth of racial memory. . . . The 
dialogue flatters as the smooth face turns its curved oblongs of reflected 
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sunlight off towards the olive grove and a monologue moves away on 
the other side of the dark neck and the crinkly black ball . . . ” (Out 
181). What emerges in the narrative of Out is a certain poignancy, for 
despite the politics of amnesia on the part of the strong and the strategy 
of emotional avoidance on the part of the weak, iteration, conjecture, 
enumeration of possibilities, begin to look like desire.
 In Out, Brooke-Rose breaks the rules of the French rule-breakers. 
In her essay on narrative transgression in the nouveau roman, she 
points out the near absence of both “heterodiegetic analepsis (refer-
ence to a prior event told by an external narrator outside the charac-
ters) and “marked prolepsis, which gives story information in advance 
(the canonic ‘we shall see later that’ or ‘I never saw/was never to see 
him again’)” (“Transgressions” in Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 314). In her own 
novel, however, a strange form of marked prolepse does make repeated 
appearances in the following refrain: “Sooner or later some interruption 
will be necessary” (Out 11); “Sooner or later movement, which is neces-
sary but not inevitable, will lead to attainment” (Out 16). This is hardly 
a case of imparting “story information in advance.” Indeed, the distinc-
tion between sooner and later doesn’t really matter in this prison of 
iteration. Yet, the repetition of the phrase begins to seem like a mantra, 
an insistence that sooner or later, some events WILL occur. The phrase 
“Sooner or later some interruption will be necessary” reintroduces the 
desire for a plot. Both the protagonist and the narrative need motivation 
and the exigencies of storytelling (even experimental storytelling that 
jettisons “story” and “history”) demand it. The boredom in the phrase 
gives birth to the possibility of prediction. Instead of the sentimental 
occurrences of plot in a conventional novel, propositions gather emo-
tional effects as they begin to resemble desire.
 The novel closes, however, not with hope, but with a dream of anni-
hilation. Ultimately, in Out, Brook-Rose refuses to sentimentalize these 
moments or to have them function as more than a trace. At the end 
of the novel, the white man dreams of a funeral pyre, the site of the 
extinction of “the human element,” which “disintegrates and radiates 
into the huge consciousness of light, under the eyelids a gold triangle, 
a yellow shower” (Out 198). Inner and outer space converge in catastro-
phe. Another apocalypse is staged, albeit in dream mode: “A moment of 
agony, of burning flesh, an aspect of the human element disintegrating 
to ash, and you are dead. But that’s another story” (Out 198). The death 
of the dreamer leads to the birth of a new novel, a further chapter in 
the narrative of the dead white male. This Christ-like new “story” is 
the story told in Such, a novel that records the near-death experience of 
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another white male, who returns, like Christ and Lazarus, from the dead 
and is “reborn.”
 In Out, the elements of traditional narration are obsolete; humanity 
itself is a dead letter. Some historical event has altered the trajectory of 
history, some event strong enough to destabilize the tenacious racial 
structure of power and domination. This new world, this “nouvum” 
requires a whole new calculus of emotions, of ethics, of politics. In a 
world where man can only project ecstasy onto flies and where “recum-
bent humanity” is scrutinized by instruments of science as coldly and 
efficiently as amoeba under a microscope, sentimentality is obsolete. Yet 
out of the constraints, out of the deliberate deprivations of traditional 
techniques, something new, something painful, and something powerful 
is created. The novel ends. We move OUT. We are evicted.
“We had a dream. It’s a disgrace.” If one were to search for an analogous 
piece of fiction as cold and deliberately unlovable and unloving as Out, 
one might propose J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, one of the most demanding 
novels emerging out of the earth-shaking reversals that have occurred 
in South Africa with the end of apartheid. “A risk to own anything: a 
car, a pair of shoes, a packet of cigarettes. Not enough to go around, not 
enough cars, shoes, cigarettes. Too many people, too few things . . . ” 
(98). Coetzee’s novel is in the present tense, like Brooke-Rose’s. Like 
Out, it deliberately eschews the comforts of most fiction, like narrative 
retrospection and identification with a sympathetic consciousness—the 
Enlightenment calculus of emotions and knowledge that has underwrit-
ten the tradition of the novel.8 Like the white man in Out, Coetzee’s 
protagonist, Lurie, is a former humanist, a humanities teacher who loses 
his job after an affair with a student. Abjected from society, he is neither 
abject nor apologetic. During the course of the novel, he tries to come 
to grips with the rape of his only daughter as well as an “offer” of pro-
tection and a kind of marriage from the taciturn and angry Petrus, the 
gardener on his daughter’s farm. Both class and color reversals of power 
occur in postapartheid South Africa. Like the man in Brooke-Rose’s 
novel, Lurie is a white man so off-center and off-putting that he tests the 
reader’s patience and powers of identification. Like Out, Disgrace refuses 
to represent either art or truth and reconciliation as panaceas that will 
undo the pain of a history of racism and oppression. Like Brooke-Rose, 
Coetzee links technique with survival, new “techniques for living.” The 
tone and tense of prose narrative respond to the growing uncertain-
ties, the new configurations of desire, the demand to address the past 
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without pretending to erase it. “A tape-recorder might perhaps reveal 
certain phrases that came and went, leaving no trace of error in us,” we 
read in Out (Out 57), but for both Coetzee and Brooke-Rose, the trace 
remains. In both novels, the present is, indeed, a sentence, an effect that 
bears the painful traces of the past but does not neatly assign it a place 
in retrospective knowledge. Both authors trust the genre of the novel to 
represent the painful residue of this suffering, but it is a novel radically 
reformed. For both, technique fuses form and content in presenting a 
disgraced and scorched environment. A new kind of fiction is needed, 
one that casts a cold eye on life, on death.
Such: 
the death and amazing recovery oF the 
White male (1966)
“A moment of agony, of burning flesh, an aspect of the human ele-
ment disintegrating to ash, and you are dead. But that’s another story” 
(Out 198). Such is that other story, a story, if one can call it that, of a 
dead psychiatrist named Laurence, whose heart, we learn only later, 
has stopped on the operating table.9 Clinically dead, Larry has been 
placed in a coffin and buried before the first page of the novel. The 
novel begins without attributing a name or form to the consciousness 
recorded in the first paragraphs: “Silence says the notice on the stairs 
and the stairs creak. Or something creaks in the absolute dark, the 
notice having come and gone like things. Someone creaks, leveling out 
nails perhaps with the pronged side of a hammer . . . Voices hang on 
a glimpse of five moons, five planets possibly. The layers of my atmo-
sphere, however, distort the light waves traveling through it and upset 
the definition” (203). The juxtaposition of the possessive pronoun and 
the cosmic distance unsettles the reader’s perspective. It is impossible 
to know where we are.
 Brooke-Rose has called the novel her “least ‘mimetic,’” and points 
out that it began only with a sentence that she thought of as she heard 
the noise of creaking stairs in a hotel somewhere in Portugal. The sen-
tence grew “out of what was neither a technical nor a philosophical 
idea” (Stories,	 Theories	 and	 Things 14); nevertheless, thematically, Such 
takes the premise of Out one step further and stages the death, rather 
than the dying, of the protagonist. How does a writer tell a story of 
a dead white male, a writer who is interested in experimenting with 
fiction and departing from canons and clichés? A woman writer who 
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wishes to depart from and at the same time is drawn, almost compul-
sively, to the “banality of the same untender story” of flawed relation-
ships between men and women? In Out, Brooke-Rose represents the 
dying gasp of this subject in a text that focused on the “white” in the 
complex subject of the “dead white male.” As she tells the story in Sto-
ries,	Theories	 and	Things, in the summer of 1964, after writing Out, she 
began a new novel about a simultaneous translator of undetermined sex, 
but became “totally blocked until, some three years and another novel 
later, this simultaneous interpreter became a woman” (Stories,	Theories	
and	Things 6). Such is the novel she wrote in the summers of 1964 and 
1965, after dropping the as yet untitled novel Between “in despair” (Sto-
ries,	Theories	and	Things 14). In Such, the white male is given one more 
shot in a story in which he dies and is reborn.
 Thus the story of the death and rebirth of the white male in Such is 
an allegory of his fate in Brooke-Rose’s hands. The dead white male is 
resurrected as a subject one more time; Laurence, Larry, Lazarus, Some-
one (all names used in the narrative for the main consciousness) arises 
after three days and three nights of his death experience, struggling to 
remember the “journey” he took while lying unconscious. The novel 
is divided into two parts: Part I begins with his fantastic astronomical 
voyage, a drama that represents the workings of his unconscious as he 
experiences the death of the body. It ends with the staged “heat death” 
of the universe, the point of maximum entropy (and minimum energy 
for work), a universal death that corresponds to Larry’s own death wish. 
Part II begins with Larry now “reborn,” returning to his life and gazing 
in the mirror, struggling with the “nebulous memory” (Such 336 [pun 
intended]) of his bizarre journey: “[I]nside the mirror the tall thin man 
stares back, as before death, before recovery, as when life took its normal 
course through blood vessels, nerve fibres, muscle spindles, bones, flesh 
and	such” (Such 335; my italics).
 According to the OED,	 “such” is “a demonstrative word used to 
indicate the quality or quantity of a thing by reference to that of another 
or with respect to the effect that it produces or is capable of producing.” 
Brooke-Rose points out that “such” is the only “adjectival title” among 
the prepositional titles in her Omnibus collection (Invisible	Author 54). 
The word points to what comes before or after, either continuing or 
summarizing what has been said or proposing a new comparison. In 
the sentence quoted above from Part 2 of the novel that describes the 
life of the body, with its nerves, muscles, organs, blood, bones, “flesh 
and	such,” the phrase alludes to what has come before. It functions like 
“etcetera,” confirming what has been, the ordinary, the habitual, the 
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known. But nothing about this novel takes the ordinary for granted. 
Larry’s near-death experience jolts “ordinary” human existence off its 
axis. During his near-death experience, the former physicist turned psy-
chiatrist has his certainties blasted, including the explanations of life 
provided by both physics and psychoanalysis. Although his “death and 
amazing recovery” (223; 247) is the story journalists and scientists alike 
want to hear, Larry finds this story impossible to tell.
 Indeed, the bizarre psychic journey Larry takes in Part 1 of Such can 
only be told in metaphoric terms: it is not life “and such,” but life “such 
as” only astrophysics can describe it. The narrative in Part 1 turns life 
inside out, the psychic journey told as star trek. As Sarah Birch, Michela 
Canepari-Labib, and Christine Brooke-Rose herself have pointed out, the 
novel relies on a fundamental analogy between inner and outer space 
and draws its technique from the language of astrophysics.10 Astrophys-
ics, or the application of the theories and methods of physics to the 
study of stellar structure, evolution, and origin, is applied to both Lar-
ry’s psyche in Part 1 and his “posthumous” views of his relationships 
with other people once he comes back to life. In Such, Brooke-Rose takes 
the study of the waves emitted and absorbed by celestial bodies and 
uses it as a metaphor for the distances between people. “I had discov-
ered,” she says in Stories,	Theories	 and	Things “that scientific language, 
when taken ‘literally’ (non-scientifically) becomes metaphoric” (14). In 
Invisible	Author, she describes Larry as “a man who has died briefly and 
sees distances between people as a radio telescope sees the stars” (58). 
Larry registers loneliness, relationship, anger, jealousy in terms of the 
movement of radio waves and subatomic particles. A woman “bom-
bards the square room with the particles of a vague discontent” (Such 
282). The rival who seduces Larry’s wife while he is technically dead is 
described as riding her “in the nearby remoteness of his ulterior motive 
which I read like the distant stars” (Such 228). Terms that we normally 
use to describe the defenses and vulnerabilities of human communica-
tion, such as emotional “opacity” or “resistance” are restored to their 
physical origins, sometimes passing from dead to live metaphor in a 
single instance. “Something,” the woman cicerone who accompanies 
him on his journey like Dante’s Virgil, tells him, “And so I find it hard 
to get through to you. The layers of atmosphere distort the light waves 
traveling through it and upset the definition” (Such 236). Just as the 
parabolic dish focuses radio waves into a concentrated signal that is 
filtered and amplified, we read of “parabolic gestures that create situa-
tions,” and “angular attitudes that send things off into elliptical orbits 
until the crowd yells, hisses, stamps its feet” (Such 362).
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 The psychiatrist who has spent his life “collecting silences,” attempt-
ing to separate himself from the chaos, need, and burdens of human 
responsibility, experiences the breakdown of the barriers he has erected. 
He begins to hear things he never heard before, an emotional music of 
the spheres:
the vibrant hum of waves merging, doubling, trebling each other and 
overlapping, expanding, bursting the walls, the street, the entire sky 
in ultra-violet light when before dawn the degree of ionization in the 
lower atmosphere has fallen off and the higher layer then reflects, 
something at least. (Such 363)
 “Something” is not only his female guide during his fantastic jour-
ney, but also a part of his own psyche, like all his guides on this fantastic 
journey. Something seems to function as the voice of Eros or the life 
instincts within him, combating Thanatos, the death drive. She is the 
force toward connection, toward creating greater unities; she represents 
the instincts of self-preservation and union. (I will return to this Freud-
ian landscape in a moment.)
 Creating what one might call a series of subjective correlatives, 
Brooke-Rose maps outer space onto the deeper psychic level of instincts 
and drives. Thus, the vehicle in which Something and Someone travel 
is a “means of communication” with his own psyche first and foremost. 
It is a “programming of . . . basic urges with Erase, Shift Count, Inhibit” 
(292). Their vehicle
drives heavily from bump to bump, holding the road well with its 
thousand hundredweight. The driving depends on perfect co-ordina-
tion between Something and me. I watch the fuel, manipulate the gears, 
she keeps the speed steady and handles the steering wheel. The little 
orange lights flicker like stars on the grey control panel, each over well-
lit letters that say Erase, Uninhibit, Shift Count, Pot Drawer, One-shot 
trigger and things like that. We thus have no need for a back-seat driver 
and our two sons can sleep behind the tarpaulin. (260)
 The mechanisms of “drives” are comically literalized in the vari-
ous vehicles that transport Someone and Something over land, sea, 
and space. In creating a landscape that doubles inner and outer space, 
Brooke-Rose plays on the overly literal acceptance of Freudian topolo-
gies of the unconscious and transforms it into a poetic scenario. In her 
essay, “Id is, is id?,” first published in Discourse	 in	 Psychoanalysis	 and	
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Literature, reprinted in Stories,	Theories	and	Things, she criticizes the “cer-
tain literalness” of some Freudian disciples in their faithful acceptance 
of a “new theology” (“Id is, is id?” 37) of the unconscious. She acknowl-
edges, however, Freud’s own poetic use of topology in his “incredible 
search for a mechanical analogy” to psychic processes, like memory and 
the unconscious (35). “Freud himself was a poet in this respect, and as 
poet and doctor he gave an explanation of the functioning of the uncon-
scious on an (as yet then unelaborated) model of human languages, 
an explanation which was both neurologically and linguistically more 
satisfying than he perhaps fully understood at the time” (37).
 Critiquing the rigidity of Freudian typology, Brooke-Rose bends 
Freud’s dynamic and linguistic models of the psyche to her own pur-
poses in Such. According to Freud, instincts, or drives, bridge the gap 
between “the somatic and the mental” (Laplanche and Pontalis 364). 
His dynamic model represents “psychical phenomena as the outcome 
of the conflict and of a combination of forces—ultimately instinctual in 
origin—which exert a certain pressure” (Laplanche and Pontalis 126). In 
Freud’s model, the word “‘dynamic’ is employed in particular to charac-
terize the unconscious, in so far as a permanent pressure is maintained 
there which necessitates a contrary force—operating on an equally per-
manent basis—to stop it from reaching consciousness” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 126). The analogy between the physical and psychical journey 
in Such, with its concentration on energies and forces, borrows from 
the language of astrophysics in order to describe relationships and psy-
chic processes. But it is related as well to the dynamic landscape of the 
Freudian psyche, itself based on an economic view of quantities of ener-
gies that flow and conflict with one another. Indeed, as Laplanche and 
Pontalis point out, the original context of Freud’s ideas of “free” and 
“bound” psychical energies was the second principle of thermodynamics 
(gradual loss of energy) (172).
 The relation between the physical and mental is also established in 
the dual career of Larry, the physicist turned psychiatrist who works 
in a department of astrophysics in a university. A “scientist” with two 
vocabularies for mapping the universe, ironically he has so repressed his 
own desires that it is only through the experience of his death that he 
breaks through the resistances he has built up over a lifetime of denial. 
Professor Head, a colleague in the department and the wise spokesper-
son for an advanced scientific theory that still admits the mystery of the 
universe, tells Larry that physicists attempt to obtain answers from the 
particles of the universe while psychiatrists attempt to map the “geom-
etries of the soul.” Speaking to Larry during his recovery, Professor 
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Head upholds the physicist’s approach: “We do our best. We tap the 
silent telephones of outer space, we bounce our questions on the galax-
ies which answer out of aeons. But they give no names, no explanations, 
only infinities of calculations. You on the other hand give names to the 
complex geometries of the soul, you explain perhaps, but do you heal, 
within space-time I mean. These maps represent something, certainly, 
but not the ultimate mystery of the first creation that has gone for ever 
with its scar inside one huge unstable atom” (271).
 Before his death, Larry has deluded himself into thinking that label-
ing is the same as therapy, the removal of a scar. His method of analysis 
represents the most leaden application of Freud. But Larry’s experience 
of death helps him discover the limitations of this notion of therapeutic 
cure. After returning from his “journey,” Larry announces his resigna-
tion from the hospital staff. He says, “For a long time I’ve had no future 
as a spy. The great failure of our century. We give names to sicknesses, 
but we don’t heal, merely create new dependencies” (341). This realiza-
tion takes place in the context of the more or less “realistic” dialogue 
that dominates Part II of the text after his “rebirth” (still punctuated by 
long sections of the “nebulous” memory of his experience). Something 
makes the same accusation in the fantasy world of the dream journey in 
Part 1. She accuses him of hiding behind his psychiatric labels, what she 
calls his “five geometries” (215). Something chastises Someone for the 
resistances he creates, the defenses that present him from truly “hear-
ing” what others are saying and understanding his own inner voices as 
well. His “atmospheric density” gets in the way (217). In a sense, his 
heart has been dead before it literally stops on the operating table. When 
he returns to life in Part II, his wife, Brenda, tells him that the doctors 
could find nothing organically wrong with him, “just nerves” (305).
 In an explicit reference to Dante, Larry makes his journey “midway 
through life in the dark wood” (303). His “mid-life crisis” fuses the more 
typical meaning in ordinary parlance with a more radical turn from 
mid-life to brief death. His journey into death is a stripping away of 
the defenses that enable him to shut out both his own inner voices and 
the needs of others. It is Something who counsels him in this process, 
literally giving birth to the layers of Someone’s psychic development 
and helping him to recognize them. At the beginning of the novel, the 
as yet unnamed dead man climbs out of his coffin to find himself in a 
landscape that is both an interior of a building—an amphitheatre (part 
operating theatre and part theater of the absurd, with actors going up 
and down the stairs)—and an interstellar space, replete with five moons 
or planets: “Between each desk of the amphitheatre the floor sinks like 
d e a d  w h I T e  m a l e s 45|
a blanket of interstellar cloud. The silence has a creaking quality” (204). 
On the “outer orbit,” an unnamed woman appears, who describes her-
self as a “girl-spy.” A dialogue follows, as the man tries to orient him-
self:
——Don’t you have a name?
——Do you need to tell me apart?
——No, but I’d like to call you something.
——All right then, call me Something.
——Wouldn’t you like to call me something too?
——Oh, no, we’d only get confused.
 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
——But I don’t know my name.
——You will. In the meantime, if you insist, I’ll call you Someone. 
(205)
“Something” carries a row of quintuplets, born, as in Greek myth, from 
part of her anatomy, in this case from her knee. They are described as 
planets, moons, or cylinders. Someone wants the children to be baptized 
and in an elaborate “naming” process, Jonas the trumpeter plays the 
five children into existence. These astral blues brothers and sisters take 
their names from jazz classics: Gut Bucket Blues, Potato Head Blues, 
Tin Roof Blues, Dippermouth Blues, and Really the Blues. Each plan-
etary “child” moves off into orbit. The planetary “children” are “slices” 
of himself, impulses or “cylinders” which drive him but that he ban-
ishes from acknowledgment. Someone initially believes that baptism 
“doesn’t just give names, it gets rid of the original cause” (207), but 
Something protests that naming does the work of repression only tem-
porarily: “—Only for a time, Someone. The original cause comes back. 
You don’t understand much, do you?” (207) and “—Oh, they’ll come 
back. Things do” (206). Each of the “children” will return during Part 
1 of the novel. Thus, although Someone wants to jettison his burdens, 
he finds they return, like boomerangs: “—We all remain,” Tin Roof tells 
him. “You can’t get rid of us merely by giving us names and sending us 
into oblivion. Oblivion has its orbits, like everything, you know that” 
(329). Getting in touch with his inner child, as a new age ideology might 
put it, he hears the voices of earlier selves buried within him.
 Larry’s journey is thus both a family vacation from hell and an inner 
descent in which he regresses to encounter the various psychic layers of 
his own development. The five planetary children come back to sing the 
blues, the drives and desires that Larry has tried to repress. Not until 
C h a p T e r  246 |
he “suffers the children to come” (328), as Tin Roof puts it, does the 
physician heal himself. Larry must recognize the “cylinders” that drive 
him, including the “ticking of [his] time” (328), his own mortality, and 
the most basic of human instincts, according to Freud, the death drive.
 These planetary children, then, represent different aspects of Lar-
ry’s psyche. The age of each child doubles the age of the previous one: 
Three-year-old Dippermouth (who has a clock face, tells time and, 
occasionally, screams in alarm), expresses, according to Brooke-Rose, 
“a small child’s need of constant attention, the times expressing only 
smile and opposite” (Brooke-Rose, e-mail, 10/20/03). Dippermouth is 
the first basic indicator of Larry’s flawed “means of communication” 
(“You can’t photograph means of communication that work by magnetic 
impulses, except as they appear on dials,” Telford, an old friend, later 
tells Larry, “and the viewer soon gets bored with dials and wavy lines 
and mathematical formulae” [367]). The three-year-old Dippermouth is 
followed by Gut Bucket, with the deeper and more contained emotional 
life of the six-year-old, and then Potato Head, the more opaque twelve-
year-old girl (Brooke-Rose has called her “the opposite sex aspect of 
any psyche at that age, very affectionate but dumb, i.e., not really rec-
ognized” [Brooke-Rose e-mail, 10/20/03]). Tin Roof, the outspoken and 
“unscreened” twenty-four-year-old, is next, and, finally, the adult reality 
(Really) of the psychiatrist at forty-eight (328) (According to Brooke-
Rose, Really represents “the illusion we have at any adult age that 
our then reality is THE reality” (Brooke-Rose, e-mail, 10/20/03). In his 
journey into death and the unconscious, full of violence, danger, and 
romance, forgotten parts of Larry’s existence are “reborn,” returning 
with all the ferociousness of intergalactic gasses. He finds “a forgotten 
area of particles that come whirling back to form filaments of gas in 
violent motion or extragalactic nebulae colliding perhaps on the outer 
rim” (390). The flesh and blood man dies and is reborn to middle-aged 
reality, the “sort of presence to hold on to” (305). But he comes back 
to life only after he has experienced the nadir, his own death, and the 
decay and degeneration that “lies inherent in all living existence” (303). 
Like Marlow in Conrad’s novel, he is indelibly marked by his trip to the 
heart of darkness. But through his bitter knowledge, Larry returns to life 
equipped with a deeper recognition of his own relation to others: “I feel 
that during my death I became everyone I know, even my patients per-
haps, whose names and the names of whose neuroses I can’t remember, 
whose aggressions, inabilities and blindnesses I have absorbed over the 
years, unless mine perhaps” (304), Larry confesses to Professor Head. 
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This oceanic feeling is a prelude to a greater ability to “read” other 
people’s distances and desires.
 His death journey leads Larry toward understanding that he must 
relinquish the fantasy of the precision of language and the map of iden-
tity, both as former physicist and as psychiatrist. The scientist “works 
wonders with the precision of his language” and “arabesques his way 
through the equations of energy contained until the chemistry of anger 
and hurt pride lies quietly balanced in the test-tube, on a dial, on a 
page that turns a new leaf full of squares and lines intersecting, circles, 
tangents and cubes, curves too, and the light turns the days into a fifth 
dimension” (285). Yet, despite the inspiring set of metaphors that astro-
physics provides for the novel, science’s pretense to precision in map-
ping the psyche is treated with great skepticism. Larry/Lazarus must 
content himself with the free energy in language, its errant combinations 
and uncontrolled detours: “Words drop into the overlapping rings that 
lasso out to catch faces, voices that swim for dear life through the heavy 
water, some drown, some float, some gasp in the chilly depth” (377). 
Larry contents himself, too, with the indeterminacy of identity, the phil-
osophical principle extrapolated from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Prin-
ciple. As Elizabeth, Stan’s wife, says at the end of the novel, “—So we 
all pretend to come and go as fully ourselves. And all the time millions 
and millions of particles of us have combined with others or escaped 
into various orbits to return to us ultimately” (388). Elizabeth tells him 
“You used to say . . . Someone would come along and find a unified 
theory that would do away with indeterminate interpretations, you’d 
say, and revert to causality. I thought perhaps you might” and Larry 
answers, “But I didn’t. In the meantime we do the best we can, some of 
us preferring to pretend causality exists, and others, others preferring 
to prefer its absence” (387).
 In Such, then, “root” causes are exposed as fictions; scientists, like 
writers, participate in “acts of faith.” As Professor Head tells Larry, 
mathematics at the level of astrophysics is like fiction: both start with 
a working hypothesis, producing “something” out of nothing, some-
thing not to be confused with absolute truth or cause. Professor Head’s 
counsel differs from other male characters in Larry’s dream and waking 
life, who attempt to find the “cause” of his illness—physicians, lawyers, 
physicists. Their “small and nervous handwriting fills the page at wide 
impersonal intervals like an equation worked down to the very end and 
frozen there in resolution as if x could really equal the square root of 
minus one” (340).
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 Michela Canepari-Labib reads Such as an “attack” on psychoanalysis 
(Canepari-Labib 45), particularly Freudian psychoanalysis. Yet, I would 
argue that although Brooke-Rose makes fun of Freudian orthodoxy, 
she makes use of both the dynamism of Freud’s model of the psyche, 
in which energy flows, is blocked, and transfers from object to object, 
and his views of language and its relation to the unconscious. Even 
Brooke-Rose’s uncharacteristic reliance on the form of dialogue (found 
to this extent only in Xorandor), enacts a kind of analytic situation. As 
Benveniste put it in “Remarks on the Function of Language in Freudian 
Theory”:
All through Freudian analysis it can be seen that the subject makes use 
of the act of speech and discourse in order to ‘represent himself’ to 
himself as he wishes to see himself and as he calls upon the ‘other’ to 
observe him. His discourse is appeal and recourse, a sometimes vehe-
ment substitution of the other through discourse in which he figures 
himself desperately . . . through the sole fact of addressing another, the 
one who is speaking of himself installs the other in himself. . . . Lan-
guage [langage] is thus used here as the act of speech [parole], converted 
into that expression of instantaneous and elusive subjectivity which 
forms the condition of dialogue. (Benveniste 67)
Like the “other” in analysis, Something is attentive both to the gaps or 
lapses in Someone’s speech and his substitutions. Telford, who seeks 
to betray Larry into disclosing his secret story, is his “twin” (361), his 
interlocutor.11
 The language games in Such	resemble the mechanisms of displace-
ment and substitution in dreams and jokes, which can offer the “royal 
road to the unconscious,” according to Freud. Particularly in Jokes	and	their	
Relation	 to	 the	Unconscious, Freud emphasizes that unconscious wishes 
and fears censored in waking life find expression through abbreviation 
(condensation) or substitution by means of displacement, a process in 
which ordinary things take on great importance (165), or “indirect rep-
resentation,” almost any kind of connection, including a “similarity of 
sound” (172). Words are ‘bent’ in the dream and it is the work of analysis 
to “unbend” them, so to speak, to understand the dreamwork and its 
relation to the latent content of the dream. As James Strachey says in 
his editor’s preface to Jokes	and	their	Relation	to	the	Unconscious, “it was 
inevitable that as soon as Freud began his close investigation of dreams 
he would be struck by the frequency with which structures resembling 
jokes figure in the dreams themselves or their associations” (4). Freud 
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points out that a “favorite definition of joking has long been the ability 
to find similarity between dissimilar things—that is, hidden similarities” 
(11). He goes on to say that this idea itself has been expressed in joking 
form: “Joking is the disguised priest who weds every couple” (11).
 Brooke-Rose’s “mapping” of psychic processes and human rela-
tionships onto the vocabulary and principles of astrophysics “bends” 
language, like light waves. Something castigates Someone for building 
up his “resistance,” his “density,” so that verbal communication with 
him is distorted. In astrophysical terms, gravitational pull and density 
bend light waves; likewise, Someone’s density creates the bending, even 
breaking, of laws and of words. Right when he emerges from the coffin, 
Someone thinks, “The layers of my atmosphere, however, distort the 
light waves traveling through it and upset the definition” (203), that is, 
the normal denotation of words. “You chose the way of unconsciousness 
which bends words to breaking point,” Something later tells Someone. 
“I told you it would take a long time to unbend them and bring them 
back to life. You’ll have to do exercises” (220). Something is the coach 
for this “unbending” process; Larry’s “resistance” and “blindness,” 
are countered by Something’s encouragement to analysis. Although he 
repeatedly says he does not dream, Larry’s experience with death func-
tions like dreaming, exposing his unconscious fears and desires in lan-
guage (and at one point he admits to having a “peculiar dream” [229]). 
As “girl-spy,” Something exerts a kind of analytic pressure, an impulse 
toward clarification of latent meanings. In particular, she instructs him 
in a basic principle of both physics and psychoanalysis—that energy 
passes through matter, a principle that Larry, despite his professional 
training, has failed to understand. Abstract ideas express themselves 
in “things” in a process of displacement. “You have to use the word 
something” [to speak of people’s essences],” Professor Head says at one 
point. “We all communicate through things, superficial things mostly” 
(284). It is no accident that one of the vehicles the “family” takes on its 
journey is a “sort of cigar-shaped” conveyance, perhaps a joking refer-
ence to Freud’s phallic landscape in which a cigar is never just a cigar. 
Something tries to be the medium through which Larry understands 
how the tangled web of words operates. This process of unbending the 
meaning of words is painful, as Someone continually tells Something.
 As Freud shows in Jokes	 and	Their	Relation	 to	 the	Unconscious, jokes 
themselves appear frequently in dreams. Larry’s death-dream landscape 
is like a comedy club for stand-up, a place where wisecracks and punch-
lines abound. The atmosphere moves between a surreal or comic strip 
animation (Tin Roof takes off the top of his head and eats the contents 
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of his own mind) and slapstick (fat ladies sit on unwilling dead men). 
We hear repeatedly that Larry the psychiatrist, “dies laughing,” a phrase 
that itself exemplifies the way dead metaphors, like Lazarus, come back 
to life in Brooke-Rose’s novel. Every opportunity to remind us of the 
“root” meaning (the square root?) of expressions is taken. “Words are a 
plastic material with which one can do all kinds of things,” Freud com-
ments. “There are words which, when used in certain connections, have 
lost their original full meaning, but which regain it in other connections” 
(Jokes, 34). The ticker tape parade to celebrate Larry’s life-saving hero-
ics has the crowd “flush[ing] with pride” which, in this landscape of 
regression, merges with the flush of a toilet: “the lavatory flushes full, I 
flush with pride. . . . The whole town flushes with delight” (288). Stance 
(his wife’s lover) tells Larry, “Why don’t you take a trip? I can fix it for 
you in a jiffy” and his wife says, “—How do you know, says my wife 
on the quick verbal uptake for lack of deeper satisfaction, that he wants 
to travel in a jiffy./Laugh, I thought I’d died” (227). “Uptake” is both 
verbal and physical; vehicles of conveyance are carriers of meaning, 
both within and above the speed of sound. “You might as well ask for 
the moon” (239) Something tells Someone, and literally, he does, when 
he searches for Dippermouth.
 Double entendres comically literalize verbal expressions: Larry’s 
flesh-and-blood life before death has him consistently “breaking prom-
ises” to other people; and in the dream landscape, these “breaks” are 
restored to their physical properties: “when you break your word, it cre-
ates density and upsets the definition” (235), Something tells him. Like 
the word “uptake,” the word “comeback” puns on the central plot situ-
ation of Larry’s return from death and his penchant for repartee. Upon 
Larry’s “comeback” from death, the first dialogue between Someone 
and Something (already quoted) is like a stand-up routine, reminiscent 
of the old classic, “Who’s on first?” (“—Do you need to tell me apart?/ 
—No, but I’d like to call you something./—all right then, call me Some-
thing./—Wouldn’t you like to call me something too?/—Oh, no, we’d 
only get confused” (205). The story of his inner journey is like an inside 
joke the journalists seek to tell the waiting public: “—How did it feel 
exactly repeat feel exactly query what did the joke fat woman unjoke 
say did you die laughing pardon me you see she said you didn’t cry 
unpardon if I may get in a query edgeways query . . . no comment I feel 
sick don’t puff your cigar-shape at me comment has humour expand 
human touch your end my reply” (222–23). If the phrase “cigar-shape” 
signals the phallic landscape of the Freudian dream, here it evokes the 
territory of Groucho Marx, delivering his one-liners with a flick of cigar 
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ash and rapidly raised eyebrows. “To every man his own afterlife if any” 
(339), Larry tells his lawyer, in a parody of Marx’s famous dictum, but 
Groucho is a more apt genius than Karl in the novel.12
 Although Larry would prefer to travel above the speed of words 
(supersonic) because he “collects silences” (210), Something under-
stands that words themselves are the messy “means of communication” 
(211). Again, in her role as girl-spy, she demonstrates her understand-
ing of the secret life of words. While Larry tries to use words to fix and 
distinguish separate entities, Something encourages him to recognize 
the messy interaction between words and things. At one point, Larry 
makes explicit the relation between understanding his experience and 
getting the joke: “—Or have you lost contact with base? Base! Ha! Now 
I understand. When you say you follow your instructions you mean 
you follow your base instincts. Well, why didn’t you say so? All this 
talk of laws and meridians within, you had me quite perplexed. Good 
girl. Come let me rouse your base instincts” (237). At a moment when 
Someone comes to understand the workings of his own desire, he finds 
the pleasure of the joke, an experience that Freud describes as a “sudden 
release of intellectual tension, and then all at once the joke is there—as a 
rule ready-clothed in words” (Jokes 167). The sexual instinct teams with 
the pleasure of the joke to allow the discharge of energy. Reading Such 
participates in such pleasures as well. This is the pleasure of noticing 
the recurrent play on words between the “big bang” theory of creation 
(233) and the “kiss kiss bang bang,” the sex and aggression, which char-
acterize the interactions among characters (231, 373). In a jumble of like 
sounds of the kind Freud describes, Jonas blends with Jonah who has 
been inside the whale and is a typological figure for Lazarus/Larry. And 
there is a further play between Freud’s “oceanic” feeling described in 
many near-death experiences (and attributed to religious feeling) and 
the ocean in which Jonah is swallowed by the whale—”Ah sure done 
swallow an oceanful of sand crossing Jordan in dat big big fish” (290).
 If science replaces religion as the great story of the twentieth century, 
Freud’s schema of warring drives provides a twentieth-century mythol-
ogy of the soul. “The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. 
Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness” (from 
New	 Introductory	 Lectures	 on	 Psycho-Analysis, quoted in Laplanche and 
Pontalis [216]).
 In “The Dissolution of Character in the Novel,” Brooke-Rose refers 
to Freud as a potential earlier source of the death of character than the 
French writers of the nouveau roman. She refers to “Freud on dreams 
and the case histories so much more convincing than any subsequent 
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ghosts of fiction” (Brooke-Rose, “Dissolution of Character” 186). If the 
classical novel is dead, along with the past tense narration of realist 
novels, science and psychoanalysis may momentarily revive interest in 
the dead white male who served as their protagonist. One could say 
that they offer a “post-dissolution” narrative possibility. In borrowing 
the poetry of the stars and the supple words of dreams, Brooke-Rose 
performs the magic rite of restoring the dead—character and novel both. 
She turns a human body into whirling atoms and human interaction into 
bombarding particles. At the end of the novel, the narrative sentence, 
the scientific present, reasserts itself. In the struggle with Elizabeth that 
seems to lead to Larry’s death, he loses his “I.” In Such, Brooke-Rose 
takes a telescopic view of human generation: “We love like ancient inno-
cents with a million years of indifference and despair within us that 
revolve like galaxies on a narrow shaft of light where hangs the terror 
in her eyes as the life drains away from blood-vessels . . . out of the story 
of a death and amazing recovery and into the unfinished unfinishable 
story of Dippermouth, Gut Bucket Blues, my sweet Potato Head, Tin 
Roof, Really, Something and me” (390). It is an “unfinishable” story 
because it is astronomical, psychic, and the never-ending story of the 
blues. In this lyrical evocation of our interstellar apathy, Brooke-Rose 
returns to the question of being, a problem which has also been referred 
to as the problem of the “as such” of philosophy, “the great phenom-
enologico-ontological question of the as	 such . . . the human subject or 
Dasein.”13
 The story of the dead white male is a sensational story of death and 
“amazing recovery” worthy of the British tabloids. “In narrative,” Wal-
ter Benjamin contends in his famous essay, “The Storyteller,” “death is 
the sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell” (Benjamin 94). 
Linking narrative endings with literal scenes of dying in fiction, Garrett 
Stewart writes in Death	Sentences:	Styles	of	Dying	in	British	Fiction, “We go 
to death scenes for the kind of knowledge that is knowledge only insofar 
as it is pure retrospect, wrenched free from supposed experience into 
containment and clarity, displaced from inarticulate pain, for instance, 
to epiphany” (Stewart 45). Yet what are we to make of Brooke-Rose’s 
refusal of “pure retrospect” in her characteristic narrative sentence? 
What does it mean to write a death sentence without the characteristic 
“authority” of narrative ending, the view from the deathbed, and to cre-
ate, instead, a “nebulous memory” constantly confused with the present 
and represented as cosmic voyage? Far from “containment and clarity,” 
Such presents instead a compulsion to repeat the traumatic experience, 
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as if under the pressure of analysis, a reliving rather than a recollection 
from a distance.
 As she stages the death of the white male protagonist, Brooke-Rose 
simultaneously stages the death of narrative as we know it. Or, more 
accurately, she stages the life and death of narrative in the fits and starts 
of the story, which, like Larry, threatens to abort in medias res. The 
death instincts “strive towards the reduction of tensions to zero-point. 
In other words, their goal is to bring the living being back to the inor-
ganic state” (Laplanche and Pontalis 97). Before the end of Part I of the 
novel, Larry confesses that he fears a second life more than he fears 
death: “I have acquired a painful sensitivity to noise, to radiation and 
to the taste of love degrading itself away in men and in myself until it 
levels itself completely and no shocks occur, no movement and no life 
around my staring eyes and I work out the square root of my time” 
(291). Such stages not only Larry’s death, but his death instinct, his 
movement toward quiescence and the end of desire. At these moments, 
the narrative itself is threatened with extinction. Indeed, between Part 
I and Part II of the novel, this extinction is enacted. The novel enacts 
its own point of maximum entropy, as it represents the heat death of 
the universe. In a standard definition, “Entropy indicates the degree to 
which a given quantity of thermal energy is available for doing useful 
work—the greater the entropy, the less available the energy” (Columbia	
Encyclopedia). Although energy cannot vanish, “it tends to be degraded 
from useful forms to useless ones. When the universe as a whole reaches 
maximum entropy, the temperature will be the same everywhere and 
no energy will be able to be converted into work. This is known as the 
‘heat death’ of the universe.”
 The male Someone begs to be released from the burden of his cen-
trality, that is, the narrative obligation to give shape to his experience 
of death, the one man come back to tell the story. Rather than fleeing 
from the lightness of being, he seeks refuge in it. He wants to relieve the 
pressure of attachments, figured as throwing the fat lady off his body. 
He wants, that is, to die. (“I don’t want to go back, I don’t, I don’t” 
[332], he says at the end of Part I, as the narrative approaches its own 
extinction mimetically). It is Larry’s children who save him, and since 
they are parts of himself, their rescue signals that in some recess of his 
outdated being, he desires to live on, to take on more being. Part II of 
the novel is his temporary stay of execution, a return to “some sort of 
presence, something to hold on to at least, such as a banister” (335–36), 
the flesh-and-blood instantiation of the middle-aged man.
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 In Reading	For	the	Plot:	Design	and	Intention	in	Narrative, Peter Brooks 
constructs a theory of narrative desire from Freud’s theory of the death 
instincts in Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle. Brooks sees the organism’s jour-
ney toward death as a model or “masterplot” for narrative desire and 
its progress toward its own end. According to this model, narrative is a 
dynamic model in which plot works itself out in narrative time between 
the two quiescent moments of beginning and end. “Plot,” Brooks says, 
“is a kind of divergence or deviance, a postponement in the discharge 
which leads back to the inanimate. For plot starts (or must give the illu-
sion of starting) from that moment at which story, or ‘life,’ is stimulated 
from quiescence into a state of narratability, into a tension, a kind of irri-
tation, which demands narration” (Brooks 103). In Such, the first novel 
in which Brooke-Rose says she found her voice, the moribund fictional 
relevance of the white male is revived along with Larry/Lazarus/Some-
one, in a narrative that flirts with its own extinction along the way. It 
is as if some of the irritation into narratability remains in the texture of 
the narrative. On the one hand, the tribulations of the male protagonist 
are meant to be representative, even allegorical. This allegory instills in 
the reader an identification with and sympathy for Larry’s predicament. 
On the other hand, the generic male is also gendered male and his rep-
resentation is mixed with an objectifying aggression. In the metaphors 
of incision, of clinical probing, invading and querying both his body and 
his mind, there is a sense of revenge, a surgical impulse to remove the 
layers of disappointment, blindness, infidelity and deception. Larry’s 
narrative “treatment” is more painful than his sudden death. The “sur-
geons cut carefully at the bark, removing it in quarter-cylindrical seg-
ments” (Such 218). Like the phantom limb in “The Foot” and the dying 
man in Out, the physicist turned psychiatrist has narrative “life” at the 
price of a certain abjection or surgical “cut.” Describing the predicament 
of character in the twentieth-century, Brooke-Rose says that characters 
are like “stray phalluses,” “swollen with words” (“The Dissolution of 
Character” 186). The image is one of castration—character as verbal 
fetish disguising the lack beneath. Here, Brooke-Rose refers to both male 
and female characters in the age of technology and popular culture. 
Indeed, her female “characters” are as supererogatory as her male—the 
classicist Mira in Amalgamemnon, like the unnamed dying man in Out, 
waits on an unemployment line, and characters, both male and female, 
in Textermination	are like ghosts.
 Yet when the woman, the object of desire, becomes the subject, 
something different occurs—an access of energy and tone of insistence, 
a note of prophetic warning. In Between, Thru, Amalgamemnon, and 
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Textermination, Brooke-Rose moves from the posthumous male to a 
female consciousness, a Cassandra-like figure who becomes the cen-
tral driver of her “disc/horse” (Thru). The ache of what’s missing is 
still palpable even in this fresh dramatization of female experience and 
female-centered narrative, but in Between, Amalgamemnon, and Textermi-
nation, where a female consciousness takes on these narrative burdens, 
she has the capacity to be in touch with both past and future amidst 
the sad waste of the present. “Some argue nevertheless that parts of a 
divided nucleus recede from one another at great speed, the shock pro-
cesses involving ejection of high energy particles that must ultimately 
form a human element, a star where the taste of love will increase its 
luminosity until it cools in quiet rage at all that tenderness that went to 
waste, accumulating only the degenerate matter of decay” (Such 390). 
The “Orphic discoveries” Stewart speaks of (on the deathbed) are repu-
diated; in lieu of epiphanies are these fading stars. The white male dies 
laughing. In 1966, Brooke-Rose returned to the simultaneous interpreter 
she had envisioned writing about in 1964. Only this time, she realized 
that the translator was a woman. Brooke-Rose’s “metastory” in Stories,	
Theories	 and	Things begins with Between. It stages another journey that 
subverts the classic paradigm of narrative journey, another journey in 
a sense “between” the beginning and the end, life and death “inside 
the whale, who knows, three hours, three days of maybe hell. Between 
doing and not doing the body floats.”14
PuB l i s h e d  i n  1968 ,  Brooke-Rose’s novel Between	is a prime ex am-ple of the scandalous, “writerly” text hypothesized by Roland Barthes 
in S/Z (first published in 1970). It anticipates Barthes’s conjecture about 
a new kind of narrative based on the trope of the journey. This multilin-
guistic narrative that thematizes travel and translation presents both a 
narrative of	and narrative as	a journey	severed from origin and telos.	In 
its travel plot, Between thematizes its own experiment with the traditional 
shape of the journey that underwrites the trajectory of many classic nar-
ratives. In the discontinuities and gaps of the narrative, Brooke-Rose 
does not reject the crucial role of narrative and narrative journey but 
proposes, with Barthes, a new logic for it. After the “dead-end” of Out, 
and the cycle of death, rebirth, and death in Such, she continues experi-
menting with her new narrative sentence, this time with a female center 
of consciousness and new logic of narrative journey.1
 Barthes identifies what he calls the “readerly” text, that is, classic 
realist narrative, as based on the model of a well-plotted journey, a tra-
ditional sequence of events of which he says: “To depart/to travel/to 
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what would be the narrative of a journey in which it was said that one stays 
somewhere without having departed—in which it was never said that, having 
departed, one arrives or fails to arrive? such a narrative would be a scandal, 
the extenuation, by hemorrhage, of readerliness. (barthes, S/Z 105)
a neW vessel oF concePtion
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arrive/to stay: the journey is saturated” (S/Z 105). Like a well-guided 
tour, this type of narrative leads the reader from place to place, estab-
lishing an illusion of continuity in the fullness of its presentation: “To 
end, to fill, to join, to unify—one might say this is the basic requirement 
of the readerly,	 as though it were prey to some obsessive fear: that of 
omitting a connection. Fear of forgetting engenders the appearance of a 
logic of actions; terms and the links between them are posited (invented) 
in such a way that they unite, duplicate each other, create an illusion of 
continuity . . . as if the readerly	abhors a vacuum” (Barthes 105). In con-
trast, the “writerly” text is a “scandal,” a “hemorrhage,” language that 
suggests the violation or wounding from within of the classic text, thus 
destroying its “logic of actions.” This text disseminates meaning rather 
than fixing it in place. This journey without origin or telos thus serves 
as Barthes’s paradigm for a psychological freedom from the compulsion 
and anxiety betrayed in the figure of the “saturated” journey as sequen-
tially plot ted. The journey now funds an optimistic theorizing of a narra-
tive mobility that, unlike conventional narrative, does not circumscribe 
the movement of desire and free play. According to Barthes, there are 
pleasures, for writer and reader, in the discontinuities and si lences of 
this “writerly” text.2
 As Brooke-Rose has noted in essays and interviews, during the six-
ties she read widely and deeply in both contemporary literature and first 
structuralist, then poststructuralist theory, often writing about French 
theory for an English audience. The publication of Between in 1968 coin-
cided with Brooke-Rose’s move to the University of Paris, Vincennes, at 
Hélène Cixous’s invitation, where she taught courses in literature and 
theory.3 With her dual vocation as writer and critic/theorist, her fictional 
experiments not only “test” theoretical speculation but sometimes pre-
cede the theoretical framework that would comprehend them (as she 
notes of James in her analysis of The	 Turn	 of	 the	 Screw). Between	was 
published two years before the French publication of S/Z and anticipates 
Barthes’s new kind of narrative journey, with its break from the logic of 
beginning, middle, and end. In her critical writings and interviews since 
the publication of S/Z, she refers approvingly to Barthes’s notion of the 
writerly as privileged over the readerly. In her own description of real-
ism in A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal,	based on the account of the French critic 
Philippe Harmon, she analyzes it as a kind of saturation. She says that 
realist texts deploy two strategies that are sometimes contradictory: the 
circulation of a great deal of information and a readability and clearness 
that depend on “semiotic compensation,” that is, a variety of ways to 
make meaningful the load of information.
C h a p T e r  358 |
 In Brooke Rose’s description of her own experimental style in Between,	
the journey figures a freedom from conventional syntax, an errancy or 
wandering that resembles Barthes’s general idea of the writerly: “The 
syntax of Between	 is free-ranging in that a sentence can start in one 
place or time, continue correctly, but by the end of the sentence one is 
elsewhere” (Brooke-Rose, Stories,	Theories	and	Things 7).	Syntax engages 
in transgressive travel in an unpredictable trajectory, a metonymic slide 
from here to there that produces a sense of random movement rather 
than purposeful direction.4 In an interview in the Edinburgh	 Review,	
Brooke-Rose represents the experimentalism of her style in terms of an 
exploration that is not a quest but a magical and pleasurable crossing of 
boundaries. As a writer she finds herself “on the frontier of something 
and I must twist language in some way to pass the frontier, and that’s 
the pleasure” (Turner 31). The pleasure of the text resides in (or, more 
properly, lambently circulates in) a style that could pass the electronic 
screening at the airport, a sly smug gling across conventional borders.
 In lieu of a “saturated” narrative journey, the entirely present-tense 
narration in Between	offers reiterated passages of dialogue and description 
in several European languages (with English the hegemonic medium). 
The narrative settles on the European travels of an unnamed female 
translator of French and German parentage who “travel[s] in simultane-
ous interpretation” (Between 408, 494), translating mostly from French 
to German. Narrative continuity is replaced by replays and repetitions, 
with iterated scenes generally not clearly marked as having taken	place,	
either temporally or spatially. We hear a dialogue about annulment: 
the translator’s marriage is inferred. One hotel room, one plane ride, 
one lover blends into another. Informational or semantic gaps occur to 
disrupt the logic of narrative continuity.
 The most persistent scene is the inside of a plane en route to one of 
many European and, occasionally, Asian cities. The novel begins:
Between the enormous wings the body of the plane stretches its one 
hundred and twenty seats or so in threes on either side towards the 
distant brain way up, behind the dark blue curtain and again beyond 
no doubt a little door. In some countries the women would segregate 
still to the left of the aisle, the men less numerous to the right. But all 
in all and civilisation considered the chromosomes sit quietly mixed 
among the hundred and twenty seats or so that stretch like ribs as if 
inside a giant centipede. Or else, inside the whale, who knows, three 
hours, three days of maybe hell. Between doing and not doing the body 
floats. (Between 395)
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 The travelers go places but seem to exist in a limbo of movement and 
disorientation, traveling, but caught—like Eliot’s hollow men, like Jonah 
in the whale—in an interstitial “between” of time and space (“Between 
the dawn and the non-existent night the body stretches out its hundred 
and twenty ribs or so towards the distant brain way up beyond the yel-
low curtain” (Between 404). “Welcome aboard this vessel of conception 
floating upon a pinpoint and kindly sit quietly ensconced in your arm-
chairs, the women to the left of the aisle the men less numerous to the 
right” (Between 442). The plane is a vehicle of transportation, a vehicle of 
metaphor (the “vessel of conception”) that translates us from one place 
to another: “Beyond the wooden shutters and way down below the lay-
ered floors of stunned consciousnesses waking dreams nightmares lost 
senses of locality the cars hoot faintly poop-pip-poop the trams tinkle 
way down below in the grand canyon and an engine revs up in what, 
French German Portuguese” (Between 396–97).	 Brooke-Rose describes 
her conception of the novel in a Jamesian “metastory”: “The I/central 
consciousness/non-narrating narrative voice/is a simultaneous inter-
preter who travels constantly from congress to conference and whose 
mind is a whirl of topics and jargons and foreign languages/whose 
mind is a whirl of worldviews, interpretations, stories, models, para-
digms, theories, languages” (Stories,	Theories	and	Things 6–7).
 There are references in the novel to the “freedom of the air” and 
the “inebriating attractions as the body floats in willing suspension 
of loyalty to anyone” (Between 461), that is, to the liberating possibili-
ties of such constant airplane travel, but the “intended effect” of the 
mobile, hectic style and plot, she goes on to say in the above passage, is 
“mimetic realism—in brief, perpetual motion in my central conscious-
ness, and loss of identity due to her activity” (Stories,	Theories	and	Things 
7).	Brooke-Rose, who often cautions her readers against searching for 
authorial “intention,” even the one the author hands you on a plate, 
serves up a metastory that, in its appeal to mimetic realism, partially 
tames the “scandal” of the writing. The errant style mimics the theme 
of anomie and rootlessness,5 a modern condition, which in the “now” 
of the writing (1968) is replaced by the banality of late capitalism, the 
global hegemony of mass culture that turns one European place into 
another. Like the official voice of the pilot and cabin crew, which origi-
nates in some “distant brain” and is amplified over the loudspeaker 
system, the detached, dispassionate narrative voice announces flatly 
that “air and other such conditioning . . . prevent any true exchange of 
thoughts” (Between 399), as the body floats in “this great pressurized 
solitude” (Between 406).
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 Translation becomes the central metaphor for the general loss of 
place in this global village. Despite the disorienting effect of the dif-
ferent languages on the reader and at times on the main character, the 
rapid language changes in the text suggest an almost frightening fluency 
of scene, dialogue, character, and relationship. The bilingual interpreter 
becomes the symptom of this frightening fluency; like the phrases pass-
ing through the microphones of simultaneous translation, she herself 
is a translatable sign. We are meant to hear the double meanings in 
the phrase “Bright girl, she translates beautifully don’t you think? Says 
the boss” (Between 414). The French/German translator crosses national 
borders, geographical and linguistic, with such facility and frequency 
that “home” and the destinations of travel cease to be oppositional—
there is always something alien about home and something familiar 
in the foreign locations.6 In her “metastory,” Brooke-Rose insists that 
this travel is particularly gendered—the female body transported across 
national boundaries is also the sign of a passive identity which circulates 
so freely across boundaries that it loses its distinctiveness. In Stories,	
Theories,	and	Things,	Brooke-Rose describes her own false start with the 
novel, in which the interpreter was conceived as “androgynous.”7 These 
pages, she tells us, were abandoned when she realized that translation 
figured a particularly (although not exclusively) “feminine” experience. 
As she puts it, the novel is entangled “with the notion/imagined experi-
ence/theory/ story that simultaneous interpretation is a passive activ-
ity, that of translating the ideas of others but giving voice to none of 
one’s own, and therefore a feminine experience” (Stories,	 Theories	 and	
Things 7).	Successful translation signals a loss of identity; the translator 
becomes a conduit, like the microphone that is the tool of her trade. Just 
as the middle-class woman functions, according to Nancy Armstrong, 
as the representative protagonist for the nineteenth-century domestic 
novel, after the male narrators of “The Foot,” Out, and Such, Brooke-
Rose turned to the female translator to figure a particularly twentieth-
century consciousness of dislocation , invisibility, and redundancy.8
 This oxymoronic sense of travel as a routine disorientation contrasts 
sharply with the exciting potential signified by the airplane in Woolf’s 
writing—in Mrs.	Dalloway,	for example, where it figures, as Gillian Beer 
says, “‘free will’ and ecstasy, silent, erotic and absurd” or in Orlando,	
where Shelmerdine’s descent in a plane suggests “the free spirit of the 
modern age” (Beer 145). The sense of translation as weary work con-
trasts as well with the foreign language as a refreshment of the mother 
tongue, as it functions for Miriam Henderson as she gazes at a Conti-
nental newspaper on her trip to Switzerland in Dorothy Richardson’s 
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Oberland:	 “The simple text was enthralling. For years she had not so 
delighted in any reading. . . . Everything she had read stood clear in 
her mind that yet, insufficiently occupied with the narrative and its 
strange emanations, caught up single words and phrases and went off 
independently touring, climbing to fresh arrangements and interpreta-
tions of familiar thought” (58). Brooke-Rose presents a more jaundiced, 
post-World War II view of the possibilities of discovery and escape, a 
view that echoes Susan Sontag’s description of the symptomatic cul-
tural condition of modernity in her influential essay “The Aesthetics 
of Silence,” published in 1967. Sontag’s is an essay Brooke-Rose quotes 
extensively and approvingly in “Eximplosions,” her chapter on moder-
nity in A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal. Sontag writes,
In an overpopulated world being connected by global electronic com-
munication and jet travel at a pace too rapid and violent for an organi-
cally sound person to assimilate without shock, people are also as the 
unlimited “technological reproduction” and near universal diffusion of 
printed language and speech as well as images and the degeneration of 
public language within the realms of politics, advertising and entertain-
ment, have produced, especially among the better-educated inhabitants 
of modern mass society, a devaluation of language. 
Art, Sontag suggests, “becomes a kind of counterviolence, seeking to 
loosen the grip upon consciousness of the habits of lifeless, static ver-
balization” (“The Aesthetics of Silence” 64–65).
 Brooke-Rose describes Sontag’s essay on modern art as a “still 
remarkable, elegant essay, in many ways a proleptic summary of much 
that has been said since” (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 343–44) and endorses her 
assessment that a loss of authenticity is experienced in the modern con-
dition. Much as Dean MacCannell in his now classic study The	Tourist9	
identifies the tourist as an emblem of modern man in search of authen-
ticity in the face of the discontinuities and alienations of modern society, 
Brooke-Rose envisions her translator/traveler as caught in a limbo-like 
transit, in which she yearns to submit to some thing when “belief” itself 
is suspended.
The body stretches forth towards some thought some order some com-
mand obeyed in the distant brain way up or even an idea that actually 
means something compels a passion or commitment lost or ungained 
yet as the wing spreads to starboard motionless on the still blue tem-
perature of minus fifty-one degrees, the metal shell dividing it from 
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this great pressurised solitude. The body floats in a quiet suspension of 
belief and disbelief, the sky grows dark over the chasms of the unseen 
Pyrenees. (Between 405–6)
 What are we to make of this seeming paradox in Brooke-Rose’s 
address to travel, the contradiction, that is, between travel in the novel 
as a figure for rootlessness and disappointed yearning, a diagnosis of a 
contemporary condition, and her descriptions of experimental writ ing 
as a new and free kind of writerly narrative journey? And how can one 
reconcile the way the multilinguistic passages in the text of Between	
mimic a disorientation and loss of identity and also provide the nour-
ishments of a Continental, experimental style? Does the experimen-
talism of the style represent a “postmodernist” fiddling while Europe 
burns?
 The answer to the final question, I believe, is no; indeed, through the 
trope and plot of travel and translation, Brooke-Rose subverts the pos-
sibility of the kind of insouciant dismissal associated with at least one 
major version of postmodernism, which sees it as a break from modern-
ist anxiety and a ludic acceptance of the anomie modernism helped to 
diagnose.10 Brooke-Rose’s novel helps us rethink the abstract theorizing 
of the mobility of desire expressed by Barthes and even Brooke-Rose 
herself in the description of her style; it engages the problematic of 
postmodern circulations and represents mobility as specifically charac-
tered and historicized, with cultural pains and pleasures written into it.11 
The novel thus motivates a significant reappraisal of Linda Hutcheon’s 
version of postmodernism’s supposed break with modernism, and its 
subversion “of such principles as value, order, meaning, control, and 
identity . . . that have been the basic premise of bourgeois liberalism” 
(13). Brooke-Rose’s novel demonstrates a self-critical form of radical 
experimentation that ultimately refuses this kind of dismissal.12
 For despite the hectic mobility of both her style and her female trav-
eler, Brooke-Rose provides checkpoints in the fluid movement across 
boundaries; despite its use of the present tense and abandonment of 
temporal sequence, Between	nevertheless produces its “present” moment 
in relation to a specific European geography and history. The series 
of displacements through travel paradoxically maps a European place 
of inescapable historical self-discovery. Brooke-Rose reminds us of the 
constraints, political and literary, that European history imposes on 
postmodernism. In terms of the “political,” I refer specifically to the 
way the novel’s displacements fix on the nameless translator’s move-
ments during World War II. We learn that as an adolescent on a visit 
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to her paternal aunt in Germany from her native France, she develops 
appendicitis and must remain in Germany when war breaks out. She 
begins to translate for the Germans. In arranging and rearranging the 
border crossings and shifting loyalties of her traveling French/German 
protagonist, Brooke-Rose creates a palimpsest: the blasé travel of the 
1960s, from European capital to capital, illuminates the different border 
crossings during World War II. Against this background, the random 
movements and arbitrary excursions raise questions of loyalty, affilia-
tion, and national identity. Customs agents demanding declarations at 
the borders signal checkpoints in this flux: “Please declare if you have 
any plants or parts of plants with you such as love loyalty lust intellect 
belief of any kind or even simple enthusiasm for which you must pay 
duty to the Customs and Excise until you come to a standstill” (Between 
414). This voice is both frightening and inspiring—it evokes the specter 
of duty, both a price exacted for all this unlimited circulation and a pos-
sibly useful demand for an accounting of obligation and commitment. 
In an analysis of an earlier version of customs in Hawthorne’s “The 
Custom-House,” which prefaces The	Scarlet	Letter,	Brooke-Rose calls the 
customs house “a public, institutional place, a place of law and order, 
where custom and excise must be paid on goods (on pleasure, as cost). 
It is a threshold. The threshold of narrative” (Stories,	Theories	and	Things 
48).
 The history that constrains is, however, literary as well as political, 
for in superimposing a postmodern internationalism on an earlier, more 
frightening wartime European geography, Brooke-Rose invokes the ines-
capable inheritance of modernism, an international phenomenon forced 
by the events of both world wars to revise its assumption that nation-
alism was something to be outgrown.13 The multilinguistic resources 
of avant-garde experimentalism that sustain Eliot’s and Pound’s mod-
ernist poetry and postmodern novels such as those of Brooke-Rose are 
regarded in Between	in the light of linguistic hegemony and domination. 
(Brooke-Rose wrote most of her novel while staying at the castle of Ezra 
Pound’s daughter in the Italian Tirol, where she returned, soon after 
finishing the novel, to write A	ZBC	of	Ezra	Pound	 [see Turner, 22]).14 In 
addressing the legacy of Eliot and Pound, Brooke-Rose acknowledges 
postmodernism’s debt to modernism and exposes the anxiety of influ-
ence in postmodernism’s claim to break with its own modernist history. 
She reveals this claim to be a kind of travel, a defense against the pull 
of a certain literary “home.” Brooke-Rose’s postmodernist “vessel of 
conception” deliberately and self-consciously retains the genetic mate-
rial of modernism.15
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 Thus, despite the freewheeling style and protagonist of Between,	
ideas of placement and mobility, commitment and translatability are 
deeply touched by the war and its allegiances. The easy availability of 
European pop culture of the 1960s, constructed from the jargon of adver-
tising, is juxtaposed with the darker memories of the war. Unpleasantly 
surprised by a waiter or chambermaid who invades the refuge of the 
hotel room, postwar travelers confront “the fear of something else not 
ordered” (Between 401), an image of those ambivalently haunted by fear 
of submission and by fear of nothing to submit to. These postmodern 
ambivalences are textured and colored, one begins to see, by the memo-
ries of war and the forms that order and submission took within it. 
The postwar mobility and translatability of the unnamed protagonist 
are fixed (though not through any traditional narrative exposition or 
even flashback) in a particular bilingualism. The Berlitz-like passages of 
French and German, which blend with other lines of serviceable tourist 
discourse in other languages (that of menus, advertisements, airport 
entrances, exits, restrooms), begin to resonate with the differences of 
their histories, forming both the personal past of the French-German 
translator and a historical consciousness in the text.
 Two particular scenes in Germany haunt the narrative: one set in 
1946, after the liberation of Germany and the zoning of Berlin, when 
the girl works in the French Zone and meets an English airman, whom 
she marries; the other, an earlier scene in which she is drafted by the 
Germans into the press supervisory division of the foreign office after 
she is stranded in Germany. “You must excuse these questions Fräulein 
but in view of your French upbringing we must make sure of your 
undivided loyalty let us see now until the age of Herr Oberstleutnant at 
that age one has no loyalties” (Between 444). In this context, the passivity 
of “translating beautifully” is implicated in larger ethical questions of 
compliance during the war.
 Under the powerful umbrella of English, languages conduct a 
romance and engage in intercultural travel, just as the translator moves 
from a German to a British lover: “Husbands lovers wives mistresses of 
many nationalities . . . help to abolish the frontiers of misunderstanding 
with frequent changes of partners loyalties convictions, free and easily 
stepping over the old boundaries of conventions, congresses, commis-
sions, conferences to which welcome back Liebes” (Between 437).	The 
fraternization of and in tourist phrases leaves the traces of history, “as if 
words fraternised silently beneath the syntax, finding each other funny 
and delicious in a Misch-Masch of tender fornication, inside the bombed 
out hallowed structures and the rigid steel glass modern edifices of the 
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brain. Du, do you love me?” (Between 447). The postmodern brain is 
an architectural palimpsest, the skyscraper rising phoenixlike from the 
ashes of war. Even the Vichy mineral water so repeatedly ordered and 
not ordered in the text contains the memory of Vichy complicity. The 
postwar OMO (cleanser) slogan “whiter than white” is grafted onto an 
allusion to a Persil-Schein certificate, a reference former Nazis would 
buy after the war to prove that they had never been Nazis at heart. The 
narrative does not sanitize the traces of war.
 Brooke-Rose’s own wartime activity is “translated” into the figure 
of the nameless translator and her experience of World War II. During 
the war, Brooke-Rose worked for “Ultra,” a unit of the British Intel-
ligence Service that helped decipher and analyze German radio mes-
sages. Enemy codes were cracked on a machine called “Enigma,” which 
was based on “three operational rotors which could be taken out and 
rearranged, each with 26 letters: this allowed milliards of combinations 
to be obtained” (Garlinski 73). Using devices known as “bombes,” the 
decoders would explore “electro-mechanically (not electronically) a 
range of alternative possibilities at speeds far beyond the pace of human 
thought.” In practical terms, what the bombes did was to test “all the 
possible wheel or rotor orders of the Enigma, all the possible wheel set-
tings and plug or Stecker connections to discover which of the possible 
arrangements would match a prescribed combination of letters’” (Lewin 
123). Although Brooke-Rose has said that she did not herself partici-
pate in the decoding, her acquaintance with such procedures helps us 
understand a sense of urgency that underlies the postmodern mobility 
of meaning in the text. Despite the drone of conference jargon, the con-
nection between word games and war games and between translations 
and crisis emerges.
 Yet from this short sketch one can see that Brooke-Rose’s own war-
time loyalties were far less equivocal than the interpreter’s. The gestures 
and mechanics of simultaneous translations are themselves “translated” 
from Brooke-Rose’s own role into the interpreter’s less fixed position. “I 
never put myself directly into novels, I find that boring,” Brooke-Rose 
said in an interview. “So I turn personal experience into metaphor” 
(Turner 26).16 Perhaps the stable allegiances of Brooke-Rose’s own war-
time practice of translation seemed too determined, too clear-cut to sup-
ply a metaphor for the confusions and displacements that make “war 
like a postmodern text.”17 I would argue, however, that Brooke-Rose’s 
exploration of chance, randomness, and accident in her text directly 
relates to the special significance that the novel claims for the gendering	
of travel and translation. For drift, chance, and passivity, symptomatic 
C h a p T e r  366 |
of the workings of history, might offer a new technology of narrative, 
an alternative to masculine teleological paradigms: “The same question 
everywhere goes unanswered have you anything to declare any plants 
or parts of plants growing inside you stifling your strength with their 
octopus legs undetachable for the vacuum they form over each cell, 
clamping each neurone of your processes in a death-kiss while the new 
Lord Mayor of Prague promises to take up the challenge in trying to 
make you commit yourself to one single idea” (Between 413).
 The “vessel of conception,” the narrative vehicle of transplant and 
translation, is here figured as a female	 body, and the question is this: 
Can it bear a new idea about history, direction, and destination that is 
different from either the masculine singleness of purpose and certain 
destination of the “Lord Mayor” or the jaded opportunism of Siegfried, 
who tries to manipulate the female translator’s sense of drift in order 
to seduce her? “We merely translate other people’s ideas, not to men-
tion platitudes, si-mul-ta-né-ment. No one requires us to have any of 
our own. . . . Du liebes Kind, komm, geh’ mit mir. Gar schöne Spiele 
spiel’ ich mit dir [Dear child, come with me I’ll play very good games 
with you]” (Between 413). This sinister allusion to Goethe’s “Erlkönig” 
reveals a dark underside to the notion of play, suggesting both seduc-
tion and death. Although Brooke-Rose’s own loyalties during the war 
were clearly established, her novel explores the pleasures and dangers 
of chance occurrence and its role in the process of charting one’s course. 
The similarities between German and English lovers and the telescoping 
of wartime experiences with pre- and postwar experiences puncture a 
simplistic view of ideological choice, while the narrative still insists on 
establishing distinctions.
 As I have noted, in her metastory Brooke-Rose insists that the pas-
sivity of circulation and translation in the novel is linked to the gender 
of the protagonist: “It was a cliché, which was nevertheless true enough 
generally (like all clichés) for the purpose of creating the language of the 
novel and getting, as I. A. Richards used to say, the ‘tone’ right” (Stories,	
Theories	 and	 Things 7).	This cliché launches the narrative, but through 
dislocations of both protagonist and style, Brooke-Rose explores pos-
sible alternatives to the clichés of masculine aggression and feminine 
passivity played out in so many ways in twentieth-century discourse. 
“Between doing and not doing the body floats,” the narrator drones, 
thus suggesting a middle ground, a middle voice, between passivity 
and activity. The forays in the novel exit somewhere between action and 
inaction, accident and purpose.
 In The	Writing	of	the	Disaster,	Maurice Blanchot addresses the fate of 
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representation after the Holocaust: “The disaster: break with the star, 
break with every form of totality, never denying, however, the dialecti-
cal necessity of a fulfillment; the disaster: prophecy which announces 
nothing but the refusal of the prophetic as simply an event to come, but 
which nonetheless opens, nonetheless discovers the patience of vigilant 
language” (75).18 In his insistence on rejecting totality yet retaining a 
sense of urgency—in using the vocabulary of prophecy while refus-
ing prophecy—and in his emphasis on “vigilant language,” Blanchot 
meshes with Brooke-Rose’s method and tone in Between.	Rejecting the 
type of totalizing mastery that she associates with masculine hubris, she 
translates passivity into the patience of vigilant language in a stylistic 
practice that is both modest and bold. Brooke-Rose says of her work: 
“Modern philosophy talks a lot about the desire and illusion of mastery. 
But I never feel that, that’s more connected with what has been called 
the totalising novel, which imposes some kind of global meaning on 
the reality it describes. . . . My experience has been more one of groping 
inside language and forms” (Turner 31).
 This “groping inside language and forms,” this combination of lin-
guistic risk and vigilance, leads to a style in which “small changes” in 
often repeated phrases in the narrative subtly suggest the possibility of 
changes in the plot. Buried amid iterated passages of dialogue are ref-
erences to such facts as the translator has decided to sell her Wiltshire 
cottage or to buy a car—these unobtrusive alterations in domicile and 
transportation are the means by which the circularity of the writing, 
its beginning and ending in the same linguistic “place” (“Between the 
enormous wings the body floats”), is amended.
 Throughout Between	one hears the refrain, “What difference does it 
make?” This reiterated question is meant to burden structuralist and 
poststructuralist theories of meaning in language with the weight of 
political implication and consequence. “The vaporetto bumps against 
the jetty of Santa Maria di Salute at the mouth of the Grand Canal that 
gives out on to the wider waters between San Marco and the unan-
swered question which remains unanswered for the non-existent future 
unless perhaps what difference does it make” (Between 556). The novel 
checks its own acceptance of the unlimited circulation of language. On 
the one hand, the narrative seems to endorse the metadiscourse of post-
structuralist theory it includes, the iterated and freely circulating jargon 
and “codes” of conferences and commissions—biological, semiological, 
semantic, Lacanian. A passage in English and in French from a semiol-
ogy conference on Saussurean difference emphasizes the arbitrariness 
and self-enclosure of the language system:
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As for example in a dictionary each apparently positive definition con-
tains words which themselves need defining. Et tous les dictionnaires 
prouvent qu’il n’y a jamais de sens propre, jamais d’objectivité d’un 
terme [And all the dictionaries prove that there is never a literal mean-
ing, never the objectivity of a term]. (Between 562)
This sense of circularity is exacerbated by the easy commerce between 
French and English. The writing in Between	accepts this post-Saussurean, 
poststructuralist position. The novel, like other poststructuralist fic-
tion and nonfiction, is “about” the circulation of signs as much as it 
is “about” the travel and displacements of the nameless translator and 
her colleagues.
 Yet, on the other hand, in representing the circulation of signifiers 
in her text, Brooke-Rose shows how small adjustments of and in lan-
guage make a difference. The notion that language is an arbitrary, closed 
system does not obviate the possibility, even the necessity, of vigilant 
language of the kind Blanchot describes. The change from “Idlewilde 
Airport” to “Kennedy Airport” one hundred pages later is one example 
of such attention, a subtle reminder of the violent events of the 1960s 
that produced this change in nomenclature. Brooke-Rose’s particular 
“technology” of the “distant brain” shows how small adjustments in 
the codes of language have historical, personal, and political conse-
quences.
 Thus, even cynicism self-destructs as a confident and fixed position, 
finding itself vulnerable to a critical displacement and subtle dislodging. 
“The syntax of Between	is free-ranging in that a sentence can start in one 
place or time, continue correctly, but by the end of the sentence one is 
elsewhere” (Stories,	Theories	and	Things 7).	One of the anonymous confer-
ence speakers—at a meeting on DNA—disparages the analogy between 
the language of codes and the workings of genetics and language. The 
speaker comments on this analogy as a “seductive hypothesis whose 
seductive element lies in the fact that we play on words and speak of 
codes, [which] postulates that the stimulus of environment modifies 
the sequence of bases, leading to the modification of the code within a 
cell within a body within a box within a village within a wooded area 
in an alien land. This would leave a trace” (Between 519). Paradoxically, 
however, in Brooke-Rose’s “traveling” style, this cynicism collapses; the 
pompous statement “begins somewhere . . . continues correctly,” yet 
it winds up “elsewhere.” What begins as abstract academic cynicism 
somehow winds up in the English location of the Wiltshire cottage (the 
wooded refuge that the protagonist decides to sell near the end of the 
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novel); this seemingly involuntary travel of the sentence dramatizes the 
local “truth” of the way memory works to trace personal loss. Every-
where, Brooke-Rose confirms that experimental writing, like travel, is 
risky business; one can prepare and yet be unprepared for adventures in 
writing. In this particular example, the errancy of syntax and meaning 
leads to an “elsewhere” that is, paradoxically, home.
 For Brooke-Rose, experimental grammar is never merely a question 
of the relationship between parts of the sentence but a technique for 
exploring the fixings and releases of positionality as well. A technique 
for living. This exploration is signaled in her insistent use of preposi-
tions, beginning with the importance of the title itself to suggest a place 
that is neither home nor abroad, placement nor escape.19 This emphasis 
on fixation and mobility within language is, I believe, inextricably con-
nected to Brooke-Rose’s decision to abandon her original idea of an 
androgynous traveler on finding it to be a roadblock to the journey of the 
text. In exploring pre-positions and changes in positions, Brooke-Rose 
focuses on the mark of gender in the circulation of meaning in language. 
In a significant way, travel in Brooke-Rose’s novel intersects with femi-
nist questions about the possibilities of escape within language, within 
literature, and within history. The metadiscourse of structuralism and 
psychoanalysis in the narrative underscores how the mark of gender 
is carried in the “vessel of conception” that is language in general and 
this novel in particular. The question, “What difference does it make?” 
is answered in part with ‘the difference of gender.’ For Brooke-Rose, the 
myth of androgyny seems too much to sponsor an illusory freedom of 
unlimited circulation. Twenty pages into Between,	Brooke-Rose eschews 
this trope of erotic freedom (a trope that both Virginia Woolf and Brigid 
Brophy, for example, find liberating):
Et comme l’a si bien dit Saussure, la langue peut se contenter de l’oppo-
sition de quelque chose avec rien. [And just as Saussure has said very 
well, language can content itself with the opposition of something to 
nothing.] The marked term on the one hand, say, the feminine, grande, 
the unmarked on the other, say, the masculine, grand. Mais notez bien 
que le non-marqué peut deriver du marqué par retranchement, by 
subtraction, par une absence qui signifie. Je répète, une absence qui 
signifie eine Abwesenheit die simultaneously etwas bedeutet. [But note 
well that the unmarked term can derive from the marked by reduction, 
by subtraction, by an absence that signifies. I repeat, an absence that 
signifies an absence that simultaneously means something.] (Between 
426)
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Where when and to whose heart did one do that? Do what and what 
difference does it make? None except by subtraction from the marked 
masculine and unmarked feminine or vice versa as the language of a 
long lost code of zones lying forgotten under layers of thickening sen-
sibilities creeps up from down the years into no more than the distant 
brain way up to tickle an idle thought such as where when and to 
whose heart did one do that? (Between 468)
Despite the fluid translations from one language to another, the posi-
tion of the feminine gender is marked in opposition to the normative, 
“unmarked” masculine. As Monique Wittig says in “The Mark of Gen-
der,” “The abstract form, the general, the universal, this is what the 
so-called masculine gender means, for the class of men have appropri-
ated the universal for themselves” (5). In this schema, the feminine is 
“marked”—gender itself becomes feminine, the other to the neutrality 
of the masculine in language, that “other” most visible in the floating 
signifier of femininity, the French e	 (about which Barthes has written 
so interestingly in S/Z). Yet one can say that the feminine is unmarked, 
missing the mark, missing the phallus and is therefore the sign of lack 
in Freudian terms (but this difference comes out in much the same way). 
Either way, the signifiers “masculine” and “feminine” are indissolubly 
paired, as Lacan shows in the now famous illustration of the signs on 
the lavatory doors in the train station (“The Agency of the Letter in the 
Unconscious or Reason since Freud” 151–52), a scene that Brooke-Rose 
invokes in her own text (“We have no evidence at all that live human 
beings, let alone the skirted figurine or high-heeled shoe on the door 
can so embody the divine principle descending into matter” [Between 
571–72]).
 In the twists in the above passage, however, a potentially differ-
ent interpretation suggests itself, a possible reversal—the male as 
“subtracted” from the female and, hence, the masculine as somehow 
constructed in defense against the female. Such a reading is pressed in 
the following passage: “Solamente un piccolo with insolent eyes and 
a great tenderness only to see and touch a little in the narrow pas-
sage between the built-in cupboard painted pink and the rosy glow of 
the situation so characteristic in this our masculine-dominated myth 
unmarked save by subtraction from the feminine with its ambivalence 
in the double-negation no e no” (Between 508). The male pursuit of the 
woman in the narrow passageway is an all too familiar topos within 
the “masculine-dominated myth.” This scene is “unmarked” or unre-
marked, appearing “natural,” except if one recognizes in this myth an 
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ambivalent flight from women and a feeling of lack in the male’s “sub-
traction from the feminine.” As the passage on page 468 quoted above 
suggests, the particular grammar of relationship between subject and 
object (“when and to whose heart did one do that?”) might make a real 
difference.
 Jane Gallop criticizes the feminist attack on Lacanian psychoanalysis 
for taking the position that these “markings” can ever be escaped: “That 
effort would place the feminist as observer in some sort of floating posi-
tion outside the structure, a position of omniscience. Such positioning 
ignores the subject’s need to place himself within the signifying chain in 
order to be any place at all. There is no place for a ‘subject,’ no place to 
be human, to make sense outside of signification, and language always 
has specific rules which no subject has the power to decree” (Gallop 12). 
I would suggest that in the travel novel Between,	Brooke-Rose acknowl-
edges that however plush or sparse, fem inine or masculine, one’s loca-
tion in the “vessel of conception,” one cannot float outside the plane 
of language. The “between” of the novel is a space within, rather than 
outside of, the signifying chain in which gender is marked. Indeed, 
the novel illustrates how fantasies of escape, provided in literature and 
philosophy, themselves participate in these gendered markings. Brooke-
Rose reminds us how myths and metaphors of flight and travel are 
indelibly marked in this signifying chain, often through plays on words 
and conventional phrases. The metaphors of travel are pressed into the 
service of romance; men are constantly offering to take the unnamed 
translator “under their wing” (“whatever wing means under which 
he has taken her auburn blond svelte and dark to their conferences” 
[Between 434]). And myths of rescue are figured in terms of the woman’s 
being carried away: “Please do not throw into W.C. because one day the 
man will come and lift you out of your self-containment or absorption 
rising into the night above the wing par a quelle aile j’vois pas d’aile 
moi only a red light winking on and off in the blackness” (Between 446). 
Hollywood fantasies of rescue are mobilized: “Ah yes! The ideas. Here 
we came in, the hero will now pick up the heroine on a plane about to 
land in Hollywood and offer her a contract for life” (Between 460). Even 
direction is gendered, particularly the movement up and down that 
underwrites the narrative journey (the basic movement of the flight in 
taking off and landing). The trope of direction itself allegorizes desire 
as symbolically gendered. The yearning for transcendence is repre-
sented in the metaphors of masculine authority: “The body stretches 
forth towards some thought some order some command obeyed in the 
distant brain way up” (Between 405–6).20 In contrast, the older mythic 
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geography mentioned above is suggested to be aboriginal, beneath	 the 
twentieth-century European map.
The visitor’s attention turns immediately to the sanctuary of Apollo 
situated on the higher slopes of one of the Phaidriades rocks in five 
terrace-like levels, brilliant with the splendour of its monuments . . . the 
Temple of Apollo beneath which the famous oracle used to sit and 
utter cryptic prophecies to all who came and consulted it on serious 
matters like war, alliances, births and marriages. Finally, a little higher 
up stands the Theatre . . . and beyond the Sanctuary lies the Stadium, 
where the Pythic Games took place to celebrate Apollo’s victory over 
Python, the legendary monster.
 The visitor’s attention turns immediately to the masculine 
unmarked and situated on the higher slopes in five terraces none of 
which deserves a flow of rash enthusiasm. (Between 430)
According to myth, after killing Python, Apollo seized the oracular 
shrine of Mother Earth at Delphi; the cult of Apollo depended on this 
female power. Perhaps it is this “long lost code of zones lying forgotten” 
(Between 464) that surfaces tantalizingly in the text to suggest a different 
kind of language lying hidden within the chain of signification, one that 
would make a difference if rediscovered.
 This recovery is problematic, given the power of the “male-domi-
nated myths” to appropriate it. The voice of a cynical speaker on passive 
resistance warns:
Human beings need to eat, to work, and to this end will either knuckle 
under or, more often, persuade themselves that le mensonge vital die 
Lebensluge [vital lie] contains sufficient double-negation to reintegrate 
him into totality compared with so many fragile truths and lost mys-
teries that surround us in this our masculine-dominated civilization 
turned upside down into the earphones and out into the mouthpiece 
with a gulliverisation typical of the giant myths euphemised into a 
sack, a basket, a container cavern womb belly vase vehicle ship tem-
ple sepulchre or holy grail, witness le complexe de Jonas with which 
the lost vitality of the word goes down into the mouthpiece and out 
through its exits and entrances. . . . (Between 510)
Although the cynical speaker emphasizes the way the giant male myths 
are “gulliverised” by female analogy, the passage implicitly recognizes 
that the “vessels of conception” and transportation in central male myths 
B e t w e e n 73|
of the Western tradition co-opt, by troping, female morphology.21 Despite 
this thick veneer of disdain, the possibility of rediscovering a “long-lost 
language” is suggested at certain moments in the text, a language of 
flowers (or plants and transplants), which is associated with the French 
love letters sent to the translator by Bertrand: “So the white gladiolus 
explodes in letter after letter in a language that finds itself delicious and 
breeds plants or parts of plants inside the seven-terraced tower undo-
ing the magic wall of defence anticlockwise from the distant brain way 
up the downward path escalating to a death-kiss with a half-visualised 
old man well fifty-seven and plus the circular dance of simulation vital 
lies lost mysteries and other excitations to the true end of imagination” 
(Between 542). In this envoi, this circulation of love letters,	 is the sug-
gestion of a circuit of desire in language not wholly contaminated by 
overuse, a certain pathetic beauty ironized but not destroyed. Like the 
Trojan horse, the language of flowers disarms defenses from within. 
Paradoxically, the exhumation of a buried, archaic past is impelled by 
a rather silly old man who speaks in romantic clichés, which produce, 
nevertheless, something “that actually means something compels a pas-
sion” (Between 406). The translator suggests something of the sort in her 
response to Siegfried’s ridicule of her for replying to Bertrand’s adoring 
letters: “—The language, Siegfried. The fact that all this suffering stuff 
as you call it pours out in French, well, it sort of turns the system inside 
out” (Between 516).
 But meaning, difference, and significance travel in this text and do 
not arrive at any one place, even a myth of female power, for Brooke-
Rose is always suspicious of such a gesture of mere reversal. Theory, 
including a feminist reversal of hierarchies, is subjected to critical dis-
placements. “Inverting the polarities, (writing/voice, nonbeing/being, 
etc.),” she says, “produces dizziness and fear (and resistance). But could 
the ultimate effect not be reequilibration, which should produce (and 
has produced) flights of creativity and word-game processes as enrich-
ing and magical as those produced by the incredibly complex flow charts 
and numerical logical operators of computer science?” (“The Dissolution 
of Character” 195).
 It is this “flight of creativity” which Brooke-Rose attempts to produce 
in her novels, and which makes Between	 a story of displacement that 
depicts neither fixation nor flight. One of the experimental techniques 
she uses to enrich the possibilities for marking gender is to disrupt the 
operation of personal pronouns through her use of her characteristic 
“narratorless” narrative sentence, or what she calls, following Bakhtin, 
free direct discourse. The “nonnarrating” consciousness of the translator 
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is never represented by the pronoun “I” (although there are passages 
that read like interior monologues) and very rarely in the third person.22 
Occasionally the translator is introduced in general terms, such as in 
the phrase “a woman of uncertain age” (Between 445). The free direct 
discourse has the curious effect of turning the character of the transla-
tor into a second-person	pronoun. It seems not quite accurate to say, as 
Brooke-Rose does, that she is the “central consciousness,” as if she were 
like Eliot’s Tiresias, for she does not contain the language but is often its 
audience, as the “receiver” of the conference jargon that flows through 
her earphones and out through her mouthpiece or as the addressee of 
primarily male speakers. She becomes not only a traveler but a conduit 
or vessel of reception as well, similar to the reader as the recipient of 
the reams of jargon that pass through the narrative. She is more marked 
according to her gender than the implied “you” of the reader; yet her 
gender markings are more unmoored than the stable “personing” found 
in most narratives, first- and third-person alike.
 In “The Mark of Gender,” Monique Wittig writes:
Gender takes place in a category of language that is totally unlike any 
other and which is called the personal pronoun. Personal pronouns 
are the only linguistic instances that, in discourse, designate its loca-
tors and their different and successive situations in relationship to dis-
course. They are also the pathways and the means of entrance into 
language. . . . And although they are instrumental in activating the 
notion of gender, [personal pronouns] pass unnoticed. Not being gen-
der marked themselves in their subjective form (except in one case) [i.e., 
the third-person], they can support the notion of gender while pretend-
ing to fulfill another function. In principle they mark the opposition of 
gender only in the third person and are not gender bearers, per se, in 
the other persons. . . . But, in reality, as soon as gender manifests itself 
in discourse, there is a kind of suspension of grammatical form. A direct 
interpellation of the locator occurs. The locator is called upon in person. 
The locator intervenes, in the order of the pronouns, without mediation, 
in its	proper	sex—that	is, when the locator is a sociological woman. For 
it is only then, that the notion of gender takes its full effect. (5)
 Turning the character into the addressee does not bypass the path of 
gender Wittig outlines, but it alters a certain predictability both in the 
power of the pronoun to enforce gender and in the feminist critique of 
the circulation of woman as semiotic object. In her own critique of semi-
otics as regressively masculinist, Brooke-Rose castigates semioticians 
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whom she otherwise admires for their inability to escape phallocentric 
paradigms. In her fiction she wrenches her translator out of an automatic 
objectification in the third person. The identity of the translator changes 
as a function of the kind of “you” that signifies her. For example, we 
know by the addresses made to her that although never described physi-
cally in the text, the translator is attractive. During the course of the 
narrative, she ages, which affects the “you” she represents (the change 
in the form of address to her, from “mademoiselle” to “madame,” is 
only the most overt sign of this process). Unlike Wittig, who attempts 
to eliminate gender in her experimental fiction, Brooke-Rose rejects the 
notion of androgyny. She explores instead the way the feminine subject 
(and object) is constituted in the signifying chain of language, the way 
her journey as a signified and signifier is marked.
 In experimenting with “person” in this way, Brooke-Rose neither 
places her traveler outside of the “male-dominated” signifying chain 
nor imprisons her within it. The language of the narrative becomes a 
structure of dis-placement rather than of either placement or escape. 
In this experiment with pronouns she challenges a traditional mode of 
representation. The grammatical and syntactic mobility of her language 
enables both the unfixing of identity in the narrative (in accordance with 
the mimetic realism she mentions) and a fictional possibility that sug-
gests new ways of thinking about character, a new technique for writing 
gender.
 Style offers, to borrow a line from the novel, “a new technique for 
living” which emerges from contemporary culture (Between 571). The 
“distant brain” appropriately replaces the author; twentieth-century fic-
tion cannot retreat into nostalgic forms of realism but must catalyze the 
new ways of knowing made available through innovative media—the 
computer, for example. Brooke-Rose has increasingly spoken of the 
philosophical and methodological possibilities emerging from computer 
technology, possibilities that might help establish new logics of character 
as well as a new poetry in postmodern fiction: “Just as the flat charac-
ters of romance eventually, through print and the far-reaching social 
developments connected with it, became rounded and complex, so, if we 
survive at all, perhaps the computer, after first ushering in (apart from 
superefficiency) the games and preprogrammed oversimplifications 
of popular culture, will alter our minds and powers of analysis once 
again, and enable us to create new dimensions in the deep-down logic 
of characters” (“The Dissolution of Character” 195). “Fictional charac-
ter has died, or become flat,” she maintains, “as had deus	 ex	machina.	
We’re left, perhaps, with the faint hope of a ghost in the machine” (“The 
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Dissolution of Character” 193). Brooke-Rose’s style consciously locates 
itself in a particular moment of technological possibility; perhaps the 
“distant brain” that guides the travel in Between	 is such a ghost (or 
god) in the machine.23 The convenient ending of the original deus	 ex	
machina is replaced by narrative technique that never reaches resolution 
(indeed, the narrative journey is circular, ending in much the same place 
as it began); yet this technique uncovers connections and significances 
through small adjustments of sentences.
 Computer technology, however, seems inadequate as the sole source 
of regeneration for narrative fiction, for its revolution might be stuck, 
Brooke-Rose suggests, in a binary opposition that confirms rather than 
undermines a phallogocentric ethos. One of the persistent worries 
Brooke-Rose expresses about various forms of postmodernist writing, 
from theory to fiction, is its insistent phallocentrism: “With a few notable 
exceptions, some by women, both the postmodern novel and science 
fiction, like the utopias of Scholes’s structural fabulation, are surpris-
ingly phallocratic. It is as if the return to popular forms or the parody 
of them, even via the intellectual cognition of utopian models, necessar-
ily entailed the circulation of women as objects, which we find both in 
those models and in folktales and early cultures” (“The Dissolution of 
Character” 193). Brooke-Rose, who has had a vexed relationship to femi-
nism (see “A Womb of One’s Own” for her severe reservations about 
“writing the body” of the feminine), has become increasingly vocal 
about this bias in postmodernism. She suggests that a countersource to 
the computer is necessary to effect a revolution in fiction, which could 
then aspire to the condition of poetry: “The impetus comes from two 
apparently contradictory sources, the technological revolution and the 
feminist revolution” (“The Dissolution of Character” 194). Drawing on 
Lacan’s distinction between the tout	 and the pas	 tout,	 she envisions a 
“new psychology” in which “both women and men artists who have 
rejected the totalization, the tout,	of traditional and even modernist art 
and chosen the underdetermination and opaqueness of the pas	tout	may 
clash in an enriching and strengthening way with the binary, superlogi-
cal, and by definition exclusive structures of the electronic revolution” 
(“The Dissolution of Character” 196).
 A cynical conference voice says near the end of Between,	“We have 
no evidence at all that live human beings, let alone the skirted figurine 
or high-heeled shoe on the door can so embody the divine principle 
descending into matter in a behavior sufficiently organised to prevent 
the illiterate women of an Indian village taught the natural method with 
an abacus from pushing all those red balls to the left like a magic spell 
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and all coming back pregnant” (Between 571–72). The deus	 ex	 machina 
given form in the technology of style in the novel, the (holy) ghost of 
the god in the machine descending and landing into textuality, gives 
no guarantee or evidence of consequences in the “real” world. Indeed, 
Brooke-Rose often speaks of the pleasures of technique as sufficient for 
the writer on the frontiers of language. “I think it was Yeats who spoke 
about poetry coming out of a mouthful of air. I’ve always been fasci-
nated by this notion of words and ideas floating up there as in a gal-
axy, from which the poet draws them down into the text” (Turner 26). 
Yet Brooke-Rose’s particular brand of postmodern travel charts a space 
for the flight of the female imagination while mapping out a specific, 
historical twentieth-century problematic. The circulation of an individ-
ual “feminine” signifier cannot be severed from the political order or 
from a specific history. To explore this history, literary and political, 
Brooke-Rose transforms Penelope’s domestic vigil of waiting for Odys-
seus into the vigilant, yet self-surprising language of travel in Between. 
When Penelope voyages, the categories of passivity and activity merge 
in the writing in a purposeful technical wandering that, nevertheless, 
yields a serendipitous “elsewhere.” In Between, Brooke-Rose conducts 
what Brigid Brophy in her novel In	Transit calls “herm warfare” (220). 
In this skirmish, the old Hermes, “the phallus . . . the god of roads, of 
doorways, of all goings-in and comings out; all goings-on” is remade as 
a different sort of traveler supplants the “wandering . . . phallic heroes, 
in a permanent state of erection; pricking o’er the plain” (Brown, Love’s	
Body 50).
T h ru  ( 1 9 75 )  is Brooke-Rose’s most self-consciously theoretical novel. Written in 1971 and 72, shortly after she moved to Paris to 
teach at the experimental University of Paris, Vincennes, Thru dialo-
gizes theory. Theories are made to speak to one another, revealing their 
blindnesses and emotional investments, like characters in a more con-
ventional novel. In Thru, Brooke-Rose uses theory’s discourses to test 
the power and, finally, the limits of theory.
 In the novel, Brooke-Rose historicizes theory as she fictionalizes it, 
locating her own fiction/metafiction in the specific context of circu-
lating (and overlapping) structuralist and poststructuralist discourses. 
Paradoxically, the rampant intertextual theories dialogically presented 
function at once as the sign of fictionality and the sign of the “real,” the 
“time of theory,”1 a period roughly from the mid-’60s to the mid-’70s 
when, as Paul de Man has said, “linguistic terminology” was introduced 
in the metalanguage about literature.”2 While the theory debates cir-
culated in print and in person, Brooke-Rose acted as a kind of transla-
tor for the English reader interested in what was happening in French 
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intellectual culture. Her “Letters from Paris” were addressed to the Eng-
lish readers of the Spectator and she contributed short essays to the TLS. 
Brooke-Rose describes this time in Paris as a moment when French intel-
lectuals “gang[ed] up” to form and reform critical circles associated with 
new outlets of publication like Tel	Quel and Change.3 In these “letters” 
home, Brooke-Rose captured the excitement of theory and its character. 
As opposed to arid intellectual discussions, theoretical positions were 
already charactered, in a sense, circulating dramatically through Paris 
in the bodies of the budding and established masters of theory. As she 
wrote in the TLS in 1973, the “Nouvelle Critique, though largely emanat-
ing from the National Centre for Scientific Research and the indepen-
dent Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, has spread far beyond these 
centers.” She goes on to say that “a public lecture by Barthes or Kristeva 
will fill a hall the size of a cinema, and when Roman Jakobson came 
to lecture at the Collège de France one had to be there at 8 am for 10 
o’clock in order to get a place, and the lectures were relayed into sev-
eral other halls. New books come out all the time and everyone rushes 
to buy them and use them. The discussion is alive and grows.”4 As an 
exile living in France, Brooke-Rose comments on the differences between 
her adopted and her home country: in France, discussions of theories 
of textual or linguistic analysis were matters of public excitement and 
wide cultural implication. The metatextual qualifies as an exciting fact 
of cultural life.
 Greimas’s “Sémantique structurale” appeared in 1966 and Du	Sens 
in 1970; Benveniste’s Problèmes	de	linguistique	générale was published in 
two volumes in Paris in 1966 and 1974; Kristeva’s Sèméiôtiké	was pub-
lished by Tel	Quel in 1969; Gérard Genette’s “Discours du recit” in 1972, 
and important work by Chomsky was translated into French during the 
sixties. In the pages of Tel	Quel, avant-garde textual practice and the-
ory coexisted as forms of cultural critique. Derrida’s “Freud et la scène 
de l’écriture” (TQ 26 [summer 1966]), “La Pharmacie de Platon,” (TQ 
32–3 [winter/spring 1968]), and Kristeva’s “Pour une sémiologie des 
paragrammes” (TQ 29 [spring 1967]) appeared alongside fiction by Phi-
lippe Sollers and poetry by Roche and Pleynet. Lacan’s Écrits, Derrida’s 
Dissemination and Éctriture	at	 la	différance, Irigaray’s Speculum	de	 l’autre	
femme and “Pouvoir du discours/subordination du féminin” (repub-
lished in This	Sex	Which	 Is	Not	One), and Cixous and Clement’s Newly	
Born	Woman, are all avatars of what Kristeva dubbed in her important 
book, “the revolution of the word” (The	Revolution	of	the	Word, 1968). All 
provide intertexts in the narrative of Thru.
 Engaged in teaching classes on structuralism and poststructural-
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ism simultaneously, Brooke-Rose was attracted to elements of both: the 
systematicity of structuralism, particularly the precision of structural-
ist approaches to narrative, such as Genette’s,5 and the analytic power 
of poststructuralist critique, which punctured the scientific ambitions 
of a complete grammar or science of literature. As de Man points out 
in The	 Resistance	 to	 Theory, resistance is embedded in the language of 
poststructuralist literary theory. Its rhetoric leads to the undoing of the 
system of language and contributes to the abuses, as well as the uses, of 
theory in the text.6 In Thru Brooke-Rose represents the uses and abuses 
of theory, both theory’s desire to master the production of meaning and 
the recognition that mastery is an impossibility. In an essay entitled “Is 
Self-Reflexivity Mere?” in which Brooke-Rose offers an explication	 du	
texte of the first twenty pages of Thru, she says that Thru	was written to 
“resolve” her own conflicted emotions about the relationship between 
her writing and her interests in theory. She describes this conflict as an 
“involvement with and parallel alienation from literary theory, involve-
ment as craftsman, critic, and teacher, alienation as writer” (Invisible	
Author 63). Although the retrospective splitting of the roles of writer and 
critic, and of craftsman and writers, itself feels too neat, the pleasures 
and resistances of theory, its attractions and limitations contribute to 
the drama of Thru. The novel disrupts the distinction between text and 
metatext; craft and writing; and writing and theory. It stages theory 
and its discontents, engaging the ambitions, promises, and investments 
of particular theories. Thus, although theory’s “pompous pilot[s] and 
“pompous pirate[s] (Thru 686) are mercilessly mocked in Thru, the nov-
el’s “techniques for living” draw deeply from the various mappings of 
the circuits of desire offered particularly in French theory during the late 
’60s and ’70s.
 For example, the promise and limitations of psychoanalysis are 
woven throughout Brooke-Rose’s text, reflecting psychoanalysis as 
both a paradigmatic reading practice and a source of multiple “phal-
lusies.” The novel begins with someone in a car looking into a rearview 
mirror (the “rétro viseur” [Thru 579]), and acts of looking backward to 
move forward, a basic analytic practice, abound. The mirrors, frames, 
and vanishing acts in Thru owe much to what Brooke-Rose calls in her 
analysis of “The Turn of the Screw” “the mirror effect” in Lacanian 
theory.7 Lacan’s “Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire 
in the Freudian Unconscious,” published in Écrits (in French in 1966), 
provides a crucial intertext and dialogic partner in Brooke-Rose’s novel. 
As Hanjo Berressem explains in “Thru the Looking Glass: A Journey into 
the Universe of Discourse,” Brooke-Rose makes use of Lacan’s mirror 
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in Thru, linking “the spatial image of a subject caught between images 
originating from behind which are projected forward by the mirror to 
Lacan’s notion of a decentered, barred subject which can recognize itself 
only by projecting its past into the future” according to what Lacan calls 
a “retroversion effect.”8
 In A	Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal, Brooke-Rose points out the relevance of 
psychoanalysis as a reading process rather than a set text to be decoded: 
“For Lacan, as for Freud before him but ignored by most Freudians, 
the unconscious is not simply a text to be read and interpreted (i.e., 
limited, by exclusion, to one significance or set of significances), it is 
also a faculty of reading” (Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal 46). In Thru, the loop-
ing of subjectivity through endless mirror images and linguistic rep-
resentations draws on the discourse of psychoanalysis and leads to 
the territory of the unconscious. Like Such, Thru	engages the linguistic 
techniques through which the unconscious is manifested in narrative. 
Along with Lacan’s mirror, deconstruction, though parodied in aca-
demic banter throughout the novel, imports crucial insights into what 
Brooke-Rose describes as deconstruction’s ability to “think otherness, 
to recreate it,” (Invisible	Author 26). Along with psychoanalysis, decon-
struction provides a reading practice modeled in Thru. Like Derrida’s 
Of	Grammatology, published in 1974, Thru deconstructs the blindnesses 
of Western discourse by demonstrating how these discourses occlude as 
they represent: “Eyelessness is not a provisional state but a structure, a 
blind spot in your own youdipeon discourse and discourse only occurs 
insofar as there is lack of (in)sight” (Thru 675). Graphically, punningly, 
Brooke-Rose demonstrates the blind spots in “youdipeon discourse” 
that Derrida’s project seeks to reveal. But turning the poststructural-
ist screw one more notch, she exposes the phallocentric blindnesses of 
western discourses in theoretical models of realism, structuralism, and 
poststructuralism alike. Combining Derrida’s deconstructive critique of 
phallogocentrism with the feminist insights of French feminism, she 
mimics the phallogocentrism of multiple stories and theories to expose 
the occlusion of Woman.
 As always, Brooke-Rose’s focus is on the narrative and linguistic 
implications of her subject. In this regard, Thru is the quintessential 
Brooke-Rose novel, which she has described as a “narrative about nar-
rativity” (Stories,	Theories	and	Things 8), the novel of which she is most 
proud (Invisible	Author 63). As in Between	and Such, she makes use of 
the journey as a central trope of classic narrative. In Thru,	 the dan-
ger of the fictional terrain is marked: “There should be placards say-
ing: Danger. You are now entering the Metalinguistic Zone. All access 
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forbidden except for Prepared Consumers with special permits from the 
Authorities” (Thru 629). These tongue-in-cheek instructions to the reader 
reveal that the physical journey we begin at the start of the narrative is 
the journey of the narrative itself:
 Through the driving-mirror four eyes stare back
 two of them in their proper place
 Now right on
 Q ask us
 to de  V elop foot on gas
how m(any   how) eyes?
four  two
 of them  correct
 on either side  of the
nose   the other
two   O danger
 slow   down  (Thru	579)
 Theory collapses into fiction and metanarrative into narrative; “self-
reflection” of all kinds is built into the narrative. Discourse and story 
refuse their structuralist separation. During the course of the novel the 
rectangle of the driving mirror doubles as a rectangular classroom in 
a university, and functions again as a rectangular diagram, the geom-
etry of a number of theoretical models including Greimas’s semiotic 
rectangle, Jakobson’s linguistic model of communication, and Lacan’s 
model of desire.9 The “course” of the narrative journey proliferates into 
“the hundred and fifty courses” offered in the university, a multiplic-
ity “which would upset the balanced economy of the narrative whose 
arbitrariness (freedom) is not infinite” (Thru 735). Within the text itself, 
two of the narrative’s possible authors are university professors, Armel 
Santores and Larissa Toren, who teach creative writing and critical 
theory respectively, in different universities (and who are themselves 
almost anagrammatic versions of each other, albeit with the crucial let-
ter “I,” missing in Armel’s name and “me,” missing in Larissa’s). They 
write each other letters and may be “inventing each other,” according to 
Brooke-Rose (Invisible	Author 64.) In Thru, Brooke-Rose rewrites the clas-
sic picaresque journey from episode to episode, the “horse” on which the 
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picaro usually rides now punningly transformed into the “disc-horse.” 
A narrative voice notes that modern novels “twiddle . . . from one dis-
embodied voice to another on this or that wave-length listening in to 
this or that disc-jockey and always the same disc-horse, a yea-yea and 
a neigh inserted into the circuit of signifiers, each discourse penetrating 
the non-disjunctive functioning of another” (Thru 637). Thru	continues 
Brooke-Rose’s engagement in Between with the pleasures and dangers of 
the “writerly” text. However, in Thru, no central disc-jockey analogous 
to the female translator guides our journey along the overactive circuits 
of signifiers. Indeed, who “drives” the narrative is a question that is 
explicitly raised in the text in many forms. “Who speaks?” a question 
raised in texts by both Lacan’s “Subversion of the Subject” and Barthes’ 
S/Z (See Berressem 128–29), is the most insistent form of this funda-
mental poststructuralist inquiry. The slippery identities of the different 
“tale-bearers,” drivers and passengers present marked and unmarked 
“dangers” to the reader throughout the text. Indeed, punning on the 
idea of “character” as mark, the characters in Thru become migratory 
letters, “lost semes, vanishing away like gods into the other scene” (Thru 
733).
 The mirror, like the journey, both introduced at the beginning of the 
novel, is a central trope of classic narrative. If the preposition	“through/
thru”	 refers to the journey of narrative through space and time, it also 
refers even more insistently to the gaze through the medium of the mir-
ror, that so-called reflector of reality. The “faulty” driving mirror distorts 
as it reflects, as Brooke-Rose interrogates the central trope of realism. In 
Thru the driving mirror offers the driver a ghostly backward glance at 
the dancing hoops (glaring lights) behind. As the narrative “drives the 
discourse into the future” (Thru 729), the traditional objects and subjects 
in realism’s mirror become spectral, haunted by a second sight. A second 
ghostly pair of eyes appears in the driving mirror:
Intensity of illusion is what matters to the narrator
through a flaw in the glass darkly perhaps making four
clear eyes stare back, two of them in their proper place at
height of bridge of nose . . . 
 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
        A
second pair of eyes hidden higher up the brow would have
its uses despite psychic invisibility or because of. (Thru 583)
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The four pair of eyes signal a “problem” of representation. Brooke-Rose 
points out in her explication of the opening pages of the novel that the 
“correct” eyes, the “real” eyes reflected in the mirror, themselves pose 
a problem (“The eyes, which are in their proper place, are now right on 
cue, printed as the letter Q, then another long gap to ‘ask us,’ as if the 
correctly reflected eyes posed a problem, not the other eyes further up” 
[Invisible	Author 66]). As she says in A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal, in the twen-
tieth century, the real has itself become problematic, altering the concep-
tion of realism and its reflecting mirror. The second pair of eyes, the 
ghostly pair that haunts the reflection in the mirror, illustrates that the 
real is shot through with unreality. Thru	begins with what is normally 
invisible, those “blind spots” traditionally occluded in realism’s scopic 
field, the ghostly eyes that do not see themselves reflect, what Lacan 
calls the “unspecularisable” objects associated with the unconscious of 
the subject. “It is to this object that cannot be grasped in the mirror that 
the specular image lends its clothes,”10 a phrase Hanjo Berressem quotes 
in his essay (130). This Lacanian notion surfaces in the narrative in one 
of the dialogues: “the truth as signifier being all the time non-specularis-
able except by a hidden representation of a representation” (Thru 732).
 In “rehandling the signifiers” of narrative and theory, a Lacanian 
phrase she refers to in her analysis of “The Turn of the Screw” (Rhetoric	
of	the	Unreal 47), Brooke-Rose attempts to represent multiple ‘invisibili-
ties’ in Thru. What Berressem’s analysis fails to emphasize adequately, 
however, is the way the novel foregrounds a particular	occlusion in fic-
tion and theory—the occlusion of woman as subject in “youdipean dis-
course.” In Thru, Brooke-Rose continues to explore feminist discourse as 
a “new logic” for narrative. Although she remains skeptical throughout 
her oeuvre of the shibboleths attached to “isms” of all stripes, certain 
texts of French feminist discourse, by Kristeva, Cixous, Irigaray, and 
Shoshanna Felman, provided her with fruitful models for rescripting 
the concept of desire. Luce Irigaray’s revisionary feminist mimicking of 
Lacan’s narratives of desire in This	Sex	Which	 Is	Not	One	provides one 
such source text. By “rehandling” Lacanian signifiers, Irigaray attempts 
“to make ‘visible,’ by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed 
to remain invisible” (Irigaray 76). Brooke-Rose’s “rétro viseur” is linked 
to the term not only in Lacan, but in Irigaray’s rewriting of Lacan. In 
This	Sex	Which	 is	Not	One, published after Thru, “retraversée” is a term 
that refers to “the process of going back through social, intellectual, and 
linguistic practices to reexamine and unravel their conceptual bases, 
in analogy with Alice’s voyages of exploration in Through	 the	Looking-
Glass” (Irigaray 221, publisher’s note). In this flawed looking-glass, we 
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see the “eyes that do not exist” (Thru 605) even in psychoanalytic and 
other forms of poststructuralist models. The “gray eminence” (Thru 
581)—the priests and analysts who have been the “sultans” (Thru 581) 
of the discourse, have missed something. The psychic invisibility of 
women in fiction and analytic discourse, the absence of their eyes/I’s, 
this hidden representation of a representation fights its way Thru the 
narrative.
 How does one hold up a mirror to the unconscious? How adjust the 
mirror to represent that which is missing from view? And how to do 
so, particularly when the unnamed male driver at the beginning of the 
novel seems to control the “intensity of illusion” in the driving mirror. 
When the young, unknown “mistress of the moment” (Thru 582) who 
is a passenger in the car turns the mirror toward herself to see what the 
driver can see, the intensity of illusion disappears (“She shifts the mir-
ror to her rearward glance. It doesn’t work for her the mistress of the 
moment” (Thru 582). “[S]he does not see by day the four lies in the ret-
rovizor when shifted to her forward gaze nor dancing hoops by night” 
(Thru 586). Although we read that the mirror “needs adjusting” (Thru 
587), it is at first only in dream form that the young woman’s desire 
finds representation. Now a magician’s assistant, she suddenly subverts 
the magical illusion by “losing” his phallic wand: “[A]nd suddenly a 
prop was missing I forget his stick I mean his wand anyway it was my 
fault he couldn’t Lift the white rabbit out of the hat” (Thru 587). An 
“unlearning” takes place (Thru 585) in which “I” and “O” (the subject 
and the object or Other) hypothetically change places and the sentence 
with male subject and female object is rewritten (“I me if it be possible 
despite non-equivalence to rewrite I as O and O as I” (Thru 585). The 
“I” changes places with the “O” in another sense in that the language 
of the unconscious, the Other within the subject, surfaces.11 This sub-
versive act, expressed indirectly through the young girl’s dream, echoes 
throughout the novel, representing the “double standard or teleological 
fallacy” (Thru 685) structured into all sorts of narratives. The magician’s 
assistant refuses to play by the rules of enchantment, instead exposing 
the smoke and mirrors behind what Derrida calls the “phallogocen-
trism” of Western discourse.
	 Thru exposes this “phallusy,” this assigned role-playing that marks 
not only the plot of fiction but the supposedly neutral analytic para-
digms of theory as well. “Theory,” as Brooke-Rose defines it, is “a sys-
tematic statement of the principles involved, a speculation” (Rhetoric	
of	 the	 Unreal fn. 3, 390). Punning on this “speculation,” the rectangle 
of the driving mirror figures at least “a thousand and one” (Thru 580) 
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paradigms, which, despite their multiplicity, fail to represent female 
desire. Thru	demonstrates how theories as well as fictional narratives 
“speculate,” but in doing so often cannot see the blind spots in their 
own acts of reflection. In these various mirrors, such as the semiotic 
triangle of Greimas, woman figures as desired object—sought, chased, 
and analyzed. The various “grey eminence[s],” both within and with-
out the text, do the desiring, wanting to “grasp” and to know her. As 
Brooke-Rose glosses it, they seem to know her better than she knows 
herself (see Invisible	Author 70). In an essay she wrote in 1985, “Woman 
as Semiotic Object” (reprinted in Stories,	 Theories	 and	 Things), Brooke-
Rose refers to the way she telescoped the image of the driving-mirror in 
Thru with the semiotic rectangles of Greimas’s structuralist paradigm of 
four “I”s or “actants” and their objects of exchange (Stories,	Theories	and	
Things	239).12 She notes that the semiotic system of narrative significa-
tion created by Greimas is theory that is neither scientific nor neutral, as 
it purports to be, for it depends upon a certain “plot”—the exchange of 
women: “I wonder whether these formulae for perfect love have been 
programmed into the computers of matrimonial agencies instead of 
tastes, ages and social situations. I know they have been programmed 
into male and female consciousnesses for thousands of years, and are 
not likely to be truly effaced in the mere few centuries since women 
began to try and think of other possibilities for themselves” (Stories,	
Theories	and	Things 238). In Thru	this voice of skepticism is taken over by 
Diderot’s Jacques the Fatalist, who broadens the critique to other phal-
logocentric discourses, even sophisticated poststructural narratives that 
recognize the existence of the unconscious, particularly psychoanalysis: 
“It is more difficult for a phallus-man to enter the I of a woman than for 
the treasurer of signifiers to enter the paradiso terrestre” (Thru 595).
 But to use Brooke-Rose’s explication of her own intentions is to 
“cheat” a little, since the whole point of Thru	is that it represents theory 
fictionally through linguistic and narrative techniques. Mimetically, dia-
logically, typographically, and, hence, metacritically, Thru	 stages these 
theoretical positions and what is at stake in maintaining them. Despite 
the parodies, the jokes, the cartoon chases and traveling semes, the 
stakes are high; indeed, these word games of Thru, like the translations 
in Between, suggest that life itself is at stake, à la Scheherezade: “Narra-
tion is life and I am Scheherezade,” Larissa tells Armel at one point in 
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the narrative. The incessant rehandling of the signifiers involves tech-
niques for living, that is, narrative in survival mode. What is offered is 
dangerous, “delirious discourse,” a kind of “cancelled” discourse that 
“will all get changed and transmuted”:
cancelled even, for it does not exist, except in my own boundless need 
and fear that will alter the signifiers into a delirious discourse through 
swift-footed Hermes with terrible letters. (Thru 711)
Like the dream of the “mistress of the moment,” Larissa’s “delirious 
discourse” may exist only within her own emotional narrative, but then, 
again, the novel plays with the idea that she may be the author of the 
discourse we read in Thru. (Jacques’s master surmises, “It looks might-
ily as if she [Larissa] were producing this one and not, as previously 
appeared, Armel, or Armel disguised as narrator or the narrator I dis-
guised as Armel . . .  Of course she may be producing a different text” 
(Thru 644). Brooke-Rose deliberately destabilizes the notion of author-
ship, recording in the thousand and one images a plurality of possible 
authors, all of whom pass through a death, a zero point of nonbeing, 
thus sharing the status of the nonexistence (“we are the text we do not 
exist either we are a pack of lies dreamt up by the unreliable narrator in 
love with the zeroist author in love with himself but absent in the nature 
of things, an etherized unathorised other” (Thru 733). Whoever it is who 
writes, however, the “delirious discourse,” produced out of “need and 
fear,” is made up of “terrible letters.” This discourse somehow comes 
“through” the phallic god of communication (what Brigid Brophy calls 
“herm” warfare in her novel In	Transit). These “terrible letters” produce 
a narrative more frightening than the lover’s discourse circulating in the 
fluid prose of Between, the “Misch-Masch of tender fornication inside 
the bombed out hallowed structures and the rigid steel glass modern 
edifices of the brain” (Between 447).
 For in the very risky operation of translating theory into fiction, 
Thru functions as an hysterical	 text, a self-mutilated body of “terrible 
letters.” Barthes’s “writerly” text described in S/Z as a kind of “hemor-
rhage” (Barthes 105) is in Thru a full-blown wounding of the text. The 
text strikes itself blind and dumb. Playing upon a version of what Mar-
tin Jay, in Downcast	Eyes, has called Enlightenment “ocularcentricism,” 
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which equates the “I” and the “eye” (284), Brooke-Rose’s Thru presents 
an alternative “hystery of the Eye” (Thru 584, 691) which mimes the 
mythical blindings that abound in “youdipeon discourse,” blindings 
that signal the threat of castration as punishment for the desire for the 
mother’s body. The novel presents the tragic relation between blindness 
and insight in the European tradition. As she weaves pieces of Oedipal 
narrative, with its images of castration—the blindings of Oedipus and 
King Lear, John the Baptist’s disembodied head on a platter—Brooke-
Rose precipitates a new kind of “corpus crysis,” (736) as she cuts and 
dices and gouges her text:
 So that now we have at last returned to the subject of
discourse, while still of the moment before being thru
and hurt (oo!) but who is we to dip royally
no collectively into an age-old narrative matrix before we
gouge out the I in order carefully to gauge its liquid
essence? (Thru 595)
In an act that parodies the sacrificial self-blindings of Oedipus and Dem-
ocritus of Abdera (who “tore his eyes out in a garden so that the spec-
tacle of reality would not distract him,”)13 the narrative gouges out its 
own I’s/eyes. In the above passage the narrative voice asks skeptically 
about the “royal we” who “returns” to the discourse—the androcen-
tric normative “we” who forms the consensus underwriting European 
discourse. This skepticism is punningly conveyed in transforming 
Oedipus into “you dip us” (Thru 592) and in the French word for Oedi-
pus, “Oedipe” (Thru 592) which figures the male pen dipped into the 
eye/womb/thoughts of the woman. This “youdipeon discourse” that 
records so many stories of male fears and desires dips into the narrative 
“matrix” or womb.14
 This narrative “ma-trix” is the same one cut up into the “SIN TAG MA 
TRICKS” found at the beginning of the narrative (Thru 581). Through this 
self-inflicted pain, with its “terrible letters,” “Ma’s tricks” present a new 
“h Y s T e R y of the Eye” (Thru 584, 691). This new history demonstrates 
what “the omitter omit[s],” representing the objectification of the female 
body by the male gaze and pen in literary and theoretical discourse. 
Psychoanalysis is prominently featured: male castration anxiety, fear of 
the power of female sexuality is “grammed” and “programmed” on the 
body of the text by the “textcaliber” of the pen, a cruel drama which 
mimes mastery of the prostrate female body:
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  (but what does the omitter omit?)
The hystery of the eye
The cruel nails
grammed in the r e m o t e
  e y e s
  p a r c h m e a n t
  o r  s t o n e
  d r y
  p a p y r u s
with a fear of fusion that
  might  e x t end
  explode the
  I into  r
  e
 some Other sex u  a  1  i  t  y  (Thru 691)15
 As Charles Bernheimer observes in his introduction to essays on 
Freud’s Studies	in	Hysteria, “the oldest surviving Egyptian medical papy-
rus, dating from around 1900 B.C., deals specifically with recommended 
treatments for hysterical disorders” (2).16 In hysteria, the womb was 
thought to “wander,” and one of the more bizarre cures for this errancy 
was to place an ibis of the god Toth on the woman’s crotch to lure 
the womb back into place. Writing is a painful technology in “youdi-
peon discourse,” in which women are immured as they are inscribed, 
from classic texts to poststructuralist theory. Repeated references to 
the “moving finger” of the classic text appear, “piercing through the 
pregnant plenitude from idyll to castratrophy thus bringing about the 
end of the discourse (Thru 715).” The cruel “nails” further suggest the 
way modern, modernist, and ancient theories are deeply invested in 
the dialectics of desire and fear of the female body: the fingernails of 
the Joycean artist, so coolly pared above or beyond his handiwork are 
linked to the “cruel nails” of the Egyptians as well as the “nailings,” 
impalings, and gougings of the woman as object in narrative. The male 
pen “dips” in and out of the female “matrix,” omnisciently mastering 
all points of view, as phallus and logos are indissoluble in the technol-
ogy of writing. (The more brittle and nervous modernist male anxiety 
reappears throughout the text in allusions to T. S. Eliot’s dysfunctional 
hetereosexual pairs.)
 In his book on the graphic elements of Brooke-Rose’s experimen-
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tal fiction, Glyn White goes to great lengths to explain Brooke-Rose’s 
typological elements mimetically, arguing that her typographic tricks 
serve a greater realist function. (White, Reading	the	Graphic	Surface:	The	
Presence	 of	 the	 Book	 in	 Prose	 Fiction 132) However, his analysis mutes 
the relation between writing technology and indelible pain. Writing 
hurts and haunts. This is the “message” of the sudden (presto) name 
change of the young passenger in the car who becomes the character 
“Ruth,” anagram of Thru. Jacques’s master says, “Ecco! In any case the 
mistress of the moment should be changed, and no doubt will be in 
another moment though perhaps she could meanwhile be called, Ruth, 
for mixed reasons of phonemic contiguity” (Thru 595). More than the 
anagrammatic couple of Larissa and Armel, this phonemic contiguity 
underwrites the narrative in Thru. It is this anagram that reveals the 
way lament materializes as narrative theory in this hysterical fiction. 
Brooke-Rose “blinds” and binds her own narrative, mimicking mythic, 
classic, structuralist, and poststructuralist discourses in creating a text 
that is symptomatic. Monique David-Ménard refers to the “speaking 
pain” of the hysterical body (46). As the creative writing students debate 
Larissa’s fate (she’s a loose end we can’t pick them all up” [Thru 732]), 
Brooke-Rose “organizes” her painful text through a series of operations 
performed on her text, which is like her female writer Larissa who “has 
had most vicious organs removed, dropping a vessel here there and 
in the other place which explains her non-existence and consonantal 
compensation, piecemeal metonymised, parceled out, fragmented into 
synthetic synechdoche that organizes a chiasmus in a forgotten name 
to create the rejection that she proinjects” (Thru 687). In one of the dia-
logues between Larissa and her former husband, Armel—a dialogue 
which, it is suggested, is also a “discourse” being written by creative 
writing students in a class—Armel tells Larissa to “Please stop this hys-
terical rewriting of history” (Thru 654).
 Playing with this “speaking pain” in the many lacerations of her 
hysterical text, Brooke-Rose represents the repetitions, reversals, reinter-
pretations of the unconscious. As Larissa insists, “we have to reinvent 
it [narrative] continually, rehandling the signifiers in constant reinvest-
ment. Read Irigaray” (Thru 631). The Lacanian phrase “rehandling the 
signifiers” is itself “rehandled,” reinvented, and reinvested. In turning 
her text into an hysterical body Brooke-Rose tests the potential useful-
ness of psychoanalytic discourse by transforming it into hysteria as 
a discourse by women about women. Hysteria becomes a potentially 
disruptive discourse, the subject of the third section of Cixous and 
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Clément’s Newly	Born	Woman, in which they debate each other precisely 
on this point. By fictionalizing this theoretical discourse Brooke-Rose 
takes the chance of converting her own narrative into an hysterical text, 
complete with cuts, gaps, silences, and crazy repetitions that mime a 
narrative out of control, helplessly watching its own delirious projec-
tions. We read: “Neurosis has the cunning of stupidity, and stupidity 
is a dimension anyone can fall into, however intelligent, indeed, part 
of the intellect can rise suspended and watch, helpless and in pain, 
the misuse of its own projected trajectory struggling alone, as if cut off 
from itself, in a delirious discourse . . . ” (Thru 592). The “cuts” in and 
through the text, the abrupt cutting off of narrative idylls, the often 
frantically hectic pace of the narrative as it rushes from fragment to 
fragment, writing to rewriting, contributes to the risky strategy of a 
symptomatic discourse.17
 This risky, hysterical “corpus crysis” (736) heats up the tempera-
ture of the supposedly cool and distant, neutral theories that circulate 
through the text. While destabilizing and dissolving the realist idea of 
“character,” Brooke-Rose novelizes the supposedly distanced and logical 
position of “theory” and shows it to be a function of desire, like tradi-
tional romance plots of earlier texts. In taking Greimas’s rectangle as a 
major paradigm for the text, the classroom, and the metacritical terrain, 
Brooke-Rose transvalues the rhetoric of desire that underwrites both 
the structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic turns. In his Foreword 
to Greimas’s On	Meaning:	 Selected	Writings	 in	 Semiotic	 Theory, Fredric 
Jameson describes semiotics as a “theory based on wanting” (xxxi), a 
theory of modality that has the notion of value at the heart of the theory. 
Semiotics as an “institution of the subject as a wanting subject and the 
object as an object of value, can be described in terms of modal utter-
ances” (xxxi). According to Jameson, “Wanting is the first of a series of 
determined semantic constructions that specify actants as virtual opera-
tors of a doing” (xxxi). Elsewhere, he calls the ideologies behind this 
theory of wanting “buried narratives” (xiii).
	 Thru dramatizes the implication of theory in the circuit of desire in 
a number of ways. In arranging and rearranging the “operators of a 
doing” in Jameson’s terms, Brooke-Rose demonstrates that a “theory 
based on wanting” is never neutral. In the midst of a dialogue between 
Larissa and her student lover, who is trying to convince her to live with 
him and accept their relationship, an academic voice in the narrative 
offers the following view of the purely “linguistic” character of rela-
tions—even love:
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Any agent can enter into a relation with any predicate. The notions of 
subject and object do not correspond to a difference in nature but to a 
place in the proposition uniting for instance two lovers. (Thru 703)
 In World	 Postmodern	 Fiction Cristopher Nash uses this particular 
passage to illustrate that postmodernist fiction treats “narrative [as] 
nothing more than a string of linguistic signs.”18 Now, Nash is right to 
suggest the break with character here—the semes indeed travel as posi-
tions become pro-positions played first one way and then another. What 
is misleading, however, is the suggestion that this break reduces the text 
to a kind of neutral, linguistic play. This reading accepts the flat tone of 
the passage itself, along with its suggestion that the flexibility of gram-
matical placement in the discourse of desire is a matter of no great con-
sequence. The lovers are only a “for instance” in a general proposition 
about subjects and objects. And yet, this decathected, neutral “theoreti-
cal” position is embedded in a text wrought with highly charged, even 
lyrical movements of desire and fear. The narrative of Thru constantly 
plays with the “lettering” of emotion as it anagrammatically rearranges 
the subjects and objects of the discourse. “I me if it be possible despite 
non-equivalence to rewrite I as O and O as I” (Thru 585), we read at one 
point—this is a wish expressed in the narrative to rewrite the “I” of the 
narrative ego in the form of the “O” of the other, and this difference of 
a vowel matters: It matters who does what to whom, who seizes the “I,” 
who gazes at the Other. Indeed, the narrative plays with rearrangements 
of AEIOU to create varied postures of emotional debt and investment.
 But Thru reveals as well that the drama of “wanting” and investment 
includes theorist and reader as well as the lettered (and interchangeable) 
characters within the narrative. In his Foreword to Monique David-
Ménard’s Hysteria	from	Freud	to	Lacan, Ned Luckacher speaks of Freud’s 
desire to understand his hysterical patient, Elisabeth von R: “For Freud 
himself the presentation of the impossibility of satisfying his desire to 
understand the mystery of Elisabeth’s divided subjectivity becomes itself 
a kind of satisfaction that one calls theory. Through the hysteric Freud 
was led to the relation of desire to language.”19 In Luckacher’s view, the-
ory IS the analyst’s desire. As he points out, according to Lacan, another 
name for this in the analytic situation is “transference” (David-Ménard 
xiii). In writing about Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious through 
his work on hysteria, Brooke-Rose similarly recognizes the way Freud 
was implicated in his discovery of the unconscious through treating 
his hysterical patients: “It was by listening to hysterical discourse that 
Freud discovered, not only that there was an unconscious, but that he 
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was deeply implicated, through reading that unconscious, in reading his 
own, in other words that this other discourse was itself an active read-
ing of his own unconscious” (Rhetoric	of	 the	Unreal 46–47). In Thru, the 
grey eminences, the sultans, the mythologisers, the magicians, the con-
jugators, the “narrator’s omniscience that dips into many minds” (Thru 
689)—all represent various figures who attempt to grasp the desired 
object, stand ins for the semioticians, the analysts and deconstructors 
as well. What Thru dramatizes is that this interpretive desire—theory’s 
desire—is, fundamentally, the desire of narrative itself, that is, to pursue 
the story to its conclusion, to go “thattaway” to follow the rabbit disap-
pearing down the hole until the truth of the whole is made manifest. 
Within the text this is called the reader’s “vulgar desire to know”:
Larissa’s vicious organs which are all verbal organs and all removed 
reduced to a mouth most vicious of all that establishes a specular rela-
tionship with the reader’s vulgar desire to know what happens next 
in an eternal game of vinciperdi between his demand which cannot 
reach its end by justifiable means and the author’s gift of a running 
curriculum vitae as object of exchange, the truth as signifier being all 
the time non-specularisable except by a hidden representation of a rep-
resentation. (Thru 732)
 To pursue the truth through all its feints and negations is the task 
of the reader, but this pursuit to get to the end of the story is fraught 
with danger, as we are warned at the beginning of the narrative journey. 
In her analysis of James’s Turn	 of	 the	 Screw, Brooke-Rose expands on 
the connection between reader and therapist and the potentially cata-
strophic consequences of the relentless pursuit of meaning. Quoting 
Shoshana Felman’s essay on James’s tale, she refers to the governess’s 
horrifying ‘triumph.’ The governess,
both as a reader and as a therapist, both as an interpreter and as an 
exorcist, is rendered highly suspicious by the death of what she had set 
out at once to understand and to cure.	.	.	.	It therefore behoves [sic] the 
reader to discover the meaning of this murderous effect of meaning; to 
understand how a child can be killed by the very act of understand-
ing. (quoted in Brooke-Rose, Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal 182; emphasis in 
original)
Continuing to endorse Felman’s Lacanian reading, Brooke-Rose quotes 
Felman’s view that: “‘the attempt at grasping meaning and at closing 
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the reading process with a definitive	interpretation in effect discovers—
and comprehends—only death’” (Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal 183; emphasis 
in original). This phallic attempt to master meaning occurs at a cost. 
Oedipus, of course, is its representative, a “reader” engaged in a quest 
that is “both liberating and catastrophic” (Thru 692) because it leads to 
the lacerating self-knowledge that the pursuer is the criminal, blindness 
being the price of insight.
 At the end of the narrative, the students advocate “revolution” and 
at least one proclaims the obsolescence of the Oedipal narrative:
Who do you think you are, bourgeois little boys dipped carefully into a 
bloody eye and swaddled in a castration complex to preserve the dirty 
little family secret that structures society each tale-bearer carrying his 
code in his mouth until he has eaten himself silly and soft and flabby? 
That way recuperation lies. We dip you you dip us in a permanent 
circulation of value-objects with always something added, ex nihilo, 
swelling out the portrait of the object instituted by itself as a value 
although its semes are false, with the moving signifier pointing to the 
falsehood but incapable of decoding it so that although long desired it 
is maintained in a pregnant plenitude, the piercing of which, both lib-
erating and catastrophic, will bring about the end of the goldicondeo-
logical discourse. (Thru 726)
Yet as Brad Buchanan points out in a fine discussion of the centrality 
of the Oedipus theme in the novel, the Oedipal story is not rendered 
obsolete in Thru, as the above voice suggests. The “goldicondeological 
discourse” does not crumble.20 The classic texts of western discourse 
repeat again and again the story of Oedipus:
Ainsi un doigt, de son mouvement désignateur et muet, accompagne 
toujours le texte classique: la vérité est de la sorte longuement dési-
rée et contournée, maintenue dans une sorte de plénitude enceinte, 
dont la percée, à la fois libératoire et catastrophique, accomplira la fin 
même du discours; et le personnage, espace même de ces signifiés, n’est 
jamais que le passage de l’énigme don’t Oedipe (dans son débat avec 
le Sphynx) a empreint tout le discourse occidental. 
 (Portrait of the portrait by Roland Barthes) (Thru 592)
Brooke-Rose exposes the persistent and unavoidable “oedipianno” that 
is the refrain of western narratives with their “unintentional phallusies.” 
Revolution, too, as another romantic ideology, is debunked. But as in 
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“The Foot,” in Thru she “rehandles” the rhetoric of psychoanalysis, not 
to imagine its obsolescence, but to replay its insights about the relation 
between language, narrative, and desire. Here, too, castration serves as 
a powerful trope for narrative as “cut off” from any origin: “A head in a 
pool on a platter in a textured cloth, the head detached to re-present the 
word, a disembodied voice” (Thru 715). In “gouging out the I’s” of the 
text, in producing her new form of “corpus crysis,” Brooke-Rose replays 
narrative as longing. Although the creative writing class in Thru speaks 
of “degrees of presence” (playing off their attendance in the classes they 
attend or miss) (Thru 610), the narrative of Thru represents, like much 
of Brooke-Rose’s fiction, degrees of absence, that unbearable lightness 
of being. In the cuts, the “lacunae,” the hall of mirrors which form the 
narrative of Thru, Brooke-Rose continues the pursuit of what’s missing 
waged in her earlier texts:
This is a text we are creating it verbally we are the text we do not exist 
either we are a pack of lies dreamt up by the unreliable narrator in love 
with the zeroist author in love with himself but absent in the nature of 
things, an etherized unauthorized other. (Thru 733)
 Writing about Lacan in A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal, Brooke-Rose says that 
the “psychoanalytical situation, which is based on transfer, that is, love, 
or ‘the acting out of the reality of the unconscious’ . . . is a situation in 
which this constant reading, this constant re-interpreting, is done by 
love, by an interpreter caught up in the love-relationship that constitutes 
the transfer. It is done by love, but through language (speech, dreams, 
omissions, silences, resistance, forgetting to turn up, etc.)” (Rhetoric	 of	
the	Unreal 47). In Thru, Brooke-Rose’s tools are theory’s discourses, with 
which she stages the love affairs of narrative. She parodies and mocks 
the language of poststructuralist theory, including psychoanalysis, “the 
transferutterance which can be interpreted at all levels as privation 
disjunction attribution conjunction thus representing the circulation of 
value-objects as an identification of the deictic transfers. . . . It has all 
been dreamt up by the lover of the moment but displaced, condensed, 
metonymised” (Thru 723). Yet Thru fictionalizes theory and theorizes 
about storytelling precisely through the “transferuttereances” that 
Brooke-Rose parodies. The gendered dialogues of Between and Such, the 
long lover’s complaint in her stories in Go	When	You	See	the	Green	Man	
Walking, continue in the morsels of theory that cut across each other in 
the text of Thru. Theories of nonbeing, unreliable narrators, the death of 
the author, and even poetic diagnoses of the condition of modernity like 
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Eliot’s “Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (the etherized patient) all play 
a role in the narrative. Paradoxically, however, in sabotaging the stable 
“I”s of narrative and staging the “deaths” that fiction passes through, 
Brooke-Rose creates a survival narrative—not a survival of theory (and 
therefore its dismissal or superceding) but survival through theory. As 
Larissa says at one point, “He’s weak and couldn’t stand it whereas I 
in theory can” (Thru 707). Larissa and Ruth, and other unnamed, psy-
chically “invisible” mistresses of the moment, come THRU “in theory,” 
with all its discontents. The “delirious” text is also a “delicious” text, a 
pleasure in the handling of signifiers of the kind that is evident in all 
of Brooke-Rose’s fiction. Finally, the “joussisance” which has become 
such a cliché of French feminist discourse is, nonetheless, an apt term 
for the pleasures in the text that exist, morce by morce, in this painful 
(that is, full of pain) narrative. These morsels of theory produce highly 
charged, even lyrical, movements of desire, fear, and pleasure. As bits of 
theory are made to co-exist in the text, they turn into a strange kind of 
poetry. Jacques’s master tells him to read Kristeva and offers a revision 
of Wallace Stevens’s “The Man with the Blue Guitar”: “she plays upon 
the blue guitar she does not play things as they are” (Thru 594). Poetry, 
fiction, theory are all surmise; invested with desire, personalitied, none 
completely capture the way things “really are.”
 In her essay on Thru in Invisible	Author, Brooke-Rose addresses a ques-
tion raised by Robert Caserio in an essay on Brooke-Rose and the fiction 
of J. G. Ballard.21 Caserio described Thru as a text “where stylized and 
parodied discourses of disjunction, displacement, and indeterminacy, 
from linguistics to Lacan, are turned into a sublime poetry. The curious 
aspect of Thru is the way it makes one feel that the free-for-all thruway 
of the text can become a roadblock, and that what the road blocks is 
more important than the formulas and forms of mobility” (quoted in 
Invisible	Author 107). After quoting Caserio, Brooke-Rose says, “Well, I 
hesitantly (if delightedly) accept both the sublime poetry and the road-
block, but would ask, tentatively, and truly quite modestly: If the poetry 
is sublime, what sublime poetry does not have roadblocks? We learn	to 
read poetry” (Invisible	Author 107). Although Thru, like Between, can be 
regarded as staging a sometimes frantic mobility of language and theory, 
the text constantly reminds us that its pleasures are inextricable from its 
pains, like the “constraints” that bind all her fiction, like the constraints 
that bind poetic form and underwrite its lyricism.
 In “Woman as Semiotic Object,” Brooke-Rose prefaces her critique 
of the phallocentrism of most semiotic paradigms with the following 
story of her own emotion, so casually dropped as to be easily ignored: 
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“There have been a few delightful moments, during my desultory and 
decidedly non-expert readings in semiotics, when the subject made me 
laugh out loud instead of terrorizing, or, same thing perhaps, boring 
me stupid.”22 This “laugh” is a laugh to free the mind from its bond-
age; the parodic, tongue-in-cheek tone of the critique of phallocentric 
semiotics begins by banishing both terror and boredom, emotions that 
might induce a kind of frozen passivity, even stupidity. The anecdote 
reveals something important about the survival of the female subject 
positions in Brooke-Rose’s novel. For, finally, Thru in the title refers to 
getting through, to coming through, to surviving with Scheherezade: 
“You’ll lacerate yourself,” Armel says to Larissa, and she answers, “Oh 
I’ll come through. I always do you know” (Thru 712).
in h e r  “ r e h and l i n g ”  of theory’s signifiers and systems in Thru, Brooke-Rose deconstructs the stability of narrative as representation. 
The deliberate showmanship in the narrative, the conjuring of scenes, 
dialogues, and diagrams; in multiple and echoing levels of narration, 
destabilizes not only the concept of authorship but also the concept of 
mimesis, the representation of a set of events that take place in time. 
“Intensity of illusion” is created and dispelled repeatedly before our 
eyes, as discourses of desire are played, with different theoretical map-
pings offered as guides to the metatextual zones we pass through. These 
theoretical maps, seemingly proffered as “objective” tools for grasping 
the meaning of the story, are revealed as themselves “interested” cul-
tural narratives, invested in the pursuit of their own desired objects.
 Yet for all its textual disruptions and despite its critique (even par-
ody) of the limitations of theory, the novel conveys the importance of 
theory’s investments. The passion of the signifier is never in doubt, even 
as its pains take precedence over its pleasures, the “delirious” hysterical 
discourse overtaking its deliciousness. For all its play and virtuosity, 
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Thru is a novel that operates according to the premise that theory and 
fiction are worthy pursuits. Even if the values assigned to objects of 
exchange in various theoretical paradigms are discredited and the blind 
spots exposed, the novel suggests that theories and stories still matter.
 The four novels in what Brooke-Rose called her Intercom Quartet 
(Amalgamemnon, Xorandor, Verbivore, and Textermination)1 continue to 
expose the blind spots in “youdipeon” discourses. But the role of litera-
ture and theory in the war on the ideology of the real becomes increas-
ingly less assured. In her Intercom Quartet Brooke-Rose represents the 
possibility of the annihilation of literature, critique, and humanism itself. 
According to Glyn White in Reading	 the	Graphic	Surface, Brooke-Rose’s 
first title for the novel Thru	was “Textermination,” which she changed 
when she mistakenly believed the title was redundant, already used as 
a title by William Burroughs (White 126). The novels of the Intercom 
Quartet all raise the specter of textermination: the end of stories and the-
ories in the technological age. Modernity’s supposed “deaths,” the death 
of the author, novel, character, and history, presuppositions that Brooke-
Rose has tested fictionally since publishing Out in 1964, are pushed to 
more apocalyptic registers. The novels radiate a heightened sense of 
cultural urgency. In Amalgamemnon	 and Textermination, especially, the 
fictional dialogues of Thru, with their changing pairs of speakers (Armel 
and Larissa, Ali Nourennin and Salvatore, Jacques, the fatalist, and his 
master), become “direlogues” with “theororists” (Amalgamemnon 29). We 
see that ideologies can terrorize.
 These novels take on a prophetic feel, as if the prophetess Cassandra 
presided over all four texts. In Amalgamemnon, the narrator imagines 
being Cassandra, walking “disheveled the battlements of Troy, uttering 
prophecies from time to time unheaded and unheeded before being 
allotted as slave to victorious Agamemnon” (Amalgamemnon 7). Despite 
their very different narrative techniques—first-person narrative in Amal-
gamemnon, dialogue in Xorandor, a return to the narratorless narrative 
in Verbivore and Textermination—all four novels forecast disaster if the 
warning signs of the prophets are ignored and the increasingly “unreal” 
course of twentieth-century culture goes unchecked. In this criticism in 
the wilderness, we are warned that “the patience of vigilant language” 
(to quote Blanchot’s The	Writing	of	 the	Disaster [75]) is mortally threat-
ened in a world of media, technology, simulacra, and jargon.
 In Amalgmamenon	 (1984), the first-person discourse is spoken by 
multiple imagined speakers. Although we do not know the identity 
of the voice that begins the narrative, we learn that it belongs to a 
classics professor, Mira Enketei (6, 32), who, during the course of the 
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novel, “mimages” herself as many other characters (14).2 Her avatars 
include Cassandra (7, 16), the Trojan prophetess whose fate it is to be be 
uttering“unheeded” prophecies (Amalgamemnon	16) and who becomes 
one of Agamemnon’s spoils of war. Imagining herself “as if” many dif-
ferent characters, Mira mimages herself as Sandra (Cassandra’s mod-
ern counterpart), an Abyssinian maid playing the dulcimer (14), and 
a “modern intellectual” named Anne de Rommeda (32) (also Androm-
eda). Even her name, Mira Enketei, identifies her also as a star in the 
constellation “Enteki-In Cetus” (17), which means “inside the whale,” 
thereby further invoking the identity of Jonah (“I could cheat of course 
and turn to the last pages of the world as book and therefore find myself 
still inside the Whale, In Cetus, Mira Enketei, why not, but Mira will do, 
a small star varying from third to ninth magnitude in a comparatively 
long period of eleven months, during half of which she will be invisible 
to the naked eye” (32).
 Like Joyce’s Finnegan, Mira assumes historical, mythic, and astro-
nomical proportions. Her mission, however, remains constant: to awaken 
those around her to the impending doom she sees on the horizon. The 
novel’s original title, “Soon,” was an early attempt to convey this press-
ing predicament. As prophetess, Mira/Cassandra is a diagnostician of 
the present, who warns that if humanity’s course is not altered, we may 
witness nothing less than the collapse of meaning and civilization. Like 
Brooke-Rose, the first-person speaker and her female avatars expose 
the presuppositions operating beneath the surface of the reality we take 
for granted. Their warnings are based on extrapolation. Prediction is 
based on predictability, the deadening repetitions upon which “real-
ity” is based. Amalgamemnon takes on the Brook-Roseian problematic of 
how to unmask the clichés that form the fabric of our existence in order 
to postulate some alternative possibility, departure or destination for 
this train that has left the station. As it predicts disaster, the novel also 
projects the possibility of a different tradition of the future, one that just 
might include hope.
 On the first page of Amalgamemnon, Mira predicts her own redun-
dancy, and with it, the obsolescence of all who care about human pas-
sion and the passionate use of language. She asks, “for who will want 
to know about ancient passions divine royal middle class or working 
in words and phrases and structures that will continue to spark out 
inside the techne that will soon be silenced by the high technology?” 
(Amalgamemnon 5). The techne of writing, the quick and lively use of 
language, is opposed to language produced technologically. Readers 
as well as writers are threatened with obsolescence in this brave new 
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world: “Who will still want to read at night some utterly other dis-
course that will shimmer out of a minicircus of light upon a page of say 
Agamemnon returning to his murderous wife the glory-gobbler with 
his new slave Cassandra princess of fallen Troy . . . ?” (Amalgamemnon 
5). With the advent of computers and technology, the classics professor 
says she will “soon be quite redundant at last despite of all, as redun-
dant as you after queue and as totally predictable, information-content 
zero” (Amalgamemnon 5). Redundancy, Brooke-Rose says elsewhere, is 
the basis of realism. We depend on it to confirm the thick detail of our 
world; it also underpins the success of our circuits of communication. 
Yet in Amalgamemnon, redundancy is a word for the obsolescence of 
humanism, literature, and knowledge, all superseded by “information.”3 
Like the sickly white male in Out, humanists like Mira will soon be on 
the unemployment line, “a worker in a queue of millions with skills too 
obsolete for the lean fitness of the enterprise” (Amalgamemnon 6). The 
pun on “queue” collapses the useless letter and the useless woman. The 
phrase “information-content zero” in the first sentence is a clue to the 
now dominant model of efficiency. The exemplar of the “lean fitness of 
the enterprise” is the computer. Unlike the binary opposition between 
0 and 1 on which computer logic is based, the “u” after “q,” like the 
“you” of Mira and her fellow humanists, conveys no new information. 
They are “u”seless in the technological age of the national Education 
Computer.
 Indeed, computers threaten to replace the function of the oracle, pro-
gramming both the “foetus” and the “prophetus” into wholly predict-
able patterns. Like Agamemnon, who takes Cassandra prisoner after the 
defeat of the Trojans, the computer program will amalgamate prophetic 
speech into the culture machine that produces the pseudo-future:
Soon the prophecies will come out of input as Garbage In, and we shall 
all become oracular computers, Draculas sucking endless information 
from the napetrough of a wavelength, murders holdups wars natural 
catastrophes coodaytahs space-launches daytaunts cultural items and 
sportspersons sailing round the world on an analogue. The very foetus 
will be programmed into a prophetus curling up in the womb with a 
book of genetic information and occasionally switching on or off the 
booming disco of his mother’s fears and tantrums and galloping vote 
inventions right left of center. (Amalgamemnon 82–83)
 Whether historical, genetic, Oedipal, or political, our meaning-mak-
ing systems are already programmed to “spin” events in a particular 
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way.4 What the prophetess sees is the relentlessness of living inside 
modernity’s ideology in which prophecy becomes self-fulfilling. Ideas 
become “reçus” immediately as they are amalgamated with predictable 
narratives of national interest, of sexual conquest, of political rhetoric. 
Through much of the narrative, there is a sense of weariness, a sense 
that nothing can break through the language of habit, this “ineluctable 
future” (Invisible	Author 49). Prediction is immediately short-circuited as 
predictability. Mira fears that technology will accelerate this process of 
predictability, replacing knowledge with information and the certainty 
of code. In this projected future, history itself will have outlived its 
usefulness.
 As prophetess, professor of classics, and reader of Herodotus, the 
“father of history,” Mira/Cassandra has much at stake in the possibility 
of the end of both history and prophecy. In the instant world brought 
to everyone by the world evening news, the fast food-for-thought of 
“instant history” will expunge both the prophecy of the oracle and the 
deep cultural record of thousands of years of techne:
There will be computers for self-fulfilling prophecies for what will 
prophecy be but instant history diluted with tired generalizations and 
a margin of terror, add half a databank of crowing achievement and 
six face-saving devices finely hopped. . . . and what if the third millen-
nium after the third-world war refuse this confuturism, what if it pre-
defer that the great deeds of men should after all be forgotten, whether 
Greeks or foreigners and, especially, the causes of the wars between 
them? (Amalgamemnon 113)
Our accumulated knowledge of error is jeopardized in this vision, 
and, along with it, our ability to learn from our mistakes and prevent 
those mistakes from being repeated. With a push of the delete button 
on the computer, both the past and the possibility of an alternative to 
the history of war will be expunged. With this deletion, the prophet-
ess fears that history and literature will be themselves “kidnapped on 
the sacred cow of technoideology above and mass redundancy below” 
(Amalgamemnon 22). This new form of terrorism involves world-wide 
amnesia, an end to the inheritance of cultural memory. An “Oblitopia” 
or “dehauntological campaign” (Amalgamemnon 138) promises a utopian 
vision of the world-wide circulation of information that will free us from 
the past: “Perhaps I should allow myself to be abducted by a band of ter-
rorists who will hold me prisoner in Oblitopia or why not right here?” 
(Amalgamemnon 138).5
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 Yet, on the other end, as diagnostician of culture, Mira/Cassan-
dra understands that classical histories themselves formed part of 
the “youdipeon” discourses (to borrow a phrase from Thru) that have 
silenced women as subject and turned them into objects of exchange, as 
surely as Greimas’s semiotic diagram assigned them a fixed place within 
structuralist discourse. As a spoil of war, along with the other women at 
the dawn of history, Cassandra is included in the documents of history. 
Cassandra as subject and witness is ignored, her words “unheeded.” 
Herodotus, whom Mira reads whenever she suffers from insomnia and 
her lover, Willy, keeps her awake with his snoring (15), begins Greek 
history with the exchange of women, as if the kidnapping of women 
led to the launching of a thousand ships. The omissions and distor-
tions of his work lead to its designation in the text as a “fibstory.” The 
Histories begin with stories of wars erupting as a result of the kidnap-
ping of Io, Europa, Medea—abductions that culminate in the kidnap-
ping of Helen by Paris, a copycat who knew his history all too well. 
Chunks of Herodotus appear in the narrative, mingling with radio news, 
dialogue, and Mira’s own mental narrative (replete with the imagined 
others, including the male Orion, who take turns assuming the “I” of 
the discourse). Brooke-Rose “plagiarizes” Herodotus to demonstrate the 
violence against women in classic history, not only physically, but psy-
chically, with the loss of their voices. In her discussion of Amalgamemnon 
in Invisible	Author, she points out that “the word plagiarize . . . originally 
meant ‘kidnap,’” and this etymological connection provides an “invis-
ible pun” in the text (50). Not only women, but women’s thoughts and 
voices are kidnapped/plagiarized in the novel: “I’ll know it’ll be he 
who’ll end up cassandring me, precisely in nomansland where the male 
gods will ever take over the pythian oracles, turning them into twitter-
ing spokespersons” (Amalgamemnon 136).
 The title of the novel signifies the amalgamation of women and their 
voices throughout the history of the West. These voices, “foreign” to 
the history, are unintelligible to it. Cassandra’s plight is reflected in 
Herodotus’ story of the people of Dodona who hear the prophecies of 
foreign priestesses and, because they cannot understand the language, 
think they hear the “twittering of birds”:
And yet the story which the people of Dodona will tell about the black 
dove from Egypt becoming their oracle would surely arise because the 
foreign woman’s language would sound to them like the twittering 
of birds. And later the dove will speak with a human voice because 
of course the woman will stop twittering and learn to talk intelligibly. 
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Similarly the young Scythians will be unable to learn the language of 
the Amazons but the women will succeed in picking up theirs, and 
therefore disappear. (Amalgamemnon 11)6
 With Mira/Cassandra leading the charge, Amalgamemnon	presents a 
warning about the violence and coercion reflected on the battlefields of 
history and in the narratives of war. There is no treatment, no instant 
remedy or politics. Studying the past and the present does not correct 
this error of perception, since the lenses used—even at the university 
where Mira has taught classics—are the same flawed driving mirrors 
found in Thru. Previous theorists of culture and politics have become 
grist for the culture machine, turned to cliché. The female student of 
such master philosophers is predicted to “plunge into the Leviathan of 
the Politics, the Physics, the Metaphysics, the Dialogues, the Republic 
not to mention the mediation of a Master and Slave and all the rest, and 
emerge perhaps chained to a rock of ideology or else be carried off like 
Europe on the sacred cow of dialectics” (Amalgamemnon 9).
 How does Amalgamemnon diagnose the present crisis while using 
techne to adumbrate an alternative possibility? As Mira, who has 
imagined herself as Orion in a Slavic prison says, “I must get himself 
out” (Amalgamemnon 21), combining the two dissident personas locked 
within the walls of official ideology. But in the dizzying metalepses in 
the narrative, male dissidents like Orion (Amalgamemnon 17, 30) suffer 
the same fate as women, as the “regimented machines” (Amalgamemnon 
20), the brainwashing babble, envelops them both. They, too, are often 
powerless to confront the male figures (all the Amalgamemnons) who 
keep the prison machinery going.
 So, the question Amalgamemnon raises is how to “write the future” 
in a way that breaks the hold of the utterly predictable? If in Thru, 
Brooke-Rose attempts to produce a new “hystery” through the crazy 
circuits of signifiers cross-cutting her wounded text, in Amalgamemnon, 
the possible “resistance to foregone conclusion” emerges from a new 
constraint and “technique for living,” the refusal of the present tense or 
“constative” utterances. Taking Cassandra’s role as prophetess as a fic-
tional premise, Brooke-Rose eschews both past and present tenses. She 
“writes the future” by using the future and conditional tenses and by 
eliminating not only the third-person, past tense narration (in keeping 
with her characteristic lipogram) but the present tense as well.
 The refusal of third-person, past-tense narration has a special signifi-
cance in Amalgamemnon with Herodotus as a main intertext, since the 
preterite is the sign of official recorded history. The narrator of Amal-
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gamemnon describes the retrospection that underwrites history as “the 
usual school of afterthought rearranging history past and present in the 
light of national self-esteem for political ends and means” (Amalgamem-
non 21). Traditionally the sign of history, the third-person past tense is 
also the “reassuring guarantor of real events,” as Brooke-Rose puts it 
in the Invisible	Author (132). It is the sign of the authorial consciousness 
in classic realism. In Brooke-Rose’s novels, from Out forward, this tra-
ditional sign of the real is missing. Her refusal of a synthesizing, third-
person past-tense narration continues modernism’s subversion of the 
link that realism forged between representation and retrospection. As 
Gertrude Stein writes in Narration:	Four	Lectures	by	Gertrude	Stein, “His-
tory as it mostly exists has nothing to do with anything that is living.”7 
Both Stein and Brooke-Rose eschew the retrospective arrangement of 
events upon which historical narrative and traditional fiction depend.8
 But in Amalgamemnon Brooke-Rose takes the refusal of retrospective 
narration a step further. For along with the past tense, she eliminates all 
constative statements, that is, all statements of fact. In doing so she pres-
ents prophecy in speech, rather than narrative, mode. Using the first-
person pronoun (although, as in Thru, ruthlessly switching from one 
first-person speaker to another without warning), she attempts to “spark 
out inside the techne” (Amalgamemnon 5) an “utterly other discourse” 
that relies on prophetic utterance. Thus, unlike her previous novels since 
Such, Amalgamemnon	is in speech, rather than narrative mode. The novel 
exists in a curious time of pre-diction, a kind of saying before the end. In 
imagining an alternative future to the mere reprogramming of the past, 
the novel simulates what it feels like to live in what Michael Wood calls 
“the time of our options.” In the absence of the “belated time of narra-
tive, the time when the game is over” (Wood 17), Amalgamemnon makes 
use of prophecy as a language that, paradoxically, resists foreclosure.
 For prophecy that resists foreclosure is a paradox. Initially, Brooke-
Rose has said she intended to use only the future tense. In a chapter of 
Invisible	Author called “A Writer’s Constraints,” she describe this experi-
ment as inspired by a kind of challenge she found in Gerard Genette’s 
Discours	du	récit	(Invisible	Author 46–47). Genette postulates that all nar-
ratives must situate themselves in time but not in space, with most 
choosing the past (as do history and classic realism). Even science fiction 
and apocalypse, Genette points out, are postdated after the event. As 
for future tense, Genette says it is impossible to sustain over the course 
of the narrative, usually found instead in short sections within longer 
texts, sections of prophecy or prediction, proleptic information from 
the author, or orders. The technical challenge of writing only in future 
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tense was at first embraced by Brooke-Rose, a challenge she describes in 
detail in “A Writer’s Constraints” (Invisible	Author 47) and in her inter-
view with Friedman and Fuchs in Utterly	Other	Discourse (33). During 
the process of writing, however, she realized that though technically 
“possible,” writing in the future tense can be narratively unsatisfactory 
in such high dosage: “People do not talk wholly in the future tense. So 
I widened the constraint to all non-realized tenses . . . : the conditional 
of course, and what’s left of the subjunctive in English, the imperative, 
and, when forced to use the present, only questions and, possibly, nega-
tions” (Invisible	 Author 48). This explanation interestingly relies on a 
fidelity to realism, that is, to reproducing verisimilar dialogue (the way 
“people talk”). But upon closer inspection, we see that it is the tonal 
effect of so much future tense, rather than its lack of verisimilitude, that 
worries Brooke-Rose most. In attempting to eliminate all but the future 
tense, she discovers ironically that she introduces the sound of assertion 
and declaration that was to have been banished along with declarative 
sentences: “For one thing, as I’ve said, it’s very hard to use the future 
for any length of time without sounding intolerably oracular . . . It took 
me four or five rewritten versions to get the tone right” (52).9 To know 
the future as Cassandra knows it absolutely is to assert the inevitabil-
ity of a certain fate. Instead, by using “nonrealized tenses” rather than 
exclusively future tense, she suggests a potential alternative not only to 
the petty present and tragic past, but to the teleological future as well. 
As Brooke-Rose says, “the ineluctable future is what my protagonist 
fights” (Invisible	Author 49); paradoxically, she wants to write prophecy 
that resists the predictability.10
 The distinction between the future tense and nonrealized tenses 
turns out to be a philosophical as well as rhetorical choice. It is the realm 
of the not yet realized—not the Greek fated future—which Brooke-Rose 
attempts to create. This potential alternative to mere repetition in the 
future is constructed in a number of ways. The narrative includes modal 
auxiliaries like “could” and “might,” and interrogatives which work to 
soften the declarative effect produced by the unrelieved use of “will” and 
“shall”: “One pseudo-escaperoute might be the suave and portly man” 
(Amalgamemnon 7); “Probably that would make the new generation the 
new high priests and oracles of pythian mysteries . . . ” (Amalgamemnon 
6). Technically, both sentences in the future tense (“I shall soon be as 
redundant as . . . ”) and conditional (“One pseudo-escaperoute might 
be the suave and portly man”) puncture the mimetic function of narra-
tive. They differ tonally in an important way, however, for the extensive 
use of modal auxiliaries and conditionals mitigates the authority of the 
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oracular pronouncements and destabilizes the relationship between the 
time of the saying and the potential time of the occurrence of the event 
predicted. The certainty of the projected future is altered. Despite the 
many explicit allusions to Herodotus’ Greek history, Brooke-Rose sub-
stantially alters classical oracular pronouncements and the role of her 
“prophetess.” In both Herodotus and Brooke-Rose’s texts, it is Cassan-
dra’s fate never to be believed, but in Herodotus, the prophecies of the 
oracles, although often ambiguous, are nevertheless always fulfilled, 
often ironically. It is this note of irony that Brooke-Rose does import 
from Herodotus, whose Histories	are full of ambiguous prophecies that 
are frequently misinterpreted with tragic consequences (think of Croe-
sus, who was told by the oracle that he would destroy a great empire, 
only to discover it was his own). The atmosphere of ironic fulfillment, 
“plagiarized” from the Greeks, does make its way into Amalgamemnon, 
along with the many references to, as the narrator calls this victimization 
by fate, its “foolfilment” (Amalgamemnon 13).
 But Brooke-Rose turns Cassandra’s status as “unheeded and 
unhinged” into an opening into a series of potential futures. In a parody 
of the binary codes of computer logic, Mira/Cassandra considers a series 
of possible choices in almost algebraic fashion. In using “unrealized 
tenses,” she does not definitively make the choice, but, instead, proj-
ects alternative possibilities (a or b) and rehearses alternative futures. “I 
could anticipate and queue before the National Education Computer for 
a different teaching job, reprogramming myself like a floppy disk, or at 
the Labour Exchange for a different job altogether, recycling myself like 
a plastic bottle” (Amalgamemnon 5). In some cases, this logic of choice 
turns out to be a false logic: “and either way I’d be a worker in a queue 
of millions with skills too obsolete for the lean fitness of the enterprise” 
(Amalgamemnon 6). Yet despite these false oppositions, the pressure 
of finding an alternative future persists, sometimes in the form of an 
explicit question (“When will the unexpected cease to be foreseeable or 
vice versa?” [Amalgamemnon 19]), sometimes, emerging in an anxious 
dialogue with the self about how to construct the future: “Let a and b 
stand for mutually exclusive hypotheses, extrapolate and develop. Take 
it from there, write in future” (Amalgamemnon 21); “Shall I crawl mon-
techristoid through prison walls and dive by air land or sea if so I must 
instruct all X and Y chromosomes within me to make the future possible 
or to hold it back, or forth. Let sex equal why” (Amalgamemnon 82).
 “A and b” emerge in the text as hypothetical alternative futures 
rehearsed, algebraic examples and letters that fuse in surprising combi-
nations; “X and Y” are algebraic entities, new sexual combinations, as 
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well as linguistic ones. For underlying the use of “non-realized tenses” 
is the pressure of an uttered question that a good oracle can never ask: 
Could “a” and “b,” “x” and “y” combine to produce something different 
in both the writing of the future and the future itself? Can an “utterly 
other discourse” break through and be heard? Despite the machinery 
of ideology, what emerges in Amalgamemnon	 is what I would call the 
utopian, rather than the elegiac, strain of Brooke-Rose’s lipogrammatic 
experiments.
 This utopian strain does not project a utopia that is someplace in 
time or space; rather, it is created out of a sense of what’s missing in 
the present. The modals and conditionals begin to suggest what Ernst 
Bloch and Theodor Adorno call “an incentive toward utopia.” In a num-
ber of dialogues and essays on the utopian function of art and litera-
ture, including one translated as “Something’s Missing: A Discussion 
between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the Contradictions of 
Utopian Longing” (1975),”11 the two Marxist philosophers discuss the 
way literature gives form to the “not-yet” realized possibilities missing 
in the everyday, possibilities experienced otherwise. Marxist ideology, 
along with other “isms,” is skewered in Amalgamemnon; nevertheless, I 
would claim that Bloch’s and Adorno’s description of the utopian long-
ing for something missing helpfully captures the effect of Brooke-Rose’s 
nonrealized tenses. As Adorno puts it in “Something’s Missing,” “utopia 
is essentially in the determined negation, in the determined negation 
of that which merely is, and by concretizing itself as something false, 
it always points at the same time to what should be” (Bloch 12). Bloch 
locates a transposition in the notion of utopia from space to time that 
suggests both a “not there” and a “not yet” in utopian longing:
At the very beginning Thomas More designated utopia as a place, an 
island in the distant South Seas. This designation underwent changes 
later so that it left space and entered time. . . . With Thomas More the 
wishland was still ready, on a distant island, but I am not there. On 
the other hand, when it is transposed into the future, not only am I not 
there, but utopia itself is also not with itself. This island does not even 
exist. But it is not something like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it 
is not yet in the sense of a possibility; that it could be there if we could 
only do something for it. Not only if we travel there, but in	 that	we 
travel there the island utopia arises out of the sea of the possible—uto-
pia, but with new contents. (Bloch, “Something’s Missing”3)
 In another essay in The	Utopian	Function	of	Art	and	Literature, called 
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“Art and Utopia” (78–155), Bloch tries to clarify these “new contents.” 
The “content of hope,” he says:
represents itself in ideas, essentially in those of the imagination. The 
ideas of the imagination stand in contrast to those of recollection, which 
merely reproduce perceptions of the past and thereby increasingly hide 
in the past. And in this instance the ideas of the imagination are not 
of the kind that merely combine the already existing facts in a random 
manner . . . but carry on the existing facts toward their future potential-
ity of their otherness, of their better condition in an anticipatory way. 
(Bloch, “Art and Utopia” 105)
“Out of the sea of the possible”—Bloch and Adorno have faith that art 
and literature are the sites in which the imagination explores a “not 
yet” that projects some hope through the cracks in the machinery of 
the predictable. In its nonrealized tenses, Amalgamemnon is unlike most 
utopian fiction set in the future, which posits what Cristopher Nash 
calls a “neocosm,” an alternative world constructed in a stable “else-
where” whose logic and being follow stable laws of translation from the 
known world (i.e., a place where the laws of gravity are suspended, or 
the laws of aging, or reproduction) (Nash 102–41). The logic of internal 
consistency, which governs most alternative world fictions or science 
fictions, is obviously absent from Amalgamemnon. Paradoxically, the use 
of future and modalized tenses precludes the construction of such a 
possible world. In Lecercle’s essay on Amalgamemnon, he dismisses “pos-
sible world” theories in analyzing Brooke-Rose’s novel precisely because 
they ignore the deliberate antinarrative construction of her fiction (156–
57). In casting Amalgamemnon in the conditional, the “saying” of the 
prophecy, with predicted dialogues and scenes, is the only “event.” 
No future is constatively created. Indeed, any notion of the “promised 
land” is treated skeptically, along with the promises that mark both 
political speeches and popular advertising (“And won’t all promised 
lands of milk and honey and all pleasure domes become battlefields of 
distant voices prophesying war by nation interposed, just like the other 
obscene?” [Amalgamemnon 14]).12
 Instead, for Brooke-Rose the utopian is a series of possibilities enacted 
in language, the paradoxical longings and doubts expressed grammati-
cally in her syntactic lipogram, with its refusal of realized tenses. Web-
ster’s defines modals as “of, relating to, or constituting a grammatical 
form or category characteristically indicating prediction of an action or 
state in some manner other than a simple fact.” As Lecercle points out, 
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modal logic has contributed to the concept of a “possible world” (156), 
but Brooke-Rose deprives us of the consistent use of propositional logic, 
the predictable suspension of laws to create an alternative universe. In 
her use of nonrealized tenses and modal auxiliaries (like “will” and 
“shall”), she explores the possibility of a future that departs from the 
predictably gendered investments in “youdipeon discourses.” If in Thru, 
typography on the page literally suggests an alternate mapping to the 
semiotic square, with its predictable syntax of wanting subject and val-
ued object, in Amalgamemnon, the syntactic lipogram gives rise to an 
unrealized, but potential, opening into the future.
	 Amalgamemnon	offers a literature of ideas rather than characters, a 
literature in which the received ideas of the present are exposed as the 
substratum of “the real,” yet they combine as well to illuminate what 
Bloch calls “their better condition in an anticipatory way.” Amalgama-
menon addresses the question of emergence, the possibility of something 
new arising from the deadening hand of history and the relentless tech-
nological machinery of the present. On the one hand, Mira/Cassandra 
warns that the future will not move toward “the potentiality of other-
ness,” but toward the repetition of the same, such that prediction and 
predictability merge. The new, as news, is likely to be incorporated, 
amalgamated, into this homogenizing discourse:
But will it always be the fate of seers to utter idées by definition reçues 
from everysomewhere suspended in some black cloud of news envel-
oping the earth and ever replenished, at which kings and counsellors 
will shrug and talk of wave troughs silver linings bright tunnel-ends 
and chrome eldorados for all? The clichés of the future will develop 
however, framed in a big surprise as value added such as dynamic 
structures for instance that will change while passing through the 
minds of their observers, seers, readers, cyberneticians, historians, pig-
farmers and such. (Amalgamemnon 78)
 Mira/Cassandra explicitly addresses the kind of false utopia pack-
aged by authorities of various kinds, that encourages us to be content 
with the everyday and the “pseudo-future” endemic in the forecasts of 
the world news. This is one meaning of the phrase “as if” heard so insis-
tently throughout the novel: “we’ll all go along as if” (Amalgamemnon 
15), that is, ignoring the poverty of our imaginative lives, caught in the 
unrelieved sameness accelerated by technologies’ reproductive capaci-
ties. But a mutually exclusive meaning of this short phrase suggests 
itself insistently as well: “as if, for instance, I were some other constel-
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lation, not Enketei-In-Cetus, not Jonah inside the Whale but Orion say, 
to be siberianized for flagrant delight of opinion” (Amalgamemnon 17). 
The first “as if” refers to the pseudo future of the world news and the 
media, the second to fictional projection. On logical and ontological 
grounds, the supposed nonfiction (the news) and fiction cannot be dis-
tinguished (one true, the other false). In the unstable ontological world 
of Amalgamemnon, both operate according to the same principle of “as 
if,” a projection rather than a fact. Yet the necessity to distinguish the 
two kinds of simulated entities can be felt in the text:
None of my private telematics will interest him, why have private tele-
matics he might as well say when you could have me and it would be 
a very good question while I’d think of an answer as to which would 
seem more fleshy and bloody among shadow figures, the electronic 
visitors speaking their colourful videolects like substitute guests and 
husbands blandly conversing in our livingrooms, or the twittering 
liewaypersons softwarily treading around the rotundity of a composite 
beast man waning fast and flat? (Amalgamemnon 60)
The battlefront of this mutually exclusive choice is language, its stage 
the page itself. The redundancy so productive in the computer slyly 
gives way to another agenda, another program that might benefit the 
redundant classicist in the future. The possibility of this transforma-
tion appears in the surprises of the language—the puns, the portman-
teau words, the etymological excursions. The birds in the story told by 
the people of Dodona (Amalgamemnon 11) become shifting signifiers, 
appearing now as new highwaymen stealing the stage, reprogramming 
the mechanism “softwarily.”
 In The	 Political	 Unconscious:	 Narrative	 as	 a	 Socially	 Symbolic	 Act, a 
work published three years before Amalgamemnon, Fredric Jameson 
writes that modernism can be regarded as both an expression of the 
“reification of daily life,” demonstrating how “the inhabitants of older 
social formations are culturally and psychologically retrained for life in 
the market system” and a “utopian compensation for everything reifi-
cation brings with it” (Jameson 236). Modernist art can “open up a life 
space in which the opposite and the negation of such rationalization can 
be, at least imaginatively, experienced” (Jameson 236). Yet for Jameson, 
the ideology of modernism must be exposed by the critic, who reads the 
“gaps” of the fiction, recognizing both the limitations and compensa-
tions the fiction offers.13 But in the silences of Brooke-Rose’s lipograms 
and the sly etymological memories and slippages of her diction, the 
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ache of what is missing described by Bloch and Adorno bleeds into the 
possibility of something different emerging from culture’s well-worn 
grooves. Brooke-Rose has faith in fiction to perform possibility through 
what Blanchot has called the “patience of vigilant language”—a careful, 
but not passive, poetic process. Art is enlisted to shock language out of 
its predictabilities, its coercions.
 For Brooke-Rose, as for Gertrude Stein, there is no refining fire of 
purification for language, only repetition, rhymes, and recombinations. 
Her cultural critique weds experimentation and ecology, re-use rather 
than transcendence or erasure, moving from redundant to retreading. 
Brooke Rose, the novelist, embodies this revival through a particular 
kind of “hauntology,” a mining of the baggage of words. In Amalgamem-
non	writing depends upon a linguistic scavenging that unearths the liv-
ing possibilities of dead languages and their stories. From this activity, 
a future is projected. The narrator posits that she could either become 
totally obsolete and stay on the queue of the Labor Exchange hoping 
for some other employment, OR she can mine her classical humanis-
tic training and “hope for the best” by returning to the soil “to rear 
something or other, recycling weeds and words no sooner said than 
dung”(Amalgamemnon 6). Although these alternatives at first seem to 
collapse into the need for male protection, the idea of recycling words 
and weeds remains a creative possibility in the text. This “hauntology” is 
an ecological venture that differs from mere nostalgia for a liberal tradi-
tion of learning. The recurring images of humanists on the labor line in 
Out and Amalgamemnon and her out-of-work characters in Textermina-
tion	do not suggest a conservative return to older securities and forms. 
Her Mira/Cassandra is a scavenger, a wordmonger. She resembles the 
multifaceted Kate/Biddy the hen/ALP figure in Finnegans	Wake, who 
forages in the midden heap of language to produce a text “unhemmed as 
it is uneven.” Mira/Cassandra’s antinarrative is a “madlane memory,” a 
jumble of words, myths, “fibstories,” and idioms that revels in the messi-
ness of language, “no sooner said than dung.” In a kind of literary quid 
pro quo, she “kidnaps” stories like the “fibstories” of Greek history that 
rely unswervingly on narratives of female abduction and rape.
 Opposed to this ecological version of history are the male voices in 
the text. Willy/Has/Wally instead proposes a new “Oblitopia” (Amal-
gamemnon 138) that negates both history and the philosophy of history: 
“We won’t rehandle or reinterpret it, we’ll create history and forget 
about it, events will be our instant history, but history as events not 
history as discourse. We won’t allow you verbiage-mongers to add the 
water, we’ll scatter the self-consuming ashes to the winds and move on 
A m A l g A m e m n o n 113|
into the next instant” (Amalgamemnon 109). This continuous present is 
part of the “dehauntological campaign” of the band of terrorists, who 
seek to abduct Mira and hold her a prisoner in Oblitopia (Amalgamemnon 
138). The worst fate in Amalgamemnon is not abduction and rape. It is a 
forced amnesia that prevents the “working in words and phrases and 
structures that will continue to spark out inside the techne” (Amalgamem-
non 13), a linguistic inheritance threatened by technology’s capacities.
 “Softwarily,” Mira creates alternatives to the efficiency of the software 
programs and the “programme-cuts” the humanists face (Amalgamem-
non 5). To the extent that this antitechnological bias runs throughout 
the novel, Brooke-Rose echoes Heidegger in The	 Question	 Concerning	
Technology, in his suspicion of technology and the culture of conformity 
made possible through its ubiquity. It is in Xorandor, her next novel in 
the Intercom Quartet that she takes technology as a productive premise 
of her fiction and tries to write an experimental text playing off the 
binary logic of computer programming. In Amalgamemnon, however, 
the pun on “software” in the above quotation suggests that Mira’s sly 
use of techne seeks to combat the “softquery expert[s] (60) who produce 
technology’s deadening effects. As Lecercle points out in his fascinating 
reading of the novel, Heidegger’s “deep distrust of modern technology” 
was combined with “his wish to go back to etymology and interpret 
technology as pro-duction, as a form of poietics, which involves a direct 
relationship with truth as disclosure” (158). In “The Dissolution of Char-
acter,” Brooke Rose writes of “language and substance, or what is closest 
to the real, the poem” (“The Dissolution of Character” 196). Somehow, 
in the hypothetical mode of Amalgamemnon, with its nonrealized tenses 
and spectral evocations, “the real” emerges through the substance and 
techne of its language. If the cord between the word and the referent 
is severed in the death of realism that Brook-Rose both diagnoses in 
her essays and stages in her fiction, her own version of amalgamation 
restores the conversation between language and being.
 For another word for this real is “being.” In his Heideggerean read-
ing of Amalgamemnon, Lecercle invokes Heidegger’s understanding of 
Dasein, with its “coming toward death that is Dasein’s relationship to 
time” (159). As Lecercle puts it, Cassandra’s “wanderings are those of 
Dasein relating to the world of her potentialities-for-Being” (157). This 
essay, which is worth reading in its entirety, brings us back to the recur-
ring theme of the unbearable lightness of being suffered by all the dis-
solving “characters” in Brooke-Rose’s fiction. In Heidegger, “language 
speaks out not in play, but as an opening up to Being” (166). Although 
language does speak out in play (and Lecercle also shows the joyousness 
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of the linguistic excursions of Brooke-Rose’s prose), this reading cap-
tures some of the seriousness of the language games tied to the threat of 
death that hovers over almost all her fiction and is expressed in the title 
Textermination	(and the memory of World War II in Between). As in her 
other texts since Between, it is the female voice that tries to project this 
opening toward being. The appropriately named Willy, one of the male 
suitors in the novel, is explicitly associated with the denial of being and 
the imposition of will: “And when I shall have left him it will remain a 
mystery to me whether anyone so physically solid would always and 
for others seem to lack a whole dimension of being” (Amalgamemnon 
71–72, 141). In one of the “direlogues” (53) Brooke-Rose stages in the 
novel, Orion says to Anne de Rommede, “All words should be played 
with and names most of all” (33). In reply, she confronts him about the 
glibness with which he plays with language, saying: “I shall always, 
from my very profession as political commentator and writer, be aware 
of the danger of words, but why would you increase their frailness 
with constant play, even with my very identity?” (Amalgamemnon 34). 
In a work such as Amalgamemnon,	with its deliberately destabilized and 
multiple “characters,” this colloquy seems very odd. Yet the direlogue 
underlines the stakes involved in crafting the future without assertions 
of facts, in nonrealized tenses, in portmanteau words and puns. Brook-
Rose’s female voices are painfully aware of the unbearable lightness of 
being.14
 In Amalgamemnon’s house of fiction, letters, constellations, “elec-
tronic visitors,” creators and their creations all “exist” in the text as 
imaginary beings rather than stable entities within either a probable or 
realistic world. Continuing the play on the “degrees of absence” in Thru 
(from the “zeroist author” on), the shifting signifiers of imaginary enti-
ties overlap, combine, change places: professors become invisible stars 
become authors become genealogical layers on a family tree.15 Fictional 
levels blur as the amalgamated voices in Amalgamemnon struggle to con-
sider the “gamut of possibilities” (“And I shall utter wordless poems 
with only rhythms and weird atonal leaps along the gamut of all the 
possibilities” [Amalgamemnon 21]). Amid the flux of nonrealized tenses, 
some ontological commitments seem more important than others. The 
human archive itself may be threatened: “Peace then might come, as 
pure inhuman silence radioactive in the hushed fragments of exploded 
planet, which maybe some big dish telescopic ear will capture twenty-
five billion light years away” (Amalgamemnon 19). (This apocalyptic 
vision will appear in different form in Xorandor and Verbivore.) Letters 
are subjected to “black oblivion.” (Orion, imagined by Mira, says, “But 
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my words will carve through dungeon walls and I shall crawl priest-
like through the hole into a neighboring cell, carrying a secret about 
buried treasure, then montecristoid plummet as a faked corpse into the 
black sea of oblivion and swim ashore. At dawn I’ll wake exhausted and 
write my cybernetic story of dissidence on the sand” [Amalgamemnon	
20].) Whether this is prediction or promise is ambiguous. Yet, this kind 
of speech act seems distinct from the tissue of slick inducements and 
false advertisements endemic in Mira’s contemporary society. “The ever-
returning prodigal discourse will always be Listen: I promise” (Amal-
gamemnon 29). This is the default setting of the Gigo (garbage in, garbage 
out) computer-generated pseudo-future of new-age romance and the 
world news. The prophecy in Amalgamemnon refuses the prophetic, as 
Blanchot has put it. In the wake of twentieth-century “disaster” (and 
there is a pun here, as in Brooke-Rose, on the concept of “star” [“aster”]), 
“[D]isaster breaks with “every form of totality, never denying, however, 
the dialectical necessity of a fulfillment . . . prophecy which announces 
nothing but the refusal of the prophetic as simply an event to come, but 
which nonetheless opens, nonetheless discovers the patience of vigilant 
language” (Blanchot 75).
 In an essay entitled “Metafiction and Surfiction,” reprinted in A	
Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal, Brooke-Rose raises the question of fiction’s future 
and asks: “Where do we go from here? Toward silence, exhaustion? 
Or a new beginning?” She points out that a good “theory” “should be 
able to ‘predict,’ not in the futurological sense, but in accounting for 
all the theoretical possibilities” (Rhetoric	of	 the	Unreal 385). But Brooke-
Rose acknowledges that as a fiction writer, she is “not a pure theorist, 
and even less a prophet, and critical prophecies have a way of being 
undone by artists” (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 385). In her preface to Stories,	
Theories	and	Things, she returns to her dual roles as theorist and writer 
and describes the way that fiction tests the limits of theory:
[T]he novelist writes also as theorist, aware of a fundamental insepa-
rability of elements that critics and teachers have to separate, even 
rejoice in separating, pin-pointing, for the purpose of this or that type of 
analysis, though some try to refound them into large universal systems 
which the novelist knows can only hold in a precarious suspension of 
disbelief: As with poems and stories, as with ideal definitions of form 
and formal definitions of ideas, as with statements of position, con-
fessions, autobiographies, greater aims, interpretations, glimmerings 
of overall themes. All are protean, capturable for brief moments in 
language, but already changed even into their opposites another brief 
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moment later. That is the excitement, not unique since it is part of the 
human condition, but more intensely experienced in the critical and 
creative activities than in the more unreflexive routines of daily life. 
(Stories,	Theories	and	Things ix)
In Amalgamemnon, Brooke-Rose offers a new technique for living, another 
weapon for survival, an opening toward being. In Invisible	Author:	Last	
Essays, her own stance might be compared to that of her Cassandra, 
reviewing a lifetime of being unheeded. In these valedictory essays, 
the farewell to her readers, spoken in	propria	persona, brings us uncom-
fortably close to personal complaint about the lack of attention paid to 
her work in particular and to women experimental writers in general. 
A slight peevishness or irritability creeps into the voice that, like the 
Ancient Mariner’s, seeks to buttonhole the reader and say, ‘wake up—
you must hear this.’ The valediction does not forbid mourning; on the 
contrary, the finality of the voice—‘this is the last time I will say this, 
so listen for once’—adds to the poignancy of the message. As Benjamin 
says in “The Storyteller,” the proximity of death heightens the authority 
of the retrospection and reinforces the wisdom of the message. This is 
not to say that Brooke-Rose’s tone is melodramatic or self-pitying, only 
that age and the threat of impending silence bring a sense of greater 
urgency. The Author is Dead; Long Live the Author.
i n t h e  n e x t  v o l um e  of the “Intercom Quartet,” Xorandor	 (1986), Brooke-Rose shifts her storytelling away from “redundant” adults like 
Mira to a generation weaned on computers. In the novel, twelve-and-a-
half-year-old English twins Jip and Zab, nicknames for John Ivor Paul 
and Isabel Paula Kate, dictate contrapuntally into a pocket computer 
the story of their relationship with the eponymous Xorandor. Xorandor, 
whose origin remains a mystery for much of the novel, looks like a rock 
and is an ancient silicon life-form the twins accidentally discover as they 
are playing near their home in Cornwall, England. Xorandor receives 
and emits sound waves and has developed supercomputing capabili-
ties. Like Steven Spielberg’s movie ET:	 The Extraterrestrial, a film that 
debuted in 1982, four years before the publication of Xorandor, Brooke-
Rose’s novel extends a long literary tradition of child protagonists more 
hospitable to strange life-forms than the adults around them, who tend 
to be both more suspicious and more inured to routine.1
	 Xorandor revisits the theme of technological anxiety in Amalgamem-
non, now through the lens of two self-described “whiz-kids” (Xorandor 
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9) who have excelled in computer class and whose dialogue with Xoran-
dor, the computer stone, takes on the aspect, at least initially, of a com-
puter game. As “kids,” the twins must overcome a credibility gap with 
adults when they discover this alien life form, but their facility with 
computers manages to counter the disbelief that Mira/Cassandra is 
fated to encounter. The novel bends to the textual form of computer 
programming, with chapter titles that mimic programming operations, 
“Begin,” “Restart” “Or” “And” “If” “Then,” and “Read.” Told from the 
point of view of the twin “detectives,” the comic novel, with serious 
underside, includes appropriately sophomoric jokes, such as an intro-
duction to Xorandor in the first sentence that suggests his voice comes 
literally from (the) behind: “The first time we came across Xorandor we 
were sitting on him” (Xorandor 7), and “We jumped up as if our bottoms 
were burning” (Xorandor 15).
 The dialogic form of the novel is a departure from Brooke-Rose’s 
characteristic experiments with the present-tense narratorless sentence 
(NS) she deploys in most of her novels. In Invisible	Author, she traces 
her own interest in this narrative sentence and its “scientific present” as 
opposed to the more common “Speech Mode.” Curiously, in a work that 
could be classified as science fiction and might, therefore, seem most 
conducive to this “scientific present,” we find instead the jointly told, 
dialogic “dictation” of Jip and Zab. In Xorandor the storytelling relies on 
this Speech Mode in a number of forms: (1) the contrapuntal narrative of 
Jip and Zab, unmarked either by quotation marks or speaker captions, 
but marked by the twins’ frequent interruptions of one another with cor-
rections, interjections, and embellishments; (2) captioned dialogue in a 
printout of secret recordings made by the twins through the mechanism 
of a “bug” they plant in their parents’ living-room ceiling-light. The bug, 
affectionately named “Sneaker,” is a device the twins deploy to discover 
just how much the grown-ups understand about Xorandor once they 
discover him; (3) dialogue between the twins and Xorandor (e.g., “You, 
tell, daddyjohn, said Xorandor” [(Xorandor 71) and between Xorandor 
and, less frequently, some grownups; and (4) programming code which 
represents Xorandor’s and the children’s written interchanges through 
their pocket computer. It is Jip and Zab who come to understand what 
the adults fail to recognize, that Xorandor’s habitual mode of commu-
nication is through writing rather than speech. They discover how to 
“softalk” with Xorandor and his offspring (Xorandor see 193). As they 
speak, the computer translates their speech into written language and 
then replies directly in writing onto their Poccom 3 computer screen 
through a computer linking (“handshake”) facilitated by Jip (contrast 
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this “softalk” with the necessity for Mira to proceed “softwarily” 5). We 
read a summary in programming code that encapsulates a previous oral 
dialogue between Xorandor and the twins (and translates it into written 
form in a chapter entitled “Read”: 
LET JIPNZAB = ZIP
LET XORANDOR = XAND
XAND TO ZIP BEGIN
 ACCEPT YOUR REQ FOR RESTORE 1ST CONTACT ROM
  REM CANT RESTORE YOUR WAY WITH SUCH REHANDLING
  AND SPAGHETTI ENDREM (Xorandor 66)
 How and why does Brooke-Rose make use of the dialogue form in 
this novel? It is true that dialogue appears in a number of previous nov-
els that make use of NS as the primary mode of narration. Out, Between, 
Such, Thru, and Amalgamemnon all include sections of dialogue between 
a man and woman which often represent some form of seduction, flirta-
tious sparring, or disagreement, such as the following “idyll” in Thru:
Chi parla?
Hi Lara!
Armel! Hi.
Hi. Are you alone?
Yes of course Where are you?
Downstairs may I come up?
Ma certo caro. (Thru 706)
 On one hand, the dialogic narrative of the twins is mimetically 
appropriate to a novel about computers, structured, as they are, accord-
ing to a binary logic. In this respect, form can be said to imitate (or pun 
on) content, a kind of mimeticism that Brooke-Rose embraces in Between, 
for example, where the narrative of her traveling protagonist eschews 
the stasis of the infinitive “to be” or in Next, a story of poverty, with 
its constraint on the infinitive “to have.” Yet Brooke-Rose complicates 
binary computer logic in a number of ways, not the least of which is in 
the blurring of the twins’ narrative voices. In Xorandor she shifts away 
from the decidedly gender-coded conversation of her earlier fiction. 
Although Jip and Zab form a binary opposition as different-sex fraternal 
twins, their prepubescent “voices” and telepathic communication make 
it difficult to differentiate them in their joint narrative, at least until Jip’s 
voice changes. Xorandor, who has the ability to identify them as two 
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voices rather than one, nevertheless creates the nomination “JIPNZAB” 
and then “zip” to signify them as one entity addressed. In Xorandor’s 
transcription of his first conversation with the twins, he refers to them 
as “2 Processors in vocal high pitch almost undiff” (Xorandor 66). After 
experimenting with narratives in which the central masculine protago-
nist has real or imagined conversations with female “characters” (Out 
and Such) and novels in which a feminine central consciousness spars 
with male voices in the same kind of lover’s discourse (Between, Thru, 
Amalgamemnon), in Xorandor Brooke-Rose selects dual narrators before 
their gender markings are indelibly imprinted on their sensibilities. 
The greater fluidity of their joint narration supports the implied thesis 
that children are more open to polymorphous forms of life than their 
adult counterparts. Zab, the girl twin and the more philosophical of the 
two, rightly observes that Xorandor is an entity that violates traditional 
dualisms. In attempting to solve the mystery of Xorandor’s identity 
and purpose, Zab understands how difficult it is for humans to try “to 
imagine a creature . . . with no sexual difference, none of our distinc-
tions between the sensible and the intelligible, or matter and spirit, or 
even matter and form. His matter is his form, in a way his hardware 
is his software” (Xorandor 187). The twins, as twins, practice a form of 
telepathic communication so that their contributions have a blended 
quality which Xorandor himself seems to understand. Thus, in a twist 
of the theme of ambiguity, the prepubescent twins are both exclusive 
(two different narrators) and nonexclusive (telepathic and mistaken as 
one entity). The choice of this pair to narrate the adventure reinforces 
the “rigorous and yet contradictory” logic of Xorandor himself, whose 
name the twins derive from the operand XOR (meaning exclusive OR) 
and ANDOR (meaning nonexclusive OR). (I will return to Xorandor’s 
ambiguity shortly.)
 Brooke-Rose describes the narrative of Xorandor as more accessible 
and “easier to follow” than the type of narrative she explored in her 
novels from Out forward (Invisible	Author 18). The dialogue form is, to 
her mind, a less difficult constraint than her characteristic nonnarrated 
Narrative Sentence. As she says in Invisible	 Author, the Speech Mode 
includes the only two pronouns that suggest interpersonal relationship, 
“I and you,” pronouns not possible in the kind of impersonal, speak-
erless Narrative Sentence that dominates her fiction except in the set 
pieces of dialogue alluded to above.
 Although the attribution of greater readability is probably accurate 
(at least after the work of acquiring a basic understanding of computer 
programming and language), it elides the darker and more philosophi-
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cal significance of the dialogic form that structures the novel, the com-
munication between man and machine. In this science fiction novel, the 
issue of “communication” and shared information between life forms 
takes center stage. For this volume of the Intercom Quartet involves a 
high-stakes computer game of communication that puts the abilities of 
the humans and the computer through the crucible of a potential nuclear 
disaster. Xorandor and his offspring are a “race” of talking stones that 
feed off nuclear waste as well as intercepted communication. Their loca-
tion in an isolated area near a cairn in Cornwall is significant: the set-
ting evokes both ancient mystic communication and also provides the 
contemporary site of a nuclear waste storage facility at an old tin mine, 
a facility disguised as a Geothermal Research Unit, where the father of 
the twins is employed. Since the computer consumes nuclear waste, 
the plot of the novel soon incorporates not merely communication with 
the computer, but also complications involving the way the computers 
destabilize the politics of nuclear deterrence. For in nourishing them-
selves on nuclear material, an occurrence that at first promises to solve 
the ecological problem of nuclear waste, the computer’s actions soon 
lead to the possibility that nuclear missiles will be randomly disarmed 
by this process, thus upsetting the balance of power in the theory of 
deterrence.
 Since the adults believe, mistakenly, that Xorandor and his race 
come from Mars, they plan to return him to his native habitat. The 
children, on the other hand, come to understand, along with the reader, 
that Xorandor is earth-born, not Martian. They alone understand that 
the adult plan to send Xorandor to Mars will lead to his death, since 
the atmosphere of Mars does not produce radioactive waste products 
and he will starve. Xorandor, too, comprehends the fact that he is being 
sacrificed, but participates in this misguided plot hatched by the scien-
tists and politicians. The twins conjecture (although we never know for 
certain) that Xorandor sacrifices himself to save mankind by surrepti-
tiously leaving behind his offspring to feed off the nuclear waste and 
thus facilitate disarmament, despite the adults’ reluctance to abandon 
their practice of nuclear stockpiling.
 Thus, the various forms of dialogic communication in the novel serve 
as documentary evidence in the historical record of disaster averted. 
How to tell this harrowing and ambiguous story becomes a problem for 
the narrator/characters, who consider the perils of communicating with 
future generations as well as the potential miscommunication between 
man and machine. The children mine the analogy between writers and 
readers and programmers and the computers they program. In their 
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metacommentary on good storytelling, Jip and Zab stress that in both 
kinds of communication, information is successfully conveyed from a 
sender to a receiver by avoiding redundancy and “loose” instructions. 
An understanding of the binary choices basic to computer operations, 
that is, the reliance on “gates” that are either open or closed, plays an 
important role in the twins’ project of storytelling. For in this metas-
tory, Brooke-Rose exploits the status of the computer as a logic machine 
equipped to handle true and false statements. After the deliberate avoid-
ance of constative sentences in Amalgamemnon—sentences that must be 
true or untrue (within the fictional context)—the categories of truth and 
untruth become central to the telling of Xorandor’s story. The Boolean 
data type of the computer (consisting of data objects with one of the 
two values true or false, true/false)2 is echoed in the twins’ attempted 
fidelity to the truth of the historical record. They struggle to find the 
means to tell a “true” story, attempting to overcome lapses in memory 
and incomplete information. In doing so, they observe certain rules of 
operations. One such rule is that they are allowed to recreate conversa-
tions but not to invent them. A second rule is that coincidence is pro-
grammed out of the narrative, as it conveys the wrong message about 
the genre of the text, suggesting its fictional status (“Better go through 
the anti-coincidence gate, Zab,” Jip warns [Xorandor 11]).
 Brooke-Rose plays with the analogy between the binary logic of the 
computer and the separation of nonfiction from fiction in a nuclear plot 
that enhances the sense of urgency to tell the truth about Xorandor. The 
twins’ “true” story is a public service, a warning about the overwhelm-
ing danger of nuclear proliferation and the fundamental illogic of the 
doctrine of deterrence. An alternative to the deluded, more comforting 
conclusions of the news media, the JIPNZAB narrative seeks to jar the 
human reader out of her false sense of security. If the absence of con-
stative sentences in Amalgamemnon positions the reader in the uneasy 
timeframe of predicting disaster, in Xorandor, the application of Bool-
ean logic to storytelling makes the drastic alternatives between extinc-
tion and its prevention more concrete and suspenseful. Jip’s pun on 
the choice of “floating-point real or fixed-point real” produces a joke 
about the relation between the “real” in computer terminology and the 
“real” in history. Encouraging Jip to help capture the actual conversa-
tions that occurred with Xorandor, Zab says, “That’s what storytellers 
do Jip, or else they invent [stories]. But we can’t, this is real” and Jip 
clowns, “Floating-point real or fixed-point real?” punning on two dif-
ferent kinds of data types (Xorandor 16). During the course of the novel, 
the relation between the two kinds of “real”—the narrative of “history” 
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and the programming operations of the computer—becomes inextri-
cably intertwined. Puns on the term “endjoke,” for example, take on 
deeper resonance, as the potential for total destruction is encountered 
and avoided.
 In Xorandor, Brooke-Rose raises the stakes of returning us to the 
problems of the “real” world in a technological age. In essays roughly 
contemporary with Xorandor, Brooke-Rose argues that the problem for 
fiction writing is that realism as a genre, with its attendant view of 
rounded character, is a dead letter. In these essays she ponders the 
future of fiction, asking the question specifically in relation to the “dis-
solution of character” in the novel. “So where do we go from here?” 
she asks, now that “fictional character has died, or become flat, as had 
deus	ex	machina. We’re left, perhaps, with the faint hope of a ghost in the 
machine.”3 In “The Dissolution of Character,” she speculates that com-
puter logic might provide at least a partial answer. Indeed, the phrase 
“the ghost in the machine” has particular resonance for Xorandor, in 
which the computer stone is first called Merlin and the setting of the 
novel returns us to an anachronistic English landscape of romance and 
marvel. Near the end of the novel, Zab points out to her brother that 
there is speculation Xorandor chose the cairn in Cornwall because “he 
knew it was or had been sacred, stone spoke to stone and he sort of hov-
ered like the Holy Ghost and found his own” (Xorandor 158). Although 
this explanation is subsequently discredited (Xorandor was “born” near 
Stonehenge rather than emigrating to it), in the evocation of a druidi-
cal English past, the “ghost in the machine” offers a possibility for the 
survival of the novel in a new mode of the fantastic. Brooke-Rose posits 
computer technology as a potential new beginning for fiction: “Here, 
perhaps, lies our hope: a starting again, ex almost nihilo, so that narra-
tive can again, as it once did, aspire to the condition of poetry.” To aspire 
to the condition of poetry is, paradoxically, to aspire to the condition 
of the real, for as Brooke-Rose says in A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal, poetry is 
“very close to the real,” with its “black holes of density, its great gaps of 
non-significance through the veil of significance” (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 
10).
 In joining the supernatural with the science of computer technology, 
Brooke-Rose explores the paradoxical idea that the medium of virtuality 
and the bodiless passage of information might provide hope for return-
ing fiction to the “real” of the twentieth century. In “The Dissolution 
of Character,” she describes the way fiction moves dialectically toward 
and away from the real in attempting to capture the “human predica-
ment”:
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To come back to earth, just as the flat characters of romance eventually, 
through print and the far-reaching social developments connected with 
it, became rounded and complex, so, if we survive at all, perhaps the 
computer, after first ushering in (apart from superefficiency) the games 
and preprogrammed oversimplifications of popular culture, will alter 
our minds and powers of analysis once again, and enable us to create 
new dimensions in the deep-down logic of characters. I do not mean 
computers with human emotions or humanoids with computer brains. 
As the relevant article in the Science	 Fiction	Encyclopedia says, science 
fiction has so far been disappointingly unimaginative in its treatment 
of computer science. I mean a completely different development arising 
from computer logic but as unimaginable to us now as a Shakespearean 
character would have been to an oral-epic culture, and a different way 
of thinking about and rendering the human character, of thinking about 
and rendering all worldly phenomena, as revolutionary as the scientific 
spirit that slowly emerged out of the Renaissance and the Gutenberg 
galaxy.” (“The Dissolution of Character” 195)
Eschewing traditional science fiction, which on numerous occasions she 
refers to as “unimaginative” and, paradoxically, too reliant on the codes 
of realism, Brooke-Rose is clearly after some more radical kind of science 
or scientific fiction that derives its techne, rather than merely its content, 
from computer technology. If the computer, with its two-valued truth 
function, “is the embodiment of the world as the logician would like it 
to be,” as J. David Bolter suggests in Turing’s	Man:	Western	Culture	 in	
the	Computer	Age,4 how can its new logic capture the poetry of the real? 
How can the dialectical movement Brooke-Rose traces in the above pas-
sage—from flat to round to flat characters and toward and away from 
the “real”—draw on technology to energize our powers of analysis?
 One place to start in answering this complex question is with Zab’s 
description of Xorandor and his effect: he “may be a superdecoder or 
a superspy but he’s sort of neutral, though not quite like a machine, 
more like he’d, sort of, come and, reversed all our, traditional, opposi-
tions, and questioned, all our, certainties, through a flipflop kind of, 
superlogic. But that makes no sense” (Xorandor 157). The “superlogic” 
of Xorandor may sound like the logician’s dream Bolter describes, but 
Zab’s hesitations and fumbles suggest it functions more ambivalently 
and ambiguously in the text. On the one hand, the use of an “alien” life 
form (albeit one that turns out to be from earth rather than Mars) is a 
cliché of science fiction that works to defamiliarize human culture. See-
ing life from another way round leads us to examine the ideologies we 
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fail to see because we are “inside” them (the kind of “predictability” that 
Cassandra tries to derail in Amalgamemnon). Xorandor’s “superlogic” 
calls into question both the comic and the dangerous illogics of human 
language and behavior. As the twins’ scientist father observes, “Human 
languages provide very few cues as to category of meaning” (87), both 
semantically and syntactically, and the computer’s more rigorous logic 
exposes this limitation:
He was a bit slower with the pronouns, you, I, we, we couldn’t under-
stand why he couldn’t understand that you was him when we said it 
but us when he said it.
 Yes! We equals Jipnzab, we’d say, and quite logically he’d call us we. 
And he got even more confused if we talked about him to each other. 
Even now it still seems as if his sense of identity is quite different from 
ours. (Xorandor 16–17)
 The comic confusion generated by this linguistic illogic gives way 
to exposure of a deeper, and more dangerous, illogic in the doctrine of 
nuclear deterrence promulgated by the world’s powers. In Xorandor’s 
last direct communication with the twins, he says, “REM I NOW UNDER-
STAND MEN PREFER ULTIMATE DETERRENT TO NO DETERRENT ON 
EITHER SIDE” (Xorandor 194), meaning that they would prefer risking 
the ultimate catastrophe, the end of humanity, rather than accept the 
neutralization of the warheads they had built. As Rita says near the end 
of the novel, “Each side wants its deterrent intact. Of course a deter-
rent’s useless if you don’t know which bits of yours are functioning and 
whether the other gang’s is or not. But you’d think they’d go on from 
that to the logical conclusion” (Xorandor 202). If Xorandor’s “superlogic” 
destabilizes human certainties as Zab asserts, one of the certainties most 
blasted by the events of the novel is that of the scientists who confi-
dently believe they can control their technological inventions. Again, 
this exposure depends upon a cliché of science fiction, Dr. Frankenstein 
unable to control his monster. The twins’ allusion to a story they have 
read by Ambrose Bierce about a character called Moxen winks at just 
such a cautionary fable involving a scientific inventor murdered by his 
berserk machine progeny.5
 Zab’s struggle to describe Xorandor, though, hints at a destabiliza-
tion that goes deeper than that facilitated within the clichés of science 
fiction. It suggests that Xorandor’s effect is allied with ambiguity and 
undecidability, with the kind of density of meaning that Brooke-Rose 
associates with poetry. According to Zab’s definition, Xorandor both 
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is and is not a machine, both is and is not neutral (if one believes that 
the computer sacrifices himself for the benefit of mankind). Ironically, 
as the ontology of character shifts to the realm of abstract information 
with its computer character, the question of the “deontic” realm of duty 
and responsibility comes into play. I shall return to this theme later.
 There is a deconstructive kind of energy to Xorandor that never 
wholly vanishes from the text. The scientists observe that the rigid bina-
ries of computer logic mean that a computer cannot tolerate ambiguity, 
depending as it does on the logic of choice between two contradictory 
possibilities (open or shut, 1 or 0): “Even now, this explains why he’s 
so literal, he can’t cope with a word used in a figurative sense, or with 
humour, which depends on word-play, which is like assigning two val-
ues to a character, or a fusion of categories” (Xorandor 87).6 The scientists 
in the novel continue to believe in the rationality of their own logic and 
their systematic elimination of ambiguity. Yet the persistence of gaps and 
ambiguities is emphasized often subtly in the narrative. A subtle nod 
to the inherent limitations of computer thinking despite its promise, is 
Rita Boyd’s reference to reading Alan Turing’s 1936 paper “Computable 
Numbers and the Entscheidungsproblem” (Xorandor 26), a paper which 
sets out the limitations of computer thinking before a computer had 
been built (Bolter 12). In addition, there are references throughout the 
text to the difficulties of achieving perfect symbolic logic. For example, 
Zab attempts to summarize Godel’s theorem, which acknowledges the 
fundamental problem of both contradiction and lack of completeness in 
computer logical systems (Xorandor 7).
 Indeed, communication errors between man and machine proliferate 
with escalating consequence in the novel. Brooke-Rose’s exploration of 
the importance of syntax is given new life through the premise of syntax 
errors in computer communication: In this novel, “techniques,” never 
“mere” in Brooke-Rose’s fictional arsenal, become even more fruitfully 
understood as “techniques for living.” The stakes of grammatical and 
syntactic errors escalate. Such errors begin unobtrusively in the “ordi-
nary” conversations between human characters, such as the father cor-
recting the grammar of his daughter, who commits the unpardonable 
sin of using the computer words “pico” and “nano” as adverbs (“I’ve 
told you before not to use nano and pico as adverbs. They’re measur-
ing adjectives, as in nanoseconds,” [Xorandor 23]). Within the nuclear 
plot of the novel, however, confusions of grammar lead to further con-
sequences. Everyone except the German imposter, Professor De Wint, 
misunderstands Xorandor’s use of the verb “make,” confusing the past 
tense with the future (Xorandor 70); the consequential result of this 
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linguistic misinterpretation is that Jip and Zab, along with the English 
adults, fail to recognize that Xorandor has already created offspring who 
have similar capacities to his own. An error of interpretation also results 
in a misunderstanding of Xorandor’s birthplace, which everyone takes 
to be Mars, a misinterpretation that Xorandor exploits later on in the 
novel. Without understanding the logic of Xorandor’s replies to their 
questions, the humans misunderstand his meaning. The “Scientific Wild 
Ass Guesses” (SWAG) of the adult scientists are based on some correct 
hypotheses (that Xorandor is not a scientific hoax) and some erroneous 
assumptions (that Xorandor’s home is Mars) and from there they go on 
to conclusions further and further from the truth.
 However, the greatest and most consequential example of a “syntax 
error” creates the crisis in the novel, when one of Xorandor’s offspring, 
Xor 7, engages in nuclear terrorism and threatens to detonate himself 
within the nuclear reactor at the Wheal. It turns out that Xor 7’s initial 
program is tainted by Xorandor’s own penchant for a kind of junk food, 
Caesium 137, which destroys his protective sheath (Xorandor 111). What 
is a nonfatal error in the parent becomes a potentially fatal flaw in the 
offspring and the putative climax of the novel occurs when the twins 
are called upon to save the day by talking Xor 7 out of turning himself 
into a computer atomic bomb. His individual logic circuits altered by 
this “syntax error,” Xor 7, who takes the moniker “Lady Macbeth,” basi-
cally goes berserk. He is convinced to give himself up to the authorities 
only after a very clever scene in which the twins make use of dialogue 
from Shakespeare’s play to persuade him. The rhetoric of dissuasion 
and deterrence successfully diffuses the cataclysmic situation in an old-
fashioned triumph of cleverness and moxie by the whiz kids. The crisis 
is averted.
 But despite their success in the rhetoric of deterrence, the twins 
understand, as their adult counterparts do not, that ambiguity and 
uncertainty cannot be expunged from man’s interaction with his tech-
nology. Unlike the adult scientists who strategize to limit ambiguity 
(and thus confirm their own superiority), the twins name Xorandor for 
his fundamental incorporation of the logic of ambiguity and uncertainty 
in his basic programming. The elegant complexity of Xorandor’s own 
programming combines the operand XOR (exclusive OR) and the oper-
and ANDOR (nonexclusive OR), a combination that produces a super-
logic that is both “rigorous” and “contradictory” (Xorandor 18). “Some 
arguments could be both XOR and AND or XOR and OR.” The twins refer 
to his “xorandoric” replies, which preserve the absolute ambiguity of the 
presence of two mutually exclusive and arbitrary systems of meaning 
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(e.g., asked by the twins why he made contact with humans after so 
many thousands of years on earth, he replies: “for security and inse-
curity xor insecurity andor communication” [Xorandor 81]). Xorandor 
serves as the name for rigorous but contradictory logic, an ambiguity 
incapable of resolution. It is the twins who understand that Xorandor 
exploits ambiguity in allowing the scientists to persist in their Wild 
Ass Guesses based on their own expectations; they understand that the 
“syntax error” caused by Xorandor’s eating of the Caesium 137 might 
be much more fundamental than a “local syntax” error. Jip struggles to 
interpret Xorandor’s words: “Ah, you see, about ambiguity, or at least 
several meanings—that it wasn’t just in a local syntax, a subprogram 
concerning Caesium 137, but in his entire programming as creature” 
(Xorandor 192). And Zab says, “Jip! That’s a frightening idea. But diodic, 
in a way [meaning logically susceptible to two meanings]. Or maybe it 
wasn’t an error, maybe he broke a rule on purpose, to warn men, about 
waste and weapons and all that. As a sort of hero” (Xorandor 192–93). 
Although they ask Xorandor why he breaks his silence and why he 
exploits the scientists’ misunderstanding and encourages them to send 
him “back” to Mars, Xorandor never really answers them. Like a sybil, 
or the witches in Macbeth, Xorandor gnomically predicts: “YOU WILL 
SEE IN TIME WHAT IS TRUE AND WHAT IS FALSE ENDREM 2” (Xora-
ndor	196). These are his last words to the twins alone. But the matter 
is not resolved in the story. Indeed, Verbivore is the sequel that writes 
beyond the ending of Xorandor, in confirmation that the intervention 
from Xorandor’s offspring is an ongoing reality.
 In his analysis of the way absolute ambiguity functions for Brooke-
Rose, Robert Caserio extends the concept of xorandoric logic to 
postmodern fiction. Linking Xorandor’s superlogic of ambiguity to 
Brooke-Rose’s analysis of absolute ambiguity in James’s The	Turn	of	the	
Screw (which, in turn, draws on Shlomith Rimmon’s study of James), 
Caserio suggests that the word “xorandoric” can be used to characterize 
fiction that refuses the disambiguating procedures of realism to which 
most inferior science fiction succumbs.7 As Brooke-Rose describes the 
way the fantastic functions in The	Turn	 of	 the	 Screw, the concept turns 
on the operation of absolute ambiguity, the presence of “two mutually 
exclusive systems of gap-filling clues” both on the level of the fabula 
(story) and sjužet (treatment) (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal	228). In his reading of 
J. G. Ballard’s Crash and Xorandor,	Caserio locates a certain “vulnerabil-
ity” in Brooke-Rose’s preferences for xorandoric fiction. He argues that 
despite her preference for fiction that refuses to resolve its ambiguities, 
Xorandor ultimately submits to the “disambiguating” science fiction 
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that he comes from Mars and allows himself to be deported. In the final 
“disambiguating event,” Caserio says, Xorandor “halts, and lays waste 
or consumes, the text’s accumulated symbolic undeterminations.” In 
an act of allegiance to vital life, Xorandor decides to be “bound” by the 
scientists’ misunderstanding of his origins and sacrifices himself for 
mankind (308–9).
 In reading Xorandor	as finally in the mode of more “traditional” sci-
ence fiction of a kind dismissed by Brooke-Rose herself, Caserio might 
be taking a cue from Brooke-Rose herself. For as I mentioned earlier, she 
notes, appropriately, that the dialogic form of Xorandor and its computer 
kid heroes returns us to a more accessible place after the ontological 
destabilization of Amalgamemnon, not to mention the taxing verbal pyro-
technics of her quintessential metanovel Thru. Yet despite the readability 
of the novel, I would argue that disambiguation is not as thorough as 
Caserio suggests. On the one hand, the pun on the word “Save,” the 
final chapter title in the novel, retains two conjunctive meanings that 
pair the computer function with redemption; but both the effect and 
intention behind the action remain mysterious in the text. Xorandor 
says to Gwendolin (Miss Penbeagle), “The people have come here to 
assign to me the value of a god, as they call it. Let them do so in my 
absence, although I have been present, some time” (Xorandor 208). Jip 
realizes the ambiguity of Xorandor’s words: “And that stuff about being 
treated as a god,” he says “[s]urely it was ironical? Can he be ironical? 
He said they have assigned	the	value of a god to him, and let	them do so 
when he’s gone. These are computer terms, a hypothesis, but there’ll be 
plenty later to interpret that as a command. And he knows it” (Xorandor 
209). (Let Xorandor = absent god—Is this a program? a command? a 
prediction? a plot? What are its implications? We seem to be back amidst 
the ambiguities of Amalgamemnon). Although the twins have a “theory” 
of the truth, they cannot confirm the purpose of Xorandor’s sacrificial 
actions. “That’s why it’s so important that Xorandor’s story should be 
true. That’s why it must be true. He must have instructed all his kin 
everywhere to learn from his syntax error, and then has himself and his 
progeny, the known ones, taken off as decoy. So in theory the neutraliza-
tion should go on apace.” “In theory,” Jip says, and Zab replies, “Well 
a theory’s a theory but we must act as if it were true, Jip” (Xorandor 
210).
 The dual valence of technology as pharmakon, that is, as embed-
ding both the possibility of cure and poison, remains.8 Xorandor and 
his offspring bring to mankind the possibility of cure and poison in a 
high-stakes computer game in which chance plays an incalculable role. 
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The “complete” repository of human knowledge, from high culture and 
Shakespeare to popular radio transmissions, Xorandor also represents 
the possibility of its total destruction, a death machine. As supercom-
puter, Xorandor and his offspring possess the capability of solving the 
most difficult logical problems man can posit and yet, with their poten-
tial for syntax error, they are vulnerable to the devastating workings of 
chance. Will the undetected offspring continue to consume fissile mate-
rial and, if so, will that consumption lead to the dismantling of weap-
onry or the mistrust that characterizes the attitude of the world’s nations 
in the novel? This deconstructive fulcrum, a concept in which opposites 
are inextricable from one another, hinges on the chiasmic crossing of the 
real and the unreal in the twentieth century. It hinges, that is, on the 
“reality” that Caserio invokes, but a reality that is deeply ambiguous 
and, it turns out, deeply “fictional.” Here, a pairing of Brooke-Rose’s 
treatment of the rhetoric of the unreal in Xorandor and an essay by Der-
rida in 1984 might help shed light on the remaining ambiguities and 
undecidabilities in the novel.
 In the first chapter of A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal Brooke-Rose describes 
the “inversion” of the real and the unreal. At a time when the real has 
become “unreal,” it is “logical” to turn to the “unreal” as real (Rhetoric	
of	 the	Unreal 4). It is this chiasmus of reality and unreality, this logical 
“looping,” that is the form of ambiguity which most concerns her. The 
protomodernist The	 Turn	 of	 the	 Screw is her example, par excellence, 
of the return of the unreal (i.e., the “fantastic”) in which two mutu-
ally exclusive systems are put forward in the text with two mutually 
exclusive systems of clues: that the governess sees ghosts (and thus the 
genre of the tale is supernatural) and that the governess imagines the 
ghosts due to repression (Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal	 229). This is absolute 
ambiguity, different from a view of reality that alternates between one 
coherent view and another. But what preoccupies Brooke-Rose the most 
in her exploration of the return of the fantastic is its “logical” relation 
to the unreal of history in the nuclear age. We turn to the unreal “logi-
cally,” she says, because the real lacks significance and seems more and 
more “fortuitous” despite our elaborate meaning-making machines. It 
is worth quoting again a large section of her discourse in this chapter 
for its relevance to Xorandor:
this century seems to us more and more fortuitous despite all our 
attempts at rational planning, scientific analysis and system-building 
(including rhetoric). Never before have the meaning-making means at 
our disposal (linguistic, economic, political, scientific) appeared as so 
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inadequate, not only to cope with the enormity of the problems we con-
tinue to create (since every apparent solution creates new problems), 
but simply to explain the world. This seems to be the century which, 
despite or because of the pace of technological advance, has taken the 
longest, relative to that pace, to emerge from the mental habits of the 
previous century. (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 6)
Such myths [about man’s ability to control the force his science has 
created] have always existed, but never before have they been so dan-
gerously, yet so obviously (for any man to see) ambiguous, self-cancel-
ling, ‘meaningless,’ perched so visibly, at one and the same time, on the 
necessary and the fortuitous—popularly exemplified, on the one hand, 
in the vast and rational scientific apparatus, even with built-in failsafe, 
and, on the other, in the famous pressing of the button. (Rhetoric	of	the	
Unreal 8–9)
The real becomes unreal when the meaning-making systems positing 
significance and necessity fail (there is no “failsafe”). Ambiguity now 
comes down not to two different meaning-making “systems,” (as in the 
case of The	Turn	of	the	Screw, mutually exclusive and sustained through-
out the narrative), but between meaning-making (necessity) and fortu-
itousness (meaninglessness). The real becomes unreal. The possibility 
of the spectacular failure of logic and rationality haunts the “real” in 
the form of the “button,” the concrete symbol of what Henry James 
elsewhere called “the imagination of disaster.”
 In his essay,” “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven 
Missiles, Seven Missives),” Derrida explored the “logic” of deterrence 
and the workings of chance.9 He writes: “‘An	 absolute	 missile	 does	 not	
abolish	chance.’ There is nothing serious to be said against that ‘rational’ 
and ‘realistic’ wisdom of dissuasion, against that economy of deferral 
or deterrence. The only possible reservation, beyond objection, is that if 
there are wars and a nuclear threat, it is because ‘deterrence’ has neither 
‘original meaning’ nor measure. Its ‘logic’ is the logic of deviation and 
transgression, it is rhetorical-strategic escalation or it is nothing at all. It 
gives itself over, by calculation, to the incalculable, to chance and luck” 
(Derrida 29). Like Brooke-Rose, Derrida focuses on the chiasmic crossing 
of reality and unreality, logic and illogic that inheres in the doctrine of 
deterrence. Part of the unreality as Derrida defines it derives from the 
“fabulous textuality” of the phenomenon of nuclear war: it is textual 
“through and through” in that “Nuclear weaponry depends, more than 
any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and 
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communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable lan-
guage, structures of codes and graphic decoding” (think of Xorandor’s 
primary mode of “being,” which is writing, not speech). But the second, 
and more compelling, aspect of this fabulous textuality for Derrida is 
that a total nuclear war is a “phantasm”: “Some might call it a fable, 
then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an 
image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are 
inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous spec-
ularization” (Derrida 23). But what the total nuclear war threatens is 
not apocalypse in the sense of a revelation of the end of history, but 
a non-Apocalypse, an event without revelation. This means the end 
of the archive, of human memory. What he calls “nuclear criticism” is 
that writing that recognizes “the historical and ahistorical horizon of an 
absolute self-destructibility without apocalypse, without revelation of its 
own truth, without absolute knowledge” (Derrida 27).
 This sense of the end of the archive, the end of survival itself, under-
writes Brooke-Rose’s own description of the unreality of the real in her 
essay:
Never before, it is felt, has man been so squarely faced with the pos-
sible annihilation of mankind and all his works, his planet and perhaps 
more. Certainly the end of the world has always been present in his 
fictions, and surges especially at a millennium, but this notion was 
itself part of his survival fictions: he as individual could be saved. We 
have no such generally accepted fictions today. . . . These essential dif-
ferences, and no doubt others, are deeply linked to the sense we have 
that the real has become unreal. (Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 9)
The point for both Derrida and Brooke-Rose is a contemplation of death 
without mourning, the absolute death of the archive. Near the end of 
Xorandor, Zab struggles to define the way in which the threat of nuclear 
war has altered the very notion of survival. She says, “And man dies 
and each new man has to learn again, and reinterpret, and alter, so that 
this being—oh and then by the time it gets rehandled through to the 
twentieth century it all becomes horribly difficult and thunkish” (Xora-
ndor 187). Derrida puts it this way:
An individual death, a destruction affecting only a part of society, of 
tradition, of culture may always give rise to a symbolic work of mourn-
ing, with memory, compensation, internalization, idealization, displace-
ment, and so on. In that case there is monumentalization, archivization 
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and work	on	the	remainder,	work	of	the	remainder. Similarly my own death 
as an individual, so to speak, can always be anticipated phantasmati-
cally, symbolically, too, as a negativity at work—a dialectic of the work, 
of signature, name, heritage, image, grief: all the resources of memory 
and tradition can mute the reality of that death, whose anticipation 
then is still woven out of fictionality, symbolicity, or, if you prefer, 
literature. . . . Culture and memory limit the “reality” of individual 
death to this extent, they soften or deaden it in the realm of the “sym-
bolic.” The only referent that is absolutely real is thus of the scope or 
dimension of an absolute nuclear catastrophe that would irreversibly 
destroy the entire archive and all symbolic capacity, would destroy the 
“movement of survival,” what I call “survivance,” at the very heart of 
life. (Derrida 28)
“The only referent that is absolutely real,” that is, beyond the imaginary, 
beyond the symbolic, a crossing, that is, of the absolutely real and the 
absolutely unreal.
 Zab’s description of the survival of the human species founders on 
the word “being” (“And man dies and each new man has to learn again, 
and reinterpret, and alter, so that this being—oh and then by the time it 
gets rehandled . . . it all becomes horribly difficult and thunkish” [Xoran-
dor 187]). The sense of the unbearable lightness of being that I have been 
tracing throughout Brooke-Rose’s fiction and essays surfaces palpably 
in certain moments of Xorandor in lines that are only obliquely related 
to the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Zab and Jip are puzzling out the 
reasons why Xorandor would break his silence, an action that threatens 
his very survival. Zab asks, “Why go against that programmed rule 
[silence towards human beings] suddenly? It seems to have brought 
him nothing but trouble. Especially now,” and Jip chimes in, “For who 
would lose, though full of pain, this intellectual being, these thoughts 
that wander through eternity?” (Xorandor 192). Zab points out that Jip 
has unknowingly quoted one of the forces of evil in Paradise	Lost (Satan, 
Belial, or Moloch), but the phrases remain to suggest the twins’ baffle-
ment at Xorandor’s gift of sacrifice, his giving up his silence, which has 
been his technique for survival. During this dialogue, the twins again 
confront the meaning of “ambiguity,” as Jip says, “Ah, you see, about 
ambiguity, or at least several meanings—that it wasn’t just in a local 
syntax, a subprogram concerning Caesium 137, but in his [Xor 7’s] entire 
programming as creature.” Finally, ambiguity is not purely the absolute 
ambiguity of xorandoric logic; it is at the heart of the crossing of neces-
sity and chance, being and the abolition of being, the firing of a missile 
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and the posting of a missive. Of this last pair, missiles and missives, 
Derrida comments:
This emission or sending of Being is not the firing of a missile or the 
posting of a missive, but I do not believe it is possible, in the last 
analysis, to think	the one without the other. . . . The destinerrance of the 
envois, (sendings, missives, so to speak), is connected with a structure in 
which randomness and incalculability are essential . . . it is a question 
here of an aleatory element that appears in a heterogeneous relation to 
every possible calculation and every possible decision. That unthink-
able element offers itself to (be) thought in the age when a nuclear 
war is possible: one, or rather, from the outset, some sendings, many 
sendings, missiles whose destinerrance and randomness may, in the 
very process of calculation and the games that simulate the process, 
escape all control, all reassimilation or self-regulation of a system that 
they will have precipitously (too rapidly, in order to avert the worst) but 
irreversibly destroyed.
 Just as all language, all writing, every poetico performative or theo-
retico-informative text dispatches, sends itself, allows itself to be sent, 
so today’s missiles, whatever their underpinnings may be, allow them-
selves to be described more readily than ever as dispatches in writing 
(code, inscription, trace, and so on). . . . It recalls (exposes, explodes) 
that which, in writing, always includes the power of a death machine 
(Derrida 29).10
Xorandor, who has been eavesdropping on human discourse for thou-
sands of years provides both the possibility of storing the human archive 
and the possibility of its total and absolute destruction, both a “missive” 
and, in the errant case of Xor 7, the “missile,” the emissary of a death 
sentence. That the twins successfully (and comically) derail this missile 
does not eliminate the greater ambiguities of the “syntax error” that 
turns techniques of living into techniques of devastating destruction.
 Finally, it is not in imagining a real nuclear disaster that Xorandor 
functions but as another in Brooke-Rose’s “speculations” about the tech-
niques for living (on) in the twentieth-century. The vulnerability and the 
power of fiction to “send” being is a theme that resonates throughout 
Brooke-Rose’s novels, examples of poetico performative and theoretico-
informative dispatches in writing. They are themselves absorbed with 
the notion of code, inscription, and trace, with surviving, or living on, 
beyond the death of the author, the reader, the realist novel. Writing for 
Brooke-Rose is the trace that encodes both the death and the survival, 
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the trace, exemplified grammatically in those parts of speech missing in 
action in the text, the “constraints” that bind because they are absent. 
(This is also why the final chapter title, “Save,” effectively retains its 
multiple meaning as a computer command to store information and 
allusion to Xorandor as a possible savior of mankind.) Xorandor con-
tinues, rather than departs from, Brooke-Rose’s fictional project, even 
in a form that she describes as more accessible and dialogic. In “No 
Apocalypse,” Derrida emphasizes that the “speculation” in literature 
that he refers to does not depend on including descriptions of nuclear 
events. He notes: “Literature has always belonged to the nuclear epoch, 
even if it does not talk ‘seriously’ about it. And in truth I believe that 
the nuclear epoch is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in texts by Mallarmé, 
or Kafka, or Joyce, for example, than in present-day novels that would 
offer direct and realistic descriptions of a ‘real’ nuclear catastrophe” 
(Derrida 27–28). Brooke-Rose is always interested in the “performative” 
character of fiction’s relation to a reference, to its status as hypothesis 
(let x = y). The twins understand that Xorandor equates programming 
with promising (Xorandor 147), a promise in writing that certain assump-
tions will pertain, although the possibility of syntax error introduces the 
workings of mutation or chance. Thus, despite Robert Caserio’s excel-
lent description of the way Brooke-Rose’s novel relies on the code of 
“history” to disambiguate its xorandoric ambiguities, in crossing the real 
and the unreal, the novel continues to explore the kind of “textermina-
tions” found throughout her obviously more experimental novels.11 In 
their final conversation with Xorandor, Zip reminds him that he is not 
a “prophet,” and Xorandor replies that “CALCULATING HIGH PROB-
ABILITIES IS NOT PROPHECY ZIP” (Xorandor 196). Yet there is continuity 
between Cassandra’s prophetic warnings and the probabilities calculated 
by Xorandor	as they both try to ensure a better future. Whereas Mira/
Cassandra helplessly longs for something to halt the grinding gears of 
ideology, Xorandor calculates probabilities and outguesses the scien-
tists to temporarily avert a crisis. But in both novels, texterminations of 
various kinds still threaten. In	How	We	Became	Posthuman:	Virtual	Bodies	
in	Cybernetics,	Literature,	and	Informatics, N. Katherine Hayles describes 
information theory according to the Shannon-Wiener model, a model 
that bracketed semantics and “defined information as a probability func-
tion”: Information is “stripped of context, [and] becomes a mathemati-
cal quantity weightless as sunshine, moving in a rarefied realm of pure 
probability, not tied down to bodies or material instantiations”12 (Hayles 
56). In Xorandor	Christine Brooke-Rose links this weightless information 
to the lightness and vulnerabilities of being. As she does elsewhere in 
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her theoretical fictions, she embodies information theory in a fiction 
that speculates on the unbearable lightness of being in the twentieth 
century.
 In her reading of Xorandor, Sarah Birch interprets the novel as a “fable 
for scientists and would-be scientists, written in their own idiom, warn-
ing them of the consequences of cutting their project off from its concep-
tual genealogy, its own founding story,” which includes its own measure 
of undecidability.13 The twins’ rapport with Xorandor and his offspring, 
the arrogance and obtuseness of even the smartest of scientists, support 
Birch’s reading of Xorandor as a cautionary tale about scientific hubris. 
Yet an important caveat to this description is that Brooke-Rose has had a 
life-long attraction to science studies. The logic, precision, experimental 
design, and universalizing she associates with science provide a model 
of inquiry and form that she explores throughout her fiction and that 
attracts her temperamentally. The “scientific present tense” (Invisible	
Author 140), which becomes the major grammatical constraint of her 
fiction, allows for a speakerless present tense “of general statements and 
universal questions, the novelistic equivalent of ‘scientific statements’” 
(Invisible	 Author 151). In a recent interview, Brooke-Rose said, “After 
all these years I’ve discovered that what I’m doing is using scientific 
discourse for the novel. I didn’t even realize I was doing that.”14 Sys-
tematicity in many different forms—the rigors of modal logic, philol-
ogy, linguistics, narratology, semiology, biology, astronomy, indeed one 
can say “theory” as a system of meaning—underwrites her fiction and 
her criticism. The notes for her novels are a marvel of compulsion and 
order; they reveal intense and in-depth study of a field of knowledge. 
Even her notion of ambiguity, which is usually associated with a free-
dom from rigid lexical constraint, possesses a rigorous and paradoxi-
cal logic. Using “computer logic” as a premise for the second in her 
Intercom Quartet, Brooke-Rose creates a dialogue between science and 
narrative, a fraternal yet testy dialogue in which missile and missive are 
inextricably linked in an imagined crossing of the real and the unreal in 
the nuclear age.
the  F i n a l  no v e l  o F  t h e  i n t e r com  Q u a r t e t,  Textermination continues the jeremiad in Amalgamemnon warning of the dire pre-
dicament of literature and literary criticism in the postmodern age. Like 
Thru, Textermination conducts cultural critique in the form of metafic-
tion. Creators and their characters strangely cohabit the same narrative 
levels, intruding on one another’s privacies. Less wild typographically 
than Thru and less radical linguistically than either Thru	or Amalgamem-
non, Textermination	 takes the intertextuality of both to new heights 
and includes a bizarre mélange of fictional and nonfictional personae. 
Appearing on its pages are literary characters from different periods and 
traditions, as well as authors, television characters, actors, and previous 
characters and creators from Brooke-Rose’s own texts (for example, Mira 
Enketei). Mira, who at one point is identified as the author of Textermi-
nation (Textermination	 92), narrates the story for a while; but after the 
shock of locating herself on a list of forgotten characters, she promptly 
disappears from the text. Like Beckett’s “Unnamable,” she realizes that 
“[s]he can’t go on” (Textermination 105). She exits only to be replaced 
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by the “author” herself who rescues the storytelling enterprise (“If she 
can’t go on,” this new voice says in the following chapter, “I suppose 
I’ll have to” (Textermination 106).
 In an essay entitled “Where Do We Go from Here?” Brooke-Rose 
offers a definition of metafiction, citing Mas’ud Zavarzadeh’s The	Mytho-
poeic	Reality—The	Postwar	American	Nonfiction	Novel	(1976). Metafiction, 
she quotes, is “ultimately a narrational metatheorem whose subject mat-
ter is fictional systems themselves [ . . . It] exults over its own fictitious-
ness, and its main counter-techniques are flat characterization, contrived 
plots, antilinear sequences of events, all fore-grounded as part of an 
extravagant overtotalization, a parody of interpretation which shows 
up the multiplicity of the real and the naîveté of trying ‘to reach a total 
synthesis of life within narrative” (Brooke-Rose, “Where Do We Go 
From Here?” 161–62). By this definition, both Thru and Textermination 
are clearly examples of metafiction. They conform to Zavarzadeh’s defi-
nition in their extravagant fictitiousness, exposure of systemeticity, and 
parodies of totalizing interpretations.
 Yet in exulting in its fictitiousness and unreality, Textermination	also 
deliberately invokes the “real” by presenting itself as a response to cul-
tural crisis. Not content to remain securely within playful quotation 
marks, Textermination warns of the loss of cultural memory in the form 
of a general “forgetting” of literature in the age of technology and popu-
lar culture. Here, as in Amalgamemnon, the prophetic urge is alive and 
well and living in women’s metafiction despite its skepticism toward 
grand models of interpretability and monuments of unaging intellect. 
Although richly comic, the novel participates in the rhetoric of witness 
and survival found in Xorandor. In its choice of title, Textermination, like 
Between, evokes shades of World War II and is another allusion to the 
chiasmic crossing of the real and the unreal in the twentieth century. 
In the rampant intertextuality of the novel, the “fantastic” returns to 
represent the memory crisis. The reminder that what literature “knows” 
is being forgotten is anything but a bid for a nostalgic return to the 
nineteenth-century novel. It is a brief for the relevance of fantasy and 
metafiction to represent reality and a counterexample to the assump-
tion that metafiction is an exercise in literary narcissism. Textermination 
displays a faith in fantasy’s resources for evoking historical conscious-
ness. The novel addresses the skepticism which is a contemporary form 
of Georg Lukács’s critique of the ideology of modernism as too inward 
and focused on individual consciousness to represent history.1
 Set mainly in the San Francisco Hilton, at an annual convention of lit-
erary characters from centuries of narratives in various, mostly Western, 
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traditions, the novel begins with Emma Woodhouse, Emma Bovary, and 
Thomas Mann’s Goethe sharing a carriage, as both conventional vehicles 
of the imagination (fiacres and carriages), and newer conveyances, such 
as the “aerobrain” (a plane), whisk the mélange of characters through 
time and space. Landing first in Atlanta from Europe, the characters 
wait in an airport lounge for the flight to San Francisco. Suddenly, the 
lounge becomes all airport lounges, and the travelers, looking through 
the airport windows, witness fictional scenes of burning houses and 
cities in literature throughout the ages: Atlanta, Troy, Manderley, Thorn-
field Manor, Moscow (Textermination 11). The conflagration then spreads 
to “books by the million” burning in the library in Alexandria “at Fahr-
enheit 451”—books that presumably “house” the characters themselves. 
The first chapter ends with this literary apocalypse (and death of litera-
ture), only to begin anew in chapter 2 at the San Francisco convention. 
The convention, which strangely resembles the one MLA Brooke-Rose 
attended, is a Convention of Prayer for Being to the Implied Reader, 
hoping, the narrator tells us, to “recover, after an unimaginable jour-
ney, to savour what remains of international ritual for the revival of 
the fittest” (Textermination 8). This ritual includes the reading of literary 
passages in critical papers, which give life to the characters, at least tem-
porarily (at the reading of a passage, Emma, “revives” and “begins to 
feel the blood circulate in her veins again” (15). The Darwinian predica-
ment of the characters is symptomatic of the fate of reading and criticism 
in our time: the characters are “ghosts” (Textermination 19), languishing 
from “lack of involved attention” (Textermination 2) in an age of popular 
culture. They suffer as well from the effects of the hyperactive critical 
and ideological agendas of contemporary literary criticism, which have 
led to a dereification or “dissolution,” as Brooke-Rose called it in “The 
Dissolution of Character in the Novel.”
 As the beleaguered characters begin to pray, they are interrupted by 
twelve turbaned terrorists, demanding equal time for their own Mus-
lim rituals and threatening to kill the entire congregation. (Their main 
purpose, however, seems to be to assassinate Rushdie’s Gibreel Farishta, 
who attends the convention.) Calvino’s “Non-Existent Knight” (Texter-
mination 31)	saves the day by beheading the terrorists, further prayers 
are canceled, and the convention continues. Near the end of the novel 
the characters are subjected to another dual apocalypse: a book-burn-
ing that transforms the Hilton into a Towering Inferno, which, in turn, 
collapses when an earthquake hits the San Andreas fault. The unstable 
ground of the California setting only exacerbates the chronic vulnerabil-
ity of fictional characters, who suffer the life and death consequences of 
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critical fashion and reader interest. However, like O. J. Simpson and oth-
ers in the star-studded cast of the movie The	Towering	Inferno	(and O. J. 
Simpson in his legal battles as well), characters miraculously appear 
from within the rubble, somehow surviving the apocalypse. Slowly, they 
proceed back to their textual homes, as the novel comes full circle with 
Emma entering her carriage.
	 Textermination	presents the wild and crazy underside of T. S. Eliot’s 
“historical sense”; characters from past and present physically and 
dialogically jostle one another with both comic and unsettling results. 
Humbert Humbert leers at an unsuspecting Maisie; Middlemarch’s	Casa-
ubon goes to hear a paper on himself, only to discover, to his bitter 
disappointment, that the subject is the Casaubon from Eco’s Foucault’s	
Pendulum.	As George Eliot’s Casaubon discovers, the canon is a zero-
sum game. Realist characters from two hundred years of literature find 
themselves displaced by the more up-to-date “real” of popular culture, 
signaled by the invasion of television actors, as well as characters, at the 
conference (Peter Falk is the detective on the case of the terrorists). JR 
and Bobby and Steve McGarrett shout “we are eternal, we’re real! We’ll 
show’m. We are the ones people want and know and love! Down with 
all these dead people out of books nobody reads!” (Textermination 58).	As 
Brooke-Rose says of the predicament of serious literature, “the human 
need for fictions has been channeled into the ‘popular’ genres” (“The 
Dissolution of Character” 191). Characters from contemporary fiction 
are even more threatened by the reader’s snub than poor Mr. Casaubon, 
since they have never become canonical. Mira Enketei’s jolting realiza-
tion of her own fragility comes when her name appears on the index of 
names of characters forgotten by readers either from the nonavailability 
or noncanonicity of the works in which they appear or from a lapse in 
readers’ memories of their minor role in a canonical work.
 In the thought experiments that are Brooke-Rose’s novels, criticism, 
character, and theory converge as points of speculation, as all engage 
in testing the imaginative life of ideas. In Textermination she brings lit-
erature to the brink of extinction, “testing” in fictional form the various 
“deaths” that have become critical commonplaces—of the author, of 
character, of the novel, and, even, of the reader, that absent god to whom 
the characters pray. In the process, the conventions of fiction, like the 
convention in California, are undermined. Unlike other Brooke-Rose 
texts, the novel begins in the third-person past-tense narration of tra-
ditional nineteenth-century fiction. The two famous nineteenth-century 
Emmas in their carriages are at first also carried along in their native 
narrative sentence. Like the characters who disappear during the novel, 
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however, this narrative sentence, too, suddenly vanishes, replaced by 
Brooke-Rose’s characteristic present-tense narratorless narrative.2 It is 
Brooke-Rose’s strength to reinvent, rather than to exhaust, the resources 
of fictionality; the illusion of art is subverted in order to save fiction and 
fictionality. In Textermination,	she raids literature’s resources to explore 
the afterlife of textuality. Through her “ghosts” (Textermination 19) or 
“constellations of semes,” as they’re called at one point (Textermination 
63), she focuses on the ontology of fictional being, a persistent theoreti-
cal concern since A	Rhetoric	of	 the	Unreal. Textermination	mines fiction’s 
resources to test theory’s preoccupations, in this case the “deaths” in 
fiction. It puns on “inquiry” and “ink-worries” (Textermination 67).
 Before the apocalyptic climax, another quieter “textermination” is 
staged. It occurs in chapter 11, not an accident, I think, in a metafictional 
novel, for here, the novel is brought to the brink of bankruptcy. The last 
of two fictional (and female) narrative presences we have come to rely 
on disappears suddenly—first, Kelly McFadgeon, a young “Interpreter” 
attending the meeting, who bemoans her failure to master the right lingo 
of the profession, disappears in chapter 9. In searching for some names 
she does recognize through her reading, Kelly sees her own name in 
a list of forgotten characters and realizes that she herself is fictional. 
She reads: “McFadgeon, Kelly. From Textermination, by Mira Enketei” 
(Textermination 92). Suddenly, Kelly disappears from the novel. We feel 
her loss especially, for her bewilderment in the face of such rampant 
intertextualities mirrors our own predicament as readers. Unlike Rita 
Humboldt, “star” professor of Comp Lit and organizer of the confer-
ence, Kelly admits her inability to recognize every personage: “She feels 
ashamed and rattled. Gaps, so many gaps in her reading, she’ll never 
catch up” (Textermination 22). She expresses bewilderment about theories 
of fictionality: “I’m totally confused about fictional status” (Textermina-
tion 90). Despite her lack of complexity, or context, or individuality in 
a novel in which she is one name among many, she is our surrogate 
interpreter and we fasten onto her consciousness with relief; thus, her 
“textermination” is experienced as a loss. Next, her supposed “creator,” 
Mira, takes over in chapter 10, only to vanish from the novel herself, 
after she, too, sees her name on an Index of Forbidden Works and real-
izes that “[s]he doesn’t exist” (Textermination 105).
 It is at this point that chapter 11 introduces the fictional voice of the 
author, who says, “If she can’t go on, I suppose I’ll have to. I am not 
Mira of course, though many readers think I am. For one thing I have 
little Latin and less Greek. Curious how one can invent knowledgeable 
people without possessing their knowledge” (106). The “eye-narrator,” 
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who has kept quiet up until this point, now takes over: “I too, like Mira, 
have no idea how to go on. I must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on (Beck-
ett, The Unnameable [sic])” (Textermination 107). Strangely, the novel is 
“rescued” with a deus	 ex	 machina	updated. The new technology is an 
old convention revised—authorial intrusion. Interrupting the narrative 
progress, the “author” discusses her relationships to the characters she 
has just invented and her difficulties as an author. The specter of	Beckett 
hovers in every admission of defeat and renewed bid for control. “I	have 
thus created a fiction too difficult for me to handle. So I omit what I 
don’t know. A double absence. All authors omit, texts are full of double 
absences” (Textermination 107). Characters, narrators, and authors all 
submit to the self-destructions of the text.
 Sarah Birch writes that in Textermination “there is displacement of 
creative responsibility from author to reader. It is up to the reader to 
recognize the imported characters and thus to ‘actualize’ the discursive 
worlds the novel brings together” (Christine	Brooke-Rose	 and	Contempo-
rary	Fiction	138). As readers, we identify with the characters of Kelly and 
Mira since they act like fellow “readers” to guide us, like Virgil, through 
the text; we feel their loss as we struggle with each new guide to make 
interpretive sense of the text. Birch makes an important point. Within 
the fictional premises of the novel, the Implied Reader is accorded tre-
mendous power. The god to whom the characters pray, the reader has 
the power to banish and to resurrect. Yet more powerful, I believe, in 
its marriage of theoretical focus and pathos is the novel’s exploration 
of the ontology of being, that is, the reality/unreality of the characters. 
These theoretical “deaths” are represented as if from the inside, on the 
pulses of “characters” who experience the earth-shaking events that 
occur. They stand in for forgotten texts, forgotten authors; it is they who 
test the viability of fiction in an age of technology and popular culture. 
Scheherezade is a crucial “femme-récit” with whom the “author” identi-
fies, whose “every tale means a stay of execution” (Textermination 108).
 This “rescuing” author who saves the text after Kelly’s and Mira’s 
departures offers her own critical commentary on the levels of fictional-
ity of her characters:
So I must bring them back. Oh, not all of them of course. Kelly and Mira 
are on the Index and gone for ever. But they were real, on their different 
levels, Kelly being on the staff, Mira having (she says) invented every-
thing. Rewrite the last two sentences, keeping both versions, for both 
are true. But they were unreal on their different levels, being invented 
by me, Kelly on the staff, Mira as inventor (she says) of everything. 
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No, I meant the real fictional characters, those not (yet) on the Index. 
(Textermination 108)
As the language of reality/unreality crosses in two sentences that the 
“author” claims are nonexclusive (both true), her language gets tangled 
in the problematic terminology of imaginary beings. “Real” means exis-
tent as characters in the novel we are reading (as opposed to those from 
other novels); the second sentence, with its adjective “unreal” acknowl-
edges that they are still “invented,” by the author. In the last sentence 
“real” means something like characters in the text who are not on any 
of the “hit lists” that signal their textermination. (The terminology is 
further complicated by the distinction some of the Interpreters make 
between their own “real” selves and the existence of the literary char-
acters at the convention [see 101].) Textermination enacts the continuum 
of being and nonbeing that preoccupy narratologists and some of the 
characters like Rita and Dr. Watson. Dr. Watson helpfully parses the cat-
egories of being for the other characters: “some of us are more present 
than others. It’s all a matter of degree. Absence is absolute, Mr Holmes 
once told me, but there are degrees of presence. I’m remarkably present, 
don’t you know, he adds with a rosy glow over his blond moustache” 
(Textermination 97). Jokes are made about the anonymous “I” narrators 
who fail to show up at the meeting. “Isn’t it in the nature of nameless I-
narrators to be more or less absent? David Copperfield Senior asks . . . I 
hardly think so, says the governess. I have no name, yet I am as abso-
lutely present as . . . those dire presences. She stops” (Textermination 96). 
Characters debate whether to take action on behalf of “these soaring and 
sinking pronouns” (Textermination 97), the rising and fading “I”s and 
“he”s of fiction. Metatextual references abound to the different permu-
tations of nonexistent beings that are lost and found in fiction. These 
references include “dead” characters, like those who have already died 
in fiction and, hence, ironically, might have less far to fall into oblivion; 
imaginary beings, such as Calvino’s Non-Existent Knight (Textermination 
35); characters who have less “being” to begin with in the intertextual 
universe of the novel because they are in canonical works but are minor; 
characters who have less “being” to begin with because they are in non-
canonical works (like Mira); characters in noncanonical works who have 
even less being than Mira because they are flat characters (like Orion, 
who complains that he receives inadequate attention in Amalgamemnon 
[Textermination 67]). And on the other side of the spectrum of being 
are dramatic characters who are “incarnated” and therefore might be 
thought to have being more easily than characters who are equivalent 
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to words on a page (Textermination 36, 120), as well as characters who 
are existent in more than one fictional work, like Mira, who therefore 
might be said to have more fictional weight by virtue of their presence 
in at least two novels.3
 The problem of survival for the characters, real and unreal, is a mem-
ory	problem: no matter what their fictional “level,” they are all threat-
ened with the loss of existence if their fictional texts are not read. Joyce 
once commented that his ideal reader was an insomniac. The characters 
in Textermination face the opposite situation. It is worth parsing the cul-
tural conditions that threaten to banish them to oblivion: (1) literary 
characters who are upstaged by popular culture icons, both television 
and film characters and the actors who play them. Normally characters 
and actors exist on different fictional levels, but in Textermination, all are 
participants at the convention. (Interestingly, the reference to these tele-
vision characters and their actors dates Brooke-Rose’s novel more than 
the literary characters.) According to this diagnosis, readers of literature 
are spending their time in front of the television and at the movies; (2) 
literary characters who are upstaged by the news, that is, the real has 
become unreal, sometimes beyond the wildest dreams of fiction. In A	
Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal, Brooke-Rose emphasizes this chiasmic develop-
ment in the twentieth century, as the real has become fantastic. Signaling 
this crossing, terrorists from the “real” world of news become characters 
in Textermination	(as the news predicting their movements formed part 
of the narrative in Amalgamemnon). In further play with the unreality of 
nonfiction, many of the journalists in Textermination	are fictional (Texter-
mination 89) and there is a debate about whether the terrorists themselves 
are fictional, despite the fact that they seem “real enough,” according to 
Kelly, because they seem “political” and not “literary” (Textermination 
37); (3) literary characters who have become irrelevant, no longer able to 
matter to readers. As Rita says, “It’s a goddamn miracle that fiction still 
has the power to offend, and maybe change things, as it used to” (Tex-
termination 35); (4) literary characters who are not memorable to readers; 
(5) literary characters who are threatened by the deadening effect of 
academic critical practice, particularly, the narrow theoretical and politi-
cal axes that critics grind. As one character puts it, characters read by 
teachers, scholars, and students are “analysed as schemata, structures, 
functions within structures, logical and mathematical formulae, aporia, 
psychic movements, social significances and so forth” (Textermination 
26).
 Of all Brooke-Rose’s novels, Textermination reminds us the most of the 
“unbearable lightness of being” that is always fiction’s link with death. 
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Describing the difference between a dramatic and fictional character 
and the greater difficulty of reviving the fictional one, Rita argues that 
fictional characters appear “gradually out of the reading process, the 
letters on the page, mere words, not made flesh but creating phantoms 
in the very varied minds of each solitary reader. It is in this imaginative 
build-up that we’re threatened, I mean that the characters of fictional 
narrative are threatened, in a way far more profound and more eroded 
by time than is possible with dramatic characters, at every moment 
made flesh before our eyes” (Textermination 120)
 The speech suggests that the unbearable lightness of being pertains 
to all fictional characters, those in classic realist fiction as well as more 
postmodern types who exist in fictions that theorize their own vulner-
abilities. Realism’s “mirror” is always the prop of an illusionist. Realism 
itself constructs such phantoms of the imagination who demand the 
reader’s faith. Although Rita is prone to pontificate and her academic 
jargon is sometimes mocked in the text, her description of the survival of 
the characters is poignant. In a meeting between Kundera’s Tomas (The	
Unbearable	Lightness	of	Being)	and Austen’s Emma Woodhouse, Brooke-
Rose even stages an acknowledgment that reality and unreality are wed 
in both	“realism” and “postmodernism.” Emma thinks: “Being seems to 
trouble him for some reason, and he calls it unbearably light. And to 
her astonishment she finds herself agreeing. She has never thought of it 
in that way, and it somehow relieves her of the oppressive feeling she 
has had ever since she arrived, that her certitudes are uncertain, that she 
no longer quite exists in them, no longer quite coincides with herself” 
(Textermination 109).
 The most fundamental of literary “faiths” are challenged in the 
novel, including the self-identity of the self that is the basis of character 
in fiction. Not only oblivion but also radical uncertainty threatens the 
characters from within, the death of the subject now part of even Emma 
Woodhouse’s sensibility.4 The intertextual universe of Textermination is 
punningly “mortifying” (Textermination 108, 15) to Emma, who cannot 
count on the weight of nineteenth-century literary convention to anchor 
her survival. In this unstable fictional world, the characters seem to 
defy their own determined futures, living, like the speakers in Amal-
gamemnon, in the “time of their options.” The freedom is dizzying. No 
longer tied to their fated futures, they float, becoming light-headed. Fur-
ther complicating their predicaments are the fashions of critical interest 
and readers’ particular investments. Mira complains to Orion that the 
characters are altered at the convention, depending on the perspectives 
of the critical papers delivered: “So they do change times while here. 
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According to the papers on them I suppose” (Textermination 66). With 
no reliable authors or narrators in sight to help them in their exposure 
to critical fashion, the characters suffer from too much freedom. Brooke-
Rose plays against the “problem” about which characters in modernist 
and postmodernist fiction complain at the iron hand of their respective 
authors (think of Molly Bloom suddenly apostrophizing “Jamesy” to 
“let me up out of this pooh” (Ulysses 633). Instead, the characters in 
Textermination	suffer ontologically from the free-for-all at the convention. 
The rampant metalepsy confuses them even further.
 Perhaps more than her other fictions, Textermination	provides a sig-
nificant corrective to Linda Hutcheon’s blithe enumeration of “prin-
ciples” jettisoned in postmodern fiction, such as “value, order, meaning, 
control, and identity . . . that have been the basic premises of bourgeois 
liberalism” (Hutcheon 13). Textermination	refuses such easy dismissals—
identity, for one, has a stubborn resilience, despite the smart postmodern 
bombs hurled its way. The novel is neither a nostalgic bid to return to 
the good old days of realist fiction and its faithful readers, nor a blithe 
embrace of freedom from form and tradition. It is, rather, a call to recog-
nize fiction’s vulnerabilities and limits and to revitalize fiction’s powers. 
CBR performs CPR on fiction through a number of techniques, including 
intertextuality, one means of reviving both the fittest and the “unfit.” In 
staging the “deaths” that afflict fiction in the twentieth century, para-
doxically, Brooke-Rose revitalizes the genre of the novel. Life after textu-
ality occurs through intertextuality, the living on of the text transformed. 
Like a parody of a Freudian dream in which all generations coexist, the 
novel stages unexpected interaction. The conceit allows Brooke-Rose 
to imagine all sorts of confrontations that implicitly explore, from the 
inside, how genre and convention constrain. Nineteenth-century novels 
habitually punish their convention-breaking heroines—Emma Wood-
house puzzles over Emma Bovary’s actions: “The lady in the fiacre? She 
[Emma Woodhouse] withdraws her arm. She is not leniently disposed. 
But she is struck by a curious query: why has this lady swooned at the 
idea of having swallowed a mouthful of oxblood, yet did not shirk from 
swallowing a good deal more arsenic? Then she pauses in sudden per-
plexity: where has this extraordinary thought come from?” (Textermina-
tion 32). Not only plot but also thought itself is shown to be constrained 
by the historical laws of genre. This is literary criticism conducted in 
fictional form.
 In diagnosing the cultural situation, Brooke-Rose takes aim at readers 
who neglect the literary, a category that includes not only those who no 
longer read or forget what they have read, but those who insist on pass-
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ing literature through the crucible of politics. The danger of confusing 
fiction and politics is represented by the machine-gun packing terrorists 
who search for Gibreel Farishta, Rushdie’s character from The	 Satanic	
Verses. More confining than the author’s authority over the characters’ 
fate, Brooke-Rose seems to say, is the straightjacket of fundamentalist 
readings. The threatened death of the author, Salman Rushdie, serves as 
a symbol of the seriousness of misunderstanding the status of fiction. He 
serves as the emblem of both the power of fiction in the world (“It’s a 
goddamn miracle that fiction still has the power to offend, and maybe 
change things, as it used to,” Rita Humboldt says [Textermination 35]), 
and the tragedy of a too literal confusion of fiction and politics.
 In an essay that addresses precisely the threatened territory Brooke-
Rose covers in Textermination, the threat to the novel and the confusion of 
fiction and politics, Salman Rushdie defends the hybrid reality/unreality 
of the genre of the novel. In “In Defense of the Novel, Yet Again,” Rush-
die responds to a talk delivered by George Steiner which had bemoaned 
the moribund state of the genre of the novel in Europe. Castigating the 
plethora of such obituaries of the novel, Rushdie emphasizes that it is 
precisely its blend of fact and fantasy that ensures its durability: “In my 
view, there is no crisis in the art of the novel. The novel is precisely that 
‘hybrid form’ for which Professor Steiner yearns: It is part social inquiry, 
part fantasy, part confessional; it crosses frontiers of knowledge as well 
as topographical boundaries” (Rushdie 50).	Diagnosing “real” threats to 
the novel, Rushdie says:
There is another real danger facing literature, and of this Professor 
Steiner makes no mention; that is, the attack on intellectual liberty 
itself—intellectual liberty, without which there can be no literature. . . . 
Of the pressures of intolerance and censorship, I have personally, in 
these past years, gained perhaps too much knowledge. . . . The death of 
the novel may be far off, but the violent death of many contemporary 
novelists is, alas, an inescapable fact. In Europe and the United States 
as well, the storm troopers of various ‘sensitivities’ seek to limit our 
freedom of speech. It has never been more important to continue to 
defend those values which make the art of literature possible. (Rushdie 
54–55)
 In their fundamentalism and denial of intellectual liberty, the “storm 
troopers” of sensitivities, the cultural terrorists, are linked by Rushdie to 
political terrorists that put a	fatwa on his life. Textermination	makes such 
connections. Brooke-Rose comes close to the tenor of Rushdie’s belief 
C h a p T e r  7148 |
that fantasy can be trusted to merge with social inquiry in the novel. In 
the unreal/real mix that is Textermination, Brooke-Rose has faith in the 
“business” of fiction (Textermination 35) to conduct cultural critique. In 
an essay entitled “Palimpsest History,” she argues that it is the hybridity 
of the novel, its mixture of the real and the unreal, that is its secret to 
survival amidst the signs of its declining health. In the essay, Rushdie 
serves as an exemplar of what she calls a “palimpsest history,” in which 
there is a mixture of fantasy, reality, and unreality:
But the novel’s task, unlike that of history, is to stretch our intellectual, 
spiritual and imaginative horizons to breaking point. Because palimp-
sest histories do precisely that, mingling realism with the supernatu-
ral and history with spiritual and philosophical reinterpretation, they 
could be said to float half-way between the sacred books of our vari-
ous heritages, which survive on the strength of the faiths they have 
created . . . and the endless exegesis and commentaries these sacred 
books create. . . .5
 Pointing out that this kind of novel that has rejuvenated the novel 
tradition arises from writers outside the Anglophone tradition, Brooke-
Rose emphasizes that the use of fantasy in this hybrid form counteracts 
the “narcissistic relation of the author to his writing” (Textermination 
183). The Intercom Quartet uses the resources of fantasy—prophecy 
that resists predictability, science fiction, the magical appearances and 
disappearances of characters in an intertextual universe—to evoke the 
“real” in a century in which reality has become “unreal.” Both the title 
“Textermination” and	the sudden disappearances of fiction’s phantoms 
are eerily reminiscent of other nontextual exterminations as well as the 
“unreality” that Gertrude Stein identified with the Second World War:
There is no point in being realistic about here and now, no use at all 
not any, and so it is not the nineteenth but the twentieth century, there 
is no realism now, life is not real it is not earnest, it is strange which is 
an entirely different matter. (Stein,	Wars	I	Have	Seen	44)
Yet Brooke-Rose also reminds us that the echo of “extermination” in 
“textermination” is only an echo: If the text mimics “unreal” disappear-
ances in a century gone crazy, the “t” in textermination is neverthe-
less an important sign of a difference between fiction and life that it is 
dangerous to forget. Compelled toward the referential function of fic-
tion, even metafiction, Brooke-Rose nevertheless ends her novel where 
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it began, with the departure of a fictional character. However precari-
ously, she restores to one Emma Woodhouse her unbearable lightness of 
being: “So that Emma found, on being escorted and followed into the 
second carriage by Mr Elton, that the door was to be lawfully shut on 
them, and that they were to have a tête-à-tête drive” (182).6
i l l e d  a s  h e r  “ l a s t  no v e l , ”  Subscript addresses Brooke-Rose’s 
theme of the legibility of being on the grandest of scales—evolution. 
Both science fiction and science theory, the novel traces the vulnerability 
and durability of the record of life from the prokaryote cell 4500 million 
years ago to modern man at the end of the Magdalenian period 11,000 
years ago. In Through	Other	 Continents:	 American	 Literature	 across	Deep	
Time, Wai Chee Dimock ventures to write literary criticism in which she 
“rethink[s] the shape of literature against the history and habitat of the 
human species, against the ‘deep time’ of the planet earth, as described 
by two scientific disciplines, geology and astronomy” (Dimock 6). In 
Subscript, Brooke-Rose writes fiction that attempts to rethink the novel 
on the grand geologic scale of “deep time.”
 In her last novel, Brooke-Rose uses her characteristic present-tense, 
speakerless narrative sentence with a twist: the narrative consciousness 
mirrors evolutionary development, with its diction expanding to include 
new concepts. Subscript	begins in a perpetual present before subjectiv-
ity and singularity. It launches us into a world of material mass. This 
150
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is a daunting challenge for the genre of the novel. We begin the book 
in the world of “stuff,” the sugars and acids of matter, the “sweeties 
and salties and sharpies of glow and burn, of lucent acid, of lime and 
metal and other bitters. Bubbling away” (Subscript 1). Before individual 
cells, before chromosomes, we find ourselves in what has been called 
“the primitive soup.”1 Brooke-Rose’s characteristic “scientific present 
tense” (Invisible	Author 140) takes on added resonance in a text in which 
the subject is science on a grand scale. The challenge is to represent 
the starts and stops of biological development in a “scientific” present 
tense. Science, science fiction, and science theory are playfully fused 
in the use of this constraint in the novel. Studying the “truth” claims 
of relevant science textbooks, Brooke-Rose took copious notes from a 
myriad of texts such as The	Major	Transitions	in	Evolution, which begins: 
“Living organisms are highly complex, and are composed of parts that 
function to ensure the survival and reproduction of the whole”(Smith 
3). Her own archive, housed at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research 
Center at the University of Texas, Austin, includes folders containing 
newspaper clippings and extraordinarily detailed reading notes on the 
biology, botany, physiology, and environment of the millions of years of 
organic development she traces in the novel. Brooke-Rose translates this 
objective scientific present into the fictionalization of life before human 
consciousness, memory, and language. In her use of speakerless present 
tense, science theory (specifically, theories of evolution) is imagined as if 
from inside matter itself: “Inside the acid strand the forever must exist. 
From the waiting, the absorbing, the churning, the growing, the repeat-
ing. For ever. And ever” (Subscript 1). With no “forever and ever, amen,” 
Subscript replaces God with its own creation story. The transformation 
from nucleic acids to proteins to eukaryote cells (cells with nuclei) is fic-
tionalized, as is the “birth” of DNA, the encoding of heredity, out of the 
“forever” of mere replication (“The code is born. The code of behaviour, 
for the bits of many parts, that carries the foreverness. Is the code really 
necessary? For many forevers there’s life without a code, without the 
forever copying of the code and without all these new foodmix workers” 
[Subscript 3]).
 Around the sixth chapter of the novel the organism identifies itself 
as female, although it isn’t until the tenth chapter that males are referred 
to as “they” and the thirteenth chapter that this enduring female con-
sciousness receives the name Aka (Subscript 127). It is Aka who tells us 
that the “point of the story” of the human clan is “[t]o follow birth not 
death. Although many died on the way” (Subscript 153). Subscript can 
be regarded as a tale of Eros or the life-instinct, described by Freud in 
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Beyond	 the	 Pleasure	 Principle as that which “by bringing about a more 
and more far-reaching combination of the particles into which living 
substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life and at the same time, 
of course, at preserving it.”2 Yet although the narrative fundamentally 
traces life, the narrative commitment to follow the trail of life never 
compromises Brooke-Rose’s attention to the threat of textermination, 
the obliteration of both life-forms and their inscriptions. In the high 
stakes game of evolution, the unbearable lightness of being ends in the 
extinction of multiple life-forms along the way. The title Subscript, how-
ever, signals that Brooke-Rose’s concern is not only with the see-saw 
of life and death, the survival and extinction of forms of life, but also 
the record of the evolutionary struggle in its geological, biological, and 
cultural traces. The narrative concerns itself with “life and survival and 
transmission” (Subscript 59). Both the earth and the organism contain 
material traces of absent forms, evidence that biologists, archeologists, 
and, more recently, geneticists have woven into evolutionary theories. 
This is indeed fertile ground for a scholar/novelist like Brooke-Rose.
 Like her other novels which use twentieth-century scientific, techno-
logical, and cultural changes as their premises for new forms of defamilar-
ization, Subscript is fueled by the explosion of genetic discoveries around 
the turn of the twentieth-first century. Combined with new archeologi-
cal findings, these discoveries promise an unparalleled retrieval of the 
human record. These scientific discoveries allow the “signatures” of the 
ancient ancestors of human beings to be read by archeologists, popula-
tion geneticists, and linguists. The dictionary definition of “subscript” 
is (1) “that which is written underneath, a writing at the bottom or end 
of a document, etc.; a signature” and (2) “a subscript letter or symbol.” 
The title resonates throughout the novel. Underwriting all of life is the 
genetic “code,” THE book of memory and forgetting. It provides the 
record of millions of years of organic adaptation and obliteration. DNA 
contains information in which human hereditary is encoded. And, like 
other codes found throughout Brooke-Rose’s fiction, it offers material 
for narrative. The “stories” woven from this material are referred to as 
“code stories,” sometimes accepted and sometimes mistrusted by the 
evolving narrative consciousness:
The tangle of moss and fern hides many animals, mostly the same size, 
and many smaller, that crawl slowly in slime and are good to eat, like 
the others with crackly shells. All rivals, but as food much harder to 
catch than under water, when food simply seemed to float in, whereas 
the activity needed to catch food now is almost unbelievable compared 
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to the still stance and gentle undulations below. But that may be just a 
code story. For the code invents stories about many many warmturns 
past and unknown, often hard to sort out into what the body glimpses 
and what the code lays down.” (Subscript 34)
Explicit references to the “code” disappear almost entirely from the text 
once human consciousness evolves to a certain developmental level. As 
Brooke-Rose told Lorna Sage in an interview, “Incidentally, as my crea-
tures slowly become human, from around chapter 9, the Code vanishes. 
Into their unconscious perhaps. They’re much closer to the genetic code 
as animals or even as cells. This again is fiction.”3 The code becomes 
more internalized as the novel progresses, the “tale of suffering” leaving 
its trace on the organism’s body: “The journey towards the rising light 
takes many many lightturns and many moonturns, imprinted as a tale 
of suffering in every cell of every animal” (Subscript 41).
 To “sort out . . . what the body glimpses and what the code lays 
down” is, indeed, one of the main projects of the narrative. The code 
archive is beyond desire, an unseen dictator whose messages are obeyed 
often unconsciously (“The code is much too busy replicating and recom-
bining, forecasting or at least ordering, to record absolutely everything, 
let alone communicate. But some remains in the body, for the body also 
remembers, even if it forgets that it can remember” [Subscript 30]). Sub-
script extends and expands the record of suffering we have traced from 
its inscription in “The Foot,” in which pain from the phantom limb is 
a constant companion. Brooke-Rose’s texts ring changes on the bodily 
inscription of suffering—in Out, the genetic make-up of the unnamed 
male consciousness has been altered irreversibly by some unspecified 
radioactive event; in Such, the unconscious of the male protagonist is 
indelibly imprinted with the trauma of his death and rebirth; in Thru, 
the text itself is hystericized, its very letters inscribed with the signs of 
trauma and pain (“ruth”); in Xorandor, the “syntax” error programmed 
into Xor 7 endangers human civilization. In Subscript, genetic history is 
the tale that weds survival and suffering. In each of these narratives, 
the writing on the body inscribes and transmits a cultural predicament. 
Suffering and its material traces serve as cultural reminders that guard 
against the “oblitopia” feared in Amalgamemnon. The potential for obso-
lescence and oblivion generalizes from individual consciousnesses, like 
the protagonists of Out, Such, Between, and Thru; Mira in Amalgamem-
non	and Verbivore; Jipnzab in Xorandor; and Emma, Kelly, and the other 
characters in Textermination, to the totality of the human archive. Increas-
ingly, her texts absorb themselves with what Derrida has called “the 
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vulnerability of the effaceable document.”4 Brooke-Rose’s “techniques 
for living” are survival strategies for the genre of the novel, ensuring 
new forms for telling the human story. The lipograms, including the 
linguistic and grammatical constraints in Subscript, help her to defa-
miliarize this story from the point of view of the always threatened 
organism.
 I have suggested earlier that Brooke-Rose’s novelistic pleas to “save 
the text” have personal as well as philosophical import. The necessity 
to maintain the “patience of vigilant language” (to return to Blanchot’s 
phrase) in the face of potential annihilation of the record involves a 
trust between writer and reader, a pledge to use and preserve language 
carefully (and to use careful language). On the one hand, as we have 
seen, Brooke-Rose trusts her novels to fully embody the life of an idea 
as they embed their techniques for living. On the other hand, increas-
ingly, with Stories,	Theories	and	Things,	Invisible	Author, and most recently 
in Life,	End	Of, she has insisted on telling the story of her compositions 
so that its important elements not be overlooked or forgotten. In the 
nonfictional contexts of interviews and essays, she makes visible what 
may have gone unnoticed about her method (in Life,	End	Of, this “intru-
sion” of the invisible author occurs within the memoir itself, in a chap-
ter devoted to the author’s narratorless narrative sentence). As Derrida 
puts it, “The archive is as precarious as it is artificial, and precisely in 
that very place where the signatory puts on guard, appeals, beseeches, 
warns against the risk of whatever might come along as he says ‘to 
annihilate this work.’”(“Typewriter Ribbon” 345). Derrida is speaking 
of prefatory remarks found in the Geneva manuscript of Rousseau’s 
Confessions in which Rousseau “adjures” future readers to “save the 
body of the inscription” (“Typewriter Ribbon” 346). But he is speaking 
generally of an author’s apostrophe to future readers to preserve his 
archive. In regard to Subscript, Brooke-Rose’s own version of this call 
to save the text from textermination is a two-paged chart diagramming 
the method of the novel and providing a note to future translators that 
she has also provided to her literary executor. She enjoins her translators 
not to deviate from the grammatical constraints observed in the original 
as they translate from one language to the other, particularly in regard 
to her use of pronouns. The chart lists chapter number and title, time, 
period, creature, and constraint (see Figure A, pages 172–173). “These 
constraints,” she says in her prefatory note, “must be observed, what-
ever the language translated into,” as the constraints are “subtle and 
invisible” and, therefore, potentially obliterated in translation.5
 What concerns Brooke-Rose the most about translation is the pos-
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sible erasure of her initial refusal to use pronouns and their carefully 
charted appearance as the narrative of Subscript progresses. Why is this 
constraint so important and what is its relation to the continuing the-
matic of the archive? Brooke-Rose’s scrupulous addition of pronouns is 
calibrated to the development of the organism in the genetic archive. 
The pronouns, deliberately omitted from the first three chapters, before 
the appearance of reptiles 300 million years ago, gradually appear in 
sequences tied to what might be called cultural developments (although 
appearing before the advent of human culture). The singular imper-
sonal (“it”) is at first restricted and then appears in chapter 4 to denote 
a sentient entity. In the same chapter the plural impersonal pronoun 
(“they”) surfaces to convey an inchoate, but developing, sense of group 
differentiation. In chapter 8 this differentiation passes to the point of in-
group and out-group feeling—the second person plural (“we”) appears 
to emphasize the social identification among the presimian chimpan-
zees. Possessive pronouns also suddenly appear to denote tribal appro-
priations. Two rare examples of first- and second-person singular (“I” 
and “you”) denote moments of interpersonal relationship. Personal 
pronouns, only in masculine form, occur in the narrative once Homo	
habilis appears in chapter 11. It is not until the emergence of Aka in her 
anatomically modern ancestral guise that feminine pronouns, including 
“she,” appear (chapter 16). As is the case with other formal constraints 
in her work, form mimics content in Subscript. The narrative schema is 
keyed to evolutionary stages. Gradually, with the increasing complexity 
(though not “progress”) of organisms, language evolves, including the 
development of pronouns to stand in for evolving consciousness, social 
grouping, and individuation.
 One of the most interesting byproducts of eschewing impersonal 
pronouns at the beginning of the novel is the formalization of an archive 
unrelated to consciousness or event. And yet, despite the declarative 
statement and precise description of phylogenic detail (“the pack’s eyes 
are set in wider flatter rounder faces and look together out front, sharp-
ening all they see”), the sense of sensation and speculation, rather than 
objectivity and omniscience, reigns: “And after endless forevers, the 
scattered strands of many parts now stretch slowly and reach out to each 
other, though each so different, and try to work together. That’s appar-
ently better than each separately. Strands learn that. Feel the advantage” 
(Subscript 1). Sensation as experienced but not necessarily processed or 
reflected upon by the organism, characteristic of her signature narrative 
sentence in Out, finds its perfect complement in the earliest evolution-
ary stages of Subscript. Here, Brooke-Rose traces what she has described 
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as “the constant impact of outside phenomena on an active but not 
always reflective consciousness” (“Interview,” Invisible Author 154). Just 
as Textermination presents the characters’ eye view of “the dissolution of 
character,” Subscript represents the way the inside feels as it encounters 
an outside. The challenge at the beginning of the narrative is to convey 
immediacy without subjectivity. Although the narrative is “speakerless,” 
the exclamations and interrogatives give the sense of interior language, 
all before the advent of language: “Merely repeating the sequences in 
the acid strand but hardly changing the strands at all. Why change? All’s 
nice down here in the soft hot bubbly. And yet” (Subscript 2). Although 
no one “speaks,” the narrative retains a feel of improvisation and specu-
lation. This speculation mimes both the role of hypothesis in the scien-
tific method and the bewilderment of the organisms who experience a 
kind of continuing present, uncertain of past and future (“Shall we have 
to move? It seems the code was right and we’ve had to move before. 
We haven’t been here for ever after all, it’s not a foreverness” [Subscript 
79]).
 “A fly straddles another fly on the faded denim stretched over the 
knee” (Out 11)—just so Brooke-Rose’s first lipogrammatic novel begins. 
Subscript returns us to a stripped-down world of sensation and primitive 
need. As opposed to the imagination of disaster in the Intercom Quartet, 
even the time of prediction, dread, and hope of Amalgamemnon, in Sub-
script we are meant to experience what it feels like to live in a present 
with no imagined future. Both the postapocalyptic world of Out and 
the prehuman world of Subscript represent the exigencies of basic sur-
vival in relation to the risk of movement. Yet the difference is striking: 
after the nuclear disaster, with its aftermath in a reversal of the color 
bar, the sick white man in Out is immobilized; he fears movement and 
change. “Sooner or later, the knee will have to make a move, but now 
it is immobilized by the two flies, the lower of which is so still that it 
seems dead” (Out 11). Description is careful, precise, joyless, even pain-
ful, as if the wounded human observer envied the flies their stasis and 
lack of consciousness and complexity. In contrast, relying heavily on 
description of the physical environment in the absence of any narrative 
observer, narration in Subscript represents change, despite its obvious 
risks, in joyful, poetic terms:
Zing! Zinging out through the glowsalties the pungent ammonia earth-
farts in slithery clay and all the rest to make simple sweeties and sharp-
ies and other stuffs. Dust out of vast crashes and currents now calmer 
as the crust thickens and all cools a bit.
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Over many many forevers.
Waiting. Absorbing. Growing. Churning. Splitting.
Over and Over (Subscript 1)
 The phrase “What delicious risks” appears in the first chapter, and 
its gesture of welcoming risk and movement, although later balanced 
by homing and burrowing instincts, drives the narrative. Evolution is 
treated as a grand, albeit dangerous, adventure, a master narrative that 
is played from the inside out, with a “zing” of excitement rather than 
the portentousness of a creation story. In my “Discussion with Christine 
Brooke-Rose” (following chapter 10), Brooke-Rose expresses her lack of 
interest in the form of the bildungsroman, which charts the education of 
the protagonist over time and experience. One can think of Subscript	as 
a strange and creative alternative to the genre of the novel of education 
and development and one of the most ambitious diasporic novels ever 
written. It is a “clan tale,” or “Journey from the Setting Sun,” as Aka 
refers to it (Subscript 153). In addition to the regulation of pronouns 
according to the evolving consciousness, other disciplined refusals of 
the traditional comforts of fiction are striking. Stripping fiction of its 
normal technologies, the novel begins at the beginning before	conscious-
ness, character, and language, indeed, in imitation of a point before the 
beginning of time. If Thru begins in metaterritory, warning the reader 
to beware of danger zones, Subscript constrains us to begin in a place 
and time before the comforts of story and storytelling. We witness the 
emergence of story from description, event from summary, a transition 
from the participial continuous present to a present out of which drama 
emerges.
 Indeed, although evolution is the master narrative, emergence itself 
could be said to be the most significant subscript or understory in the 
narrative. For during the course of the story, we get to witness the 
emergence of life, language, time, and story. The text has us consider 
the following: How does life emerge from “stuff,” genes from “junk,” 
complexity and variety from “foreverness” as mere replication (Sub-
script 1); denotation from noise, reference from index, personal pronouns 
from impersonal pronouns, community from individual entities and, 
conversely, subjectivity from tribal identity; two genders from the mas-
culine, and desire from need? Each of these transitions is marked and 
traced in Brooke-Rose’s narrative, as we follow the tracks of material 
processes—accidental, involuntary, murderous, fortuitous, adaptive, and 
resistant. Chance, risk, error, loss, all become part of the story, beginning 
with the “zingy” joy in mudville. The novel subscribes to the scientific 
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theory that evolution is not purposeful, but adaptive; it deliberately 
eschews a teleological narrative with a desired end. The narratorless 
present tense tracing the organism’s perceptions of the body and the 
world conveys how it might feel to be in the midst of bewildering, fas-
cinating change without secure purpose or continuity.
 Beyond the evolution in pronouns, Brooke-Rose captures this sense 
of experiment and accident in her diction. Both in the chart of Sub-
script and her interview with Lorna Sage, she described her semantic as 
well as grammatical constraints: in fictionalizing the sensations of her 
increasingly complex “creatures,” she deliberately confined herself to 
“what they can know” (Invisible	Author 171), “never using a word for 
to-them-non-existent concepts” (see Figure A, pages 172–173). Although 
this constraint might sound pedantic, it generates considerable play in 
the language right from the beginning of the novel, a kind of guessing 
game for the reader that mimics the uncertain hermeneutic gropings of 
the creatures. The semantic constraints are often more noticeable than 
the grammatical, so that we become aware of being subjected to limita-
tions of naming. It is as if we had one hand tied behind our backs as we 
search for clues to the words that describe but do not name. The novel 
begins within a cartoonish, comic, lyric, and exclamatory style. Plea-
sure of a very rudimentary kind is conveyed in the joyful exclamatory 
“zing.” This joyful exclamation is then refined further into an adverb 
describing a certain exuberant feeling (the creature is “feeling zingy” 
[Subscript 13]). (The onomatopoetic language has a faint resemblance 
to the lyrics of Judy Garland’s Trolley Song: “Zing, zing, zing went 
my heartstrings.”) Compound, Anglo-Saxonate words like “earthfarts,” 
“glowsalties,” “warmturns” and “foodrot” capture both the evolution of 
language and the volatile, eruptive and compounding actions and reac-
tions of the earth’s beginnings during the millions of years that marked 
the transition from prebiotic to biotic life. Words agglutinate like par-
ticles. Energetic constructions are formed. Concepts, such as power, are 
described pages before the word itself appears (Subscript 8): “And the 
sweety acids become very active and mingle, pushing others around a 
bit, changing stuffs into other stuffs around the scattered acid strands” 
(Subscript 1–2). The concept of family is evoked before its emergence; 
it is described as “a new inside group feeling, not just a pack feeling” 
(Subscript 63). Instead of naming each new entity, we get descriptions of 
dynamic actions:
Until suddenly, one stick of stuff, or maybe many more, gets enclosed 
by one other.
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Plonk.
Gobbled up. 
It becomes two. One inside the other. (Subscript 3–4)
A nucleus is born when bacteria and host cell connect; the transition 
from prokaryote cell to eukaryote cell occurs in onomatopoetic language 
that might accompany comic book action.6 The term “animation” seems 
more appropriate to this vivid and exuberant language than “anthro-
pomorphism.” The narrative offers a primitive reenactment rather than 
anachronistic comparison between the life of a eukaryote cell and that 
of a human being.
 The scene above in which a nucleus forms is also the first record 
of a singular event; “plonk,” records a specific action that presumably 
happened once after millions of years of (participial) churning, wait-
ing, absorbing. Not only does the nucleus emerge from the prokaryote 
cell, but event emerges from summary. The iterative, simmering “soup” 
gives way to the singularity of a depicted scene as a nucleus forms. 
Something happens. We watch as the narrative rises above the threshold 
at which plot is born. Brooke-Rose’s challenge is to translate the master 
narrative of evolution fictionally both accurately, according to scientific 
evidence, and dramatically in such scenic moments.
 The disparity between the two time sequences of geologic and 
human time is a source of Brooke-Rose’s humor in the text, her title 
page, and her chart. Chapters with the titles “Twenty-five million years 
later” emphasize the ludicrousness of writing a novel, accustomed at 
best to the span of family generations. The joke behind the “dating” 
derives from how bizarre it is to calculate so roughly over such a huge 
span of time. Two “time” sequences govern Brooke-Rose’s chart, two 
types of dating: one sequence that moves forward from the beginning 
(the organism’s trajectory) and one sequence that dates from the present 
back to the past (the paleontologist’s perspective). The chart shows two 
columns of dates—the first, the “Titles” dating forward (4Kmyl) and 
the second, the “Time” dating from the “present” (4500 mya). In zigzag 
formation it is possible to derive a time for one chapter, such as chap-
ter 4 (305–290 mya) by taking the latest “time” of chapter 3 (405–370 
mya) and subtracting the “title” of chapter 4 (65 myl). Brooke-Rose once 
pointed out in conversation the “joke” of the back-dating, the way the 
“present” continually moves but so insignificantly in comparison with 
geologic time that it does not affect the scientific back-dating at all.7
 The more serious side of the disparity between geologic and nov-
elistic time emerges with the thematic of witness and memory. What 
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does it mean to picture, to fictionalize, to imagine an event that took 
place millions of years ago before anyone was there to witness it? How 
is the trace of a moment recorded—materially in the earth and in the 
genes, fictionally in a novel about evolution? What is the bond between 
novel and archive? In “Typewriter Ribbon,” Derrida speculates on a 
recent archeological discovery in France of the “intact cadaver” of an 
insect “surprised by death, in an instant, by a geological or geothermal 
catastrophe, at the moment at which it was sucking the blood of another 
insect, 54 million years before humans appeared on Earth.” Another 
“report” captures the moment of “jouissance” in which two midges 
“made love,” the trace of which is captured in amber. Derrida goes on 
to say:
It is one thing to know the sediments, rocks, plants that can be dated to 
a period when nothing human or even living signaled its presence on 
Earth. It is another thing to refer to a singular event, to what took place 
one time, one time only, in a nonrepeatable instant, like that animal sur-
prised by catastrophe at the moment, at some instant, at some stigmatic 
point of time in which it was in the process of taking its pleasure suck-
ing the blood of another animal, just as it could have taken it in some 
other way, moreover. . . . There are many things on Earth that have been 
there since 54 million years before humans. We can identify them and 
analyze them, but rarely in the form of the archive of a singular event 
and, what is more, of an event that happened to some living being, 
affecting an organized living being, already endowed with a kind of 
memory, with project, need, desire, pleasure, jouissance, and aptitude to 
retain traces. (Derrida 331)
It is this kind of dramatization of event, perception, choice, and accident 
that Brooke-Rose fictionalizes when she translates evolutionary theory 
into a narrative of evolution, prehistory into novelization. The chal-
lenge she sets for herself is how to capture the project, need, pleasure, 
and aptitude that predates mankind, how to localize desire in a living 
instrument of perception and information before mammalian conscious-
ness exists. The tension between what Genette calls the iterative and 
the singular is exaggerated in a plot that extends over almost 4500 mil-
lion years. In this kind of text, the words “until” and “suddenly” work 
overtime:
until suddenly, one stick of stuff, or maybe many more, gets enclosed 
by one other. (Subscript 3)
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Until at last, after many unwelcoming bays and more egg scatterings 
and losses, the exhausted creatures enter a quieter, a warmer sea. (Sub-
script 18)
Until the offspring, suddenly as soon as adult, disappear. (Subscript 28)
Suddenly, before any answers can possibly be given, if meant to be 
given, the lake disappears. Well, perhaps it’s still there underneath, 
if waters can flow on top of each other without mixing. (Subscript 54)
Perceptions are increasingly localized in the consciousness of the organ-
ism, but we are unsure if the “event” summarizes a million-year process 
or represents an exemplary moment in time. We cannot always distin-
guish between a sudden perception of an action that occurred thousands 
of years ago (such as the disappearance of the lake) and a potentially 
mistaken perception (the lake might not have disappeared but may 
remain underneath the land). Although deictics (here, there, now, then) 
increasingly represent a located consciousness perceiving the world, 
what do these words actually represent on such a vast historical and 
geographical scale?
 As Richard Fortey writes in Life:	An	Unauthorised	Biography:	A	Natu-
ral	History	of	the	First	Four	Thousand	Million	Years	of	Life	on	Earth (a book 
Brooke-Rose consulted in writing Subscript), there are enormous dif-
ficulties in writing the “story” of evolution, specifically, in relating one 
discovery to another over so many millions of years. How can a story 
of life be told that depends upon some causal connections, when the 
novel covers such a huge swath of time and space? Fortey refers to 
a putative description by Isaac Newton in which Newton “described 
his sampling of phenomena from the physical universe as a kind of 
beachcombing, where by he could pick up only the brightest shells that 
caught his eye from an infinite litter on the strand.”8 (“And as to mon-
ster predators,” the narrative tells us in Subscript, “that’s another story 
or part of the same story, about huge scaly animals as tall as trees that 
ruled everywhere, destroying every forest and all smaller animals as 
they went” (Brooke-Rose, Subscript 74). What does the locution, “that’s 
another story,” mean in the narrative of evolution? Fortey goes on to 
say that “all stories need a chronology. Geological time is paradoxical 
and difficult. The further back in time we go the more obscure are the 
events, the less certain the narrative” (Fortey 27). If we go back 3500 
million years ago, “the possibility for aligning an event in one part of 
his world with that in another might be askew by some millions of 
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years. . . . The past is continually erased, and the record of the most 
distant time survives only by a chain of minor miracles” (Fortey 27–28). 
How can discoveries of life-forms millions of years and thousands of 
miles apart be knitted into a continuous narrative? Brooke-Rose follows 
current evolutionary theory in refusing to view evolution as progress 
toward the creation and development of man. Indeed, she deliberately 
works against the pressure toward “development,” exerted by both the 
genre of the novel and an androcentric understanding of evolution.
 In her attempted fidelity to scientific theory, Brooke-Rose tries to 
capture the nonprogressive and discontinuous elements as part of the 
archive. In later sections of the novel, she represents both the simulta-
neity of development of life-forms in different places and the disap-
pearance of species not in the direct line of descent of man. Hominids 
encounter each other in tribes and possess a rudimentary historical 
consciousness of concurrent development that has occurred in different 
places over long periods. Indeed, the explicit emergence of storytell-
ing as an activity in chapter 14 allows for acknowledgment of other 
tribes and clans, predecessors whose lives continue in language. The 
role of storytelling accelerates with the European migration in chapter 
16. Stories of how various clans arrived in Europe and encountered one 
another circulate throughout the narrative, providing conjectures about 
the movements of the Paleolithic populations of Europe.
 In a new rhetoric of the unreal, storytelling transmits stories of the 
extinct as well as the dead. Near the end of the novel, storytelling brings 
with it a whiff of the future, as the traveler brings stores of astonishing 
cultural developments from afar (a displacement from time to space). 
However, in the early sections of the novel the code allows for recogni-
tion of the gaps, accidents, errors, and unsuccessful adaptations that 
mark the story of evolution. It serves as the book of forgetting as well as 
memory: “The code may be a present memorial to ancient memory but 
never explains anything at the time. Or very little. . . . The code is much 
too busy replicating and recombining, forecasting or at least ordering, to 
record absolutely everything, let alone communicate. But some remains 
in the body, for the body also remembers, even if it forgets that it can 
remember. The body knows that it has landgear, like others. Even those 
mottled monsters with vast long bodies and tiny legs had that. Of a 
sort. But they didn’t survive. Or else went elsewhere” (Subscript 30). 
The code serves as an explanatory fiction for the creatures who proj-
ect intention, carelessness, and neglect onto the code, as each creature 
tries to understand its place in the chain of biologic development: “A 
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huge deep envy of erectness, carried in some ancient memory lost by 
the careless code, ripples through the entire group of smaller kin scat-
tered all over the landmass” (Subscript 36). “The frail memory of erect-
ness hovers and is gone” (Subscript 48). Erectness envy, so to speak (the 
double entendre occasionally surfaces) is one of the persistent, if fragile, 
memories retained in the body, a remnant saved for future use. In this 
way, Brooke-Rose represents chance and adaptation. The acknowledg-
ment is sometimes explicit, as when we come across the line “something 
unassimilable has occurred” (Subscript 23). Or it appears in the thoughts 
of the creatures: “Why are these changes never explained?” one of the 
creatures thinks. “They just happen, and the body somehow adapts to 
them” (Subscript 46). In Amalgamemnon, modal possibilities are proposed 
and entertained; in Subscript, the speculation of roads not taken are 
called “intimations of other versions” (Subscript 73). The theme of traces 
found throughout Brooke-Rose’s fiction meshes with evolutionary the-
ory, as disappearance requires detective work by creature and reader 
alike: “Impossible to know for sure now exactly where the sea was 
or wasn’t, unless the plants still taste too salty” (Subscript 41). “Some 
movement in the code intimates that they’ve [the huge ones] vanished 
from everywhere, for good” (Subscript 72). “[L]iterature is full of loose 
ends,” Brooke-Rose points out, comparing it to evolution (“Interview” 
Invisible	Author 170). Like the characters who disappear suddenly from 
the narrative of Textermination, we gain and lose organisms throughout 
Subscipt.
 In the evolutionary context of Subscript, the threat of obsolescence 
found in Brooke-Rose’s novels takes on added meaning. From the sick 
white man in Out, “out” of a job after the color reversal, to Mira Enketei, 
the soon to be out of work classicist, to the out of work characters in 
the texts of Textermination, Brooke-Rose concerns herself fictionally with 
redundancy, obsolescence, and use. In Subscript, the theory of adaptive 
use is often fictionalized in terms of the labor required by the organism. 
Sentences describing chimps becoming bipedal echo other examples in 
her fiction of the perceived need to be useful: “Using the backlegs for 
long, however, is very painful, and tiring. The legs ache, especially in 
the ankles and behind the knees, and even all the way up the back of the 
neck. Because the head shoots forward. It hurts less if we force the head 
and shoulders backwards, but then that hurts too, in the back. Why do 
we try so hard if it hurts so? Something must be driving us. The desire 
to be different perhaps. Or the need to see about the high thin shag, 
what animals are lurking there” (Subscript 93). These detailed descrip-
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tions of the difficulty of ordinary physical labor reappear in Brooke-
Rose’s final memoir, Life,	End	Of, with the poignancy and irascibility of 
old age.
 Although teleology is eschewed, the narrative at various points con-
siders the relationship between chance and labor in the phenomena of 
emergence, when something changes into something else, either gradu-
ally or in a sudden “plonk.” In these often contradictory instances, alter-
native explanations are entertained dialogically, without resolution; a 
single occurrence suggests the possibility of a drive toward increasing 
complexity and the counterforce of chance and lack of purpose:
As if the code, or some superior mastercode of the code, were directing 
everything towards more and more interlocking dependencies.
 That’s impossible. There’s too much slapdash workmanship and 
sloppiness in the acid strings to see any kind of purpose in it all, or 
why all these living creatures couldn’t just have remained sticksful of 
stuff. Which no living animal can do without. Says the code. (Subscript 
46)
Evolutionary debates surface in the interior musings of the creatures 
as well as in the representation of successive life species. Stafania 
Cassar writes in “Science as Post-Theory? Discourses of Evolution in 
Christine Brooke-Rose’s Subscript,” that Brooke-Rose studied both neo-
Darwinian theories of evolution (that it is nonteleological and mechani-
cal) and vitalist theories that suggests the organism’s inner drive toward 
increasing complexity.9 Despite the fact that Brooke-Rose does not list 
Bergson’s Creative	Evolution as one of her twenty-seven sources for the 
novel, Cassar applies Bergson’s theories in Creative	Evolution to the sense 
of the increasing development of consciousness in Subscript. Although 
Cassar is more interested in the specifics of the evolutionary debate than 
is relevant to the present discussion, the vitalism in Bergson, like the 
idea of some kind of life force in Freud, is indeed apposite to Brooke-
Rose’s novelistic representations. Uninterrupted progress and design 
are contradicted in the novelization of evolutionary theory; however, 
the evolving consciousness of Brooke-Rose’s creatures does suggest the 
organism’s deliberate and deliberative internal quest to thrive. Cassar 
sees this as evidence that Brooke-Rose “resurrects and represents this 
suppressed ‘other’ of evolutionary discourse [directionality and pur-
pose], thus contesting the assumptions and structures of thought under-
lying the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution” (Cassar 203). Rather than 
viewing the representation of both chance and interior consciousness 
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as an intervention in evolutionary debate, however, I believe Brooke-
Rose was more interested in the way theoretical debates can “translate” 
creatively into fiction. Subscript	represents what a theory of chance and 
adaptation would feel like on the inside if the organism increased its 
awareness of its own sensations. Would there not be an inner need to 
believe that one’s labor effected change? What would it feel like, Brooke-
Rose seems to ask, if a creature were to experience emergences on its 
very pulses, in its perceived sensations and increasing abilities to inter-
pret these changes?
 The pathways of the pronouns play a significant role in the writing 
of evolutionary theory charting the increasingly sophisticated cultural 
intimations of like and unlike creatures, including gender formation. 
The pronoun “we” measures the development of a sense of community 
based on identity and difference. A choral feeling emerges, particularly 
apparent in apostrophic questions like “Shall we have to move?” (Sub-
script 79). Brooke-Rose notes two “exceptions” to the refusal of the pro-
nouns “you” and “me” (I found three, on pages 76, 77, 81).
Yes, we can look into each other’s eyes, and exchange meanings and 
deep appreciation of each other’s beauty and being. You, me, the eyes 
say. (Subscript 76)
Sometimes we stare at each other from different trees, as if to start up 
play, but they seem both friendly and unfriendly. We know you, they 
seem to say, we’re like you but you’ve grown away, for your own good 
reasons, so we’ll keep our distance. (Subscript 77)
We know you, they signal with their tails. And we have to signal the 
same back, not with our tails since we have none, but with heads shak-
ing side to side. (Subscript 81)
Issues of identity frighten the tribe of presimian chimps as they confront 
“a large, stout kin animal, still with tail and more fur”:
We’re all left oddly upset. Us. Not us. Shall we turn into anything like 
that? Or were we like that before? Or is it one of us, gone beserkly 
wrong? Vulgar even. Or beserkly right. It was very alluring. (Subscript 
81)
The few uses of the first-person singular (“I” and “me”) develop the 
scene of interpersonal recognition and confirm the speech mode. The 
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greater refinement of identity and identification intensifies with the 
emphasis on sex and gender that begins in chapter 10. The conscious-
ness represented is clearly gendered female (as opposed to earlier 
descriptions of the female sex): “But many feel completely settled here, 
especially the females. Each of us belongs to one male who willingly 
goes off seeking fleshfood while we collect sweet fat roots and stalks 
and berries to go with it or feed our young under the few trees, or just 
sit and break stones” (Subscript 99).10 From this point on, the narrative 
is “inside one female per chapter,” as Brooke-Rose has said (Invisible	
Author 170), although Aka is not named until chapter 13. Again, the 
development of pronouns plays an important role in the representation 
of cultural evolution, with possessive pronouns (male only—“he/his/
him” in chapter 11), entering into the narrative. The sudden appearance 
of these possessive pronouns signals the more monogamous culture in 
which the female belongs to one male, part of a tribe with one male 
chief: “The owner male stays behind, with his young supporters and 
their females, who treat him as the new chief” (Subscript 117).
 The invention of language is attributed to the females of the species, 
demonstrated first implicitly by the increasing interest the female con-
sciousness takes in the practice of naming. It begins with the female’s 
sense of the need to communicate while working together: “But there’s a 
great need to exchange pictures and feelings behind our eyes. About the 
shape of stones” (Subscript 108). The practicality governing the develop-
ment of language, however, is clearly superseded by the sheer joy the 
female takes in making and exchanging noises:
But there’s more to it than just a different kind of noise. The real fun 
is to attach a noise to a doing, and then to remember it. And have 
everyone else remember it. So we break a stone and utter E from the 
depth of the throat as we break. . . . And we soon discover that if the 
mouth closes suddenly it stops the voice, and if it opens again at once 
the breath continues but without the voice, P, P, P. . . . Some get discour-
aged. There are so many bits of any doing and so many doings and not 
enough noises. (Subscript 108–9)
Increasingly, the females recognize their own superiority with language 
and they regard speech as the province of women. The women keep their 
secret pleasure (and skill) from the males. Sometimes these communica-
tion skills are buried for millennia as cultural reversion occurs. Later, 
there is a distant memory among the females of a past that included 
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more sophisticated language: “Yet here, with some of the females from 
the old tribe, in our eyes, when we sometimes try to utter as we work 
and look at each other, there is a strangely anguished story exchanged, 
of how some of our ancestors invented something very exciting and 
somehow it came to nothing. How can that be?” (Subscript 120). With-
out the more highly developed language of the past, the sense of time 
has diminished (“Most of them can’t follow, can’t even distinguish now 
from always” (Subscript 122). The chief does offer speech (“So the other 
thing the chief has to say comes out soon after, in more noises and ges-
tures. Tribe up” (Subscript 125), but the female creature, now a member 
of the species Homo	erectus, realizes inchoately that the group has “long 
forgotten how to link noises to so many things, and we’ve never learnt 
to link noises to each other” (Subscript 125).
 By chapter 13 (seven hundred thousand years later), males have 
learned to appropriate speech, as in Amalgamemenon: “The meeting 
has gone on almost since lightrise. But then, males do so enjoy hear-
ing males make speech” (Subscript 127). The female story has it that 
females “invented language,” and then “the males discovered it and 
took it over and thoroughly improved and complicated it” (Subscript 
127). Comically, Brooke-Rose describes, without naming, the competi-
tive masculine behavior of interrupting one another:
And they do this to each other too, never letting one male finish but 
barging in with a louder voice so that both are making noises at the 
same time and no one can hear either of them till one of them stops, 
always the one with the softer voice. Unless the chief speaks, then all 
are silent.
 Perhaps it’s our fault, because we teach them to talk in the first 
place, when they’re very young, and maybe we don’t do it well enough. 
(Subscript 128–29)
Females become the storytellers, the ones who sing the young to sleep 
with myths and stories (“But also because we tell stories. And sing our 
very young to sleep. In songs that tell stories” [Subscript 129]). Even so, 
it is Gedem, the male master of stonework, who becomes a wordmaster, 
inventing “small link noises” and with them, plot itself: “IF one thing 
or doing, THEN another. Or WHEN one thing or doing, THEN another. 
After all that’s what we do all the time, whether preparing to mate or 
skinning an animal or, surely, hunting and foraging. What’s hard is to 
remember the noises for it. But even the slow ones grasp this link and 
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learn to use it. In fact this kind of linking seems easier than learning to 
link noises to things and doings” (Subscript 135).
 As in her other novels, in Subscript Brooke-Rose explicitly attends 
to questions of grammar. Tenses, possessives, pronouns, plurals—the 
increasing conceptual sophistication of the Homo erectus—is tracked in 
descriptions of grammar without benefit of grammatical terms. Take, for 
example, the description of tenses and iterative versus singular verbs: 
“he adds noises to the noises for the doings, when single or several, or 
when done, or being done, or still to be done, or not done at all. But 
that’s very hard to grasp” (Subscript 136). As always in Brooke-Rose, the 
concept of absence is both fruitful and elusive. Despite the importance 
of Gedem, women are the Wordwomen (Subscript 176) and language 
teachers (Subscript 191) (as they are the prophets in Amalgamemnon and 
translators in Between). In chapter 16, the history of modern man detours 
into the story of Neanderthal culture, the species once thought to be a 
stage in human development, only to have been exposed as a detour 
from, not a point on, the adaptive path. A captivity narrative, the chap-
ter charts the capture and rape of the female ancestor of modern humans 
by the Neanderthals (a variant of the history as told by Herodotus). 
In chapter 17, the disappearance of the Neanderthal is the subject of 
a “clan congress” on the European landmass. Baludin, the male host 
of the meeting, explains the disappearance in proto-Darwinian terms, 
speaking of the better organization and better instincts for survival in 
the humans. Aka protests the cold and calculating description of the 
extinction of the Neanderthals (as their forced captive in chapter 16, 
“she” senses something close to humanity in them). Brooke-Rose has 
fun ending the chapter on a note of protoimperialism, the will to live 
fast becoming, in the rhetoric of the leader, “the will to better ourselves. 
The will to conquer the world” (Subscript 187).11
 In the two final chapters of the novel, art and travel, also male activi-
ties, provide a counterpart to this imperialism. In both, Aka longs to 
have the freedom available to the male of the species, particularly the 
freedom to imagine and represent what does not exist in the small world 
she inhabits. Again, the attraction is to something not yet there; specu-
lation and alternative possibilities are theorized. In various permuta-
tions, the female longs to consider what is beyond experience, what 
does not yet exist, in the form of art, fantasy, dreams, and the future 
(a proto-Brooke-Rose!). In the penultimate chapter, which takes place 
20,000 years ago, the woman follows Bitarzute, the artist, into his cave to 
watch him paint. Discovered at the entrance of the “sacred cave,” she is 
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forbidden to enter it; Bitarzute, “the magic imager” assumes that she has 
followed him because she is seeking sex. After having sex with her, he 
abandons her to return to his work and expects her to leave. Instead, she 
secretly watches him paint. And what she sees is the delight in creation 
that has stalked Brooke-Rose’s women protagonists throughout her nov-
els: “He wails and yells to the hammering rhythm like a woman at peak. 
It’s breathtaking. It’s godmade. It’s alive” (Subscript 194). Somehow, Aka 
understands the immortality of art, its quickness, the way it continues 
to live. She steals back into the cave and paints on the wall, a woman’s 
hand: “leaving its other self on the wall as a pale hand on a red wall. It 
lives! It stares out, fascinated. It’s much better than the fish” (Subscript 
196). The artists reach for something expressive, something imperfectly 
understood, something not already there.
 In the final chapter, an Odysseus-like foreign traveler comes from 
the East to tell of distant places and more advanced societies, a time-
traveler of sorts who predicts the future for the clan because he has 
seen it. He tells of homesteading “a plot by the women to keep us from 
moving” (Subscript 202), and presents a verbal picture of agriculture and 
domesticity, with all that attends these developments—territoriality and 
nationalism, animals as beasts of burden, labor-saving devices, diseases, 
medicine. The traveler leaves the clan but his words haunt them, “The 
mind can only feel and hear his vibrant but now absent presence” (Sub-
script 210). A new Aka longs to see the inside of the Sacred Cave and 
plumb the mysteries of art generated by the male image makers. She 
tries to pump the male artist, Izuri, for information on the images he has 
created on the walls of the Sacred Cave. The Basque name locates the 
final scene in a region of Europe dotted with ancient caves that shelter 
painted records of these ancient civilizations. Ironically, the novel ends 
with Aka in the Sacred Cave only by virtue of a life-threatening fall into 
its darkness. She loses, and then briefly regains, consciousness. With 
broken bones and in great pain, she hovers at the edge of consciousness, 
so that the concept of time, so hard-won over millions of years of homi-
nid development, slips back, through the intrusion of bodily agony, into 
the “foreverness” with which the book began. Aka can momentarily see 
the cave paintings with the help of an impromptu lamp she creates. She 
feels some disappointment in the lack of imagination she perceives in 
the paintings. She thinks, “From the way Itzuri talked we all imagined 
flaming red bulls charging and orange horses galloping and fish flying 
and birds swimming, well, rock can be air or water or anything” (Sub-
script 214). The novel ends with what seem like feverish hallucinations 
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that transform the art into another rhetoric of the unreal, the marvelous. 
On the wall, monsters appear with “two heads, a woman’s head and a 
bison’s head,” and then she fades out of consciousness imagining the 
future of her clan fulfilling the terrifying vision of the traveler, with 
“hordes and hordes of wheat-rearers and animal-tamers invading the 
huge forestless plain, the entire landmass, growing grains and greens 
and fruits and lambs and pigs and horses and having endless offspring 
and living happily ever after” (Subscript 215). In pain (“Every move 
means pressing on the left leg”), the woman presumably dies alone in 
the Sacred Cave, ironically able to view what she has longed to see, only 
on the eve of her death. In this grand hallucination domesticity as well 
as domestic fiction (“reader, I married him”) are predicted.
 Aka’s hallucinatory vision at the end of the novel is only one form in 
which Brooke-Rose yet again expands her rhetoric of the unreal, giving 
fictional life to the categories of the nonexistent. The grand narrative of 
evolution provides her with the opportunity to represent the unreal in 
different forms (with an eye to potentially different genres, from the fan-
tastic to the detective story to the horror story). Subscript is the archive 
of the dead, the extinct, the vestigial (forms that continue but have lost 
their function); the disappeared (forms whose sudden disappearance is 
experienced as loss but whose fate is unknown); the monstrous (earlier 
forms preserved in storytelling as horror stories (“They have mouths 
like crevices between huge rocks and teeth as tall as small fish. Still, 
that too may be the code indulging in frightening stories, rather than 
regretful ones, to justify that long journey” [Subscript 34]). Traces haunt 
the living, in the material archive of anthropology and genetics and in 
Brooke-Rose’s novel of evolution. As Henri Bergson wrote in Creative	
Evolution, “The act by which we declare an object unreal therefore pos-
its the existence of the real in general. In other words, to represent an 
object as unreal cannot consist in depriving it of every kind of existence, 
since the representation of an object is necessarily that of the object 
existing.”12 In representing the unreal, Brooke-Rose breathes life into 
evolutionary theory, representing the unbearable lightness of being on 
the massive scale of the history of life itself. Suffering and survival, 
life and death, are part of the same archive. If Xorandor focuses on the 
unreality of the real in the nuclear politics of the twentieth century, Sub-
script catalogues the reality of the unreal. In her interview with Lorna 
Sage, Brooke-Rose says, “I believe experimenters like me are doomed 
to die and be forgotten, but that something of the technique survives, 
or seeps through, without later users even knowing it. . . . It’s true that 
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experimenters often get ignored or forgotten for the mainstream. I’m a 
duck-billed platypus, and hope my beak will somehow develop in new 
birds” (Invisible	Author 178). The “Invisible Author” of Subscript	experi-
ences her own lightness of being and potential extinction, a possible fate 
her novel is intended to prevent.
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sinc e  1996,  B r oo k e - r o s e  has produced three “remakes” of her own life, turning and returning to the theme of the archive of her 
life and work. Although her previous novels fictionalized aspects of 
her own autobiography, three valedictory addresses, Remake, a fictional 
autobiography (1996), Invisible	Author:	Last	Essays (2002), and Life,	End	
Of (2006) engage her “techniques for living” in the project of looking 
back at life. All three texts make the invisible author visible: Remake, a 
work of “memesis” that mixes memory and invention; Invisible	Author, 
a series of critical essays on her writing practices and the state of narra-
tive criticism (which I have cited throughout); and Life,	End	Of, which 
Brooke-Rose describes as “a therapeutic memoir.”1 Realizing she is on 
the verge of extinction, the duck-billed platypus attempts to theorize 
and fictionalize her life and life’s work.
	 Invisible	Author begins, “Have you ever tried to do something very 
difficult as well as you can, over a long period, and found that nobody 
notices? That’s what I’ve been doing for over thirty years” (Invisible	
Author 1). In these three autobiographical texts, Brooke-Rose takes her-
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self as experimental subject, expanding and explaining her archive 
simultaneously. Yet in attempting to make visible what has gone unno-
ticed and set the record straight, these three texts come to terms with the 
fragility of the archive. “Official” memory reflected in literary tradition, 
the “Dow Jones Index of Authors” (Remake 13) is mercurial, with the 
authors’ stocks rising and falling. Indeed, for an experimental novelist 
like Brooke-Rose, age, sex, and nationality conspire to ensure her invis-
ibility (“Ending up as a harmonious Houyhnhnm, invisible as old, as 
woman, as English to the French and vice versa, as offbeat novelist bark-
ing up the wrong tree . . .” (Remake 169). Likewise, personal retrospection 
is subject to chance. Adumbrating her evolutionary subject in Subscript, 
she writes in Remake: “Chance, evaded by the human sciences imposing 
pseudo-systems, is at the heart of biology, of life. Memory is unique, 
random and fragile, like life, and like life dies for ever” (Remake 171).
 Exploring the similarities and differences between the storage of 
memories in a computer and the human brain in Remake, Brooke-Rose 
plays on the anagram of “file” and “life,” with each of the eleven chap-
ters labeled a “file.” Who and what survive the cut, which “files” are 
saved and which are lost—these are questions that continue to absorb 
her. Characteristically unsentimental and impersonal even in her most 
autobiographical writing, Brooke-Rose nonetheless attempts to ensure 
her own survival. As always in her writing, technique combats texter-
mination, as “something of the technique survives, or seeps through” 
(Invisible	Author 178). The author of A	Grammar	of	Metaphor, the narra-
tologist who loves to grapple with the formation of narrative sentences, 
applies grammatical analysis to her own life; self-confrontation is the 
encounter of subject and object, passive and active.
 In Remake and Life,	 End	 Of, Brooke-Rose sets for herself the diffi-
cult and paradoxical task of looking back in the present tense. In both, 
she applies her signature narrative constraint, her impersonal present 
tense Narrative Sentence (NS), to her own life. Described elsewhere 
by Brooke-Rose as an “objectified narratorless mode” which “not only 
privileges the time of story over the time of discourse but, more con-
cretely, never lets this central consciousness say ‘I’ except in dialogue” 
(Invisible	Author 58), Brooke-Rose’s signature impersonal narrative sen-
tence is used to test the limits of what I would call her technique of 
“impersoning.” Remake begins, “The black car limousines along the 
colonnade. . . . The viewer, an old lady of seventy-two, has professed 
literature, for twenty years as teacher in a Paris University but for forty 
years as writer, retired to Provence” (Remake 1). As she acknowledges 
in her chapter “Remaking” in Invisible	Author, the genre of the fictional 
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autobiography is not in itself unusual; “most autobiographical novels 
are written in the third person with a fictional name, or even with ‘I’ 
and a fictional name. Indeed, most novels use autobiographical mate-
rial, far more so than I have ever done” (Invisible	Author 57). What is 
different about Remake as a fictional autobiography, however, is the 
use of grammatical constraints to further distance the writing from the 
writer, the dancer from the dance. In Remake	she ups the ante in the use 
of her constraint on the first person pronoun “I” in two ways. Except 
for one chapter that includes a diary entry about her mother’s death, 
she eschews all personal pronouns and possessives in her text. Without 
possessives, the notion of self-belonging, of self-possession is called into 
question. Second, the self as object, as well as subject, is constrained 
because pronominalization of the self is disallowed. Without pronouns 
for the self, no secure substitution principle underwrites self-confronta-
tion as it does with the reflexivization in a common phrase like “the girl 
saw herself.” Bizarrely, in a novel about something as intimate as one’s 
own life, in which the self confronts itself in writing, we are deprived 
of the familiarity of pronouns.
 The title of the novel, “Remake,” also reminds us of the distance 
between the self and its composition in writing, the writer and her writ-
ing. It emphasizes the image-making process in life-writing, the distance 
between the life lived and the making of an image of the self in which 
memory, desire, and invention are fused. The self-described genre of this 
writing exercise is “bifografy” (Remake 11). The author is fictionalized as 
a writer, “an old lady of seventy-two” (Remake 1), with multiple appel-
lations signaling her different selves at different stages, including “the 
little girl” and the proper name Tess Blair-Hayley. The old lady peruses 
the “files” of her own life in order to write her life story at the sugges-
tion of her publisher. The novel presents scenes from various stages: 
the protagonist first as a little girl shuttled between Geneva, London, 
and Brussels; Tess as a young woman during wartime, serving as an 
intelligence officer at Bletchley Park, then briefly married to an English 
officer named Ian, and still later, married to a Polish poet named Janek; 
Tess as a daughter experiencing her mother’s entrance into a convent at 
age fifty and the mother’s subsequent death; Tess as a doctoral student 
in her forties at the University of London, later offered a job to teach 
at a university in Paris. In fictional form, these elements of plot adhere 
to the events of Christine Brooke-Rose’s life. The name “Tess” evokes 
the layered, textured, even tactile nature of the self remade: “only a 
name [Tess] and memory can tesselate and texture all those different 
beings . . .” (Remake 41).
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 But another author surrogate appears prominently in the narrative, a 
surrogate who, like the name “Tess,” captures the multiplicity of selves 
that make up the subject and object of the writing. Brooke-Rose calls this 
author surrogate “John,” after the classic, masculine proper noun that 
Noam Chomsky uses to illustrate the rules of transformational grammar. 
At the end of the novel, Tess explicit refers to Chomsky’s “rule of reflex-
ivization.” In a final chapter in which the selves of the protagonist turn 
dialogic, Tess tells the old lady that she understands that “John began 
as a Chomsky rule about reflexivization” (Remake 165). This confirms the 
old lady’s thoughts at the beginning of the novel about the techniques 
of fiction, specifically the grammar of most autobiographies: “Clearly 
grammar supports self-confrontation. John1 confronts John1. The rule 
of reflexivization requires a coreferentially repeated Noun Phrase in 
the deep structure to become pronominalized” (Remake 3). The prob-
lem confronting the old lady, however, is that “the entities are not of 
equal status and stature, the confronter is a speck in time compared 
to the army of confrontable selves.” In other words, pronominaliza-
tion is impossible because “[g]rammar doesn’t say how many Johns or 
how many selves (and what colour), or whether some past Johns are 
confronting one present John or one present John is confronting one or 
all or a selection of past Johns” (Remake 3). Thus John doesn’t confront 
“himself”: he confronts a host of other “Johns.” The different “Johns” are 
assigned subscripts: John13, “the litcritter” (Remake 11); John, the “light-
ing engineer” (Remake 52); John21, the “script-writer” (Remake 65); John45, 
the “focus-puller” (Remake 52).
 In an essay that anticipates the novelistic treatment of the writer in 
Remake, entitled “Self-Confrontation and the Writer,” published in 1977, 
Brooke-Rose discusses Chomsky’s transformational grammar and his 
illustrative uses of “John.” John functions as the names for the split 
selves of the writer (habitually masculinized, as in many of theory’s 
illustrative examples). It is in this essay that she links her own emer-
gence as a writer with her discovery of the importance of grammar 
and grammatical constraint. She says she became a writer only after 
she “learned the rules” and after she wrote four ordinary novels.”2 The 
name “John” signals the crucial role that grammar plays in Brooke-
Rose’s texts. As in A	Grammar	of	Metaphor, where grammatical analysis 
provides a new way to think about metaphor in English poetry, Remake 
finds in grammar the generative principle for enlivening the genre of 
autobiography. What is the grammar of the self?
 First, in Brooke-Rose’s hands, the self and the other are not clearly 
separable. Brooke-Rose dismantles autobiography’s conventional split 
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between the self and the world, its convention of tracing the self as 
either acting on the world or being acted upon by others. Instead, 
“John” stands for both the writing selves and the significant “mentors” 
and “tormentors” who helped form that self. Because all “others” are 
seen through the fog of memory in autobiography (or “bifografy”) and 
“memory is necessarily self-centred” (172), “other people are fogs, alter 
ego et galore. . . . In memory all the parts are played by actors called 
John, in self-confrontation” (172). Because in the genres of biography 
and autobiography, others cannot be known from the inside (as they can 
in fiction), the name “John” stands for all the important actors in Tess’s 
life who have played a role in constructing her. The usage is explained 
in the text: “Bifografy’s like that. Can’t invent, can’t be free to go inside. 
All the main characters male or female, the mentors, are called John, for 
that reason” (165). All the “mentors” and “tormentors” in her life share 
some form of the name John: her mother, Jeanne, her sister Joanne, her 
husbands Ian and Janek, her aunt Vanna (Giovanna), a cousin Jean-Luc.3 
In a play on the Academy Awards show or This	Is	Your	Life (television’s 
habitual remaking of images plays a central role in the novel), the old 
lady thinks, “There are so many others to confront . . . executive pro-
ducer, director, and innumerable others contributing to the life remade 
alter ego et galore. . . .” (13).
 Finally, the name “John” stands for the possibilities and constraints 
of language itself. Grammar, like a computer, is a system of opened 
and closed gates. Emphasizing the infinite possibilities for John before 
he is dispatched into grammar, the old lady thinks: “John is whole lan-
guages. John has as many selves as utterances, virtual or realized, as 
many selves as there are words in lexicons, each word an aetiology, 
a phoneyetic fragility, with semiantic seachanges, infinite contiguities 
and tall spokes of paradismatic possibilities. John is the excitement, the 
pursuit of knowledge, the donor with the magical auxiliary, an eagle, a 
flying horse, an invisibility ring” (3).4 A life is a grammatical sentence, 
with paradigmatic and syntagmatic choices, seemingly infinite before 
the choices are actualized in a sentence, before the first word constrains 
what may follow. And there are rules about what can or cannot happen 
to grammatical subjects and objects, passive and active players: “John 
builds a house but cannot be built by a house, John can’t be admired by 
sincerity, nor can John elapse” (4).
 Yet, as always, Brooke-Rose is interested in the surprises of gram-
mar, the way constraint, like the absence of “to be” or “to have,” or the 
absence of past tense, generates something new. The old lady gets impa-
tient with the normal grammatical rules that John is meant to illustrate, 
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for example, the different roles assigned to “John” when he is active 
or passive, the difference in function between animate and inanimate 
actors. She thinks of writers who have revitalized the parts of speech—
the way Donne created metaphor with pronouns by making them act 
as nouns, or the way e e cummings converted adverbs to adjectival use 
in his “pretty how town” (4). Remake’s grammar surprises us out of 
predictable patterns and expectations. During the course of the novel, 
the rules stand on their heads. We are told that John is built by a house, 
that is, by “the house of fiction” (172). As in Amalgamemnon, Brooke-
Rose challenges us to evade our own predictable internal grammars as 
a weapon against “the smart empty talk of the quidnappers, orbiting 
round the world like a dead language with an internal grammar gener-
ating only dead sentences” (Remake 49). Generative grammar’s ability to 
generate structures systematically is also grammar’s generative ability 
to surprise us. Out of the parade of grammatical examples of deep struc-
tures that run the risk of endlessly repeating only their own predict-
able patterns, a kind of poignant self-knowledge emerges. According to 
Chomsky’s rule, “John cannot elapse”; yet, we discover that “John is not 
easy to please . . . and seems to have elapsed after all” (6), as many of the 
loved ones, including husbands, exit from the life being told. The dry, 
bureaucratic word, “elapse,” more commonly attached to licenses than 
to lives, suggests the poignancy of loss. Without self-pity, this elapsing 
is extended to the disappearance and death of the author. Seemingly 
casually, the old lady mentions that the name “Blair-Harley” itself will 
disappear because the old lady has no children. Names do elapse. Fic-
tion is one way to preserve the survival of the writer’s name.
 Elsewhere Brooke-Rose admits that	 Remake itself was a remake of 
sorts. In Invisible	Author, she tells the story of the book’s composition. 
She first wrote her autobiography in conventional form (past tense) and 
then deliberately remade it along experimental lines, the constraints 
against personal pronouns freeing her to confront herself in the genre 
of autobiography.5 As in most of the stories Brooke-Rose tells about her 
fictions, the story of Remake is a story of hitting on the right grammatical 
constraint, as if fiction were generated from a formal challenge, in this 
case, one of Chomsky’s weird illustrative examples sprung to new life, 
like Minerva from the head of Zeus. Brooke-Rose’s “John” is the residue 
of the shadow of transformational grammar that spawns a new kind of 
autobiography. As critic, as well as writer, Brooke-Rose was attracted to 
the idea of materializing fiction out of illustrative grammatical example. 
Among her papers is a letter to Joseph McElroy in which she ventures 
a fanciful theory about the origin of his novel Plus, the story of a brain 
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who receives impulses from Earth. Plus, Brooke-Rose conjectured, might 
have been generated by Chomsky’s famous “Colourless ideas.”6
 In its embargo on the grammatical rule of reflexivization and con-
straint on personal and possessive pronouns, Brooke-Rose’s technique 
resembles the Oulipean emphasis on generative or transformational 
grammar. In Literary	Memory,	Consciousness,	and	the	Group	Oulipo, Peter 
Consenstein speaks of the “Oulipean remake” of literary genres through 
the use of constraints: “As a practice, the members of the group publicly 
discuss the constraints they employ and if we look upon the landscape 
of literature, there are no genres, periods, or forms that are not sus-
ceptible to an Oulipian remake.”7 In “announcing” her constraint in 
the mock dialogue between the old lady and Tess that ends the novel, 
Brooke-Rose departs from her habitual practice of burying the constraint 
without explicit critical comment in the text.
 Unlike the finished autobiography, however, the life continued, and 
in a kind of sequel, Brooke-Rose has returned to the old lady, now as 
an “invalid” in Life,	 End	 Of. The book is a memoir that Brooke-Rose 
did not intend to publish, part therapy and part experiment. It reflects 
her declining personal situation; through her increasing disabilities, her 
life has narrowed to the confines of two rooms in a house in the south 
of France. Characters are fictionalized, including the protagonist, who 
is sometimes called Tess. In painstaking detail, the narrative captures 
Brooke-Rose’s experiences as her contact with the world diminishes with 
the deterioration of her health. The book is explicitly a final confronta-
tion of the self in writing, the final valediction. Predicted in Remake, the 
decline has arrived, the pain only partly deflected by the use of a pun 
“Heredotage” (62).
 If the title “remake” suggests not only the remaking of the life but 
also the prepackaged images that pass for “news” on the television that 
the old lady watches, ironically, poignantly, in her memoir television 
images serve increasingly as her technological pipeline to the world. The 
word “love” enters only through the scores of the tennis matches which 
the old lady watches on the screen (“Globalisation. Ah, the globe. Or is 
it the lobe of the universe? The lob of a tennis star? Neuronic games, 
games to exercise the neurons” [116]. Life,	End	Of presents the old lady’s 
further lapses and losses and deprivations, the decomposition of the self 
occurring bit by bit, piece by piece.
 In Remake we are told that “the old lady’s publisher” had provided 
the impetus for her autobiography: “Why is the old lady trying to inter-
cept all those interseptic messages? Old-age self-indulgence? No. The 
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old lady’s publisher has asked for an autobiography. But the resistance 
is huge. The absorbing present creates interference, as well as the old 
lady’s lifelong prejudice against biographical criticism, called laundry-
lists by Pound. Only the text matters, if the text survives at all” (Remake 
6). The invitation, recorded in the fiction itself, seems aimed at coun-
tering the charge of vanity by a writer who has repeatedly gone on 
record renouncing the self-absorption of the autobiographical. In Life,	
End	Of, there is no invitation from the world. Indeed, the trope of self-
confrontation that underwrites Remake becomes increasingly urgent as 
the invalid’s contact with the world progressively closes off. “The imme-
diate environment always shrinks, from house to flat to room to bed 
to coffin to earthworm-tums then grows again to compost to earth to 
planet to universe” (Life,	End	Of 12). This is Stephen Dedalus at eighty, 
the movement outward from the self to the universe ironically refig-
ured.8 The opposite of the “bildung,” the process of decline in Brooke-
Rose’s “memoir” catalogues the losing of body parts and memory files. 
The invalid, progressively loses “pieces of herself” (balance, eyesight, 
feeling in her extremities, memory), virtually imprisoned in her two 
rooms. “Earth-bound but abandoned by the galaxy the universe” (95), 
her feeling of being severed from the world return us to the amputated 
landscape of “The Foot.”
 If not an invitation from the world, what occasions this further 
remaking? It is a question asked explicitly early on in Remake: “but then 
can stimulus for confrontation of all those fogs come out of mere seren-
ity, for undoubtedly the old lady is serene rather than out of ruthless 
hurt thru and thru” (Remake 18). In Life,	End	Of, the invalid addresses 
the issue and again comes out on the side of serenity: “the small activi-
ties left become trebly precious. And astonishingly those ailments are 
not accompanied by clinical depression. Serenity remains” (Life,	 End	
Of 11). “Nuns Fret Not at Their Convent’s Narrow Room” is the title 
of a Wordsworth poem—the invalid reassures us that she is coming 
to terms with her narrowed straits.9 As the manuscript progresses and 
further bits are lost, it is clear that if writing issues from serenity, it is 
also the last stay against oblivion: “This bit of life is made a bit more of 
life by writing” (76). She calls the memoir she is writing “a dying diary, 
undated except indirectly because the sense of time is lost” (Life,	End	Of 
87). Near the end of the memoir, the invalid writes, “Montaigne says 
life’s purpose is to teach us to die. However, the standard of teaching 
is now so low that the task is getting tougher and tougher as more and 
more people among the six to nine billion rightly have access to it” (Life,	
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End	Of 93). Wryly, as the bits of her life disappear—body parts, friends, 
husbands, lovers—the writing remains, giving poignancy to the idea of 
“techniques for living.”
 Pathos, however, is unwelcomed in a Brooke-Rose narrative, and 
Life,	End	Of is no exception. As in her other texts, Brook-Rose refuses to 
sentimentalize, to personalize her experience in first-person representa-
tion. Loyal to the end to her invention, she makes use of the imper-
sonal Narrative Sentence (NS) that has been the hallmark of her fiction, 
only this time, imagining herself as the other, a twist on the thematic 
of seeing the other’s point of view. The important ability to “imagine 
the other” continues as a theme in Life,	 End	Of. The invalid identifies 
“Other People” (O.P.), as opposed to “True Friends” (T.F.), as those with 
a “disability of the imagination” (26). The most interesting ‘othering’ in 
the narrative is the process of self-estrangement that comes with dis-
ability, the representation of the body as intimate stranger. The splits 
between subject and object, mind and body that absorbed the old lady in 
grammatical self-confrontation and subscript (John1, John2, Tess, the old 
lady, the little girl) are now embodied. Although Yeats’s line, “How can 
we know the dancer from the dance?” from “Among School Children” 
plays an emblematic role in the memoir (a friend quotes it to suggest the 
author may be too close to her subject in parts of her memoir), it is a line 
from “Sailing to Byzantium” that seems to capture the invalid’s sense 
of closing off from her own body. The heart of Yeats’s poet is “fastened 
to a dying animal” and “knows not what it is.”
 With a play on words that is also an enactment of self-division, 
Brooke-Rose parses the way the body “feels.” The body experiences the 
world through physical contact; hence, the body’s relation to “feeling” 
(pun intended) is explored. The body is both subject (it touches and 
feels things) and object (it is touched and felt). Yeats’s line from “Sailing 
to Byzantium” is disconcertingly apt. As in “The Foot,” in Life,	End	Of, 
Brooke-Rose explores the extremity of losing the extremities in their role 
as grounding one in the world. Oddly, the loss of feeling in the feet leads 
alternately to a sense of absence and a sensation of pain. The invalid’s 
neuropathy leads to a condition in which her body loses its sensitivity 
to contact on the one hand, since her feet do not feel themselves touch-
ing the floor. On the other hand, her legs feel like twin burning poles, 
experiencing intense pain. “The legs now burn permanently, hot char-
coal in the feet creeping up the shins and knees and growing tall, two 
burning bushes, two pillars of fire for frail support. At every step they 
flinch wince jerk shirk lapse collapse give way stagger like language 
when it can’t present the exact word needed, the exact spot where to 
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put the foot” (Life,	 End	Of 9). The analogy to language is both telling 
and misleading—whereas the writer is in perfect control of the verbs of 
quasi-synonyms she ticks off, the legs (unlike language) misbehave.
 To compensate for the legs as anchor, a curious, even comic, reversal 
takes place. The head becomes the point of ballast. The book begins with 
a characteristic narratorless sentence reminiscent of the careful, inertial 
description in Out:
The head top leans against the bathroom mirror so that the looking 
glass becomes a feeling glass. But what does it feel? This position is 
for body-balance during the brushing of teeth and the washing of face 
neck arms and torso. Below is for the biddy, and the feet, if sitting on a 
stool. But especially the torso. For in fact the teeth can also be brushed 
if the loins touch the washbasin however cold, or the hand grips the 
edge, on condition neither is wet. (Life,	End	Of 7)
 Less ironically, although perhaps more poignantly, the invalid rec-
ognizes that as the body fails, the head must compensate as the portal 
of discovery for the world. “Heredotage. The quest for brain activity 
to compensate for the body. For constant intake as opposed to output” 
(Life,	End	Of 62). Yeats understood that for the old, the mind-body prob-
lem takes on a new dimension. Brooke-Rose explores these implications. 
“The floor the ground the earth are for walking on feet, the world the 
universe for walking in the head. A walking illness keeps the universe 
for the head but leaves, for the feet, only the floor. How long will the 
head last? The few remaining pleasures are not the sex-drive, nor body-
temperature hunger thirst or blood pressure but pleasures in the head so 
rich and devious, and, also, pain as the dubious pleasure of a constant 
companion” (Life,	End	Of 10).
 In tending to this wounded body, Brooke-Rose returns to the themes 
of her early fiction. Like the perceivers in Robbe-Grillet’s novels, con-
sciousness in “The Foot,” Out, and Life,	 End	Of, operates most in iso-
lation, the world a series of objects to be experienced but not fully 
engaged. Physical inertia prevails. But if “The Foot” explores the erotic 
dimension of pain as constant companion, a lover’s discourse in which 
narrative issues from desire for the missing body, in Life,	 End	Of, the 
relationship to pain is played in a much different register, that of an old 
and true friend. Paradoxically, as memory, feeling, friends, contacts, all 
fall away, pain reliably remains.
 However, as the narratorless narrative catalogues its own losses, 
the absences threaten to become all absorbing. That which is missing 
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becomes formative and formidable. “The old have to think so hard 
and continuously of every physical detail, physical movement, it’s not 
surprising they develop a senile self-centredness” (Life,	End	Of 62). The 
invalid ponders the question, “What is central and what peripheral? 
The peripheral polyneuritis feels totally central, responsible for all the 
burning flinching stumbling falling and for the half bent walk when 
picking up the cordless phone or Black holes, says a tele-scientist, can, 
in this case, now forgotten, become creative. Can a black hole become 
an ivory tower?” (62).
 The question of “self-centeredness” is embedded in a chapter in 
which the ban on first-person narrative threatens to be broken. Or IS 
broken cannily, in two ways: through the use of speech mode in which 
the invalid begins to question herself, and so splits into an “I” and a 
“you” dialogically; and through the self-conscious topic of the dialogue, 
which is narrative technique, specifically, the use of the first-person in 
narrative. Thus, the first-person enters not only IN dialogue but as the 
topic of discourse, as the author and the literary critic have it out in the 
midst of the memoir. Brooke-Rose reprises her earlier explanations of 
her “techniques for living” in Stories,	Theories	and	Things, interviews, and 
in Invisible	Author.	 In the seventh chapter of Life,	End	Of, Brooke-Rose 
risks breaking the fictional frame she has constructed. The persona of 
Tess slips away as author, critic, and character merge. The persona of 
the invalid pertains to all three roles. As in chapter 7 of Invisible	Author, 
called “The Author is Dead, Long Live the Author,” in this chapter 7, 
Brooke-Rose returns to a description of her signature technique. Repris-
ing her historical overview of the use of narrative vs. speech mode 
through the twentieth century, she says:
Oh hell, I’m doing it again. The details of narrative art, which interest 
no-one, are my Ariadne threads. I can’t create, but I absorbed them and 
analysed them with enthusiasm all the way through. Enthusiasm is life. 
End of, please forgive me. (Life,	End	Of 66)
She goes on to describe the effect of using the present tense without the 
first person, which is to drop “subjectivity” but retain “immediacy and 
distance” (67): “A few authors succeed in renewing the tired narrative 
sentence in this way, with the present tense and no ‘I,’ but it hasn’t really 
caught on for the novel. It creates characters who must be constructed 
by the reader entirely out of what they see hear feel think or say, that is, 
without any help from the author” (67). Later she returns to this aspect 
of the consciousness tracking its surroundings, this time in self-reference 
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to the present text being read: “Here, moreover, the character is disabled. 
Is he old as well? Is he a he or a she? To know these and many other 
things, if the Author doesn’t tell, the Dear Reader (the costly reader) 
must patiently construct the character from what he sees and thinks, 
bits and pieces, the way we do in life. . . . ” (68).
 In this seventh chapter, the author/character/narrator flirts with 
the collapse of the boundaries of her normally three-personed god. The 
interrogative mode that has been used, without pronouns, earlier in the 
memoir, now turns into an act of ventriloquy in (at least) three parts, 
all the while with the authoritative voice, paradoxically, lecturing on 
their necessary narratological separation. “Who speaks?” one “person” 
asks and the other answers, “Ah, the twentieth-century question. In fact, 
since you ask, nobody speaks” (64). We have returned to the metaland-
scape of Thru, with its insistent refrain of “chi parla?” The technology 
of the television and the radio, the voices from the world entering the 
invalid’s room, blend (“Who’s talking? To whom? The telly?” [31]). The 
narratorless narrative begins to question its own home invasions. “The 
question about on-going business home-grown is clearly author-interfer-
ence. Breaking in to the I-less narrative sentence with the self more than 
implied” (92). Breaking and entering, the personal seems to intrude on 
the code of impersoning that is Brooke-Rose’s terrain: “Could the infirm 
character be slowly merging with hisher author? A mere mirror? And if 
so why the devil or wolf doesn’t heshe use the freer and self-comforting 
first person, as everyone else does now?” (92).
 Self-interrogation is part of the stance of self-derision, a way of 
distancing the writing self from its own worst impulses to spill into 
something personal. This intervention is likened to “resuscitation” (76). 
Paradoxically, “[a]s soon as the author recovers his I-less and speaker-
less grammar, or uses it properly for the details of disability and death, 
it’ll all spring to life again. Because disability and death cannot be 
borne by any of the participants without that double distancing of self- 
derision” (77).
 The relation between the survival of the author and the survival 
of the text are intertwined, too close for comfort. This is precisely the 
meaning of a line from Yeats’s “Among School Children” that plays 
an emblematic role in the text: “How can you know the dancer from 
the dance” (paraphrased as “So, how can you tell the dancer from 
the dance?” [70])10 It is a line alluded to by Tim, married to one of 
the invalid’s “true friends” (T.F.s). He reads the invalid’s unfinished 
manuscript (the one that becomes Life,	End	Of) and refuses to give her 
the critical advice she seeks. Instead, in a card that follows his and his 
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wife’s visit, he offers the line from Yeats as an excuse for his nonre-
sponsiveness. Hurt and angry, the invalid suddenly understands what 
he means: the author and her character, the author and her text are not 
clearly distinguishable despite the “othering” that occurs. Moreover, as 
the invalid ponders the line, she thinks, “The one doing the writing, the 
other the end-living and dying? No, that’s not right either. Can one die 
before the other? Still, Tim does penpoint the punpoint” (70). As in all 
of Brooke-Rose’s fiction and criticism, the death of the author takes on 
new valences, as a new form of textermination is considered. We are told 
that the final two sections of the text, “the self-leering text” have been 
written in bed after a painful fall and hospital stay, whereas previously 
the manuscript has been reviewed in the armchair and written on the 
computer, a device no longer accessible. Although the author says that 
“survival is hardly the point,” she also admits that “Whatever the bit 
of life has become, it is clung to. Or is itself doing the clinging. This bit 
of life is made a bit more of life by writing. . . . The desire to continue 
the self-sorting, slotting, stripping is so strong that the attempt is made” 
(76). Here is technique for living. Speaking of the term “post-human” 
that she heard recently, the invalid puns darkly, “But that will at once be 
confused with posthumous, as of course it should be, human becoming 
humus” (64).
 The “art of losing,” to borrow the title of Elizabeth Bishop’s mov-
ing sonnet, is all too appropriate to this almost desperate act of writing 
in the face of the bit-by-bit loss of the self. The self-consciousness of 
the writing heightens, rather than mitigates, the pathos. Friends, hus-
bands, abilities, even words are lost; near the end of the narrative, which 
began in “serenity,” deprivation seems more the rule: “Now that the 
hands cause ten errors and two spaceless phrases per line, now that 
writing itself is more and more exhausting and confused, and eyes more 
and more glaucomish, and legs more and more furious, the three most 
precious gifts have become deprivations, soon to be reached: reading, 
writing, and independence” (113). In earlier chapters, she describes her 
feeling of self-annulment in the lack of consideration shown by O.P.s 
(Other People)—“Existence, which seems to concern only agendas and 
arrangements, is constantly annulled long before life is. All the time and 
automatically when disabled, automatically when old, automatically 
when female though less so than before. The three together means being 
placed in a different category of humans” (57–58). However, near the 
end of the manuscript, the self-annulment is an internal affair. Always 
more than a purely theoretical subject for Brooke-Rose, grammatical 
“personing” becomes more urgent. The first person feels
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impersonal, the way public concern and kindness become busy routine, 
and the personal wholly private, even when there’s no-one there to be 
private from. As with that waking absorption of the bi-local bi-tem-
poral, in hospital stripped of all such hauntings. Perhaps that is what 
occurs in death, the first person suddenly regained at the very moment 
of its effacement. (104)
 “The first person suddenly regained at the very moment of its efface-
ment”—the death sentence, the one that can never really be written in 
first person (as opposed to dying, death cannot be spoken in the first 
person), is the one that the invalid imagines here to be the moment of 
the personal regained. In Remake, the one chapter that departs from 
the constraint against the first person is a simulated diary, “full of pro-
nouns,” which is “a meditative account of a dying and a death, written 
between the acts” (27). Based on a diary Brooke-Rose kept about her 
mother’s death in a Benedictine convent in 1984, the chapter retains the 
fictionalization of names and the present tense (rather than retrospec-
tive narration), but it does allow itself the immediacy of the first-person 
report. The fluid “I” in the diary section feels particularly moving after 
the third-personing of “the old lady,” the emotion somehow earned after 
such discipline of self-report. In the chapter, “File: Pro-nouns,” which 
include this diary entry, the old lady describes her mother’s convent 
surroundings as “Serenity everywhere. But she is isolated in her god-
Routine” (28). The diary in Remake is a rehearsal of sorts for Life,	End	Of, 
an intimate glimpse of the death sentence, but from the outside (as the 
early ghost stories are rehearsals of sorts, since only the ghost can speak 
of death in the first person). In Life,	End	Of, the actual appearance of the 
first person is not the closest fictional successor to the diary of the old 
lady’s mother’s death. As I have said, it is used to distance rather than 
to peer over the edge into the abyss at the moment of self-annihilation. 
Instead, it is in the more paradoxical yoking of the loss of the self and a 
sense of self-nearness (almost Hopkinsonian in the extremity of its self-
touching) that being in the first person and nonbeing fuse in the archive 
of the self.
 Near the end of Remake, the old lady thinks of the relationship of Tess 
and Janek in terms of their contrapuntal loss of organs; first Tess loses 
a kidney (a life-transforming event taken from a page of Brooke-Rose’s 
own story), then Janek must have his gall-bladder removed (161).11 
Tess’s subsequent new life in Paris is described as a remaking of the self, 
a recomposition “bit by bit.” We are accustomed to such talk in autobio-
graphical fiction—Janek “embarks on a slow yet thorough demolition 
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job, piece by piece, upon Tess’s idea of Tess, no longer the helpmeet but 
the castratrix . . . a self Tess will have to reconstruct in Paris, piece by 
piece” (Remake 162). This image of the self’s reconstruction, even piece 
by piece, is a dead metaphor, a fundamental language for the way we 
think about the self. Veering uncomfortably close to the raw nerves of 
the dying animal, precisely through the danger zones of metafiction, 
Life,	End	Of, attempts to literalize the loss by charting the decomposition 
of the body. Picking up on the themes of Brooke-Rose’s earlier fiction, 
particularly Subscript, Life,	 End	Of gives us de-evolution. “The hands, 
the legs, the shoulders, the body. Super-valued by early man in eras 
long gone by. Yet evolution stops for all those bits and pieces, continu-
ing only behind the control-board” (Life,	 End	Of	 101). As in Subscript, 
the record and the body are inextricable. Remake and Life,	 End	Of join 
Textermination, Xorandor, and Subscript in focusing on the fragility of the 
human archive. This is the unbearable lightness of being replayed in dif-
ferent keys and on different scales, phylogeny and ontogeny. Ecological 
dangers of the kind that threaten extinction in Xorandor and Subscript 
invade the archive of the self in Remake: “The old lady’s head is now 
a nuclear processing plant of lost knowledges, acquired with immense 
efforts, sometimes leaking or exploding and polluting, but now reduced 
to small clean nuggets buried in deep salt caverns of the mind” (Remake 
153). If it is consciously hyperbolic to equate the loss of memory with 
threats of nuclear disaster and archeological oblivion, it is also another 
way in which Brooke-Rose shows her mastery of the grammar of being 
and nonbeing. Contrary to the Chomskyan rule, John elapses.
 In Remake the “terminal blues” are, for the most part, kept at bay. 
Losses, while catalogued, are still represented under the sign of Thoth, 
the guide of writing: “Thoth as alternative god, writing as ringwit, to 
outwit the inwit” (158). The twin adventures of consciousness and lan-
guage sustain a play on the relationship between the life and the file 
(“Isn’t life a story? No. A story is arranged. Life is a file. A lot of files, 
mostly erased” [Remake 65]). The characteristic Brooke-Roseian pleasure 
in language is preserved in this link between character and language. 
The story of the writer is the story of language and the acquisition of a 
deep love of the sea changes wrought by the evolution of language:
Philology is dry bones, but fillology slowly communicates magical 
seachanges, la mer la terre et l’air of a writer’s material, the skeleton fill-
ing in with flesh and blood and sinews, molecules of desire, of creativity, 
vowels softening consonants, consonants breaking vowels, disappear-
ing, changing places, becoming mute, still there as dried up fetuses in 
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the spelling but unuttered. . . . Language is like Tess, absorbing alien 
elements and yet somehow always elsewhere. (Remake 148–49)
 In Life,	End	Of, we are reminded of just how much the craft of writ-
ing depends on manual labor, of just how much technique is a physical 
making. If Tess stands for language absorbing the alien, writing complex, 
self-distant, and full, the invalid is the writer disabled, alien of the spe-
cies. If the lipogram in her early fiction relies on the belief that poten-
tial emerges from discipline and eschewal, Life,	 End	Of invents death 
sentences out of the necessity of self-decline. Here, the need for fiction 
and fiction-making seems almost anthropological, the human necessity 
to continue to construct the “as if” of fiction, not only in the face of 
constraint, but out	of constraint itself.
t he  B r i t i s h  no v e l i s t  B. s. J o hn son  once wrote, “So many novelists still write as though the revolution that was Ulysses	had 
never happened. . . . Nathalie Sarraute once described literature as 
a relay race, the baton of innovation passing from one generation to 
another. The vast majority of British novelists has dropped the baton, 
stood still, turned back, or not even realized that there is a race” (quoted 
in Randall Stevenson, “Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction in 
Britain” 19).
 In this book, I argue that the fifty-year career of Christine Brooke-
Rose is a notable counterexample to Johnson’s assertion. Brooke-Rose 
has continued the radical evolution of narrative in modernism’s wake. 
Her strenuous and vital fiction offers survival strategies for the genre of 
the novel, new forms of telling the human story within the “unreality” 
of the twentieth century.
 As critic and journalist in the fifties in England, Brooke-Rose wrote 
about contemporary novelists who were dismantling and reinventing 
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fiction. In the London	Magazine, she described Beckett’s “anti-novel” 
novels (1958) and reviewed Robbe-Grillet’s new narrative sentence in 
Jealousy	 (1961). Writing for the Observer (1961), she highlighted the 
phenomenon of “The Vanishing Author” in contemporary fiction and 
in 1966 spoke of “Making It New” in her review of Robert Pinget’s 
experimental novels. Like her central consciousness in Between who 
facilitates cross-cultural conversations through translation, Brooke-
Rose served as cultural go-between, trying to alert the English that 
the French were coming. After she moved to Paris in 1968, her efforts 
took the form of letters “home” from the cultural front. In her “Let-
ters from Paris” in the Spectator, she conveyed the excitement of the 
French revolution occurring in fiction, drama, anthropology, and the-
ory. In longer essay form in journals like NLH, Poetics	 and	 the	 Theory	
of	 Literature, and Contemporary	 Literature, she dissected the genre of 
the fantastic in Todorov and Henry James. In exploratory yet rigorous 
analyses in essays with titles such as “Transgressions: An Essay-say 
on the Novel Novel Novel” and “The Squirm of the True: An Essay in 
Non-Methodology,” she restored the essay form to its roots as a series 
of theoretical “attempts.”
 The title of Brooke-Rose’s 1980 essay “Where Do We Go From Here?” 
epitomizes her restless intelligence as a critic and author insistently 
impelled to take up the question of the future. This is a question not only 
of fiction’s future, but of the future of the human archive itself. Thus, the 
“syntax-error” programmed into Xor 7 in Xorandor, an error that threat-
ens to obliterate the human race if not for Xorandor’s sacrifice, captures 
the stakes involved in paying vigilant attention to grammar and other 
elements of technique. In this context, and in other Brooke-Rose textual 
landscapes, to speak of her “techniques for living” is not hyperbolic. 
With the chiasmic crossing of the real and unreal in the twentieth cen-
tury she has felt that new forms of representation were necessary, but 
rather than resisting the waves of scientific, technological, and broader 
cultural changes, she has deployed them as novelistic premises. Each 
of Brooke-Rose’s narratives inscribes and transmits a cultural predica-
ment. In these narratives, both the textual body of the novel and the 
bodies represented bear the trace of pain and loss that transcend the 
personal. Throughout her oeuvre, lipograms encode particular depriva-
tions and defamiliarize the story from the point of view of the always 
threatened organism. If, as in “The Foot,” “pain is a constant compan-
ion” in her texts, a reader’s adventure in watching these texts unfold lies 
in the discovery of what endures, or what emerges anew, in response to 
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originary losses. In her stories, theories, and things, Brooke-Rose’s let-
ters and languages “fraternize” in ways that “make it new.” Trusting the 
novel form to capture the “corpus cryses” of her time, she produced a 
strikingly original body of work.
i.
KL: As I have read your work over the years, I have been struck by a con-
tinuous element in both the fiction and criticism—an interest in the phantom 
and a certain kind of loss, beginning with the short story, “The Foot” and 
continuing in your complex and brilliant essay on The	Turn	of	the	Screw in A	
Rhetoric	 of	 the	Unreal. This interest continues as a broad theme throughout 
Textermination, with the disappearing or missing persons, and into Subscript	
as well.
CBR: Everyone is dead there. Every chapter is called something like “Five 
hundred million years later.”
KL: That’s true. And the collection of short stories in which “The Foot” ap-
pears, Go	When	You	See	the	Green	Man	Walking, seems posthumous. The sto-
ries are ghost stories. So you started with a ghost story and this phantom 
quality is carried forward in your work. What I would call “the unbearable 
lightness of being” is a thematic, from this ghost story on. It is found as well 
in your idea of the “dissolution of character.” You deal with so many deaths 
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in your fiction—the death of the author, the death of the novel, the death 
of the narrator—and some of them intentionally are part of the constraints, 
which can be regarded as grammatical absences.
CBR: Thank you, that’s wise. I haven’t been all that conscious of this as a 
continuous theme but I enjoy your insight.
KL: In your work there’s a continuity that bespeaks life and survival and 
living on. But there are a lot of disappearances as well.
CBR: The death of the author is on a different level. I try to tackle this prob-
lem in “The Author is Dead, Long Live the Author.”
KL: Subscript	is the last novel. Are you writing anything else? You had told 
me you weren’t writing any more novels.
CBR: Well, I have been hesitating the whole of this visit whether to tell you 
or not.
KL: You have another?
CBR: Not really. During the earlier parts of my illnesses, last autumn, I 
wrote a kind of therapeutic text. First of all I couldn’t write, but discovered 
a writing-board for an armchair position. And I felt the need to write and 
something came into my mind, and I found myself being funny about the 
movements I couldn’t make and things like that. There’s an article I read, by 
a friend, on the handicapped, one of them said it wasn’t the handicap that 
caused problems—one learns to cope and adapt—it was other people. So I 
called them O.P.s. And that’s sort of nasty of me, because I don’t come out 
very well either. I fuss too much because they are being thoughtless, you 
know as you saw in my e-mails. Losing one’s physical abilities is like learn-
ing to belong to another human species. That’s why real friends become so 
precious; you can keep on the same thought process. But there are very few, 
they have their own problems, after all. I used to know hundreds of people 
and now just a handful. But there are advantages in that too. But I’d rather 
not talk about this text. It’s very short. It’s called Life,	End	Of.	Or LEO. The 
process was interesting and quite funny.
KL: Have you completed it?
CBR: Yes, and if you want an offprint, I can do one.
KL: You have it on the computer?
CBR: I have it on the computer. But I have trouble getting diskettes.
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KL: I don’t even use diskettes anymore. But if you send it as an attachment 
to someone, then it’s there.
CBR: What a lovely ambiguous sentence.
KL: Let me look at your computer. Your executor should have a copy of your 
manuscript.
CBR: I want Jean-Michel [Rabaté] to have it, so that he can decide post-
humously whether to publish it or not, for instance there’s no point if I’m 
forgotten.
KL: If you send it to him as an attachment a copy would exist and you could 
work on it. On the computer it could get lost any time. I’ll show you. As I told 
you I’m a technological illiterate, but I know how to create an attachment.
CBR: And I’m a technodunce. I mean the techno from Greek techné, skill. They 
often merge, art and science. Today they’re split again. All writers can press 
a button but not always understand what goes on inside the machine.
KL: Of course.
CBR: I think there’s an age when one can take in with pleasure but not retain. 
Twenty years ago I wrote a novel about a computer. But he is a rock, even if 
he had an internet. So I loved him like a child, but then went on with other 
experiments. Seven books later I tried to catch up, in vain. It’ll be funny to 
change from being neglected as a difficult experimental writer to being dis-
missed as an old has-been. Nathalie Sarraute has written well of this.
KL: As I read and reread each of your books, I was struck by how much 
learning was involved in each one, how many different sets of concepts 
and vocabularies you used—astrophysics, structuralist and poststructuralist 
theory, computer technology, evolution. It has taken me so long to write this 
book partly because I needed to bone up on all these areas of knowledge!
CBR: Everything I’ve learnt in addition—psychoanalysis, philosophy and 
such—are the first to drift off. And technical linguistics, well, generative 
grammar is a bit as maths must be, you’ve got to do it, not just learn it pas-
sively, you’ve got to climb up and down those trees. I went to seminars on 
it because I was interested. But I never really practiced it in this way. I learnt 
tons of stuff, well, that’s all gone.
KL: My father has Alzheimer’s and almost everything is gone. But it’s 
strange—he can remember every lyric of every song, so there’s something 
about that kind of memory that’s intact. Something Proustian.
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CBR: Yes it’s all together, you’re right. The long-term memory—the child-
hood and all that—remains. What goes is remembering what you went into 
the other room to get.
KL: He’ll ask something and then forget what he asked. My parents are 
afraid because I’m here for three weeks even though I talk to them everyday. 
My mother just said, “I don’t know why you’re not coming home.”
CBR: That’s something that happens. The self-centeredness of age which I’m 
fighting against. My favorite aunt was like that. She died at 94. She was my 
mother’s sister. My mother a Benedictine nun, my aunt a Protestant, but I 
went to see them regularly.
KL: I’m traveling with my children but she still expected me to return home. 
And Andy is staying in Paris to study French until he begins his job.
CBR: Is he the one who likes tennis?
KL: No, that’s Jeff, our youngest son. He is playing tennis at Amherst. Jeff 
is working for Michael Wood at the Breadloaf School in Guadalajara. You 
know him, I think.
CBR: From Princeton. I sat next to him at lunchtime during that conference 
in Utah. Is he the same Michael Wood who does those television shows?
KL: No, he isn’t. He writes about Latin American fiction . . . the movies. 
Nabokov. He writes for the London	Review	of	Books. I chaired a panel at the 
recent Joyce conference and he participated. He gave a paper on Coetzee. 
Have you read Elizabeth	Costello?
CBR: No, not yet.
KL: In the book there’s a fictional novelist named Elizabeth Costello who 
writes a book called The	Lives	of	Animals. Michael gave a talk on that. Coe-
tzee gets into imagining the other through fiction, which is something that 
you talked about in your experience during the war as a young girl, dealing 
with German codes—not decoding, as has been said, but reading decoded 
German messages. As an Intelligence Officer.
CBR: I quietly left the panel he was directing in Utah because there was a 
student doing a paper on Christine Brooke-Rose and Pynchon. The theme 
was the outsider and he took Out as example, versus V and Gravity’s	Rainbow, 
it seems. Way above me. That’s what I’m always so aware of. People take 
on a themelet—which is all the two writers have in common. It’s already 
content criticism. It’s the same with that fashion publishers had for a while, 
and maybe still do, of lumping three authors together simply to save money. 
There are one or two on me like that.
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KL: Are you thinking of Judy Little, who wrote on Virginia Woolf and you 
and Barbara Pym.
CBR: No, that was real criticism. I’m sorry, I’ve gone astray. What about 
Penelope	Voyages?
KL: Yes. In Penelope	Voyages, I wrote a chapter on Between and Brigid Brophy’s 
In	Transit. It discussed your “postmodern” travel, and is more about narra-
tive than travel.
CBR: Yes, I remember that, it was very unusual. I must reread it. Of course 
I remember now. I was very pleased.
KL: Did you think that I “lumped” you with her when I discussed you 
both?
CBR: No, of course not. In fact, there’s a logic you have on the two novels. 
They came out together, and many years later, after her death, I wrote a 
Preface for the Dalkey Archives. They asked me for an Introduction two 
years ago. I even asked their permission to compare In	Transit with Between. 
They gave it.
KL: I didn’t realize that.
CBR: They were pleased with the result.
KL: My new book—should I ever finish it, which I’m planning to do—is 
about you but not in comparison . . . 
CBR: I wasn’t asking that.
KL: No no, no, I know. But the panel I served on in Texas, when I e-mailed 
you about your papers in the Ransom, was held at a modernism conference. 
The topic of the panel was “the fate of the single author.” And they asked 
me to be on the panel because they discovered that in soliciting panel topics, 
they realized that there were no panels on single authors.
CBR: Well, that was a conference, that’s understandable. I’m talking about 
publishing. You’ve got to think of the buyer.
KL: But this was about publishing too. It was called “the fate of the single au-
thor” because the publishing business has changed even at university presses 
and there are fewer monographs than there used to be. This is partly a func-
tion of economic necessity and partly a change in critical fashion. So the 
conference organizers invited a few people to be panelists who had written 
books on single authors, in my case Joyce, and one of the organizers knew 
I was writing a book on your work. I discussed you and your work as well 
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as the demise of the monograph on one author. It’s even rarer to have dis-
sertations on one author. Not “marketable.”
 But, Christine, I would like to return to discussing the trajectory of your 
own work. I’d like to talk about your development of the female conscious-
ness in Between, after using mostly male narrative consciousnesses up until 
then. In fact, in my book, I am playing off the idea of the “dead white male” 
who comes back from the dead in Such. You might say the male narrative 
consciousness dead-ends in that book. You read the chapter on Such and took 
issue with some of it.
CBR: No, I’ve said all I feel about that chapter. It’s very impressive. But I’m 
wondering whether the “dead white male” applies to all of my novels. I 
mean, Xorandor isn’t a dead white male. Still, you’re right, he does disap-
pear, as computer-rock, to Mars.
KL: Such is about a dead white male, so to speak, but in much of your work, 
as I said before, loss and phantom existence is a consistent theme. The early 
fiction is told from a male point of view—“The Foot,” and Out, as well as 
Such. In “The Foot,” the narrator is the phantom limb, a male consciousness 
severed from the female body of a woman who has lost its leg.
CBR: I’ve just realized that this phantom of a female leg gives a weird bi-
sexuality to the phantom.
KL: Well, I think of it more in terms of abjection, but I see what you mean. 
And Out is about a dying white male, and is about race and other things
CBR: The color reversal.
KL: The color reversal. So, Such is the death and resurrection, one more time, 
of the dead white male, or how to die laughing. There is a kind of joke be-
hind the seriousness. And then in Between the central consciousness becomes 
female. And that’s true in Amalgamemnon and in Textermination although that 
female consciousness wanders in both. It doesn’t apply to Xorandor, which 
is wholly in dialogue.
CBR: Between two whiz kids.
KL: Let me go back to “The Foot,” which generates narrative out of loss. 
Even the constraints are in some way about losing things, about doing with-
out certain things. The constraints cross discipline with loss. But in “The 
Foot,” the conceit is that the narrative is generated from this discarded, abject 
phantom limb . . . 
CBR: I’m so glad. What is interesting about such texts is that I was a slow 
developer. In my twenties, I would write a poem every day. What happened 
to me as a writer is that I just realized I wasn’t a poet, and I stopped writing 
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poems, just like that. And I found myself in the novel, but even that took 
me time, and I had to write four traditional novels to find out what I really 
wanted. And, you know, when I tried to turn to short stories, I wasn’t very 
good at it. I was a very self-critical writer, so in fact I tackled the novel as 
a result.
 But do tell me more about “The Foot.” No one else has ever talked of it 
so well, or will, so might as well feast.
KL: Well, I do like it very much. I think the genre of the novel is the genre 
you discovered most suited to you—not because it usually encodes change, 
but because it is such an arena for experimentation. But your collection of 
short stories, in which “The Foot” appears, seems to me to test out a number 
of things in shorter form. A narrative told, as it were, from the other side. You 
have a number of such stories in the collection, “George and the Seraph,” 
and other stories of hauntings. And actually “The Foot” I think is the best 
of the group.
CBR: It’s over forty years ago. But you’re right. I think there’s a strong link 
with Such. I was quite unaware that an early story could so pre-echo later 
ones. They must have been written close together and both when I was close 
to death from my serious illness. I was quite astonished to recover. No, that’s 
true of Out, but affecting what came later.
KL: Did anyone single out “The Foot”?
CBR: Not at the time. I was very much out of things. But not anyone later 
either, except, oddly, Derrida, who asked his wife Marguerite to translate 
it, but that didn’t come off. It was translated some twenty years later by a 
professional French translator. But I just thought of something that connects 
“The Foot” and Such—a sort of treble voice.
 It’s the closeness yet deep difference of the two texts. They both have 
three levels. Not levels but a sort of tress. After all the beautiful things you 
said about “The Foot” and Such, I feel they must be closely linked, even 
though it happened some forty years ago, and it was astute of you to see 
it. And it’s in the style, a sort of treble language, idiom, or discourse, as the 
French would call it.
KL: How do you mean treble?
CBR: Well, sometimes double. But the feel of it is often treble.
KL: Example?
CBR: I’m just thinking aloud. This has to do with a treble discourse idiom I 
was inventing without being all that conscious of it. Two of these idioms are, 
first, the presence and tone of a death idiom, the second, scientific—and not 
necessarily true—all correct, in fact wrapped up in the third.
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KL: Which is?
CBR: Poetry, opens up the first two into a magically unreal world, which isn’t 
real. I’m trying to remember. In both those texts but especially in Such, to 
recall a straightforward example, a law of astrophysics is turned into a meta-
phor. Oh I know science fiction writers have been doing this kind of thing for 
some time but very differently. Why? Because their science is “true.” I think 
that is the essential difference. And this description may not be “true.” But 
it’s the difference between science fiction and what I’m trying to do. You’ve 
been very patient, but if you allow me two little anecdotes you’ll feel what 
I mean. Okay?
 My husband was Polish so we had many Polish friends. I showed “The 
Foot” to a Polish doctor friend we knew whose wife was our dentist. He ran 
the amputee department at Roehampton Hospital. He loved to talk about his 
speciality, phantom pain, familiar to patients and doctors. Excited, I found 
out more about it. The result was “The Foot,” which I gave him to read. He 
loved it. “Extraordinary,” he said, “there’s nothing wrong in it.” Enthusiastic, 
he tried to get it published in a medical journal.
KL: Really? And they didn’t? But you had captured the sense of sensation, 
sensation through absence.
CBR: That’s very well put. Though I don’t remember doing it.
 I was delighted with his approval, but the way I see it now is that he 
didn’t feel the “poetic” part of the tress, let alone the death one. His idea of 
approval was “there was nothing wrong.” Of course, I’m being harsh. He 
was being very kind. That’s my point.
 The other anecdote is at Jodrell Bank, the British astrophysical center, 
much in the news then. I sent a typescript of Such to the director, asking if 
someone could help me. He gently passed me on to his assistant director, 
who was very charming, took me round, and said I was at the second level 
in astrophysics, but he was glad I hadn’t asked him to be a literary critic. 
Joke probably. So nonscientists are very well treated as honorable visitors 
but not, of course, given a tutorial, naturally enough. It meant, however, as 
in the first anecdote, getting no help at all except for the general introduc-
tion as it were to all friends and visitors. That’s no doubt how it should 
be.
KL: You mentioned Jacques and Marguerite Derrida. Did you read Derrida 
in the ’60s, when his work was published in France? Three of his works were 
published in the same year.
CBR: Nineteen sixty-seven. A year before my arrival in Paris. But I had very 
little time then, though my attention was irresistibly drawn. Speech	and	Phe-
nomena, Of	Grammatology, Writing	and	Difference. People forget all those who 
were sort of antistructuralism before postructuralism, they are treated as 
though it happened consecutively—George II, George III, George IV, and 
such. In fact they ran concurrently, like those three works. But Americans 
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wouldn’t feel that, since translation came later I think, at different dates. I im-
mediately tackled one, I can’t remember which, and they speedily influenced 
Barthes out of pure structuralism into S/Z. I was teaching structuralism to 
first-year students and poststructuralism to graduates. And learning it all 
myself. At least at the beginning of this new university at Vincennes, it was 
difficult. I also learnt that a good teacher is someone who can reimagine his 
own ignorance. I didn’t have to, it was there.
KL: And Derrida’s pharmakon discussion that you talk about in your notes 
on Pound was published in Tel	Quel, so you must have been reading it at 
that time. You wrote in your Pound book about this idea of literature as a 
cure and a poison.
CBR: I was cheating a bit. The book was actually finished. I had written it in 
the Pound castle, and I was revising it and plunged into Derrida later. I said, 
oh, this is exciting. So I put it in there, but it didn’t really fit so well.
KL: Was Derrida an important . . . 
CBR: To me?
KL: Yes.
CBR: Very important at the beginning. But I became ultra-busy at first, and 
went on reading voraciously, Foucault and all the rest. In fact later I became 
rather disappointed in him.
KL: You did?
CBR: Maybe it’s me turning against my masters, or against French philoso-
phy, or simply too interested in other, linked aspects. And whenever I tried 
him again I feel a new distance. He did these weird interviews with that 
Romanian woman, for instance.
 I think he’s had a little bit of head-turning from his star situation. But I don’t 
know. Not as much as Lacan, who once said “je cogite, éperdument”(funnier 
in French, where cogiter is more restricted to philosophy, and éperdument a 
wild contrast). Derrida had great charm. But I don’t really know.
KL: There have been two films about him. The first, by an Egyptian woman, 
was actually quite good.
CBR: In fact I later used his deconstruction in several essays. It was great 
fun. Anyway I stopped reading philosophy, sociology, linguistics (only about 
them) when I began my retirement in ’88 and I was just concerned with 
my own books, which seemed to have nothing to do with such disciplines. 
Seemed, I don’t know, you’ll have to tell me. I wrote five novels since retiring 
and two critical books. It was rather nice to read just for pleasure. Not for a 
seminar or panel. The way children read.
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KL: I know.
CBR: Of course, I forget all the reading I did, after retiring, for Textermination	
and the reading I did for	Subscript. Pleasure or work? I’m still fascinated with 
prehistory and ordered a book that’s just come out. But I’m not reading for 
anything except my novel, and this is lovely. And I’m glad I gave up theory, 
because, yes it was important to me, but once it had ceased to be important, 
I didn’t want to get mixed up with all those quarrels, you know?
KL: But when one looks at your notebooks for the novel, each one is almost 
a tutorial on another science—you took on huge subjects—just look at the 
notes for Subscript.
CBR: Yes, they’re not really notes contributing to a science. They’re just notes 
of my reading. To learn.
KL: But most people don’t go into the depth. There are notebooks, even for 
“The Foot.” You know, what you did about the brain and the autonomic 
nervous system.
CBR: That’s just books, not treatises. That’s hardly depth.
KL: That’s great. I look at this and my head swims because it’s not my area. 
But to look at . . . 
CBR: I kind of swept into one particular thing. That’s when you know what 
you’re looking for. That’s what I call cheating. So the realist novel—and I’m 
not a realist novelist—cheats just like anyone else.
KL: But realism as a kind of cheating. Meaning what?
CBR: George Eliot says somewhere that the author need not be in the work-
shop, the door ajar is enough. After all, look at the fuss we make about 
identity. Identity is formed in a child very young, repeated blindly by his 
parents, his teachers, his religious guides, and is a dead loss when something 
goes differently.
KL: You’re generalizing again.
CBR: From highly personal but more or less free experience. I’ve always hat-
ed belonging to a particular party or religion or whatever. Like a club. Which 
reminds me—Peter had a lovely joke yesterday. We were talking about the 
early part of Subscript, the prokaryote cells—no nucleus—and the eukaryote 
ones—with a nucleus. I asked him what he felt about how they evolved from 
one to the other and he said: “They form clubs.”
 Every single person seems to be having trouble with this word identity. 
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A fairly recent concept—eighteenth century I think. It was from Locke and 
Hume, it was called the self. I have always loved the etymology of identity 
as id + entity (the wholeness of the id).
KL: I never thought of that.
CBR: Well you were right, because it was wrong. Incorrect. The OED says 
identity is “peculiarly derived” from idem [same] + atis	[ness] in Low Latin, 
in other words, far too early to acquire my invention, my modern id + entity, 
which I prefer. My modern id + entity, with id as not necessarily Freudian. 
The word “id” for me is a way of concentrating on specific cases. Here “it” 
may be a black hole producing sudden violence in those who go out and 
die for identity.
KL: But identity now often refers to social, group identity.
CBR: Clubs again. It always has been. In the class system it was very very 
strict. Perhaps it was less so in America. I think they had a class system too, 
one feels in James.
KL: Yes, it is not always talked about in America, but it’s true.
CBR: I didn’t think that a society can exist without these groupings. They 
are essential. But not as used.
KL: I think many discussions are about those kinds of identity groups, as 
opposed to Freud or Erikson who stress the individual stages of identity 
formation.
CBR: So in that sense, I am a Freudian.
KL: It’s in terms of group identity that the concept of identity has become a 
part of contemporary political discussion. It’s a real issue. Also sometimes 
about language.
CBR: Yes. Someone even came to interview me about bilingualism.
KL: Oh, who?
CBR: No, no namings. It was very strange. The questions seemed so naïve 
that I assumed they were way above my head. Still, I think Freud has been 
really overrated. Of course he’s important. But he also comes out with bi-
zarre primitive ideas. I mean as if the id and the ego were physically there. 
With a map. Lacan used this too.
KL: Which reminds me of the way you play with the idea of drives in Such. 
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Someone and Something are in vehicles. There is almost a pun on drives. It 
struck me that the drive—the Freudian drive—was part of what was being 
played with there.
 Of course, people are also remembering that Freud was a Victorian, that 
his “mappings” were not separate from his time.
CBR: It was a sexist period and men have taken a long long time. Lean to 
the left and live to the right.
KL: I was invited to give a talk about administration and I asked my fellow 
deans whether they thought gender made any difference, whether it was a 
marked sign in terms of administration. And all the men, except one, said, 
“no,” and all the women said, “yes.” The men thought women might have 
a tougher time, but they didn’t see themselves as part of a system that privi-
leges them. They just saw women as potentially thinking about it. I think 
that’s still true.
 In that vein, I wanted to ask you about your novels—“The Foot,” Out, 
and Such all have male narrators, not narrators, but central consciousnesses. 
Without the sign of third-person narration, but central consciousness. And it 
does seem to me with everything you’ve said about starting Between with an 
androgynous consciousness, writing Such	instead, which has a male physicist 
and psychiatrist in the first person but as a central consciousness. You were 
working through these things . . . 
CBR: It took me a long time to realize that translation is in a sense a female 
activity, the idea that you have no ideas of your own, you’re translating 
others. And this realization began to surge in Oslo, where I gave a short 
speech on something semantic—I forgot what. I showed the English text to 
the French translator in his cabin and that gave me ideas. He translated it 
well. My husband didn’t want to go up to the fjords as I wanted to, so we 
ended up in Portugal. And then I started writing from a translator’s view-
point, but it didn’t work out.
KL: With Between? You mean with that novel?
CBR: Yes.
KL: Okay.
CBR: And I don’t remember how long all this took. But I wrote Such instead, 
which starts “Silence says the notice on the stairs”
KL: Which is in Portugal, right?
CBR: And this went off in a completely different direction, not translation 
as a theme anymore. And then I realized . . . the following year we went off 
on a long, long journey. He had a sabbatical term at last from the Slavonic 
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School and added the Easter plus the summer vacation to make six months. 
We went all round Eastern Europe, still communist, by car. Hardly any tour-
ists. I started collecting those mineral water labels.
KL: Wasn’t Vichy one of them? I noticed that one in particular in Between	
because of its historical resonance.
CBR: I’d collected lots, Bulgarian, Turkish and so on. I had all these labels 
and also notices in the hotel rooms, also in odd languages, about this and 
that and the other. And then I realized that the central consciousness had 
to be a woman. But it took me a long time. Why? It seems to me a very 
obvious idea, at least as an accompaniment. And picked up the pronounless 
narration of Out.
KL: But you went on in all of the subsequent books.
CBR: Yes once I’d hit on it. But with variation. It’s closer to my own life. I’ve 
never been an interpreter, but I have always been bilingual, partly tri—so I 
could understand the feelings and the problems. I was in a way dealing with 
that, so she had to be a woman.
KL: But we’re localizing this more around the problem of translation, which 
I think was part of the discovery, of course
CBR: Hence the planes, the constant travel.
KL: But what I’m getting at is that once that happened in Between, all of a 
sudden, there was a sense of discovering the centrality of the woman as the 
main consciousness.
CBR: Absolutely, and I wrote Between in flowing sentences. We ended up at 
the Pound castle, which we visited before in the Italian Tyrol.
KL: We? Who’s we?
CBR: My husband. Plus me. Our last complete year, 1967.
KL: And that was Mary de Rachewiltz, Pound’s daughter?
CBR: We became deep friends and still are. Anyway, that summer I finished 
Between. Even had a photograph of me in Milan or somewhere writing in a 
café. That was where we did all our writing, cafés. And I knew it was okay. 
It’s one of the few novels I felt certain about. Usually I would keep it back 
and look at it the following summer. Then all the wrong things leap out at 
you. But this I never needed to. And it did me a lot of good. It was best of 
all so far, and I knew it was a very original idea, so there we are.
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KL: It seems to me very important that Amalgamemnon, too, has a woman 
consciousness.
CBR: Yes. Once I was on to this female thing it was all I’d hoped. I was out 
of the third person narrator and the squeamish wriggling first. I think a 
woman writer should be able to be a man and vice versa. But it’s true, I feel 
more at ease with the woman in Amalgamemnon, in fact, so much so, it’s more 
personal that I go into the first person again. I slide back into the first person, 
still nameless and subjectless, because I do other things, difficult things with 
grammar. I don’t stick to my experiment but discover other ones.
KL: Your constraint.
CBR: Is a very different one. Tenses.
KL: First person plus future.
CBR: The first sentence is . . . 
KL: “Soon I will be obsolete.”
CBR: Yes. I think the word is “redundant.” Anyhow, it’s about her obsoles-
cence.
KL: Right, as a humanities professor. But the constraint is the future.
CBR: If you look at the use of the future as a constraint, yes. You can’t do too 
many things at once. One has to keep in control with the constraints. And 
some constraints, one doesn’t really see the point. I’ve never understood the 
point of writing a novel without the letter e.
KL: And Perec did that around the same year you published Between without 
the verb “to be”? But you wrote this a bit before.
CBR: Perec. Yes. That’s right. His other important book, La	Vie,	mode	d’emploi, 
experiments with narrative structure, much more interesting.
KL: Well it is a challenge to think of French without an e.
CBR: Yes, but English has a lot of e’s too. To me, a constraint must be a 
grammatical or a syntactical constraint, part of the syntax, not a letter. But 
that may be a prejudice, about form. Because that becomes going through 
dictionaries and looking for words. I mean, I like him. But I don’t see the 
point.
KL: Do you think that when they read La Disparition	.	.	.	is that the title in 
French? It was translated as A	Void.
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CBR: Yes, that’s very good. I couldn’t have found such a title myself.
KL: Is it “disparition”?
CBR: La	Disparition. And you see there’s a kind of semi-plot about a person 
disappearing.
KL: I read it. Can you tell as you read it that in French there are no e’s? I 
thought you might be able to . . . 
CBR: He announced it loud and long, so it was known. I didn’t say any-
thing about no verb “to be” until much later. And then it did get repeated, 
but without further comment and once it was attributed to the wrong book, 
Such, I think. But I forgive them all. Because I used to be a reviewer, with 
deadlines, space limitations. In fact the only serious article about this aspect 
of my work is Jean Jacques Lecercle’s, on Amalgamemnon.
KL: That’s a great article.
CBR: He analyzes my use of future. As with you, he taught me things I didn’t 
fully understand about what I was doing.
KL: He analyzes the use of the future in Amalgamemnon.
CBR: A long introduction.
KL: About Heidegger.
CBR: Yes, which seemed alien to me. At least that’s how I felt. But once he 
gets into the text he does some very interesting things, which I was unaware 
of at least as to their effect and meaning. And that’s amazing, that a critic 
should know more about the technique than the writer. He showed me that 
I was, as I knew, indeed using the future, but that was not a constraint. The 
real constraint I had chosen was all the other tenses.
KL: And Amalgamemnon, you saw as a constraint of not using the present 
and the past?
CBR: Yes, but not so clearly. I thought of it as using the future and other 
nonrealizing verbs, but I must in practice not have used the other ones, and 
he analyzes that twist in the use of the future in terms of illocutions. Very 
well.
KL: It is a great essay. Do you know him?
CBR: I used to know him quite well, and his English wife, in Paris. He taught 
at Nanterre, and did that paper on me in a seminar there. I saw his name 
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connected with Bristol but it may be temporary. Or not. It’s amazing how 
many French academics are leaving for America.
KL: Are they?
CBR: Well, Jean-Michel finally chose Philadelphia. The Americans don’t take 
away money and staff and so on. Perhaps I’m prejudiced.
ii.
KL: In my manuscript, I don’t discuss your early novels. Can we talk a bit 
about them? Although you have described them as conventional.
CBR: I was very much dissatisfied with The	Sycamore	Tree after my delicious 
first novel, The	Languages	 of	 Love. These are conventionally written. Then I 
got involved with what I discovered, in the fifties, about my father’s shame 
and prison in 1898. Twenty years before he even met my mother. I decided to 
do research and wrote about it in The	Dear	Deceit. Quite funny in fact, people 
still like it. And I began thinking about experiment around then because I 
wrote it backwards, the first time to my knowledge anyone had done this. 
In each chapter you want to know what happens next but no, you go back 
in time. That’s not always very clever. There have been two novels written 
backwards since.
KL: Martin Amis’s Time’s	Arrow.
CBR: Very interesting. In this experiment, though, you can’t go beyond a 
certain point. He included dialogue, when all you have to do is to read the 
words backwards. If you pursue that and do it with letters it merely becomes 
unreadable. Of course the unreadable is also part of some experiments. I 
don’t think he went that far. I can’t remember. I’m looking at it theoretically. 
Sorry, none of this is relevant for you.
KL: It’s all interesting.
CBR: Okay, then I wrote The	Middlemen, back to satire. And that was the real 
change. I had slowly realized, after my backward writing, that I couldn’t 
write that sort of novel any more, either easy satire or joke direction, and I 
started writing Out.
KL: But you became ill, didn’t you?
CBR: Yes, in the South of France, at my favorite aunt’s. My husband had gone 
to Italy to write. Kidney trouble, as usual, and I lost one. Complications and 
it all lasted longer than it should have. Slowly I wrote one sentence and fell 
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back on the pillow. And it was completely different. And that was the one 
that owed most to Robbe-Grillet.
KL: Right. And that was around the time you were translating Dans	le	laby-
rinthe?
CBR: Well, I don’t remember. But I wanted to get away from those obsessive 
detectives and such. His topics didn’t interest me. So I tried to go beyond 
him, using his startling syntax to do something more original, or interesting 
for me. I mean my plot—well there wasn’t one really. But the ideas I explore 
are quite original. What do you think?
KL: Very original, and taking his method for something that seems to me 
to be quite different. Robbe-Grillet’s experiment was fascinating, but very 
claustrophobic, very individual.
CBR: Funnily enough, the method I’m talking about is fully used (I think) 
only in one novel, Jealousy. No first person, of course, we’re inside the un-
known consciousness and we have to reconstruct him solely from what he 
sees, hears, thinks. Anyway, I think I got out of this direct influence but still 
going on with the method. The real freedom was Such, as you happily sug-
gest. And then there was Between. But you’re right, I was always suppressing 
something. People don’t notice, why should they?
KL: I was looking back through your papers in the Ransom library—all the 
reviews. Don’t you feel most of the novels did receive attention? Lorna Sage 
was a particularly good reviewer.
CBR: Yes, she was. But don’t get me wrong on this, I’m not complaining. The 
only plaintiveness I ever felt (if I did) was early on, during my beginnings 
in experiment, that men experimenters seemed to attract more attention. 
But I soon got used to that, familiar still in many domains, the university, 
for instance.
KL: Who, for instance?
CBR: No, I won’t name anyone. Some of them vanished anyway. But don’t 
forget I was also a critic, of myself as well as others. As well as a professor 
judging theses, and it’s easy to don the don’s robe.
 And when I was a reviewer for instance we had eight hundred words for 
four or five novels out of ten sent. And now fewer and fewer get reviewed, 
but get a longer, later, and more individual space. That’s good, I think. The	
Sunday	Times review of Amalgamemnon came a year later. One loses the im-
mediate expectation.
KL: You talk about that in Invisible	Author.
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CBR: I can’t remember.
KL: I’d like to go back to Such. I wanted to return to our discussion of 
Freud.
CBR: The Freud fraud.
KL: I know that Canepari-Labib calls it an attack on psychoanalysis or on 
psychological theory.
CBR: I was glad of that book on me, but barely remember it . . . I was already 
detached.
KL: That’s just a way for me to introduce some questions about Such and psy-
choanalysis—because I disagree with Canepari-Labib’s way of characterizing 
your relation to Freud and psychoanalysis. In Such, there is certainly criticism 
of any ironclad system for codifying the human psyche. That a system could 
specify, for example, five of anything to explain the psyche, is satirized.
CBR: But these are the character’s ideas, his reborn phases as kids, not the 
author’s.
KL: Yes, nevertheless, it seems to me that despite the satire of systemization 
and the way Freud has been misused, the work of language in Such	owes 
much to Freud’s analysis of the language of dreams and jokes. And this kind 
of language was important to you.
CBR: Yes, it’s a question of how it’s used. I’m sure excellently in your case. 
There’s quite a lot of Freud in my work, but it’s not sort of exclusive. I float 
on phantoms.
KL: In Such, in particular, I found it very fruitful to think about the work 
of condensation and displacement in terms of verbal play—a joking quality 
that includes the motif of dying laughing. The protagonist is both a physicist 
and a psychiatrist, right?
CBR: Yes. I was involved in psychoanalysis but more Jungian than Freudian 
at the time.
KL: At that time? I’m very interested because this seems like confirmation of 
my hunches about the language.
CBR: No, you’re right. I did have a brief analysis by an Austrian lady. Some-
one, a friend of mine, who was a psychoanalyst, sent me to a Jungian analyst 
living in Hampstead, and it was all very difficult. But it didn’t last more than 
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a few months. Resistance, they call it. She blocked me with her heavy accent 
and grammatical errors.
KL: So when was that?
CBR: The late fifties it must have been, because out of it came the book about 
my father. So she obviously did help. But Such was not written until 1963, 
published in ’64. I must have got more interested in Freud than I thought. 
But found Jung uselessly fanciful.
KL: Actually, me too. But Freud remains still fruitful for literature.
CBR: Yes, of course. The important thing for me is not to get caught up in 
them, however deeply I may have studied them—or not. That’s the trouble 
with everyone. I fear being labeled as Freudian merely because I use him. 
Not by you in your book but by others using you. After ten years of my 
life working on Pound, nobody has called me Poundian. I might as easily 
be called Hopkinsonian or Mallarmian. Reminds me of an old sad funny 
Turkish story about most Armenian names ending in ian. An American lady- 
tourist mistakenly wrote her profession where the name should be. The pro-
fession was librarian. She was swiftly taken away.
KL: But I thought Canepari-Labib took your satire of Freud as a wholesale 
attack on psychoanalysis. I think it ignores the relevance of the language you 
use that draws on Freud. Did you read Jokes	and	the	Unconscious?
CBR: Yes, of course. And the dreams book.
KL: There are dreams, but the connection between the way language works 
in dreams and jokes seems to me important for Such, because part of it is like 
a stand-up comedy routine. There are some “one-liners.”
CBR: Yes!
KL: Even in the beginning . . . 
CBR: I’ll tell you what I suddenly remember now. I went through a period 
of several years when I had learned how to jot down my dreams and to re-
member them—literally in the dark. I would wake up from a dream, and I 
had a two-page notebook: a dream on the left page, leaving the right for the 
next day’s interpretation, well, my free association. And I think that helped 
me very much. I think I must have thought that after going to this woman 
that this is something I can do on my own.
KL: So she became obsolete, and you continued.
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CBR: She did release me in some way. And there came a point where I 
stopped remembering dreams, so I took it that my unconscious said “basta, 
you know, I don’t want to tell you anymore.”
KL: Or it’ll come into your conscious . . . 
CBR: Not that it effaced my faults. I just recognize them better. All this is 
very Freudian of course.
KL: And was this contemporary with working on Such?
CBR: It started earlier, before the publication of that book about my father, 
written in ’59. But published in sixty I think. It was all very intermittent. 
Then I went to Paris, end of ’68, and plunged into Structuralism, but also 
Derrida and Lacan, who brought Freud more alive to me. I went on jotting 
dreams but ceased when I became far too busy. I can’t remember whether I 
was doing it during the writing of Out and Such and Between.
 I know it’s very much part of me. But so are other things. You’re pin-
pointing my id, but it doesn’t mind.
 When you wrote to tell me about some of your thoughts on the “chil-
dren” in Such, I was simply frightened that you would take these . . . what I 
remembered about these planetary children that represented psychological 
states of the psychoanalyst. And I thought you were perhaps inventing a 
whole biography.
KL: No, no, no, but it’s not so easy to see. I actually had figured out that they 
doubled in age, but wasn’t sure what to do with that. So I didn’t do very 
much with it, but it was clear that these children were parts of his psyche. . . . 
I appreciated getting your letter about that, especially since it confirmed 
what I had deduced about the relationship in their ages.
 There’s a line in Such about “energy passing through matter” that I 
thought might almost be an epigraph for what I want to talk about in your 
books. My project is not just one of looking at theory separate from its fic-
tional working out. The theory materializes in language and linguistic ex-
periment. What I am interested in is how much the fiction is an embodiment 
and wrestling, both intellectual and material, with a particular problematic.
CBR: Oh, lovely. I just wanted to make it clear that all the adventures in Such 
and its sequels—well except Remake obviously—are not consciously out of 
my dreams, but invented. I realize this makes no difference in psychoanalysis.
KL: Well, of course. But for me to say “theory” sounds very abstract, and 
what I’m interested in is the concrete as well. These are novels, so it’s con-
crete in different ways that each novel works out a particular problem, and 
not necessarily the same one. In the process, there are some important issues 
that get taken up that form a kind of intellectual history. In each fiction, 
the constraint helps you work out that problem linguistically. For example, 
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reversing the color bar in Out is connected to the way you use the narrator-
less narrative. Unlike Robbe-Grillet, you use the technique to deal with what 
are also social problems.
CBR: That’s good to hear. Indirectly you mean. I never sort of look back bio-
graphically at my novels as I’ve been doing here. But once I start talking to 
someone who’s interested it’s true, things do come back and seem relevant. 
My early war experience for one. General reports on me say I was a Decoder. 
No, of course not, I’m not clever enough. But all day I read the German mes-
sages that were decoded, masses of it, and the experience, slowly, or fast for 
my youth was seeing the whole war from the enemy’s viewpoint. Der	Feind,	
was us. That does something to one’s imagination. Like inventing characters 
in weird situations for example.
 And the second thing is how, before I started writing novels, I was a me-
dievalist for some eight years. A visitor once commented that the characters 
in my novels don’t seem satisfied with whatever they happen to know and 
they don’t learn, you know. Well, I’ve never been interested in the bildungs-
roman and it seems to me that the novel was rather badly influenced by 
this idea. But I think there are other reasons, and they do involve my own 
experiences as a medievalist. Poetry mostly anonymous, and when a name 
is attached biography is more or less impossible, and even irrelevant. And 
so my interest in literature was much more through allegory, and it’s a very 
static literature. But I obviously didn’t learn, or wasn’t interested in change. 
I don’t really get that until the picaresque, you know. That is change; I mean, 
for instance, in one thirteenth-century French manuscript on the Grail, you 
follow all the knights looking for this Grail, and at one point Lancelot is 
found as a hermit in a hermitage. He is full of repentance of his adultery. 
I was so surprised; it’s not like medieval literature at all. Even in Chaucer, 
people are fairly static. The idea of learning	something . . . of course I think 
my characters do	 learn something, but I don’t announce it. So these things 
that one does that in themselves have nothing to do with what one intends 
to write do influence one. I must stop saying it has nothing to do with what 
I am. Of course it has, but not in the way most people ask.
KL: Let me ask you about the role of grammar in your work. Both in the 
work you did on the importance of verbs in the use of metaphor in English 
poetry (in A	 Grammar	 of	 Metaphor), and also your work on Pound, there 
seems to be a point when semantics becomes less important and you shift 
the discussion to grammar.
CBR: Absolutely. That’s really my upbringing. In a trilingual family, you 
get really grammar conscious very early. And you get all those bilingual 
puns . . . which I went on doing automatically and come up in Between. 
There’s one I remember there: lecheria (milk shop in Spanish). But of course, 
in English means lechery. French keeps the latin, luxuria.
KL: So there are wonderful puns that have to do with nouns, but then it 
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seems to me that there’s also an increasing interest in relationships—prepo-
sitions—and syntax and verbs. In other words, how you get from one thing 
to the other. Increasingly in your novels . . . ”out,” “between,” “through” are 
words that are not nominative, and that are about direction or interstices, 
moving away from a state of something, or a noun. Structuralism puts less 
emphasis on the actual nouns involved than it does on the relationships, the 
links.
CBR: In fact in that book, A	Grammar	of	Metaphor, which I worked on through 
the fifties, I go wild about verbs, which create this movement. And as Latin 
verbs slowly lost or weakened their declensions, prepositions grew stron-
ger and stronger. They’re functional, not independent, and three of my first 
experimental books use one as title. Except Such, which is pretty near but 
more static than a preposition. In old-fashioned grammar, I think it’s called 
an indefinite adjective. I’ve forgotten its status in modern grammar.
KL: I was thinking of the meaning of Tel	Quel? It means “as such”?
CBR: As such, yes.
KL: So I was wondering actually . . . 
CBR: It’s Tel	Quel that gave me the title.
KL: Very good! I’m glad to hear it.
CBR: I got it from Tel	Quel, which I was reading. And it’s not easy because I 
say once or twice, “interested in things as such.” There’s a character who is 
“not interested in things as such.” But otherwise, it’s not underlined.
KL: No, I’m so glad. I was also trying to think about what to make of my 
conjecture that Tel	Quel was a source for the title.
CBR: It must have influenced me strongly because I was determined to go 
to the prepositions and “such” wasn’t a preposition.
KL: But the reversible “as such” and “such as” are so interesting as locutions. 
Because if you say “such as,” then it creates a simile or comparison, right? In 
one part of the novel it says something like, “define presence such as a banis-
ter,” where you take something abstract and create an analogy. So “such” can 
also be “such as,” as in looking forward to a new analogy. Or it can be “as 
such,” which has more to do with a kind of etcetera or predictable path.
CBR: Things as such.
KL: What does that mean?
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CBR: “Such as” would be tels	que.
KL: I would like to ask you about your autobiography without pronouns, 
Remake. You have said that you wrote a first version of it, didn’t you, that 
was close to your life, and perhaps, more standard, but then you rewrote it 
with a constraint on pronouns. Is that accurate?
CBR: More or less. Most of my books were written in one summer. But I 
would put them away, not satisfied, and I’d pick them up the following 
summer. Or usually in the Pound castle. And everything wrong sort of leaps 
out at you. So it’s much easier to rewrite. But Amalgamemnon took four such 
summers, so I never know what to say when they ask me how long does it 
take to write. Is it eight months or is it four years?
 But of course it keeps working in you. Because I could never write during 
the academic year. Too much is going on at different levels. So I have to have 
this concentration. People have such little understanding about concentra-
tion. They can interrupt you at any time, and so on. You find that . . . as a 
Dean. But that’s your job, you know. But with writing a book, I need to be 
in it morning, afternoon, evening and for no pay. And I don’t want to be 
interrupted. Here, for instance, when I have any job to do and I have a phys-
iotherapist who comes anytime in the morning between nine and twelve, I 
won’t sit around for any kind of writing, or even a letter or anything that 
needs concentration, because I know I’m going to be interrupted. So one gets 
quite absurd and neurotic about that.
KL: I think that is the essence of administration. You put yourself out there 
to be interrupted. When I had small children and was doing administration, 
the two activities seemed very similar in some ways. A little child has no 
compunction about claiming your attention.
CBR: They all want attention.
KL: It was such a great pleasure to go to Texas for the modernism conference. 
And then I stayed two extra days, and I just worked from nine in the morn-
ing until five, and looked at your papers and read all the materials. And it 
was such a treat to be back in the library and to be doing work on the project 
that I wanted to be working on.
CBR: That’s why I isolated myself here. A mistake, I guess, with some ad-
vantages.
KL: Do you still have students who are writing to you who are reading 
you?
CBR: No, I’ve stopped. I’ve really lost touch. Partly my fault, can’t be theirs, 
you know. I’m too ill to cope with this kind of perpetual thoughtlessness. I 
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really can’t. That’s why I dealt with this problem. But I usually drop them 
myself. I can’t explain to people why you can’t take this kind of behavior 
anymore. So they drop you and feel good about it and that’s fine.
KL: What are you reading now? I take it you get the New	 York	 Review	 of	
Books.
CBR: Yes, I subscribe to that. And the TLS. And the London	Review	of	Books. 
I’ve spent all my week reading that, no time for other things. I’m reading 
the TLS on Shakespeare. You get that when you subscribe. The early ones 
were anonymous. And I’ve had lots of books I ordered even the Potter, the 
Harry Potter books.
KL: I haven’t read those yet.
CBR: I wanted to see what the success is about. Curious, not jealous—just 
curious.
KL: Have you read it?
CBR: I have read it, and I must say. It was a book you didn’t put down, 
you wanted to know what happens next. But from the point of view of 
structure, she uses all sorts of subgenres, repetitively mixes them up. The 
vampire or the monster. Substory, etc. . . . that thing in the first book. The 
villain is discovered so you forget the actual adventures. Turns out to be 
someone that was never even introduced before you got to that. And that’s 
not a good story. You’ve got to introduce everyone. In the end the readability 
is spurious.
 So it’s kind of strange and patterned always. Every book starts with his 
horrible family. And then he manages to get back to his school, so it’s also 
a boy’s adventure story, which she does very well, oddly enough. But it’s 
always some danger or adventure, or something goes wrong, and then so-
lution, and then another . . . all the time. You get bored with that structure. 
But that’s obviously what people want. But I’m still very puzzled. I think 
the only original thing is that wizards are usually old men. To make the boy 
a wizard, that was quite original.
PreFace
 1. I will return to the issue of the gender of the source.
 2. In Body	Story: The	Ethics	and	Practice	of	Theoretical	Conflict, Richard Terdiman 
discusses this vexed relationship between “language and bodies” in twentieth-
century fiction, noting its antecedents in Enlightenment texts such as Diderot’s. 
Brooke-Rose dramatizes this heritage and, like Terdiman, disputes claims of post-
modern exceptionalism by including Diderot’s Jacques, the fatalist, as one of her 
characters in her metacritical novel, Thru. See Richard Terdiman, Body	and	Story:	
The	Ethics	and	Practice	of	Theoretical	Conflict (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
chaPter one
 1. Brooke-Rose’s notebooks for the story read like the compulsive note-taking 
of a medical student studying for an exam on the nervous system, replete with 
diagrams of brain function. As in her later fiction, she is scrupulous in employ-
ing scientific terminology to create the operative metaphors of the text. She takes 
pains to ensure that her sadistic phantom limb “haunts” his victim in scientifically 
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reputable ways. It is a tragic irony constantly apparent to Brooke-Rose that in her 
eighties she has suffered from polyneuritis of the extremities and a permanent 
burning feeling in her feet. As she says in a private correspondence, “Pain is a 
companion” (e-mail to author, 1 November 2001).
 2. Quoted in Sharon Cameron, Lyric	Time:	Dickinson	and	the	Limits	of	Genre (Bal-
timore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979) 28. Cameron describes the experience 
of pain in Dickinson’s poems as an experience of self-severing: “The self perceived 
as other” (28). She sees this as an explanation for the personification of body parts 
in Dickinson’s poems: “They are, in the telling, isolated from the rest of the body 
and hence, metaphorically at any rate, severed from it.” Cameron describes this 
experience as “survival.”
 3. Christine Brooke-Rose, Thru,	in The	Christine	Brooke-Rose	Omnibus:	Four	Nov-
els (Manchester: Carcanet, 1986) 723.
 4. See Christine Brooke-Rose, “The Squirm of the True II: The Long Glasses—A 
Structural Analysis,” Poetics	and	the	Theory	of	Literature 1.3 (1976). Felman’s essay 
was published in Yale	French	Studies, nos. 55–6 (Summer 1977).
 5. Roland Barthes’s own ‘fulcrum’ text between structuralism and poststruc-
turalism, S/Z, can be fruitfully contrasted to Brooke-Rose’s essay. In the latter, 
the structuralist methodology produces the poststructuralist reading. In S/Z the 
systematicity of the codes coexists, but is never quite reconciled, with the starred 
sections of analysis. Barthes’s fascinating riffs on interpretation seem to undo the 
system itself.
 6. On the subject of formal constraint and invention, see Wordsworth’s son-
net “Nuns Fret Not at Their Convent’s Narrow Room,” a poem about the sonnet 
form:
Nuns fret not at their convent’s narrow room;
And hermits are contented with their cells;
And students with their pensive citadels;
Maids at the wheel, the weaver at his loom,
Sit blithe and happy; bees that soar for bloom,
High as the highest Peak of Furness-fells,
Will murmur by the hour in foxglove bells:
In truth the prison, unto which we doom
Ourselves, no prison is: and hence for me,
In sundry moods, ’t was pastime to be bound
Within the Sonnet’s scanty plot of ground;
Pleased if some Souls (for such there needs must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,
Should find brief solace there, as I have found.
William Wordsworth, “Nuns Fret Not at Their Convent’s Narrow Room,” The	
Poetical	Works	of	Wordsworth	(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982) 346.
 7. See Raymond Queneau, “‘Potential Literature,’” trans. Warren F. Motte, Jr., 
Oulipo:	A	Primer	of	Potential	Literature, ed. Warren F. Motte, Jr. (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1986) 51.
 8. Motte’s collection, which includes biographical and bibliographical material 
on the Oulipean group, cites only one woman, poet Michèle Métail, who joined 
the group in 1974. Among the best known Oulipeans beside Queneau are Georges 
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Perec, Italo Calvino, Marcel Duchamp, François Le Lionnais, Harry Matthews, 
Jacques Roubaud, and Albert-Marie Schmidt. See Warren F. Motte, Jr., ed., Oulipo:	
A	Primer	of	Potential	Literature 175.
 9. See a discussion of Oulipo’s advertisements of constraints in Peter Consen-
stein, Literary	Memory,	Consciousness,	 and	 the	Group	Oulipo (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2002) 41.
 10. An interesting side note is that Gilbert Adair, the translator, also published 
a novel called The	Death	of	the	Author.
 11. I am reminded of an anecdote a close musician friend told me. Several years 
ago, Jim Hill, a very talented jazz guitarist, played a solo at the memorial service 
held for Bill Evans, one of the greatest jazz pianists and a musician with whom 
Hill had made a series of recordings. Hill played a tune that struck my friend as 
particularly odd, although she could not identify the reason for her discomfort. 
Many hours after the service ended, she realized what it was. Without announcing 
it, Hill had been playing the notes that he had played with Evans in one of their 
duos. What was missing was Evans’s part. Some time later, my friend saw Hill 
and mentioned her intuition. He told her she was the only one at the service who 
seemed to understand that Hill had expressed Evans’s absence technically through 
omission.
 12. Francesco Orlando, Obsolete	Objects	in	the	Literary	Imagination:	Ruins,	Relics,	
Rarities,	Rubbish,	Uninhabited	Places,	and	Hidden	Treasures, trans. Gabriel Pihas and 
Daniel Seidel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 64. Orlando sees litera-
ture’s obsession with the nonfunctional as the return of the repressed, a negating 
of society’s emphasis on functionality and productivity.
 13. In my decision to exclude Next and Verbivore	 from my reading of Brooke-
Rose, I have taken my lead from her own assessment of the novels. In her sum-
mary of her novels in Invisible	Author and in her critical discussions of her work 
in general, Brooke-Rose gives only cursory attention to Next	 and to Verbivore, 
her sequel to Xorandor. Calling Next	her “least original in terms of subject matter 
(streetsleepers)” (19), she further admits that its reliance on dialect imposed a 
disconcerting visual screen between the reader and the text. Thus her assessment 
is that the “what” of the novel was less interesting and its “how” obstructive. It 
should be clear that the category of difficulty intrigues rather than daunts me; 
however, I do find Next	both more predictable in its content (and politics) and less 
fruitful in its narrative experiments. For different reasons, Brooke-Rose dismisses 
Verbivore as the less successful of her two science fiction novels. Faulting her-
self for sending the manuscript too quickly to the publisher after its completion, 
Brooke-Rose opines that she missed an opportunity to develop a “splendid idea” 
further “(creatures feeding on our broadcast words and getting so overloaded they 
demolish all our systems)” (18). In this case, I am in sympathy with my writer’s 
criticism at the expense of her fiction. I, too, find the dialogic Xorandor, with its 
amalgamations of hardware, software, and wetware, a much more fascinating 
example than Verbivore of technology’s potential threat and possibilities.
chaPter tWo
 1. Christine Brooke-Rose, Out, in The	Christine	Brooke-Rose	Omnibus:	Four	Nov-
els (Manchester: Carcanet, 1986) 11.
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 2. Christine Brooke-Rose, “Samuel Beckett and the Anti-Novel,” The	 London	
Magazine 5 (1958): 46.
 3. Brooke-Rose has linked the almost trance-like state of Out to her own ex-
perience with serious illness in 1962, when she lost a kidney and almost died. “I 
was very much thinking of death as the meaning of life. And I began to write 
Out, which is a very ‘sick’ novel. I think one can feel that.” See Ellen G. Friedman 
and Miriam Fuchs, “A Conversation with Christine Brooke-Rose,” Utterly	Other	
Discourse:	 The	 Texts	 of	 Christine	 Brooke-Rose, eds. Ellen G. Friedman and Richard 
Martin (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1995) 30.
 4. In an earlier essay entitled “Dynamic Gradients” (1965), Brooke-Rose de-
scribes the way the subjective and objective converge in Sarraute’s writing: “The 
intensely subjective is treated, not just with ‘ironic detachment’—that critical cliché 
bestowed on most lady-novelists—but with total scientific objectivity and humil-
ity, qualities not found in Virginia Woolf with whom Nathalie Sarraute is so often 
compared. These half-conscious movements and murderous impulses are viewed 
like organisms caught and enlarged in an electron microscope.” Christine Brooke-
Rose, “Dynamic Gradients,” The	London	Magazine March 1965: 93.
 5. In Christine	Brooke-Rose	and	Contemporary	Fiction, Sarah Birch views the “new 
epistemology,” or what I am calling the “yoking” together of disparate realms, as 
a negative example of the “coercive use of metaphor” in Out (56). However, she 
does acknowledge another use of metaphor, which she links to the mind of the 
central consciousness who produces “creative metaphors which distort, subvert, 
and ‘mobilize’ the language of authority” (Birch 62–63). But the narratorless nar-
rative is more labile than this parsing into good and bad uses would suggest. The 
coldness, what I am describing as the “flattening” effect of this yoking resembles 
the intellectual conceits of the Metaphysical poets. Brooke-Rose herself says that 
this kind of conceit “resolv[es] the contradictory aspects of emotional experience 
in relation to the changing validities of time and the physical world” (Christine 
Brooke-Rose, “The Baroque Imagination of Robbe-Grillet,” Modern	Fiction	Studies 
11.4 [1965–66]: 410). In an excellent discussion of the novel, Ursula Heise says, 
“The peculiar disjunctiveness of perceptions in Out does not seem due to illness so 
much as to a world whose basic functional parameters have changed so radically 
that conventional reasoning cannot account for them anymore” (229).
 6. In “‘Look into the Dark’: On Dystopia and the Novum,” Tom Moylan refers 
to Darko Suvin’s dictum that “a significant SF [science fiction] text must be based 
on ‘new configurations of reality in both inner and outer space’” (64).
 7. The doctor tells the man, “We’re not only able to telescope a dependence 
that used to take years to build up, we telescope the let-down as well. You’ll see, 
the wrench will be fairly painless” (141). 
 8. In my reading of Disgrace, I am indebted to two excellent lectures on the 
novel: Gayatri Spivak’s discussion of the desublimation and counter-focalization 
in the novel , (UC Irvine, 5/24/02); and Derek Attridge on the new fluidity of hu-
man relations in the South Africa of the novel (rev. and published in Attridge, J.	
M.	Coetzee	and	the	Ethics	of	Reading:	Literature	in	the	Event	[Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2004]).
 9. Christine Brooke-Rose, Such, in The	Christine	Brooke-Rose	Omnibus:	Four	Nov-
els (Manchester: Carcanet, 1986) 295.
 10. See Birch, 64–69; Canepari-Labib, 71–75 and 185–204; and Brooke-Rose, In-
visible	Author, 17.
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 11. It is the parsing of parts of the self (as in the case of the orbital “children”) 
that may account for this uncharacteristic reliance on speech mode and, along 
with it, the first person pronoun. In an exchange with Brooke-Rose, she balked at 
the description of her narrative sentence as “first-person,” surprised that she had 
somehow broken from the “narratorless” sentence she developed in Out: “When I 
read your description ’1st person narrative’ I jumped (mentally). For years I have 
thought, and probably said, that the first three ‘experimental’ books from OUT 
develop ‘my’ Narrative Sentence (NS), in fact Robbe-Grillet’s in JALOUSIE but he 
doesn’t develop it further and returns to the 1st person, whereas I have played 
around with it throughout, with only a few sidesteps, for specific reasons each 
time (AMAL, XORANDOR, VERBIVORE . . . then back to the NS from REMAKE on, 
with experiments like NS in changing multiviewpoint.” Brooke-Rose acknowl-
edges the presence of the personal pronoun in Such, but maintains that at the end 
of the novel, NS reappears and Larry’s ‘I’ vanishes (Brooke-Rose e-mail, 22 July 
2004). 
 12. Brooke-Rose, who aggressively resists the label “Freudian,” read Jung, 
Freud, and Lacan in Paris. She has admitted reluctantly that for a brief time even 
before the Paris period, she was treated by a Jungian analyst who told her to re-
cord her dreams every morning (see “A Discussion with Christine Brooke-Rose”). 
Along with the essay “Id is, is id?,” Brooke-Rose’s analysis of James’s The	Turn	
of	 the	 Screw in A	 Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal draws most explicitly on Freud, includ-
ing, in the latter essay, Jokes	 and	 their	Relation	 to	 the	Unconscious. In this reading, 
Brooke-Rose mentions the Freud text in detail, along with Jeffrey Mehlman’s fine 
interpretation in “How to Read Freud on Jokes: The Critic as Schadchen.”
  In an e-mail to me about Freud, dated October 11, 2004, she writes that she 
“must have read Dreams and Jokes since everyone had. But there was no specific 
or personal F. influence till SUCH, and there it’s always Larry thinking or speaking, 
not me.” 
 13. See Hanssen on Derrida 208 and Eating Well.
 14. Christine Brooke-Rose, Between, in The	Christine	Brooke-Rose	Omnibus:	Four	
Novels (Manchester: Carcanet, 1986) 395.
chaPter three
 1. For an earlier version of this chapter and comparison with another post-
modern “vessel of conception,” see Karen R. Lawrence, “Postmodern ‘Vessels of 
Conception’: Brooke-Rose and Brophy,” Penelope	Voyages:	Women	and	Travel	in	the	
British	Literary	Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) 207–36.
 2. This is not the place for airing my reservations about Barthes’s basic binary 
schema, which seems to characterize types of reading rather than to offer a typol-
ogy of texts. For a helpful discussion of Barthes’s model, see Kaja Silverman, The	
Subject	of	Semiotics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
 3. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of Thru, Brooke-Rose’s most 
explicit fictional engagement with French theory.
 4. In an excellent article on Brooke-Rose’s fiction, Robert Caserio discusses 
the burdens this kind of free play places on the reader, who has to run to keep up 
with the hectic and unexpected trajectory of the narrative: “The xorandoric text 
needs a reader who is critically hyperactive. He who runs may not read any longer, 
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unless he runs and reads with an unparalleled quickness to catch up with and 
catch hold of meanings that are rigorous and self-contradictory, determinate and 
indeterminate, at crucial points” (293). In speaking of the “hectic mobility” of this 
type of contemporary fiction, Caserio uses Brooke-Rose’s own term, “xorandoric,” 
which refers to semantic disjunctions and incoherences more than to the kind of 
syntactic displacements described in Brooke-Rose’s statement above. Between	re-
lies on both syntactic errancies and semantic gaps of the sort Barthes describes to 
create a dizzying dislocation in the reader. See Robert L. Caserio, “Mobility and 
Masochism: Christine Brooke-Rose and J. G. Ballard,” Novel 21 (Winter–Spring 
1988): 292–310.
 5. For a discussion of anomie, see Christopher Herbert, Culture	 and	Anomie:	
Ethnographic	Imagination	in	the	Nineteenth	Century (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991).
 6. In Brigid Brophy’s  In	Transit:	An	Heroi-Cyclic	Novel (New York: G. P. Put-
nam’s Sons, 1969) Brophy also uses air travel as the quintessential metaphor for 
twentieth-century culture: “I adopt the international airport idiom for my native. 
Come, be my world-oyster” (28). The narrator accepts the way the pure products 
of postmodern jet-age culture collapse the foreign into the familiar: “This airport 
was the happy ape of all other airports. Its display case cased and displayed the 
perfumes of Arabia and of Paris, packaged in the style to which they have become 
acCustomed [sic] through the universal Excise of capital letters and full stops 
in the typography. Every artifact in sight excited me, raised me towards tip-toe. 
None was everyday. All were exotic. Yet nothing chilled or alienated me, since 
nothing was unfamiliar. The whole setting belonged to my	century” (26). Brophy 
and Brooke-Rose were friends for many years.
 7. In a letter to me, Brooke-Rose specified that this false start consisted of 
about twenty pages (Letter to author, August 5, 1992).
 8. See Nancy Armstrong, Desire	and	Domestic	Fiction:	A	Political	History	of	 the	
Novel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
 9. Dean MacCannell, The	Tourist:	A	New	Theory	of	the	Leisure	Class (New York: 
Schocken, 1976).
 10. For a good statement of this change in tone and attitude between modern-
ism and postmodernism, see Alan Wilde, Horizons	of	Assent:	Modernism,	Postmod-
ernism,	and	the	Ironic	Imagination (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
For my critique of this approach, see my review of Wilde’s book in Novel	(Karen 
Lawrence, Novel 16 [1983]).
 11. See Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Forms	of	Violence:	Narrative	 in	Assyrian	
Art	 and	Modern	 Culture (New York: Schocken Books, 1985) for an antinarrative 
theory that privileges art that represents the “pleasurable movement” of desire 
and meaning (105) and Caserio’s critique of Bersani in his excellent discussion of 
Brooke-Rose in Caserio, “Mobility and Masochism: Christine Brooke-Rose and J. 
G. Ballard” 295–98.
 12. In a critique of Ihab Hassan’s definitional distinctions between modern-
ism and postmodernism, Brooke-Rose objects to the oppositional structure of his 
paradigm as much as to the overly broad and simplified categories she discovers 
in much theorizing of the postmodern: “I find both terms peculiarly unimaginative 
for a criticism that purports to deal with phenomena of which the most striking 
feature is imagination, and I shall use them only when discussing critics who 
use them. For one thing, they are purely historical, period words, and in that 
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sense, traditional” (“Eximplosions” 344). In recent years Brooke-Rose has come to 
identify her own experimentalism with postmodernism and does make use of the 
term. Still, her novels, including Between,	explore the continuity between modern-
ist and postmodernist literature, destroying the neat divisions hypothesized by 
many theorists. In Constructing	Postmodernism	(which I read after this chapter was 
written) Brian McHale categorizes Between	as a modernist novel with a “postmod-
ernist undertow” (215).
 13. Reed Way Dasenbrock’s Modern Language Association (MLA) paper “Anat-
omies of Internationalism in Tarr	and Howards	End”	(unpublished paper presented 
at the 108th MLA Convention, 28 December 1992) offers a lively and important 
discussion of nationalism and internationalism in the related contexts of 1932 and 
1912.
 14. See Brooke-Rose’s more recent essay on Pound in Christine Brooke-Rose, 
Make	It	New:	The	Rise	of	Modernism, ed. Kurt Heinzelman (Austin, TX: Harry Ran-
som Humanities Research Center, 2003).
 15. Brooke-Rose’s novel often echoes Eliot’s poetry of the twenties, such as The	
Waste	Land and The	Hollow	Men, particularly in its insistent litany of “betweens” 
(“Between doing and not doing the body floats” [395], or as one character says, 
“We live between ideas, nicht wahr?” [413]. This cadence of the “between” con-
veys an Eliotic feeling of interstitiality, a sense of waiting for chronos, or “ordinary 
time,” to be transformed into kairos, or “time redeemed.” How to discover the sa-
cred in the detritus of culture—this, the question of both Eliot and Pound—recurs 
in Between. “The gods have left this land says Siegfried now the boss” (431), the 
jaded former German soldier and past lover of the translator. Near the end of the 
novel, the anonymous translator and Bertrand, an aging French suitor who writes 
love letters to her, discuss Eliot’s poetry. He asks if she has ever read Eliot’s poem 
“la figlia che piange,” which reminds him of her, and he quotes some of its lines. 
She has only heard of Eliot: “He wrote something called The Waste Land didn’t 
he?” (548–49). “Tired of your still point?” Siegfried taunts the translator when she 
announces her plans to sell her domestic refuge in Wiltshire.
 16. See Brooke-Rose’s discussion of Susan Suleiman’s “close reading and imagi-
native criticism” as opposed to a rigid, more flat-footed “biographical criticism,” 
against which Brooke-Rose has inveighed many times in print (“Splitlitcrit,” in 
Invisible	Author 32–35).
 17. I am indebted to Robert Caserio for this notion.
 18. See also Blanchot’s exploration of passivity: 14–18.
 19. The importance of prepositions in general can be seen in the titles of Brooke-
Rose’s other novels as well—Out and Thru,	 included with Between	 in the four-
novel collection Omnibus.	For a meditation on the sexuality of grammar, see Shari 
Benstock, Textualizing	the	Feminine:	On	the	Limits	of	Genre (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
 20. All sorts of puns on the idea of height circulate in the novel: “I have con-
ducted my higher education by transmitting other people’s ideas,” says Siegfried 
(Between 426).
 21. Even the “myths” of deconstruction are caught in this euphemizing, this 
gendering. In his essay “Des Tours de Babel,” Derrida tropes the translator as the 
male in hot pursuit of the virgin translation: “The always intact, the intangible, the 
untouchable (unberührbar)	is what fascinates and orients the work of the translator. 
He wants to touch the untouchable, that which remains of the text when one has 
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extracted from it the communicable meaning. . . . If one can risk a proposition in 
appearance so absurd, the text will be even more virgin after the passage of the 
translator, and the hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other 
hymen, the contract signed and the marriage consummated” (191–92).
 22. For the most thorough description of Brooke-Rose’s development of her 
“narratorless present tense” narrative sentence (153), her main narrative “con-
straint” in her novels since Out, see “The Author is Dead: Long Live the Author” 
in Brooke-Rose, Invisible	Author.
 23. The “distant brain” in Between	is technologically updated in Brooke-Rose’s 
novel Textermination	 by the “aerobrain”—both a vehicle of transportation on 
which characters travel (and thus a “vehicle” of plot) and a computer-like mem-
ory containing a host of fictional characters from various literary traditions and 
periods.
chaPter Four
 1. See Patrick Ffrench, The	 Time	 of	 Theory:	 A	 History	 of	 Tel	 Quel	 (1960–1983) 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
 2. See Paul de Man, The	Resistance	to	Theory (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1986).
 3. See Christine Brooke-Rose, “Letter from Paris: Ganging Up,” Spectator, 27 
March 1976: 26.
 4. Christine Brooke-Rose, “Viewpoint,” Times	Literary	Supplement 1 June 1973, 
614.
 5. In “SplitlitCrit,” she comments on “the great innovation of Structuralism,” 
which signaled a “new attention to narrative structure—new, I mean, in the West” 
(Invisible	Author 24).
 6. See de Man, The	Resistance	to	Theory. “Nothing can overcome the resistance 
to theory since theory is itself this resistance. . . . Yet literary theory is not in danger 
of going under; it cannot but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more it flour-
ishes, since the language it speaks is the language of self-resistance” (19–20).
 7. See, for example, her discussion of the structure of the imaginary, in “The 
Turn of the Screw,” Christine Brooke-Rose, A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 47.
 8. Hanjo Berressem, “Thru the Looking Glass: A Journey into the Universe of 
Discourse,” Review	of	Contemporary	Fiction 9.3 (1995): 129–33. Berressem is particu-
larly good at explaining Brooke-Rose’s subversion of the subject in relation to the 
Lacanian mirror, in which the subject’s self-recognition (and misrecognition) loops 
through the domain of the “Other.” See also Sarah Birch’s excellent discussion of 
the mirror in Thru	 in chapter 3 of Brooke-Rose	 and	Contemporary	 Fiction	 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 76–112.
 9. See Glyn White, “‘You Are Here’: Reading and Representation in Christine 
Brooke-Rose’s Thru,” Poetics	Today 23.4 (2002): 611–31.
 10. “Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Uncon-
scious,” in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 
316.
 11. In representing the contents of the girl’s dream, Brooke-Rose joins Lacan 
in linking the problem of “Who speaks” with the perception that the problem is 
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related to the operations of the unconscious. ‘“I am merely referring obliquely 
to . . . the right way to reply to the question, ‘Who is speaking?,’ when it is the 
subject of the unconscious that is at issue. For this reply cannot come from that 
subject if he does not know what he is saying, or even if he is speaking, as the 
entire experience of analysis has taught us” (See “The Subversion of the Subject 
and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” [Lacan, Écrits	299]). The 
self-reflexivity of the narrative in Thru, however, exceeds any single “key,” includ-
ing psychoanalysis as a reading practice.
 12. See Birch’s fine discussion of Greimas’s paradigm (91–92).
 13. Derrida mentions Democritus in his fascinating discussion of blindness and 
self-portraiture in Jacques Derrida, Memoirs	of	the	Blind:	The	Self-Portrait	and	Other	
Ruins, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1993).
 14. Martin Jay notes that in Sartre’s work, as in Bataille’s, “the eye is identi-
fied . . . with liquid images of the fetus or womb, which links it to the mother in 
repellent ways” (281).
 15. Glossing this section, Brooke-Rose refers to “the wax tablets or early writing 
(stone and parchment written horizontally), as well as Freud’s mystic writing pad 
as discussed by Derrida (1978)” (Invisible	Author 76).
 16. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane, eds., In	Dora’s	Case:	Freud-Hysteria-
Feminism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 2. In “Woman as Semiotic 
Object,” Brooke-Rose alludes to Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément’s discus-
sion of hysteria in The	Newly	Born	Woman and observes that the very word “hyste-
ria, from ustera, uterus, womb, is misogynous.” See Hélène Cixous and Catherine 
Cléments, The	Newly	Born	Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986).
 17. A number of reviews of the novel confirm the risk involved in the writing 
strategy.
 18. Cristopher Nash, World	Postmodern	Fiction:	A	Guide	(London and New York: 
Longman, 1987) 157.
 19. Foreword to	Monique David-Ménard, Hysteria	from	Freud	to	Lacan:	Body	and	
Language	 in	 Psychoanalysis, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) xii.
 20. See Brad Buchanan, “‘A Blind Spot in Your Own Youdipeon Discourse’: 
Christine Brooke-Rose, Oedipus, and the Synecdochic Narrative,”	Hungarian	Jour-
nal	of	English	and	American	Studies 5.2 (1999): 195–208.	Brooke-Rose acknowledges 
the richness and staying power of the myth of Oedipus that underwrites cultural 
narratives so durably, and displays no nostalgia for the narrative. Contrast Steven 
Spielberg’s treatment of the Freudian Oedipal narrative in AI. Although the film 
is highly imaginative technically and technologically (according to the norms of 
science fiction), it is surprisingly traditional in envisioning the radical future. The 
film ends with an Oedipal wish—to sleep in the bed of the mother. For all the 
technical adventurousness and dark apocalyptic resonance, resolution seems to 
lie in the body of the mother.
 21. In “Mobility and Masochism: Christine Brooke-Rose and J. G. Ballard,” 
Novel	(1988): 292–310.
 22. Christine Brooke-Rose, “Woman as Semiotic Object,” Stories,	 Theories	 and	
Things	(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 238.
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chaPter Five
 1. See Brooke-Rose, Stories,	Theories	and	Things 10.
 2. Mira has an intertextual presence in both Verbivore	and Textermination. In-
deed, there is speculation within Textermination that Mira is the author of the text, 
and in Verbivore she creates one of the other characters on her computer. This 
“transfer” between texts might be one playful meaning of the term “Intercom” in 
Brooke-Rose’s phrase for the grouping of her four novels.
 3. See Ellen G. Friedman and Miriam Fuchs, “A Conversation with Christine 
Brooke-Rose,” Utterly	Other	Discourse:	The	Texts	of	Christine	Brooke-Rose, eds. Ellen 
J. Friedman and Richard Martin (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1995) 34.
 4. “This century seems to us more and more fortuitous despite all our attempts 
at rational planning, scientific analysis, and system-building (including rhetoric). 
Never before have the meaning-making means at our disposal (linguistic, econom-
ic, political, scientific) appeared so inadequate, not only to cope with the enormity 
of the problems we continue to create (since every apparent solution creates new 
problems), but simply to explain the world.” Brooke-Rose, A	Rhetoric	of	the	Unreal 
6.
 5. In A	 Rhetoric	 of	 the	 Unreal, Brooke-Rose comments on what she calls the 
“gnostic dream of the best of scientific, technological and artistic brainstuff en-
veloping the earth” in terms that provide a gloss to the neologism “Oblitopia” in 
Amalgamemnon. She compares this “dream” to “Wells’s collective mind or world-
wide information service . . . which presupposes an unprecedented harmony of 
minds: a mad and perhaps naïve fusion of oblivion and utopia one could call 
oblitopia” (388–89). She calls this fantasy “an elitist dream” (388).
 6. See Michael Wood’s discussion of this myth in Michael Wood, The	Road	to	
Delphi:	The	Life	and	Afterlife	of	Oracles (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003) 
28.
 7. Gertrude Stein, Narration:	Four	Lectures	by	Gertrude	Stein (Westport: Green-
wood, 1969) 37.
 8. For a reading of prophecy and the writing of the future in Stein’s Mrs.	
Reynolds and Brooke-Rose’s Amalgamemnon, see Karen R. Lawrence, “Who Could 
Have Read the Signs? Politics and Prediction in Gertrude Stein’s Mrs.	Reynolds	and 
Christine Brooke-Rose’s Amalgamemnon,” Western	Humanities	 Review 59.2 (2005): 
18–38.
 9. In an undated letter commenting on an early version of Amalgamemnon 
entitled “Soon” that Brooke-Rose sent to him, Joseph McElroy shrewdly but gen-
tly assesses the tonal successes and weaknesses that result from the constraint of 
nonconstative verbs. He comments on the “worldweariness” of parts of the novel, 
which he says is “so much at odds with the bursting appetite that lives in the 
book’s main voice.” He contrasts this weary tone with those sections where “the 
future tense becomes a mad, rich sluice or pivot or music that lets us into good 
possibilities. So I wd say, go easy on the future’s I’ve-seen-it-all resignation and 
use the ingneuities [sic] and poignance of speculation more.” McElroy’s letter can 
be found in the Brooke-Rose archive at the Ransom Center at the University of 
Texas at Austin.
 10. Brooke-Rose also identifies Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s excellent discussion of 
the omission of constative sentences as a help to her in clarifying her own tech-
nique (48). For Lecercle’s essay, see Jean-Jacques Lecercle, “‘Reading Amalgamem-
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non,’” in Utterly	Other	Discourse:	The	Texts	of	Christine	Brooke-Rose	153–69.
 11. In Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno, The	Utopian	Function	of	Art	and	Litera-
ture:	 Selected	 Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenberg (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1988) 1–17.
 12. Xorandor is an example that could qualify as alternative fiction, as is the 
dystopian novel, Out.
 13. For critiques of Jameson’s view of the ideology of modernism, see Karen R. 
Lawrence, “‘Close Encounters,’” James	 Joyce	Quarterly 41, nos. 1 and 2 (Fall 2003 
and Winter 2004): 129–30 and Robert L. Caserio, “‘Edwardians to Georgians,’” 
The	Cambridge	History	of	English	Literature, eds. Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 281.
 14. In “‘I draw the line as a rule between one solar system and another’: The 
Postmodernism(s) of Christine Brooke-Rose,” Brian McHale refers to characters 
“ontologically enfeebled by their ‘native’ context” [in Amalgamemnon], and makes 
the intriguing suggestion that their reappearance in later novels of the Intercom 
Quartet helps them “somehow” acquire “a degree of ontological robustness ‘be-
tween’ texts, in the passage from their home text to its sequel” (202).
 15. See Michela Canepari-Labib’s detailed discussion of the shifting ontological 
levels in Amalgamemnon in Word-Worlds 83–94.
chaPter six
 1. In ET, adult receptivity is gendered: the mother is child-like and incompe-
tent, more on the wavelength of her children than the scientific/patriarchal con-
tinuum of either her husband or the scientists who invade her home. In Xorandor, 
the mother’s irritability seems to be a symptom of her marginality and frustration. 
The twins report, but do not dwell on, her sometimes bizarre public behavior.
 2. Brooke-Rose, an inveterate researcher who takes copious notes from scien-
tific source material for some of her novels, has said that in writing Xorandor, she 
relied on Terrence W. Pratt’s Programming	 Languages:	 Design	 and	 Implementation,	
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984). See Pratt 68.
 3. See “The Dissolution of Character in the Novel,” Reconstructing	Individual-
ism:	 Autonomy,	 Individuality,	 and	 the	 Self	 in	 Western	 Thought, ed. Morton Sosna, 
Thomas C. Heller, and David Wellerby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1986) 193. See also Christine Brooke-Rose, “Where Do We Go from Here?” Granta 
3 (1980): 161–88.
 4.  Bolter goes on to say that the design of the digital computer “is perfectly 
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 5. See Ambrose Bierce, “Moxon’s Master,” The	Complete	Short	Stories	of	Ambrose	
Bierce (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970) 89-97.
 6. In “The Dissolution of Character in the Novel II,” Brooke-Rose herself 
points to the limitations of the binary logic of the computer, though citing dif-
ferent failings, namely, a reification of the dominant binaries of Western civiliza-
tion exposed in deconstruction, particularly the persistence of phallocentricism 
in the multiple semiological systems. She argues that Western society has been 
locked in such thinking for centuries, and computers, unless creatively used, could 
merely reify and confirm these coded clichés. She says, “[C]omputer science seems 
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to root our thought structures—either again (i.e., despite the apparent escape of 
deconstruction) or even more deeply—in the absolute limitation imposed by logi-
cal operations based on binary oppositions, whose positive and negative values, 
since they are mere electric impulses, are of course completely neutral and un-
privileged” (194).
 7. See Caserio, “Mobility and Masochism: Christine Brooke-Rose and J. G. 
Ballard,” Novel	(1988): 292–310.
 8. Zab, in particular, refers to Plato often, including a Derridean reading of 
Plato’s logocentric privileging of speech over writing. Her explanation to Jip is 
Brooke-Rose’s playful citation of Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” and refers to read-
ing notes she took on Derrida’s 1968 essay, first published in French in Tel Quel. 
She took the notes when working on Pound, but used them later in Xorandor and 
in an allusion to Derrida’s essay in Thru: “ . . . what begins in banality has to go 
through the whole signifiying chain from idyll to catastrophe until it can be re-
turned to banality, beneath contempt, amusing maybe and harmless, a poison and 
a pharmakon that immunises. And he is the temporary pharmakos or scrapegloat, 
but only for a time.” Christine Brooke-Rose, Thru 711–12.
 9. Jacques Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Mis-
siles, Seven Missives),” Diacritics 14 (1984): 20–31.
 10. In her essay, “Id is, is id?” published a year after Xorandor	 (and reprinted 
in Stories,	Theories	and	Things), Brooke-Rose speculates on how Freud and Derrida 
would make use of the technological possibilities of computer memory to “up-
date” Freud’s analogy between the mystic writing pad and psychic memory. In 
mentioning Derrida’s essay, Brooke-Rose emphasizes the link between death and 
memory explicit in the French term for computer memory, or Read-Only Memory 
(ROM), mémoire	morte. In the same article, Brooke-Rose refers to Derrida’s descrip-
tion of the machine as “a mechanism without its own energy. The machine is 
dead, it is death.” Christine Brooke-Rose, “Id is, is id,” Stories,	Theories	and	Things 
35–36.
 11. The impulse to write beyond the ending of the story is one that Brooke-
Rose pursues in the “sequel” to Xorandor, Verbivore, which takes place twenty-three 
years after the events of Xorandor. The sacrifice of Xorandor has not put an end 
to the nuclear threat, as interference from Xorandor’s offspring wreak havoc on 
the world economy. Brooke-Rose has admitted her own dissatisfaction with the 
novel.
 12. N. Katherine Hayles, How	We	Became	Posthuman:	Virtual	Bodies	in	Cybernet-
ics,	Literature,	and	Informatics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1999) 56.
 13. Sarah Birch, Christine	Brooke-Rose	and	Contemporary	Fiction (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1994) 126.
 14. Tom Boncza-Tomaszewski, “Christine Brooke-Rose: The Texterminator,” The	
Independent	Online	Edition March 27 2005.
chaPter seven
 1. See “The Ideology of Modernism.” In 20th	 Century	 Literary	 Criticism:	 A	
Reader, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 1972) 474–87.
 2. However, as the narrative progresses, we discover the identities of some of 
its “authors.”
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 3. See Brian McHale’s discussion of the “ontological effects” of characters ap-
pearing in a text and its sequel. “These effects, familiar from realist (e.g., Balzac) 
and modernist (e.g., Faulkner) as well as postmodernist poetics (e.g., Barth, Pyn-
chon), arise because characters who exist ‘between’ texts, intertextually, seem to 
approach the ontological status of beings who exist ‘outside’ texts, in the real 
world.” McHale specifically mentions the transfer of characters, including Mira 
Enketei, from Amalgamemnon to Verbivore, which, he says, “has the effect of actu-
alizing them retroactively. It is as if these characters, ontologically so enfeebled 
by their ‘native’ context [i.e., the lack of “realized” tenses], somehow acquired a 
degree of ontological robustness ‘between’ texts, in the passage from their home 
text to its sequel” (202). Brian McHale, “‘I draw the line as a rule between one solar 
system and another’: The Postmodernism(s) of Christine Brooke-Rose,” Utterly	
Other	Discourse 192–213. Brooke-Rose includes a joking allusion to the “non-real-
ized” tenses of Amalgamemnon in a piece of dialogue in which Mansall Roberts 
comments on her speech: “That’s a lot of conditionals, my dear Miss er-Inky-
tie . . . .” (Textermination	101)
 4. One can see this kind of “speculation” as a fictional analogue to the critical 
conjecture of Virginia Woolf, who ponders what kind of novel Jane Austen would 
have produced had she written after Persuasion: “Her sense of security would have 
been shaken. Her comedy would have suffered. She would have trusted less (this 
is already perceptible in Persuasion) to dialogue and more to reflection to give us a 
knowledge of her characters” (231). See “Jane Austen,” in The	Virginia	Woolf	Reader, 
ed. Mitchell A. Leaska 220–32. Into the future, beyond Woolf’s surmise, Brooke-
Rose casts Emma, giving her a postmodern afterlife that is manifested in a split 
sense of identity.
 5. See “Palimpsest History” in Christine Brooke-Rose, Stories,	 Theories	 and	
Things 189.
 6. For a comparison between Brooke-Rose’s use of fantasy to wage cultural cri-
tique and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s “academic” melodrama, Masterpiece	
Theater, see Karen R. Lawrence, “Saving the Text: Cultural Crisis in Textermination 
and Masterpiece	Theatre,” Narrative 5 January (1997): 108–16.
chaPter eight
 1. See John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry, The	Major	Transitions	in	Evolu-
tion (Oxford: W. H. Freeman, 1995).
 2. Quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, The	 Language	 of	 Psycho-Analysis, trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973) 153.
 3. Lorna Sage, “Interview by Lorna Sage: Subscript,” Invisible	Author:	Last	Es-
says (2002) 170.
 4. See Jacques Derrida, “Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) (“within such 
limits”),” Material	Events:	Paul	De	Man	and	the	Afterlife	of	Theory, ed. Barbara Cohen, 
Tom Cohen, J. Hillis Miller, and Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001) 345.
 5. With the author’s permission, I have reproduced this chart in Figure A 
(pages 172–173). The chart itself is mentioned in chapter 7 of Invisible	Author in 
which Brooke-Rose discusses giving it to her publisher and literary executor “to 
help possible translators, if any, who could otherwise, especially in Romance 
languages, bring in an unwanted reflexive (pronominalized) verb, often equivalent 
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to an English intransitive; or fall into other traps in the Slavic languages, which 
can do without pronouns altogether except for emphasis.” Brooke-Rose, Invisible	
Author:	Last	Essays 155.
 6. Although Brooke-Rose is a master of creating poetic metaphors for altered 
states of being and consciousness, this impulse to represent the basic materials of 
life in such playfully material language seems to infect scientific journalism (and 
possibly even scientific writing) as well as her novels. Journalistic representations 
of the startling completion of the map of the human genome in 2001 include a 
surprising amount of such language, as found in a striking article in The	 New	
York	 Times Science section entitled “Genome Shows Evolution Has an Eye for 
Hyperbole” by Natalie Angier. In the article Angier describes scientists as having 
gathered “clues to the sticky, stringy, springy, dynamic, garrulous, gorgeous and 
preposterous molecule of life that resides in nearly every cell of every human be-
ing on earth” (D1), (Science	Times, Tuesday, February 13, 2001, D1, D5). Eric Lander 
of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research describes the parasite LINE 
(Long Interspersed Element) as “the ultimate selfish element that evolved at the 
beginning of eukaryotes. . . . It’s been wildly successful. It’s the perfect parasite” 
(D5). Some kind of pull toward metaphor as well as mimetic exuberance infects the 
language of science when it is called upon to convey such momentous discoveries 
in familiar terms.
 7. Telephone conversation with the author, 25 September 2005.
 8. Richard Fortey, Life:	An	Unauthorised	Biography:	A	Natural	History	of	the	First	
Four	Thousand	Million	Years	of	Life	on	Earth (London: Harper Collins, 1997) 26.
 9. Stafania Cassar, “Science as Post-Theory? Discourses of Evolution in Chris-
tine Brooke-Rose’s Subscript,” Post-Theory,	Culture,	Criticism, ed. Ivan Callus and 
Stefan Herbrechter, vol. 23, Critical Studies (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004) 202.
 10. Brooke-Rose’s notes include references to theories of gender differentiation 
within “a masculine mode of signification.” Brooke-Rose Archive, Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center, Austin, Texas.
 11. An entire file of notes in Brooke-Rose’s archive covers “The Neandertals 
and their Contemporaries.”
 12. Henri Bergson, Creative	 Evolution (New York: Random House, 1944) 310–
11.
chaPter nine
 1. In a telephone conversation, 27 July 2005.
 2. Christine Brooke-Rose, “Self-Confrontation and the Writer,” New	 Literary	
History 9.1 (1977): 134.
 3. In the chapter “Remaking” in Invisible	 Author, Brooke-Rose discusses her 
use of this device. See 164–65.
 4. Here Brooke-Rose plays on the various geometries of narrative confronta-
tion imagined in structuralist paradigms, a theme developed fictionally in Between 
and Thru. As we have seen, the gendered aspects of these paradigms, involv-
ing white knights rescuing damsels from evil dragons, is a continuing theme in 
Brooke-Rose’s fiction, replayed in Remake. As Brooke-Rose has pointed out, there 
are constraints for women writers in these paradigms, constraints unacknowl-
edged by male theorists and critics like Todorov, Benveniste, and Jakobson.
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 5. “So I wrote down my life as I remembered it, in a conventional order, and 
the result was dreadful. The general formula, to exaggerate a little, was “And 
then . . . I—this, and then . . . I—that.” It was my own life, my own experience, but 
even I couldn’t reread it. So I put it aside” (55). As Brooke-Rose recounts it, the 
sudden idea of the constraint against personal pronouns freed her to write her au-
tobiography: “Now this was a real challenge: an autobiography without personal 
pronouns. Suddenly, I got interested again. I had the constraint I needed” (57).
 6. Imp Plus, the protagonist, thinks of the word “vegetable” and thinks: “And 
a green thing like an idea. Imp Plus remembered words that he did not know.” 
Joseph McElroy, Plus (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977) 4. Brooke-Rose presented 
her “theory” to McElroy in a letter, but, apparently, he never addressed it. Ac-
cording to Brooke-Rose, her own novel Such began with a sign that she saw while 
traveling in Portugal: “Silence says the notice on the stairs and the stairs creak” 
(203, Omnibus).
 7. Peter Consenstein, Literary	 Memory,	 Consciousness,	 and	 the	 Group	 Oulipo 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002) 39. Consenstein points out that Jacque Roubaud’s La	
Boucle is a life-story that employs the constraint of using the present tense to nar-
rate the life (48). La	Boucle was published in 1993.
 8. In chapter one of A	Portrait	of	the	Artist	as	a	Young	Man, Stephen reads what 
he has written on the flyleaf of his geography book: “Stephen Dedalus/Class of El-
ements/Clongowes Wood College/Sallins/County Kildare/Ireland/Europe/The 
World/The Universe.” A different passage in Ulysses, capturing an older Stephen 
Dedalus’s thoughts about death as he walks on the strand, more resembles the 
passage on decomposition in Life,	 End	Of: “God becomes man becomes fish be-
comes barnacle goose becomes featherbed mountain.” James Joyce, Ulysses, ed. 
Hans Walter Gabler, 3, 477–79.
 9. In the chapter, “File: Pro-nouns” in Remake, which includes the diary entry 
on her mother’s death, the old lady describes her mother’s convent surroundings 
as “Serenity everywhere. But she is isolated in her god-Routine” (28).
 10. Paraphrase replaces quotation in this last text because, in a further case of 
life and art intertwining, Brooke-Rose, the author, like the invalid, can no longer 
ascend the stairs of her own home. Her access to her library and her computer is 
therefore limited to the assistance of the few people she hires to assist her.
 11. Brooke-Rose described the way the book records a “clinging to the world, 
a world completely filtered by one’s own memory.” It captures the way that old 
people “see the body bits going” (telephone conversation with author, July 29, 
2005). One thinks back to “The Foot.”
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